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The dissertation interrogates the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiation 
between the European Union (EU) and Zimbabwe, covering trade in goods, trade in services, 
trade-related rules and development cooperation. Within the African-Caribbean-Pacific 
(ACP) configuration, Zimbabwe belongs to eastern and southern Africa, and used this base to 
extend the 1980 Lomé Conventions and 2000 Cotonou Agreement with the EU. But EU-
Zimbabwe trade relations have reflected changing motives of the EU as the dominant 
development partner. Since the Lomé Conventions, Zimbabwe has exported diverse 
agriculture, manufacturing and mining products, especially beef, leather, vegetable products, 
beverages, spirits and vinegar, flue-cured tobacco, sugar (raw and refined), cotton (raw and 
lint), fermented tea and coffee, cut flowers, precious or semi-precious metal scrap/stones, 
articles of base metals, nickel and ferro-alloys. In turn, the country has been importing 
machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical equipment, vehicles, aircraft and associated 
transport equipment, and products of chemical and allied industries. But notwithstanding 
generous access to the EU market under Lomé, Zimbabwe (and other ACP economies) could 
not improve economic growth or broaden development through trade.  
 
As a result, many civil society organisations (CSOs) were critical of recent free trade 
agreements, although their critiques reflected extreme ideological division. Zimbabwe’s EPA 
debate reflected two distinct groups: ‘collaborators’ who emphasised direct interaction with 
the state in their engagement and participation in the process, and ‘resisters’ who repudiated 
any formal interaction and consultation, instead, opting for confrontational tactical 
engagement. This not only prevented a collective, strategic CSOs engagement on the process, 
but also created dilemmas in pursuit of a fair EPA outcome. Likewise, the post-2009 
Government of National Unity was confronted with neo-liberal versus protectionist struggles 
and related tensions, resulting in disunity in economic policy-making and EPA negotiation 
processes. 
 
The study interrogates Zimbabwe’s state-stakeholders and their fault-lines in a context of EU 
dominance, as well as the bilateral-related sanctions imposed against the Zimbabwe African 
National Union - Patriotic Front leadership during the negotiation process. Subsequently, an 
economically weak and vulnerable Zimbabwe signed and ratified an asymmetrical interim 
EPA with an economically powerful EU. The 31 July 2013 election may alter the power 
balance sufficiently to lead to a reconsideration of the deal, as Zimbabwe continues to ‘look 
East’ in its economic orientation.  
 
The study’s contribution to the field of bilateral trade negotiations is in exploring theoretical 
concepts of ‘guerrilla negotiating approaches, strategies and tactics’ employed by negotiating 
parties and CSOs that have extreme ideological differences between liberal and redistributive 
interpretations. The possibility of coherence is increasing, given the unsatisfactory politics of 
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1.1 Background to the study 
 
Since 2004, Zimbabwe has been negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement
1
 (EPA) 
with the European Union (EU) as part of the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) 
configuration
2
. However, controversies quickly arose over the merits of the arrangements. 
This was because the new ESA
3
 is a significant departure from the January 2004 Mauritius 
EU-ESA joint EPA roadmap, which not only outlined the sequence, principles, structures, 
and involvement of non-state actors
4
 (NSAs) working on trade and development issues, in the 
process, but also promised to conclude the new trade regime as a bloc. The trade talks 
culminated with the signing of an interim EPA (iEPA) on 4 September 2009 by the 
Government of National Unity
5
 (GNU), as prescribed by the Southern African Development 
Community’s (SADC) negotiated Global Political Agreement
6
 (GPA).  
 
Firstly, the trade talks coincided with eight consecutive years of negative economic growth in 
Zimbabwe; from 1999 there had been a total fall of nearly 50% gross domestic product 
(GDP), coupled with significant capital flight and reductions in private sector investment. In 
particular, most investors (foreign and domestic) had ceased making new investments during 
the 2000s, resulting in scarce in-flows of foreign reserves and a corresponding tight exchange 
                                                 
1 EPAs negotiations are meant to replace the thirty-year-old Lomé trade preferences with unprecedented 
reciprocal market access between the world’s largest and most powerful single markets on the one hand, and 
many of the poorest and least developed countries on the other. 
2 The ESA group which comprises Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. From the group, Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania (which joined the East African Community [EAC] in 2008 having 
originally negotiated under the SADC-EPA configuration), signed as a bloc while Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Zimbabwe did so individually. 
3 This comprises Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
4 Non-state actors include the private sector and broader sections of civil society organisations. 
5 The new government includes both formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) party. 
6 This is the SADC negotiated political settlement that paved the way for feuding political parties (ZANU-PF 




rate regime. As a result, the economy not only severely reduced its manufacturing capacity 
utilisation from 35.8% in 2005 to between 4 and 10% by the end of 2008, but increasingly 
became a shadow of its past well diversified industrial and export base in terms of regional 
and global trade links (Nyakazeya, 2009). This negatively affected both exporters and 
importers.  
 
Secondly, trade negotiations continued despite cold bilateral relations with the EU, 
compelling authorities in Harare to search for new east Asian markets, especially in China. 
As Bond (2007) observes, the ‘look east policy’ increasingly became a pure trade 
diversification strategy as well as part of broader foreign policy objectives in response to 
deteriorating relations with Europe and other western powers.  
 
Thirdly, trade talks continued, notwithstanding the regime’s sustained anti-colonial agenda 
and claims of ‘EU meddling in the country’s political affairs’, a strong political position that 
could have resulted in suspending the process. The state was also annoyed by the renewed 
donor and western countries’ support for civil society organisations (CSOs)
7
 working on 
basic social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as democratic and constitutional 
principles. For instance, the EU, as a donor, citing democratic and governance deficits, 
withdrew direct financial and/or technical assistance to the Zimbabwean government, 
covering a wide range of mandates including development programmes and/or projects, and 
fiscal expenditures. Individual EU member states also suspended all direct financial and/or 
technical assistance to the country covering the above areas. The EU imposed ‘targeted 
sanctions’
8
 against the 200
9
 leading ZANU (PF) rulers and their associated companies - a 
                                                 
7 Raftopoulos (2005) argues that donors have since 2000 been supporting liberal CSOs working on human 
rights, democracy, good governance and constitutionalism with unlimited resources but reject funding to those 
pursuing redistribution discourse and politics not only  with respect to land, but also economic development 
including the EPA process. This translates to dilemmas of participation/resistance and rights/distribution in 
state-civil society relationships, as discussed below.  
8 The EU revoke the Cotonou Agreement Article 9 which deals with the maintenance of the rule of law, human 
rights, democracy and good governance when the bloc imposed targeted sanctions on Mugabe, ZANU (PF) 
officials and companies linked to the regime covering visa restrictions and the freezing of their assets in 
European banks. The EU also suspended economic cooperation and development aid towards the Zimbabwean 
government (Darracq, 2011). Further the United States of America, Australia and other western governments 
imposed similar restrictive measures to same persons and companies (Hove, 2012).  But the trade officials such 
as the former minister of Trade and Industry, Samuel Mumbengegwi were allowed to attend EPA-related 
meetings in Brussels and Geneva. The removal of these sanctions is directly linked to the full implementation of 
the GPA. However, since the formation of the GNU, the African Union (AU) and SADC leadership, as the 
guarantors of GPA, made numerous calls for the removal of ‘smart sanctions’ without any success.  
3 
 
move which the state blames for drying up external trade financing. The EU further cut direct 
government-to-government contact except for purposes of negotiating with the EPA in the 
context of the ESA group. All this not only deepened the mistrust between the state and civil 
society in the country, but was also not conducive for rational, constructive, and transparent 
government-civil society engagements in many areas, including the EPA process.  
 
Fourthly, trade negotiations continued (notwithstanding the prevailing political climate which 
had polarised the country). Indeed, the politically-induced polarisation split civil society 
mobilisation into two distinct camps: one supportive of land reform and other state initiatives, 
comprising mainly small farmers, war veterans, and indigenous business advocates (Moyo 
and Yeros, 2007, and Mamdani, 2008), and the other comprising groups which emphasised 
democracy and governance (in some cases conflating respect for the rule of law, property 
rights and human rights). The latter group included those which championed broader 
struggles against neo-liberalism and continually critiqued ZANU (PF)’s crony capitalism 
(Bond, 2006b and Raftopoulos, 2005).  
 
Bond (2008 and 2009) blames government for policy zigzagging between market 
liberalisation, crony-capitalist corruption, and state interventions - which not only exposed 
state shortcomings but also alienated broader sections of civil society groups. The decade-
long tense political climate discouraged activists and scholars - who hold different views on 
trade talks, the economy, and other developmental necessities - from engaging the state on 
these issues. Furthermore, the state-civil society relationship increasingly became 
contentious, as the former became uncomfortable with the latter’s involvement in advocating 
for greater democratisation or reform of state institutions, including the body-politic. This not 
only worsened EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations, but also fuelled countrywide state-civil 
society tensions, resulting in weak, narrow and often partisan strategic engagements during 
the trade talks. The GNU was confronted with internal neo-liberal versus protectionist 
struggles and GPA related tensions, resulting in disunity in economic policy-making 
processes and undermining efforts to negotiate a better trade regime.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 However, since February 2013, Brussels has suspended sanctions against more than 100 ZANU (PF) leaders 
and a dozen firms. By end of 2013, only 10 ZANU (PF) leaders and army supplier, Zimbabwe Defence 
Industries remained on the sanctions list. 
4 
 
As was the case since the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government invited representatives of 
some CSOs10 with resources to join (as observers) various regional, bilateral, or multilateral 
trade talks, and consulted them on key strategic issues, positions, offers, and interests. For 
example, the Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute 
(Seatini’s)11 two representatives were sponsored by the EU through the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to participate at both the Regional Negotiating 
Forum (RNF) and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels. However, this 
support was withdrawn in December 2004, thereby undermining critical analysis of the 
process and the ‘inside-outside strategy’, which consisted of passing out critical, well-focused 
information to the CSOs who were not directly participating in the official EPA processes for 
advocacy purposes. Similarly, the Trade and Development Studies (Trades) Centre, through 
COMESA, was commissioned to undertake the country’s impact assessment study (IAS) 
whose findings were used ‘to prepare the country’s interests, offers and positions’. Kamidza 
(2006) maintains that even though two national dialogues were organised (in Harare and 
Bulawayo) to engage the IAS findings, most CSOs could not strategically and collectively 
coordinate their activities, and failed to share plans, processes, and outcomes in support of the 
process. Limited resources also did not allow government to deepen and widen its 
consultations with all the key stakeholders working in the diverse areas of trade and 
development.  
 
Zimbabwe’s EPA-focused organisations had limited space and resources to improve their 
own strategic networking, synergy building, and citizen sensitisation, especially compared to 
the 1990s civil society struggles against a one-party regime, neo-liberal policies, and an 
undemocratic constitutional order. Similarly, limited donor funding directly undermined the 
relevance of all the CSOs advocating for a fair global trade system, including EPA processes. 
This not only compromised effective engagements and activism towards the EU’s institutions 
and structures, the EU member-states, and the Zimbabwean government negotiators but also 
limited efforts to galvanise the views of broader sections of civil society and social 
                                                 
10 These include Seatini, Mwelekeowa NGO (Mwengo), the Trades Centre, the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt 
and Development (Zimcodd), the African Network on Debt and Development (Afrodad), the Community 
Technology Development Trust (CTDT), the Trade Capacity Building Project (TCBP), the Alternative to Neo-
liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA) and the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of 
Zimbabwe (Ledriz) - a research arm of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). 
11 Seatini monitored remarks by government officials, Ambassadors and EU officials and generated advice 
about “fault-lines” and “complementary lobbying entry points”. 
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movements. Limited donor support undermined CSOs’ efforts to build the necessary EPA-
related technical and policy analytical capacities to lobby other constituencies. CSOs could 
also not systematically participate in the RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region 
and in Brussels, since the available EU resources only supported government officials and/or 
one representative from the private sector. As a result, there was limited interaction between 
CSOs’ representatives and government officials during the national, regional, and Brussels 
meetings. Government and CSOs did not share crucial information such as calendar events or 
publish information of mutual interest. They failed to do coherent outreach regarding issues, 
positions, strategies, and interpretation of texts. There was a distinct absence of strategic 
networking, synergy building, systematic engagement, mobilisation of critical constituencies, 
collaboration, advocacy with regard to the process, and policy research analysis.12 
 
This failure could be observed in other terrains of state-society relations, not just trade 
negotiations. McCandless (2011) argues that the relationships between civil society, the state, 
and donors are driven by different underlying and competitive interests, motivations, and 
agendas for development. She explains that profound strategic dilemmas of ‘participation 
versus resistance’ or ‘rights versus redistribution’ are ideological constructs embedded in 
historical Liberal/Marxist and North-South debates revolving around orientations to socialism 
or capitalism. These divisions have hampered collective and effective civil society 
contributions to the Zimbabwean EPA debate. Such ideological dilemmas polarise CSOs 
working on EPA issues, regarding strategic questions, such as whether to work with 
government and/or international donors or against them. In this respect, the strategic dilemma 
for those working outside the state system was how to develop acceptable strategies and 
tactics in support of national positions and offers while those collaborating with government 
suffered the dilemma of how to mobilise other key stakeholders to support the process to the 
end. These ideological dilemmas have been central in shaping state-civil society and donor-
civil society relations in the country. Within the context of the above ideological dilemmas, 
Magure (2009) claims that since the late 1990s CSOs have countered hegemonic strategies in 
the struggle for democratisation.  
 
Moyo (2001) argues that the liberal rights agenda has marginalised redistributive concerns in 
its promotion of private property, partnership with donors, a bourgeois judiciary, and 
                                                 
12 This includes EPAs-related materials such as policy briefs, fact-sheets and analysis of positions and interests. 
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privately owned press; McCandless (2011) postulates that the redistribution of wealth, land 
and other natural resources is often associated with nationalism - with or without Marxist 
influence. In Zimbabwe’s case, the critical question is whether CSOs are aligned with the 
state, or against it. Some very explicit leftwing institutions (perhaps most vocally the 
International Socialist Organisation of Zimbabwe) are against ZANU (PF), while many 
indigenous business people are supportive of the ruling party. This makes advocacy on 
broader economic policy spaces, governance systems, and democratic participation processes 
confusing, and occasionally discomforting for the Zimbabwean government.  
 
Dorman (2001) observes that state-society relations in Zimbabwe are a product of the ruling 
party’s use of coercive and consent-generating mechanisms
13
 aimed at establishing its 
hegemonic influence on the nation including silencing, discrediting, and undermining CSOs’ 
activities or moral compass in society at large. As a result, some activists’ mobilisation 
strategies fail to woo those unwilling to challenge the regime’s control over social and 
economic policy-making processes. Moyo (2010) accuses CSOs critical of the ruling party of 
becoming increasingly donor-driven, pursuing foreign agendas of democratic values, 
constitutionalism, and neoliberal economics. Similarly, the government accuses critical CSOs 
as being simply mirrors of outside interests and agendas; dangerous distractions from the 
unfinished business of building a national economy based on access to and/or control of the 
country’s resources, particularly land and minerals, and urban elites with no constituencies 
beyond the internet café.  
  
The CSOs have not been sufficiently capacitated to make much difference, however. Kalima-
Phiri (2007) argues that Zimbabwe’s CSOs working on the EPA processes could not access 
10
th
 European Development Fund (EDF) resources meant to support the NSA’s 
developmental goals. This is because the disbursement of EU resources to NSA activities is 
done through the national authorising officer located in the ministry of Finance, who is 
assisted by the Project Management Committee comprising officials from other relevant 
ministries, representatives of CSOs, and the EU delegation in Harare. The EU’s decision to 
withhold financial transfers to the regime therefore equally denies NSA the resources 
                                                 




necessary to build capacity to effectively advocate for transparent, fair, and inclusive 
participation in EPA’s negotiations.  
 
Though some of the EPA-focused CSOs actively participated in the Africa Trade Network’s 
(ATN) coordinated ‘Stop EPAs Campaign’
14
 (aimed at building strategic alliances with 
African government negotiators with the view to resist pressure on initial iEPAs), the 
prevailing conflictual relationship with the Zimbabwean government on broader issues of 
democracy and governance translated into a weak alliance during the trade negotiations. 
There was also no inspiration to be drawn from related global trade campaigns such as ‘Our 
World is not for Sale’ (a broad-based international network of left-leaning CSOs) in terms of 
linking specific synergies, strategies and tactics with Zimbabwean negotiators. All this 
reflects insignificant strategic networking and engagement between Zimbabwean trade 
negotiators on the one hand and national, regional, continental and global civic bodies on the 
other during the trade talks. Also lacking was open and transparent interaction with specific 
government issues, positions, strategies, tactics and shared interpretations of offer texts. 
Unlike the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks, Zimbabwean civic bodies working on 
trade justice and their networks in Africa and beyond, failed to advocate for a collective and 
united voice capable of achieving a better deal. Within the ESA group, Zimbabwe lacked the 
political and moral authority to ‘unite group negotiators’ in a manner that could support the 
EU-ESA joint EPA roadmap, as had been the case in Seattle
15
during the WTO trade talks 
(Bond, 2006b). As a result, ESA countries were divided, leading to varied trade offers and 
signatories to the new trade regime. Ironically, despite its huge economic challenges that 
greatly undermined the country’s industrial production and export competitiveness, 
Zimbabwe was one of the four
16
countries to initial and subsequently sign the iEPAs. But, as 
noted by Keet (2007), the process and signing ceremonies did not mirror the alliance shown 
during the Cancun, Doha WTO trade talks between government delegations and CSOs. 
 
This configuration prompted Shivji (2004) to argue that donor-driven policy-making 
processes reveal how states and people have surrendered their right to self-determination to 
                                                 
14 This was first launched by a vast coalition of CSOs from European and African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) 
countries in Brussels in April 2004, who believed that EPAs would disrupt ACP economies’ production and 
fiscal revenues, thereby generating unemployment and poverty.   
15 See section 2.2, second paragraph from bottom. 
16 Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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global forces, particularly to the Bretton Wood Institutions: the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this respect, civil society’s participation in the EU-
EPA-driven trade negotiations does not only legitimise imperial hegemony, but also 
governments’ abdication of their primary responsibilities to define national and regional trade 
agendas. These claims relate to CSOs with a neoliberal orientation, who therefore have 
difficulty in claiming to represent the views of ordinary people, and to speak or act on their 
behalf. 
 
Given the tense state-society relations - as well as cold bilateral relations with the EU because 
of democratic and governance deficits - there are many complicated factors to unpack: the 
ZANU (PF) government’s anti-EU stance (based in part on claims of meddling in the 
country’s political affairs); the contradiction-ridden macro-economic policy environment; the 
politically-induced polarisation that splits civil society into two distinct camps; the conflicts 
within the GNU from 2009-13; and the limited resources available to engage the EU 
institutions. To address this complexity, there is a need for a major enquiry into the EPA 
debate in Zimbabwe. The EPA process provided strong lobbying platforms on which a new 
state-society trade relationship could potentially be built. CSOs’ participation in these 
negotiations, however, are beset with many challenges and frustrations. To make sense of 
these overlapping factors, this dissertation assessed how the country develops issues; which 
are its offensive and/or defensive interests; which positions and offers were made nationally 
and within the negotiating group; how working relationships developed between negotiators 
and relevant stakeholders, particularly EPA-focused CSOs; the implications of state 
shortcomings for civil society advocacy and strategic networking; the implications of the cold 
bilateral relations with the EU for the government’s consultative process during the trade 
talks; and the GNU’s relationship with both domestic constituencies and the EU. Each of 
these factors is taken up next. 
 
 
1.2 Broader issues to be investigated 
 
1.2.1 Research problems 
 
The EPA process has highlighted more problems than solutions in Zimbabwe’s trade agenda. 
This thesis therefore analyses the problems associated with the following: the stakeholders’ 
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consultative process, advocacy and networking within the context of political polarisation, 
conflictual state-civil society relations, cold bilateral relations between negotiating parties
17
, 
and weak industrial production and export capabilities. It is acknowledged that the EPA 
process has coincided with the decade-long, politically-motivated conflict that has left EU-
Zimbabwe relations cold. European donors and investors lost confidence in the economy, 
especially by late 2008, what with the plummeting of industrial and export capacities to the 
worst levels in the country’s modern history. This coincided with an economic meltdown that 
not only undermined the country’s industrial capacity, export potential, and competitiveness 
in the market
18
, but also generated massive social and humanitarian crises, at the time that 
Europe also began to suffer from a sustained economic crisis.  
 
The period was characterised by conflictual state-civil society relationships centred on poor 
democratic and governance practices, and tyrannical rule that overshadowed collective 
strategic wisdom in trade negotiations as well as the state’s pro-poor and pro-development 
initiatives, especially land reform. Further state-civil society antagonistic relationships 
undermined constructive, consultative and collective engagements, as well as strategic 
networking and synergy building. Poor relations between the former ZANU (PF) government 
and/or party and other key regional and global constituencies working on trade negotiations 
undermined pro-poor and pro-developmental EPA outcomes. In fact, the process exposed 
both state shortcomings and civil society advocacy inadequacies, the challenges facing the 
GNU’s economic transitional trajectory
19
, and the weakness to exploit unfolding benefits 
from SADC’s regional integration and trade agenda, as well as from emerging economies 
such as Brazil, China and India. Even the inclusive government – the GNU of 2009-13 –
struggled to normalise a relationship with Europe in particular, and western governments and 
donors in general. This was largely due to ‘pockets of resistance’ (Kamidza, 2009a and 
2009c) in the former ruling party bent on frustrating full implementation of GPA, and 
instigated in-fighting within the GNU, resulting in the transmission of conflicting policy 
directives and messages not only to the international community, but also to the national 
economic units - namely operators, producers, exporters, and investors. Kamidza (Ibid) 
                                                 
17 EU and Zimbabwe. 
18 Local, regional and global. 
19 Questionable trends in the rule of law with respect to private properties and the newly enacted 
‘Indigenisation Law’ that seeks to force foreign companies to surrender 51% shareholding to Zimbabweans. 
However, Charles Abugre argues that the new law violates the 1992 WTO principles which call for equal 
treatment for both foreign and local traders by governments.  
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observes that foreign governments, investors, and donors are looking for value-enhancing 
opportunities that are sustainable and predictable and which guarantee protection against 
invested social and economic capital. 
 
 
1.2.2 Hypotheses of the study 
 
This thesis argues that a hastily-concluded EPA negotiation, without sufficient consultation 
with civil society groups affected (or their expert allies), is likely to worsen the 
deindustrialization and impoverishment of Zimbabwe’s once-balanced economy. The EU 
commercial interests could particularly affect the agriculture and manufacturing sectors in the 
short to medium term, against a backdrop of severe politically-induced rural turmoil. Since 
2000, the effects have been witnessed in the near-cessation of white commercial farmers’ 
agricultural activities, the downsizing of production activities and closure of some industrial 
companies,  the brain drain (migration of skilled personnel), and withdrawals of donor 
funding from the state (though around US$500 million per annum supported food aid) as well 
as foreign and domestic disinvestment. The EU’s potential penetration of what remains of 
local production is therefore a crucial economic threat, potentially representing a final 
onslaught. Aside from diamond, platinum and gold mining, the Zimbabwe economy is a 
shadow of its past well-diversified, industrial strength (Nyakazeya, 2009). The thesis 
therefore suggests that withdrawal of European donors and investors may have had a short-
term logic = the loss of confidence in unfolding political developments and the fast-track land 
reform programme – but Brussels’ 50-year scenario assessment of the potential for each ACP 
economy’s subjection to European exports is far more important, and this is the lens through 
which we should view the iEPA.  
 
The process could continue to be contested, and not only by state actors. Zimbabwe’s major 
national fault-lines include conflict in state-civil society and state-private sector relations. 
There have been inadequate consultative processes in economic policy making including the 
EPA debate. The Zimbabwe state came under sustained pressure from an enlarged ACP 
(most of whose members were in support of EPAs)
20
 and business lobbies including 
                                                 
20 From 15 member states during the Cotonou Agreement to 20 countries when the EPA negotiations with the 
ACP configurations started, to now 27 member states.   
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transnational corporations (TNCs) and multinational corporations (MCs) as well as from the 
IMF and the World Bank. At the same time the EPAs were under negotiation, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions denied the Mugabe regime balance of payment support on account of the 
country’s ongoing default on the large (US$10 billion+) external debt. Since that default 
began at the end of the 1990s, both the ZANU (PF) (2000-2009) and GNU (2009-2013) 
administrations failed to unlock financial and technical resources from the international 
community. At the same time, the EU and corporate allies mobilized vast human, financial 
and technical resources to deliver the best possible deal in the iEPA negotiations, at a time 
Zimbabwe’s elites were extremely divided and there was very little attention to civil society 
concerns. The EU used its commercial unity to negotiate favourable international trade 
agreements, with all member states defending the process with single voice (Meunier, 2000), 
amplified in the Zimbabwe case by the relatively unified position on political (personal) 
sanctions against ZANU (PF) leaders.  
 
The hypothesis that Zimbabwe therefore performed poorly in these negotiations is also 
informed by the very poor diplomatic relationship between the negotiating parties, and 
between government and other key stakeholders (civil society groups and sections of the 
business community). The lack of national unity undermined chances for government to 
inclusively engage important stakeholders during the formulation of national EPA-related 
interests, positions and offers. The EU’s decision to impose ‘smart sanctions’
21
 on ZANU 
(PF) leadership and associated companies conjoined with its public funding of civil society 
groups working against the government, on non-trade and development issues such as 
electoral, governance, and human right problems.EU funding of anti-ZANU (PF) civil society 
groups and social movements – including but not limited to allies of the MDC formations – 
exacerbated the prevailing conditions of extreme political polarisation between MDC and 
ZANU (PF) with corresponding alliances forming in civil society and mass movements. That 
in turn undermined social cohesion, inclusiveness, trust, confidence and cooperation in 
economic management and economic policy making, including the EPA debate. Whether 
intended or not, the EU funding served as a  policy instrument that contributed to an iEPA 
that was against Zimbabwe’s interests, for it enhanced the competitiveness of EU 
entrepreneurs to maximize trade benefits over the long term.  
                                                 
21 The imposition of smart sanctions was triggered by the expulsion of the EU election observer team and its 
head in 2002, the escalation of political violence and Zimbabwe’s worsening human rights record. 
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The dominance of corporations in this round of EU-Zimbabwe trade negotiations was 
amplified by the adverse capital movements which put added pressure on Harare to conclude 
a deal.  The EU’s competitiveness against Zimbabwe grew, as the latter’s very low industrial 
productive capacity (often below 10 percent during the 2000s) prevented economies of scale 
and export competitiveness, even for primary and unprocessed commodities. The anticipated 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology flows did not arrive during the GNU 
period. As a result, Zimbabwe’s new indigenous economic empowerment entrepreneurs, 
including new farmers, faced very stiff trade competition from the EU, as well as the regional 
powerhouse South Africa and the East Asian economies whose products came to dominate 
Zimbabwe during the post-independence era.  Given the adverse balance of power, it is 
important to critically enquire, as to why Zimbabwe authorities opted to be among the first 
African countries to sign iEPA with the EU. This is an especially interesting question, given 
the antagonistic bilateral relationship, and the state of the economy.  
 
EPA negotiations were not the only site of this conundrum, for Zimbabwe lacked more 
general industrialisation strategies, and trade policy
22
 was ad-hoc and often incoherent 
(ZCTU, 1996; Chizema and Masiiwa, 2011). While ZANU (PF) elites mobilised energies 
against western countries which opposed land reform, they relaxed this hostility during the 
EPA process. The dysfunctional GNU administration failed to respect many crucial GPA 
provisions that would have increased unity and a sense of purpose, and hence there were 
sharp economic policy contradictions, especially when it came to the new trade regime with 
Europe. Indeed, the 2009-13 period, witnessed the GNU administration’s policy 
contradictions and resulting political irrationality and polarisation. This reflects a more 
general problem during that era: the state’s failure to depoliticise public policy as well as to 
prioritise resource allocation and collective energies towards the country’s industrialisation, 
export diversification, research and skills development and technological advancement.  
 
The thesis argues that failure by both ZANU (PF) and GNU administrations to embrace 
unifying macro-economic policies and to revamp economic production across the economy 
undermined Zimbabwe’s prospects of competing with European products. The thesis further 
argues that by denying Zimbabwe access to European Development Fund resources 
(especially the ‘development assistance envelope’) given to all EPA economies, the EU 
                                                 
22 Zimbabwe only launched formal industrial and trade policies in 2012. 
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ensured that Harare suffered from an adverse negotiating capacity. One of the most important 
sites where limited technical competence affected Zimbabwe negotiators, was in sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues with respect to live animals and beef products and cut-flowers. Failure to 
understand and negotiate effectively left Zimbabwe unable to benefit from European markets 
in the short to medium term under this trade regime. The EU negotiators also benefited from 
Zimbabwe’s lack of capital outlays for overdue infrastructural investment; lesser 
technological capabilities; and failure to acquire economic, financial, and technical assistance 
during the GNU era.  
 
As a result, the new trade regime between the EU and Zimbabwe guaranteed an African 
market for EU products in the short to medium term, given the state of the latter’s weak 
industrial and export capacities. As Tadeus Chifamba
23
, Zimbabwe’s chief EPA negotiator in 
2012 claimed, “the goal of negotiating an EPA with EU was meant to secure a predictable 
future trade regime” but this was not achieved. Zimbabwe was unprepared in this round, 
especially given deficiencies in state-stakeholder relationships. One reflection was the Harare 
negotiators’ apparent desperation to agree to a deal in order to secure Zimbabwe’s future 




The main objective to negotiate an EPA with the EU – in spite of tense bilateral 
relationships heightened by the imposition of sanctions including travel prohibition to 
enter the capital city of the EU – was largely informed by the country’s future needs 
in the EU market in particular and the global economy in general. 
 
Yet as Chizema and Masiiwa (2011) argue, trade liberalization under iEPA will result in the 
de-industrialiastion of inefficient sectors as a result of trade with the EU. This will not only 
confirm the EU’s self-interested strategy but also undermine any further progress by the 
ZANU (PF) government on land rights and other economic empowerment programmes. The 
challenge ahead for Zimbabwe’s producers, large and small, is to withstand the EU’s 
influence, dominance and divisive strategies in pursuit of short to medium term commercial 
interests. To do so will require the kind of re-engaged civil society that was not permitted into 
the negotiating process under the GNU, yet many of the leading civil society groups – 
                                                 
23 Interview discussion with Tadeus Chifamba, Harare, Zimbabwe, 14 September 2012. 
24 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 29 May 2012. 
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especially those associated with labour and anti-debt constituencies – were also ambivalent 
about working with the ZANU (PF) administration in past year. Whether any reconciliation 
can occur in the period ahead is a critical question, given what the thesis shows about the 
failure of civil society advocacy in the period prior to 2013. 
 
 
1.3 Rationale of the study 
 
This topic was chosen for both theoretical and practical purposes. Firstly, it provides an 
opportunity to link the literature on trade negotiations, regionalism within the context of free 
trade areas (FTAs) and trade negotiations, and civil society advocacy, to EPA trade talks. 
Secondly, the thesis has the potential to make a significant contribution to the body of 
knowledge about bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, international relations, and 
politico-economic and development studies. Thirdly, the empirical findings are of interest to 
stakeholders such as government trade negotiators, activists, researchers, and academia 
(Vickers, 2007). Fourthly, there is an ongoing debate about skewed developments between 
the politically and economically powerful, relatively united EU region, and the conflict-
ridden, economically-decaying country of Zimbabwe. Though the 2009-13 GNU somewhat 
stabilised the economy through a dollarisation policy (replacing local currency with multi-
currency) and a last-gasp attempt to address the foreign debt (and hence trade finance) 
overhang of nearly $11 billion, continued political fights between the former antagonists 
mirrored the weak collective and strategic positioning in negotiations on trade and 
development cooperation, including EPA processes. Indeed, GPA related tensions in the 
inclusive government added another dimension to state shortcomings in economic policy-
making and the EPA process. Lastly, the thesis has the potential to contribute knowledge 
about civil society’s strategic organisation, coordination and advocacy. 
 
Practically, this topic allows engagement with critical theoretical literature about negotiations 
in general, trade negotiations in particular, as well as economic and social justice advocacy. 
This further helps to evaluate trade negotiations in the context of cold EU-Zimbabwe bilateral 
relations, Zimbabwe’s commitment to trade talks in the context of an economic meltdown, 
multi-stakeholder consultations in the context of politically-induced polarisation and state 
shortcomings and civil society advocacy in trade negotiations in the context of integrating 
15 
 
Zimbabwe into the European market. All of the above can assist in documenting appropriate 




1.4 Broader impact of the study 
 
The study has the broader impact of technical in-put into the process of trade negotiations at 
national, regional, bilateral, and multilateral levels. This not only influences Zimbabwean 
stakeholders in regards to future trade negotiations or arrangements, but other regional 
economies as well. The study is a ground-breaking exploratory assessment and analysis of the 
conduct of trade talks between a smaller, weaker and more vulnerable economy that 
politically suffers from known fault lines including state–CSOs tensions and state–private 
sector mistrust and suspicion on national and sectoral policy directions, and an economically 
and politically dominant and powerful region in the world accused of ultra-imperialist 
motives expressed through the regime change agenda. In this regard, the study not only 
stimulates potential policy debates in the prevailing trade negotiations and advocacy theories, 
models and frameworks, but also enables stakeholders to rediscover themselves in terms of 
contributing to constructive engagement with the state, regardless of prevailing perceptions of 
immoral authority, expropriation of property entitlements (land and mining rights) and 
growing democratic, governance and electoral deficiencies.  
 
The study will have a positive impact on current and future Zimbabwean students  who are 
interested in pursuing careers in the field of trade negotiations as well as individuals 
interested in global fair trade between industrial and less developing economies and, most 
importantly, between former colonial capitalists and a sovereign independent state with an 
expressed economic redistributive agenda. The study will have a positive impact on future 
national and regional generations in terms of linking the EPA outcome with subsequent 
future socio-economic and political developments. The thesis further postulates that global 
regionalism, economic dominance and influence expressed through what can be termed 
‘guerrilla’ negotiating strategies, tactics and conquests in bilateral and multilateral trade 




Already, other advanced global regions are strategically positioning themselves in both 
current and future trade talk conquests by establishing and/or building institutional or 
structural capacities in trade analysis, trade negotiations and by implementing regional and 
international trade agreements. In this way, the study seeks to directly connect those involved 
in negotiations government officials (namely chief negotiators) and NSAs, with other 
constituencies
25
 who might not have participated in the process, but are still possibly affected 
either way by the new trade regime.  
 
The above impacts would firstly be evaluated according to the manner in which the relevant 
stakeholders participate and contribute to national and regional debates with respect to 
economic policies in general, and trade and development in particular, within the context of 
prevailing socio-politico developments. Secondly, this impact would be assessed by the 
degree of state-stakeholder consultation, synergy building and coalition formations in support 
of future national economic policy making frameworks, as well as regional, bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations. Thirdly, this impact would be evaluated by the degree of state-
stakeholder collaboration in mobilising resources in support of existing and/or the 
establishment of public-NSAs trade and development platforms seeking to unpack essential 
elements of economic, trade and development and industrial policies. Fourthly, this impact 
would be judged by the manner in which broader sections of constituencies in Zimbabwe and 
beyond - for example producers, exporters, and investors at all levels - are contributing to 
policies and frameworks that govern their respective entrepreneurial activities. Fifthly, this 
impact would be measured by the rate at which students, activists and government officials, 
having gone through trade negotiations course(s) and/or specialised trade negotiations skills 
training courses at various levels can influence their working environment in terms of 
institutionalising contributions to trade negotiations, engaging and/or lobbying public-policy 
makers and directly contributing to on-going trade negotiations processes. Sixthly, this 
impact would be reflected by volume and value of related future research in this field and/or 
related areas; the focus of teaching, training and learning at tertiary and research institutions; 
and the level of participation in broad macro-economic policy frameworks, specifically trade 
and development dialogue sessions. Lastly, this impact would be reflected by the manner in 
which government officials and other key stakeholders positively contribute towards 
                                                 




redressing regional trade and development challenges identified by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Hub and Spokes Project (2012) as shown in Box 1.1 below. 
 
Box 1.1: Sub-regional trade and development related challenges 
 Failure to use trade as an indispensable tool that can contribute towards economic growth 
and social development. 
 Limited institutional capacity to formulate and implement trade and industrial policies 
necessary to exploit opportunities associated with globalisation. 
 Limited technical analytical capacity to identify areas of concerns and points of leverage 
during bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations within the context of multi-layered 
regional integration initiatives. 
 Poor institutional infrastructure coupled with low technical capacities among trade 
officials and other relevant stakeholders to engage in trade policy design and trade 
negotiations. 
 Poor multi-stakeholder relationships, especially during trade negotiations and economic 
frameworks. 
Source:  Commonwealth Secretariat Hub and Spokes Project, (2012) 
 
The above contextual challenges are taken care of by this study, given its huge potential to 
positively impact on any ‘technical-assistance driven project’ to support the effective 
participation of sub-regional countries in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, and the 
implementation of associated agreements. This is achieved through the study’s synthesised 
relevant negotiation information, insights, topics for future studies and policy 
recommendations to build requisite trade negotiation capacities, synergies, coalitions and 
partnerships at both national and regional levels. Further, the study’s contribution resonates 
well with the ‘Aid-for-Trade’ funding window’s goal of supporting public-NSAs’ trade and 
development consultative platforms at both national and regional levels. Success in this 
regard will open opportunities for Zimbabwe and other interested countries to link up with 
other ‘Aid-for-Trade’ projects’ funding options. These range in scope from industrial 
capacity and export competiveness assistance to macro-economic policy capacity 
development, and specialised skills and capacity training scholarships in trade negotiations 
(including the e-learning trade negotiation course being offered by the WTO’s Technical 
Capacity Division). Similarly, the study has immense potential to positively impact on the 
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sub-regional Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’ secretariat mandate of facilitating 
respective member states in on-going
26
 and future bilateral, multilateral, and regional trade 
negotiations, in terms of tactics, strategies, collective and constructive articulation and 
formulation of both national and regional issues, interests, positions and offers.  
 
 
1.5 The importance and contribution of the study 
 
1.5.1 Study’s importance 
 
The global economy is littered by varied forms of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade 
and development cooperation negotiations. This thesis not only widens the understanding of 
stakeholders’ ideas, knowledge and interests, but also contributes to the country’s structural 
and institutional involvement in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade and development 
cooperation negotiations. In particular, Zimbabwe is known to be involved in various 
bilateral and multilateral trade and development cooperation negotiations, and active in the 
Trade Negotiation Forum (TNF) of various regional economic integrative initiatives,
27
 which 
demands human, financial and technical resources. According to Kuturuza, the former chief 
negotiator:  
 
... the government’s major weakness in this process has been lack of funding for wide and 
deep stakeholders’ consultations and an in-depth country’s specific industrial and/or sectoral 
analysis in a context in which the negotiations programme was fairly more frequent and 
intense. This is worsened by the inexperienced staff complement, since, apart from the 
director and deputy director, other officers were fairly junior, requiring guidance and 




Given the above, the study would assist Zimbabwean authorities, institutions, and relevant 
stakeholders in future regional, bilateral and multilateral trade and development cooperation 
negotiations, as well as with reviewing existing regional and bilateral trade and development 
                                                 
26 Negotiations on the comprehensive or full EPA that includes trade in goods (all products including 
agricultural products), trade in services, trade-related market access issues (such as safety standards, investment, 
trade facilitation, competition policy, government procurement, intellectual property rights) and beyond the 
border regulatory measures is expected to end by 2016. 
27 COMESA FTA, SADC and Tripartite FTA. 
28 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 29 May 2012. 
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cooperation agreements. For instance, Zimbabwe has bilateral trade agreements with various 
regional countries including Namibia (1992), Malawi (1995 and 2006), South Africa (1996), 
Mozambique (2004), and Botswana (2010 amendment) (Southern Africa Trade Hub, 2011), 
which are subject to review as and when parties deem it necessary (see the case of Botswana 
and Malawi). Furthermore, this study would assist trade justice activists with advocacy and 
lobbying platforms.  
 
In the eastern and southern African region, there is an increase in demand-driven, specialised 
courses on topical subjects which aim at assisting member states in their resolve to build 
social, economic, political, gender and legal analytical capacities in the quest for fair global 
trading systems; social and economic justice frameworks; public policy formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation and sustainable economic transformation 
objectives. This development enables this study to contribute towards appropriate and 
relevant literature to be used in trade negotiations courses and/or specialised trade 
negotiations skills training courses at both national and regional tertiary institutions and 
research institutes. In particular, the study’s contribution would influence national and 
regional academicians and/or universities to introduce diploma or degree courses in trade 
negotiations as well as national and regional research institutions to organise specialised 
capacity building, skills development and training in trade negotiations courses. This 
development could build critical intellectual mass across disciplines and stakeholders in 
Zimbabwe and the region and lead to strategic networking, partnerships, synergy building, 
coalition formations and consultations on trade negotiation issues and processes in particular, 
and trade and development related policy debates in various dialogue sessions
29
 in general. 
Ladner (2006) argues that a combination of literature development critical mass across 
disciplines and stakeholders would not only resonate well in strategic policy debates on trade 
and development, but also in advancing knowledge and understanding among relevant 
stakeholders in trade and development and other fields. Focused trade talk courses would 
help countries to build strategic stakeholder synergies, coalitions and networking in support 
of national and regional developmental goals. These specialised courses would be delivered 
in various forms including summer or winter schools, and/or dedicated roundtable 
discussions, seminars, and workshops, targeting national/regional government officials, 
students, scholars and activists - irrespective of their academic qualifications and experiences. 
                                                 
29 Conferences, roundtable discussions, seminars and workshops. 
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This would attract national and regional investment in the tertiary and policy oriented 
research institutions which offer the courses at various levels. 
 
Vickers (2007) argues that the apparent liberalisation impulses of recent industrial and trade 
policies have had adverse effects on poor and vulnerable groups, especially women, the 
elderly and the youth. In this respect, the study contributes to knowledge on how consumers, 
producers, and exporters are exposed to market-led policies and trade liberalisation 
paradigms which currently underpin the EPA process, and on the potentially devastating 
effects to the entire economy. Furthermore, the study is set to contribute to the debate on the 
nexus between the current level of liberalising the Zimbabwean economy and the exposure of 
consumers to a wide range of foreign products and services on the one hand, and the 
potentially negative implications of the current levels of trade liberalisation to the country’s 
effort to revitalise industrial capacity, product competitiveness and export capabilities on the 
other hand.  
 
The study rekindles memories of the economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAP) 
sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1990s, which resulted in large scale down-
sizing and closures of most sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing firms, 
production value supply chains and down-stream industries. In this regard, the study 
explicitly warns that while, at the time, the economy still largely relied on predictable policy 
directives, a shared vision among key stakeholders, and sound relations with both the EU and 
other western countries, the current EPA process is taking place despite the absence of all of 
the above. Furthermore, the study warns about the potential process of de-agriculturalisation 
(country-wide ceasation of white commercial farmers’ agricultural activities) triggered by the 
implementation of politically motivated ‘fast-track land reforms’ which are likely to get 
worse following the implementation of the new trade regime with the EU. In this regard, 
Zimbabwean new farmers are set to face stiff competition from heavily subsidised European 
agricultural producers in the short to medium term. Such development would contribute to 
the ongoing debate on the agricultural sector’s potential to anchor economic recovery through 
direct forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy, generating foreign 
currency and alleviating poverty. Through this debate, other scholars and activists previously 
shut out by the Zimbabwe Broadcast Corporation’s (ZBC) daily TV programme entitled 
“Murimi waNhasi” (Farmers Today) which was anchored by academics from the University 
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of Zimbabwe, (who were widely considered partisan with huge rationality and objectivity 
deficiencies) (see section 5.4), would have the opportunity to contribute to the growth and 
development of this sector through non-partisan, rational and contextualised inputs. 
 
The study has the potential to directly contribute to the ongoing debate on the ‘look east 
policy’ (Bond, 2007) as a strategy that could provide policy space and options to reduce the 
negative impacts of imposed sanctions-related pressure by way of identifying alternative 
markets for Zimbabwean products and sources of imports for goods and services that meet 
national requirements. The study offers lessons on how EPA negotiations with the EC can 
generate valuable insights into the management and prioritisation of the process and into 
national, regional and global stakeholder
30
 relationships. It could offer insights into the 
sincerity of the negotiators and politicians, into the prioritisation and allocation of resources 
(human and finances) in support of the process; into the implications of intra-state tensions 
and divisions; and into the economic transition trajectory of the GNU administration. 
Similarly, the study offers lessons on how negotiators succumb to surges of EU pressures, 
resulting in a harried iEPA signing and ratification without shared vision between the 
government and other relevant stakeholders, especially economic production and trading 
entrepreneurs. In particular, the study singles out the EPA negotiation managers’ failure to 
share their vision in the process by way of strategic and systematic exchanges of information 
with stakeholders and the general population. In short, the study’s contribution will contribute 
to the refinement of the ‘look east policy’, which, in turn improves the country’s trade 
diversification strategy. 
 
Several scholars and activists have consistently argued that EPA negotiations between the EU 
and ACP countries are a shadow of the World Bank and the IMF neo-liberal policy 
framework of the trade liberalisation. The above argument supports the study which 
acknowledges that trade negotiations are the central policy framework that entrenches trade 
liberalisation in ways that is fast gaining respect in many aspects of trade and industrial 
policy frameworks. Thus, the desired outcome in Zimbabwe’s meltdown economy is to 
guarantee inflows of foreign products from the EU in particular and the rest of the world in 
general into the country for the short to medium term, thereby supporting the study 
hypothesis that the EPA process is potentially an onslaught to the Zimbabwean economy in 
                                                 
30 Government, business sector, donors, civil society formations and political parties. 
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the short to medium term. The study also, as has already been said, demonstrates immense 
potential to inspire the country’s socio-economic transition and/or growth and development 
through future regional and bilateral trade justice and trade and development activities by 
directly supporting trade and industrial policy formulations and reviews. 
 
 
1.5.2 Contributions to knowledge in the discipline 
 
The study’s contribution to the field of bilateral trade negotiations is essentially at various 
levels. Firstly, the study articulates the concept of ‘guerrilla negotiating approaches, strategies 
and tactics’ (Collins, 2009) in trade and development negotiations and/or process as 
employed by negotiating parties with ‘extreme ideological differences of liberal and 
redistributive interpretations’ (McCandless, 2011 and Raftopoulos, 2005). In this regard, the 
EU in league with other western governments, MCs, TNCs, GFIs (see chapter 4), the MDC 
formations and pro-democracy civic forces championed liberal ideological interpretations, 
that is, good governance and constitutional provisions with respect to private properties, 
human rights, rule of law, and electoral practices, which were successfully kept outside the 
negotiating sessions in order to preserve ESA group unity and time-framed joint EU-ESA 
EPA negotiating road map. The study further provides insights on the EU’s economic 
dominance and influence that resulted in the split of the ESA into two groups
31
, and 
subsequently cornered individual weak, vulnerable and depressed Zimbabwean economy to 
signing iEPAs without knowledge of some resister activists
32
. Similarly, the ZANU (PF) 
government with support from former freedom fighters and villagers, and sympathy from 
most African states and emerging economies, particularly Russia and China, revoked 
guerrilla and unorthodox strategies and tactics in pursuit of redistributive ideological reclaim 
of legal land rights from former white commercial farmers. In response, Europe (within the 
guerrilla negotiation theoretical framework) financially supported pro-democracy groups to 
simultaneously discredit the moral standing of ZANU (PF) in economic management, 
including the EPA debate, and to divert focus away from EPA process. The pro-democracy 
group also collaborated closely with EPA resisters in ensuring outright repudiation of any 
formal interaction with government in the process.  
                                                 
31 ESA split into two groups: - EAC and re-configured ESA (see discussion in 4.3.3.1.and 4.3.3.2). 
32 Tendai Makanza, an activist with ANSA project questions why Welshman Ncube signed iEPA without the 
knowledge of some activist, especially those of the pro-democracy group. 
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Secondly, the study avails Zimbabwe’s knowledge and practical experiences in negotiating 
with an economically and politically powerful partner, not only with very strong commercial 
interests in the country, but also competitive in the EU and the local markets. The study 
further links the influence of MCs and TNCs with that of GFIs through their ‘debt-related 
relationship’ with Zimbabwe in ensuring that the outcome would favour the EU. The study 
argues that the influence, coupled with the dominance of the EU, would deliver the 
Zimbabwean market through demand and supply to European producers and investors. In this 
regard, the study links the short to medium term onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy to 
the EU’s ‘well perfected, decisive, predatory and merciless guerrilla negotiating strategies 
and tactics’ (Benoliel and Hua, 2009). Further, the study - while acknowledging ZANU (PF) 
guerrilla and unorthodox strategies and tactics in reclaiming land and mining rights - decries 
the total absence of similar guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics during this round of 
trade talks. Regarding the above dichotomy, the EU guerrilla negotiation theoretical 
application strategically linked the EPA process with market forces of demand and supply, 
while the ZANU (PF) led government strategically focused on its consolidating land 
ownership agenda. In this way, the study further decries lack of debate on how Zimbabwe’s 
guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics failed to get qualified support from the champions 
of the ‘unorthodox revolutionary reclaim’ (Masiiwa, 2012
33
) of the means of production from 
the legal owners of yesteryear. From the above, the study is set to benefit national, regional 
and international scholarships as it provides a basis through which students, researchers and 
academics can compare Zimbabwe’s experiences in the current group-based trade talks with 
the EU with its role in previous multilateral trade and development negotiating platforms 
(such as Seattle in the 1990s which was characterised by constant shifts of emphasis on 
government alliances and government-CSOs coalitions as well as on strategies and tactics). 
 
Thirdly, the study contributes knowledge on how the ideological differences of liberal and 
resistance in the process (McCandless, 2011) subjected Zimbabwe’s EPA debate to two 
distinct civil society participating groups: collaborators, who emphasised direct participation, 
interaction and engagement with the state, and resisters, who repudiated any formal 
interaction and consultation with the state, opting instead for confrontational and tactical 
engagement (McCandless, 2011; Raftopoulos, 2005; and Magure, 2009). Notwithstanding the 
dichotomy in an environment of non-formal Brussels-Harare contact and EU member states’ 
                                                 
33 Interview discussion with Medicine Masiiwa, Gaborone Botswana, 25 August 2012. 
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government-to-Zimbabwe government contact, the study contributes knowledge on how trade 
talks between parties that are on the ‘verge of breaking existing bilateral relations’ (Masiiwa, 
2012)
34
 on account of public policy grand-standing on some political and economic 
fundamentals finally culminated with an iEPA trade regime. In this regard, the weaker and 
more vulnerable party is blamed for irresponsible political dispensation (as argued above), 
while the powerful party is accused of negotiating while holding a ‘knife’ to the neck of the 
counterpart; in other words, consistently meddling in the political and economic affairs of a 
sovereign state. Indeed, ZANU (PF) and its allies nationally and beyond have consistently 
argued that bank-rolling democratic, governance, human rights and electoral activities while 
imposing smart sanctions and travel bans, is indicative of regime change agendas.  
 
Lastly, the study contributes to knowledge combining trade, development, negotiation and 
advocacy theories and concepts in the assessment and analysis of negotiating parties that 
bilaterally are at conflict, transcending political and economic fundamentals. This knowledge 
is also essentially with regards to the preparation and conduct of negotiations between 
negotiating parties that are politically and economically vastly different (see section 4 and 5). 
However, the study does not purport to craft new theoretical frameworks in trade and 
development cooperation negotiations, but rather provides illuminating illustrations of how a 
country in direct conflict with its negotiating counterpart has sought to dynamically navigate 
negotiations to their conclusion while balancing political and economy tensions and pressures 
in search of a predictable trading regime that is WTO compatible. It also illustrates how the 
negotiators succeeded in focusing on future trade relationships with the EU despite isolation 
difficulties on account of political differences. 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion and thesis structure 
 
The study comprises seven chapters which are divided into two parts. Part one contextualises 
the study by discussing the theories which underpin EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations, 
navigating the nexus between FTA and trade negotiations, and reviewing past inspirations of 
civil society advocacy in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. This part also draws out 
key issues and places them in the broader context of contemporary literature while building 
                                                 
34 Interview discussion with Medicine Masiiwa, Gaborone Botswana, 25 August 2012. 
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on the central argument of the study as captured by the hypotheses (Chapters 1 – 3). Part two 
explores the historical confluence of the EU-Zimbabwe trade relations and recent politically 
motivated developments that warrants an enquiry into state shortcomings and civil society 
advocacy in the EPA process, and how the above shapes the character of state-stakeholders’ 
relationships in the process (Chapters 4 – 6). 
 
Chapter one outlines the thematic focus of the study and the broader issues to be investigated 
through research problems and the study hypothesis. Chapter two comprehensively reviews 
relevant literature and identifies specific issues and debates in three key areas of interest in 
the context of EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations, namely (i) the theories which underpin trade 
negotiations, (ii) FTA and trade negotiations, and (iii) civil society advocacy and trade 
negotiations. This exploration better situates the EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiation process in 
the contemporary intellectual discourse, highlighting aspects that require attention.  
 
Chapter three explores and outlines the research methodology employed to find solutions to 
the research problems, to investigate the research questions, and to respond to the study 
hypotheses. 
 
Chapter four chronicles and demonstrates how the EU-Zimbabwe trade relations have 
evolved since the latter’s independence in 1980 and underscores the important links between 
the Zimbabwean economy and its trade performance. 
 
Chapter five explores and discusses the state of play in the EPA process by assessing 
institutional and structural dynamics in the negotiation process; critiquing state-stakeholder 
relationships in the context of inclusiveness and transparency in handling the economic trade 
agenda, particularly ongoing trade negotiations; and exploring the link between EPA 
ideology and seemingly guerrilla negotiation strategies and tactics on the one hand and the 
formulation of Zimbabwean interests, positions, and offers on the other. 
 
Chapter six examines the nexus of Zimbabwe’s state shortcomings and civil society advocacy 
by navigating the contours of state-stakeholder relationships, and in the process, summarises 




Chapter seven concludes the study by summarising the major lessons which the research 
holds for trade negotiations in the context of hostile bilateral relationships between the 
negotiating parties, conflictual state-civil society relationships and political polarisation. The 
chapter also highlights essential contributions which the study may offer to future regional, 












Most trade talks are integrative in nature; negotiating countries or regions enter into the 
process primarily because of ‘expectations to derive some commercial, social, and political 
benefits’ (Kramer and Messick, 1995). In order to unravel the intricacies, related challenges, 
and opportunities in EU-Zimbabwe trade talks in the context of state shortcomings and civil 
society advocacy, the following topics are discussed in this chapter: relevant theories which 
underpin trade negotiations, the nexus between FTA and trade negotiations, and the role of 
civil society advocacy in trade negotiations. Such an analytical approach is considered 
relevant with regard to the EPAs negotiation objectives, given in Box 2.1 below. 
 
Box 2.1: EPAs objectives 
o EPAs are conceptualised as capable of promoting deeper integration among ACP 
countries and able to act as a stepping stone for further integration into the global 
economy - taking into account geographical, historical, and economic factors; 
o EPAs outcomes must be economically meaningful, politically sustainable and socially 
acceptable in order to foster an economic growth and developmental trajectory that leads 
to reduction in poverty and inequalities; 
o EPAs outcomes must progressively abolish all trade restrictions, thereby making them 
WTO-compatible; and 
o EPAs must take into account the different levels of development of contracting parties by 
providing sufficient scope for flexibility, special and differential treatment and 
asymmetry, especially to the least developing countries (LDCs), small and vulnerable 
economies, landlocked and small island countries. 
Source:  Deve (2006) and Kamidza (2007) 
 
The joint ESA-EC roadmap acknowledges that EPAs have promised that ‘no country in the 
configurations would be worse off’ (Kamidza 2008) as the negotiations assumed a win-win 
scenario between negotiating parties that are both economically and politically unequal with 
28 
 huge developmental differences between them -and within the group (ESA) itself. While it 
is debatable that outcomes of the EU-Zimbabwe trade negotiations will achieve the above 
objectives and promises, Kachingwe (2005), Deve (2006) and Kamidza (2008) are of the 
view that EPAs are essentially FTA negotiated between unequal
1
 parties, both in political and 
economic terms. Goodison (2007) weighs in on the debate and argues that the EPA process 
perpetuates asymmetrical power relations between the EU and the respective configuration 
countries.  
 
An analytical approach is taken to evaluate how the decade-long strained diplomatic relations 
between the negotiating parties have directly contributed to the prevailing social and 
economic crisis, political polarisation and state-civil society conflictual relationships.  
 
 
2.2 Theories underpinning trade negotiations 
 
Trade negotiation is a framework that seeks to define trade and development cooperation 
between and among nations as informed by relative factor distributional effects
2
. This is 
supported by Stolper-Samuelson (1941) who favours the distributional effects of trade by 
arguing that free trade benefits factors of production that are relatively abundant compared to 
locally scarce ones. Such a comparison accurately describes the EU-Zimbabwe trade and 
development cooperation relationship. The above is in harmony with the Ricardian theory of 
comparative advantage, which argues that countries specialise in producing goods and 
services relative to production cost differences (Stephen and Chang-Tai, 2002). Thus, 
differences in production costs among countries as well as different levels of productive and 
export efficiency are at the heart of international trade. So,  when production efficiency is 
stimulated, countries realise more trade flows and maximise consumer welfare, firms’ profits 
and national wealth. Robinson (1998) observes that in the contemporary world economy, 
trade flows, capital movements, inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
technology flows, are components that sustain the dominance of TNCs and MCs thereby 
giving them competitive advantage in the global trade arena. This explains why countries 
with more TNCs and MCs presence tend to enjoy not only market competiveness for their 
products and services, but also determine the pace and framework of trade negotiations. 
                                                 
1 EU and ACP countries. 
2 Since the study is on the EU-Zimbabwe trade talks, no analysis, reflection and interrogation has been made 
with respect to the factor endowment or factor distributional effects of the negotiating parties. 
29 
 Todaro (1990) argues that the principal benefits of world trade accrue disproportionately to 
rich and poor nations. This forms the basis for bilateral trade negotiations, and assumes that 
all countries gain from trade; however, in the EU-Zimbabwe case, the outcome is not 
necessarily the gain on both sides. There has been evidence of imperfect competition on an 
unequal playing field in the markets of the two negotiating counterparts which takes 
advantage of the economies of scale. However, the EU is an industrialised economic 
powerhouse with huge presence of TNCs and MCs, whose influence filters directly to 
developing economies through policy prescriptions of GFIs (see Figure 4.1 in section 4.3.2).  
 
Negotiation conduct, practices and outcomes explain why some regions such as the EU 
succeed in negotiating international trade agreements as a single entity in spite of diverging 
preferences. Indeed, European member-states reach a common position which ‘they all 
defend with a single voice’ (Meunier, 2000) at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. 
European countries always adopt at the onset the lowest common denominator position which 
prevents negotiators from making innovative proposals, especially by submitting lots of 
offers to opponents. Through these theories, the bloc is able to not only  guide their 
negotiators during the bargaining process, but also to provide the necessary human, financial, 
technical and moral support in order to obtain the best possible deal from the opponent, while 
conceding the least. The theories also guide the bloc in articulating offensive and defensive 
strategies and tactics in line with the assumed position of lowest common denominator in 
trade talks. Meanwhile, Meunier (Ibid) argues that negotiation theories allow member-states 
to collectively allocate and utilise resources in ways that not only create a large market, but 
also attract foreign trading interests. Thus, regions such as the EU, on the wisdom of this 
theory, are home to TNCs and MCs, a development that gives the negotiating bloc greater 
international leverage over its counterparts, particularly in ACP regions. 
 
Balancing the negotiations outcomes and the social development question remain elusive to 
developing countries, and particularly Zimbabwe, whose economy was on a downward spiral 
for eight consecutive years coinciding with the process. Although this thesis is not discussing 
simultaneous, concurrent and consecutive linkages in negotiations, the parties (Zimbabwe 
and EU) must manage the flow of events that surrounds the negotiation process as well as 
opportunistic behavior. This supports rule-based trade negotiations though the outcomes may 
not necessarily redress social developmental challenges such as poverty, underdevelopment, 
and inequalities, in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. This reality of developing 
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 countries contradicts Crump (2006), who notes that multilateral negotiations are based on 
evolving rules that are non-discriminatory, while bilateral and regional negotiations reduce 
trade barriers on a reciprocal and preferential basis. The above examines the natural 
interaction of the two trading systems as well as the inherent challenges and opportunities for 
developing trade and regional integration policies. Thus, the EPA negotiation process was/is 
tied to a fixed WTO-related time frame. Indeed, Crump (2005) argues that negotiation theory, 
although it provides substantial understanding about negotiation processes and outcomes, 
fails to adequately consider the social context in which the negotiations are embedded. This 
view is in line with those of Sebenius (1996) and Watkins and Passow (1996) who argue that 
‘negotiations are not conducted in a vacuum’. This is further supported by Kramer and 
Messick (1995) and Menkel-Meadow (2001) who observe that negotiations are not only 
complex and dynamic, but also requires isolating parties, goals, interactions and outcomes 
from the social context in which they are embedded. While these views emphasise the 
necessity for the negotiating parties to have considered the prevailing social and economic 
developmental challenges in Zimbabwe during the negotiations process, the political 
hostilities and polarisation, state-civil society conflictual relationships, and poor EU-
Zimbabwe diplomatic relationships make it difficult to implement the above wisdom. 
 
Hammouda and Osakwe (2008) argue that trade negotiation is a bargaining game in which 
power relations among countries and the availability of information influences their strategic 
behaviour during the negotiation process, which in turn affects the outcome. Harrison and 
Rutström (1991) link the bargaining strength of trade negotiators to their ability to draw a 
positive 'balance sheet of concessions' from their counterparts. Each party aims to extract 
maximum benefits from their respective opponent(s). Sometimes, both parties conclude the 
process without any acrimony on issues and offers, reflecting how respective bargaining 
positions can easily converge or a trade-off between sectors can become a possibility. In 
other insistence, parties misjudge each other’s intentions while assuming an irrational 
approach to the process. 
 
Kahler and Odell (2004) argue that developing countries require sufficient economic power 
to create or threaten an important economic interest in a sharp and immediate manner during 
negotiations. However, as Rothstein (1979) argues, negotiating groups such as ESA lack 
procedural cohesion and substantive unity which diminishes the possibility of achieving 
viable settlements, while the EU bloc produces a unity which is based on ideological 
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 principles and the sum total of the group’s demands compared with those of its 
counterparts’ level of ambitions. The emphasis is on the importance of first-mover 
advantages in negotiations and the extent to which big countries or regions control the 
manner in which negotiations are conducted (Myerson, 1991; Brander and Spencer, 1992), 
and how big countries or groups such as the US and the EU are in better positions to 
influence the agendas and pace of negotiations, even though this has serious implications for 
the ability of weak African nations to protect their own interests (Osakwe, 2007). It is 
therefore necessary to evaluate the impediments and surprises such as dirty tactics and divide 
and rule strategies, embedded in trade talks. 
 
Within the context of the public choice theory, trade negotiation is seen as a process of 
interaction between competing interests, and sometimes parties agree to trade off variables 
against one another to maximise their respective socio-economic welfares. But in trade-
related institutional frameworks, and in particular the WTO and the EU, there are no spaces 
for civil society to effectively and directly participate in the negotiation process. CSOs are 
also not wanted closer to preparation platforms
3
 and negotiation rooms. At the national level, 
the direct involvement of CSOs in trade talks becomes a function of governmental 
institutions, political climate and operational capacity - to promote participation (World 
Bank, 2006). Das (2004) argues that institutional interaction has the potential to generate full 
confidence among various interest groups -particularly economic operators, producers, 
exporters and the public in general - in the trade policy and trade regime of the country. 
Basevi (2008) observes that governments set up their trade policies and act as if they care 
more about the interests of various constituencies (producers, importers and exporters) than 
they do about consumers.  
 
Game-theory models appreciate how negotiation or bargaining is a strategic interaction 
between competing parties and lobbying groups, which takes into account possible trade-offs 
and the efforts of other countries. This interaction assesses not only the parties, but also the 
game-like negotiations between government and various actors in the country. Rege (2004) 
observes that various actors have differing self-interests which they pursue rationally and 
systematically in ways that maximise the country’s economic benefits and commercial 
interests, taking into account political, institutional and other constraints under which they 
                                                 
3 Unless CSOs’ representatives participate as members of a government delegation, in which case their views 
automatically become that of the government. 
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 operate. However, these actors are not always fully informed about all the aspects of the 
issues, positions and interests under consideration. This is due to lack of information 
because parties willfully avoid facts, deliberately attempt to obscure available facts and 
unintentionally ignore the predictions and commitments of their counterparts. This 
underscores the need for assessing the strategic importance of various constituencies
4
 in the 
process.  
 
Goodison and Stoneman (2005: 40) warn that “it would be an act of foolish optimism to 
expect integrity or honesty in the EU’s trade policy towards southern Africa in particular and 
the wider ACP group in general.” The founder and former Seatini’s trade expert, Tandon 
(2004), argues that trade-related issues are usually framed in technical language which is 
difficult for many people to understand, despite the fact that it affects their livelihoods in very 
significant ways. He further deplores not only GFIs’ (the World Bank, and the IMF) support 
to the former imperial region, but also their undemocratic practices which inter alia, 
undermine institutional and state-society relationships, and effective policy structures and 
systems. This is supported by Kamidza (2007), who argues that the EU misleads negotiators 
of vulnerable and poverty-stricken countries into thinking that any negotiated trade regime 
guarantees sustainable industrial and/or sectoral growth, development and export 
competitiveness and diversification, as well as social development which includes human 
capital formation and poverty alleviation. 
 
Thus, the process and outcome of any trade and cooperation agreement with the EU 
sometimes produces unintended challenges, such as structural and institutional capacity 
limitations. Bond (2007) argues that the outcome content is likely to resemble the Doha 
agreement which amplified the free-trade agenda that had generated intense unevenness, 
inequality, eco-destruction and women’s suffering over previous decades. In essence, the 
process in Zimbabwe has undermined social cohesion, equity, inclusiveness, trust, confidence 
and cooperation and promoted an atmosphere of suspicion, paranoia, and deceit. This mirrors 
the Angola-EU and Mozambique-EU fisheries agreement (FA) that was characterised by an 
explicitly poor consultative relationship between negotiators and stakeholders, weak 
monitoring capacity in the agreement’s legal provisions and a lack of institutional memory to 
dictate possibilities of reopening negotiations on previously agreed provisions (Kamidza, 
                                                 
4 Such as producers, exporters, civil society groups, political leaders, and negotiators. 
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 2008). By tabling fishing compensation payments, the EU concluded FA frameworks with 
respective government negotiators without the knowledge and participation of key 
constituencies such as the public sector
5
, the fisher folk and the private sector. They also 
overlooked post-trade pact challenges, including fish stealing by European high-tech fishing 
vessels in the respective countries’ waters, unfair fishing competition against local fishing 
folk who use old technologies and a weak review process of the compensation fees in line 
with national developmental goals. This illustrates the impact of unintended consequences in 
trade and development cooperation agreements between unequal parties in terms of both 
economic and political standards. It is certain that the potential for unintended consequences 
in the EU-Zimbabwe trade talks is very high on account of government-CSO tense 
relationships and the business sector’s mistrust of government in the process. For instance, 
the business sector could not submit a comprehensive list of sensitive products to government 
negotiators (see Table 5.3) to be excluded from liberalisation prior to the signing of the iEPA. 
The unpredictable outcome also hovers around the process due to GPA related political 
tensions and subsequent economic policies and programmes posturing and contradictions of 
GNU.  
 
Linder (1961) explains why trade occurs between countries that have similar demand 
preferences and produce the same goods and services. It means that the countries’ production 
varieties are not primarily determined by domestic demand, but also by trade with countries 
with similar demand patterns. More importantly, this is the basis for bilateral and multilateral 
trade negotiations and, as such, emphasises the WTO’s role in developing and shaping rule-
based international trade regimes. The WTO negotiation framework provides guidelines for 
bilateral trade negotiations, such as ongoing EPAs between the EU and ACP countries. As 
Ralph (2008) argues, EPA negotiations have fundamentally been based on the WTO’s 
principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. In many instances, rule-based trade and 
development cooperation has become potentially more conflictual since economic gains or 
outcomes are translated into political utilities at the country level. This is also the basis of 
Europe-Zimbabwe trade talks where, to some degree, similar products are in demand in both 
economies (although huge gaps in technical, financial and productive capacities, and 
institutional support will translate into an outcome that reflects the socio-economic and 
political realities of both parties). Indeed, the EU is demanding market openings despite 
                                                 
5 People sector refers to civil society groups whose programme interventions are a response to the collective 
needs of communities and/or citizens. 
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 Zimbabwe’s current huge challenges to produce market competitive products, to build 
technical and analytical capacities in trade negotiations, to generate fiscal revenues and to 
develop and implement sustainable pro-poor and pro-development policies. It is known that a 
revival of the Zimbabwean economy had been slowed down by political rhetoric and 
posturing on fundamental economic processes, both prior to and post the GNU 
administration. This justifies not only an assessment of the implications of the EPA outcome 
to the economy’s future in the context of regional and global market integration, but also of 
the negotiators’ information dissemination strategies. 
 
The EU has established negotiating institutions, divisions, structures and systems that are not 
only highly visible to their counterparts, but also deprives the latter of certainty in the 
process. Putnam (1988) agrees that domestic institutions, divisions and structures are 
bargaining assets in international trade negotiations, a constraint which ACP in general and 
Zimbabwe in particular have in the ongoing EPAs negotiations. For instance, the EU 
negotiators always employ the ’Schelling conjecture’ strategy to obtain leverage in the 
process (Meunier, 2000): their counterparts are reminded of the likelihood that the deal under 
negotiation may be rejected by the member-states or the European Parliament, or as in the 
case with EPAs, that other regions may have already agreed on some process(es) or 
position(s). This explains why Zartman (1991) defines negotiation as a process of combining 
conflicting positions into a common position while the power game theory broadly defines 
negotiations as successive stages, namely, pre-negotiation, stalemate and settlement.  
 
Sequentially, the process starts with a pre-negotiation phase in which parties identify and 
agree which issues to focus on (the joint roadmap), after which neither party can refuse to 
negotiate. The second phase is the actual conduct of negotiations on substantive issues, 
interests, positions and offers during which concessions are made and details hammered out. 
Theoretically, however, negotiating parties, especially at the bilateral level, may withdraw 
from the negotiations (although in practice this often depends on the strengths of the 
negotiating parties and the level of their ambitions). This is supported by Garfield and 
Knudsen (1997) who explain how international relations theories seek to develop multi-
disciplinary models of trade policy behaviour, which allows a protectionist mentality to 
influence the course and outcome of the negotiations. This means that negotiating parties 
endowed with human, financial and technical resources naturally control both the process and 
outcome. In many instances, the road to rule-based trade cooperation is potentially conflictual 
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 because economic gains or outcomes are translated into political utilities at the country 
level. The trade regime as prescribed by international bodies is not sufficient to guarantee 
fair trade, particularly in strategic industries of weaker economies. For instance, in Seattle 
both the United States of America (USA) and South Africa failed to co-opt the Zimbabwean 
former minister of Industry and Trade, Nathan Shamuyarira, the leader of a group of African 
delegations who persuaded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) caucus to issue a 
statement withdrawing consensus, claiming “there is no transparency in the proceedings and 
African countries are being marginalised”. As a result, they (USA and South Africa), flexed 
their international trading power by imposing ever-tougher anti-dumping penalties against 
impoverished trading partners such as Zimbabwe (Bond, 2006a and 2007; and Bond and 
Manyanya, 2002). 
 
The foreign relations theory of realism (Gideon, 1998) argues that states, as primary actors in 
world affairs, treat all other states as autonomous, self-interested and animated by the single 
desire to pursue power. This is supported by regime theorists who uphold the right of states to 
pursue wealth, political stability and domestic distributional objectives. In this context, Shell 
(1995) advises states to balance the interests of groups who seek protection from foreign 
imports against the interests of exporters and others, preferring to expand free trade, mainly 
on account of creating jobs and incomes. The Wise Men’s Report (2005) to the WTO 
Director-General argues that many firms in poor nations that are currently struggling to find a 
small niche market in a tough global economy require some positive discrimination to exploit 
small comparative advantages born of a preference. This provides insight not only into the 
conduct of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations between countries or regions, but also 
how negotiations on a given issue cannot be examined separately from other issues. Trade 
talks require competence from negotiators in terms of flexibility, autonomy and authority.  
 
 
2.3 Free trade area and trade negotiations 
 
The standard trade theory defines FTA as a designated group of countries that agree to 
eliminate tariffs, quotas and preferences on most (if not all) goods between them. This makes 
FTA superior to all other trade policies, though there are usually a few administrative delays
6
 
(Balchin and Kamidza, 2008). Kahuika, et al. (2003) note that FTAs echo the Ricardian 
                                                 
6 As goods pass freely from one country to another. 
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 theory of comparative advantage
7
 (Stephen and Chang-Tai, 2002) which argues that 
countries that engage in trade specialise in producing goods relative to the production cost 
differences. Dunn (2009) argues that in practice free trade has almost always been a question 
of degree since all states maintain some restrictions but few practice complete autarchy, and 
that the degree of openness or closure bears little or no relation to overall economic 
performance. However, as Chang (2007) illustrates, governments nurture and protect 
‘strategic, infant and important industries’ until they are ready to compete in regional and 
global marketplaces. This is contrary to the views of ‘free trade economists, particularly from 
global institutions such as the IMF, the WB and the WTO’ who prescribe rapid large-scale 
trade liberalisation in developing countries
8
 despite the fact that their local producers are still 
at productive developmental stages (Hartmann, 2008). This view is supported by the WTO 
Director-General, Lamy (2010), who argues that trade openness delivers efficiencies, 
generates wealth and lifts millions of people out of poverty.  
 
The second best theory suggests that free trade may not be efficiency or welfare-enhancing in 
the presence of other distortions in the economy. The trading system sometimes restricts or 
discriminates against “low cost” suppliers (Raghavan, 2004) in the sense that an importing 
country decides on the quantities and prices of imported products to be sold in its domestic 
market. As a result, tariffs and residual quantitative restrictions as well as discriminatory non-
tariff measures, though gradually liberalised, are still unevenly distributed thereby hurting the 
major suppliers of third world countries. As a result, the system undermines potential imports 
from developing countries which also have to cope with stringent trade distorting measures 
such as countervailing duties and subsidies, particularly in the agricultural sector.  
 
Irwin (1996) argues that the international market share is reminiscent of mercantilism, and 
that the volume of world trade is fixed and divided among a few countries. This notion treats 
trade as a zero-sum game in which no consideration is given to consumers’ welfare. By 
demonstrating a ‘strong correlation between firm size and international trade’, Valodia and 
Veila (2006) argue that larger firms have been more successful at integrating their 
manufacturing activities into the global chains of production leading to increases in exports, 
competition, and volatility of local economies. Reimer et al. (2006), argue that while many 
                                                 
7 A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if the opportunity cost of producing that good in 
terms of other goods is lower in that country than it is in other countries. 
8 Developing countries are obliged by the WTO national treatment to extend policies aimed at boosting their 
own national industries, such as tax breaks, to other foreign companies in the same industry. 
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 international food and agricultural markets are oligopolistic in nature, government 
interventions result in relatively small price-cost mark-ups and modest potential trade gains.  
 
In the case of EU-Zimbabwe trade relations, the former demands asymmetrical market 
openings while the latter experiences huge socio-economic deficits and industrial and 
productive capacity constraints which hinder the implementation of sustainable, equitable, 
and people-centered developments. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwe government’s intervention
9
 in 
the agricultural sector, while an attempt to ameliorate the abovementioned weaknesses, has 
yet to produce positive outcomes. Furthermore, the GNU’s economic transition has remained 
at a ‘snail’s pace’ on account of the failure of the GPA’s framework (belligerent parties and 
SADC and AU leadership), to secure the withdrawal of sanctions against ZANU (PF) 
leadership and its associated companies, from the EU in particular, and the international 
community (western governments) in general. Further, the necessary investment levels have 
also not been unlocked. As a result, efforts to implement the necessary but critical 
interventions in building technical and analytical capacity in trade negotiations, supporting 
industrial structures and restoring confidence in the economy is undermined. Also 
undermined are efforts to improve trust and cooperation between state and business 
community and inclusive and constructive collaborations between state and CSOs on 







                                                 
9 Intervention in terms of fast-track land redistribution and inputs (seeds, fertilisers, tillage, and fuel) to farmers. 
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 2.4 Civil society advocacy and trade negotiations 
 
Change theory, which evaluates the effectiveness of foreign policy advocacy efforts, that is, 
how the actions of civic bodies influence changes in policy, attitude, or public will in ways 
that lead to desired outcomes, has been employed to evaluate civil society practices in terms 
of engagements, lobbying, and building synergies and coalitions in support of bilateral trade 
and development cooperation negotiations between the EU and Zimbabwe. In particular, 
CSOs’ advocacy on trade and development co-operation agreements calls actors to combine 
resources with a view to building synergies and deepening strategic networking and 
engagements in order to build greater leverage during negotiation processes. This forms the 
genesis of strategic consultative engagement between CSOs and other relevant stakeholders 
working on trade and development issues. However, in many respects, the level of strategic 
consultative engagements between CSOs and government is often acrimonious. 
 
Keet (2007) supports the above observation by noting how the division between African 
negotiators and civil society activists worsened during the WTO Ministerial Summit in Doha, 
Qatar in 2001, and decries Pretoria’s failure to use its political or moral weight and 
democratic reputation to actively prioritise real institutional reforms as an essential pre-
condition to any other WTO trade related discussions’ an intervention that could have offered 
lessons in the on-going ACP-EPAs negotiations. In particular, Keet (Ibid) accused South 
Africa’s former Trade minister, Alec Erwin, of accepting a controversial ‘friend of the chair’ 
position, which made him responsible for negotiating WTO rules, but in the process ended up 
disappointing observers and civil society critics. This opens the space for CSO sustained 
activism in favour of transparent and democratic pro-development trade negotiation 
processes. However, in spite of the coordinated civil society advocacy at Doha, Keet (Ibid) 
maintains that WTO ministerial conferences remain characterised by flagrantly inequitable, 
manipulative and undemocratic practices including appointments of ‘friends of the chair’ in 
informal working groups, an outcome that institutionalises undemocratic decisions on key 
issues. Keet (Ibid) further argues that Africa’s strategic alliance suffered a setback when 
Pretoria dumped continental traditional allies including Nigerian, Tanzanian, Ugandan, 
Kenyan, and Zimbabwean delegations, rejected NGO advisers to African governments, and 
carefully advanced a pro-WTO position in favour of a ‘new round’ or ‘broad-based agenda’. 
However, a demonstrated unity in civil society advocacy, coupled with the ambitions of some 
African delegations, led to the articulation of extreme basic positions aimed at pro-poor 
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 development outcomes (CIDSE
10
, Discussion Paper, 2000). Strategic networking and 
synergy building is further highlighted by Bond (2007) who quotes Keet’s claims: 
 
What is amazing, and inspiring, is that the many colourful banners and placards, flags 
and chants, songs and drumming, each with their distinctive cultural characteristics, all 
carry similar messages against the WTO, against the unjust and destructive economic 
system it is being used for, against the damages to the world environment, to livelihoods 
and lives - as expressed dramatically in the symbolic suicide of the Korean farmer, Lee 
Kyung Hae… With our distinctive black and green t-shirts and banner proclaiming that 
‘Africa is Not for Sale’, the African people’s organisations in Cancun are sending a clear 
message to the WTO and African governments that we are here to demand that the needs 
and rights of our people are not sold off by our governments. Bond 2007. 
 
As agued elsewhere in this study, trade talks at the WTO level, in terms of strategies and 
tactics influences, to some degree, the bilateral negotiation processes. This means that the 
experiences of the past WTO ministerial conferences directly or indirectly could have a 
positive influence on the ongoing EU-Zimbabwe trade and development cooperation 
negotiations. Unfortunately, the strength of the strategic alliance between civic groups and 
African governments in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, has been uncoordinated, 
discredited, suspect and weaker compared to past advocacy activities around past WTO 
events. The Zimbabwean EPA process has been characterised by lack of social cohesion, 
equity, inclusiveness, trust, confidence and cooperation in an atmosphere of suspicion, 
paranoia and deceit (Kamidza, 2007). This is supported by Seatini (2004), who observes that 
the RNF meetings’ communiqués, draft texts, proposals and timeliness were not shared with 
other constituencies to inform and share wisdom on the process, particularly at the national 
level. Further, the ESA configuration where Zimbabwe belongs shut the door on civil society 
representation in its RNF meetings in December 2004, thereby undermining the ‘inside-
outside advocacy approach’ (Tandon, 2004) in terms of pursuing and/or linking specific 
issues with specific government delegations. Critics argue that this created a vast gulf in 
understanding sticking points and issues as well as prohibited the sharing of experiences 
between negotiators and civil society groups. Indeed, frustration in advocacy work sustains 
                                                 
10 CIDSE (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) is a coalition of 15 Catholic development 
organisations in Europe and North America working with two thousand partner organisations in developing 
countries. 
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 CSOs’ perceptions that ESA governments were/are ‘selling out their countries and people to 
European capitalism’ (Deve, 2006). 
 
Throughout the process the CSOs have been irked by anecdotal evidence which 
disappointingly reveal that sub-Saharan Africa-EU trade flows declined from 3.2% to less 
than 1.4% between 1985 and 2006 in spite of the series of Lomé Conventions (1975–2000) 
that provided ‘comparative advantage’ of ACP products to European markets through trade 
preferences such as duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access, and the Everything-but-
Arms (EBA) initiatives. They have been equally disappointed that ACP countries are failing 
to access the EDF envelopes designed to improve ACP countries’ industrial capacities, 
institutional technical capacities and supply-side bottlenecks to global markets (see section 
6.4.3) before the conclusion of EPAs. The CSOs have also been frustrated by the fact that the 
ACP countries opened up their economies to EU competitive products through iEPA 
signatures without corresponding improvements in their respective limited industrial 
capabilities and export competitiveness. Further, they have been worried by the seeming lack 
of desire to protect strategic, infant and sensitive sectors of the economy for various socio-
economic and political reasons. In the Zimbabwean case, while the state has been directly 
involved in the economy through contestable politically motivated programmes, particularly 
fast-track land reform and indigenisation, and its economic empowerment policy, that 
trajectory has not been robustly defended during the negotiations. As a result, CSOs’ 
advocacy constantly highlighted negative perceptions about the process on the backdrop of 
the EU’s failure to adequately redress supply-related bottlenecks and improve industrial and 
export diversification and competitiveness as promised by the EDF’s developmental 
assistance envelopes since 1975 (Draper, 2007). 
 
Nalunga (2004) argues that CSOs have been suffering from limited developmental resources 
to finance both EPA-related programmes and activities and the EC’s existing aid portfolio in 
ACP countries. CSOs have therefore been lobbying various EU institutions to honour past 
promises with respect to EDF resources, claiming that the dangling of the ‘development aid 
envelope’ has split 89 ACP countries into six EPA regions (the Caribbean Forum 
(CARIFORUM), the Pacific, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the ESA and the 
SADC EPA as they prepared to negotiate a new trade regime with the EU. Lobbying EU 
institutions also explicitly justifies the need for more allocations under the 10
th
 EDF financial 
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 window covering the period 2008 to 2013 to adequately support most ACP countries, 
particularly Zimbabwe, which has been experiencing perennial negative economic growth, 
especially between 2000 and February 2009
11
, with a view to improving industrial production 
structures, export diversification and competiveness, as well as attracting domestic and 
foreign investors. 
 
Advocacy has been focusing on the negative implications of EPA frameworks to existing 
regional integration projects in Africa in general and southern and eastern Africa in 
particular. This means the focus has been on the implementation challenges with respect to 
aligning liberalisation schedules and commitments in iEPAs with those agreed on at regional 
levels as part of regional integration commitments. 
 
In this respect, Oxfam (2002) observes that the three decades of structurally adjusting 
economies according to neo-liberal scriptures, especially trade liberalisation, have left many 
African economies more open and integrated into the global economy than their European 
counterparts. This revelation from a pro-trade liberalisation lobbyist contradicts the anti-
EPAs advocacy which argues that the scope, structure, format and terms of EPA negotiations 
were entirely EU member states-driven in the context of donor-recipient relationships 
between ACP countries and their former colonies (Christian Aid, 2003 and 2004). This 
further favours liberal civil society advocacy groups which criticise the Lomé Conventions 
for failing to adequately provide development aid assistance as well as to increase and 
diversify production and trade in Africa. The above weakness of Lomé Conventions provides 
sufficient basis for CSOs to anchor their respective advocacy work. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
anchoring advocacy on Lomé Conventions’ shortcomings would have created acres of 
advocacy scope and space for CSOs to link the current total liberalisation with the economy’s 
economic recovery agenda within the context of EPA negotiations. 
 
Christian Aid (2005) warns that over 20 years of advocacy on trade liberalisation in 
developing countries has proved disastrous for poor people and poor producers. From this 
study and Stop unfair trade campaign
12
 (2007), the following testimonies expressing process 
and emerging outcome were captured: 
                                                 
11 The economy experienced positive growth following the GNU’s introduction of dollarization, that is, legal 
replacement of local currency with multi-currency when purchasing goods and services.  
12 Stop unfair trade campaign aims to stop trade deals between Europe and ACP countries  
42 
 Our economies will not be able to withstand the pressures associated with liberalisation as 
prescribed by the WTO, and that as partners, we need to ensure that the EPAs outcome does 
not leave the ACP countries more vulnerable to the vagaries of globalisation and 
liberalisation, thus further marginalising our economies. Festus Mogae, the former liberal 
Botswana President, May 2004: 4. 
 
We express our profound disappointment at the stance taken by negotiators in the European 
Commission (EC) insofar as it does not adequately address the development concerns that 
must be the basis of relations with Africa. We urge our negotiating partners to clearly 
demonstrate the development content of the proposed agreements. AU Trade Ministers 
Declaration on EPAs, 14 April 2006, Stop unfair trade campaign, 2007. 
 
It has become quite clear from our frank discussions that the two years of regional 
negotiations have generated very little tangible outputs, particularly as related to the two areas 
of critical interest to the ACP regions and countries, namely, the development dimension of 
EPAs and the support for regional integration processes. John Kaputin, ACP Secretary 
General, October 2005, Stop unfair trade campaign, 2007. 
 
Europe’s aim is a new framework, where neighbours work together to benefit from freer trade 
while we offer assistance to integrate them into the world trading system. Peter Mandelson, 
the EU Trade Commissioner, December 2004: 2. 
 
EU imports of frozen chicken wings destroyed the local market…EPAs are free trade 
agreements, and as such, they will bring poverty to Africa. … If EPAs carry through, African 
countries will have to kiss goodbye to their industrialisation efforts. Tetteh Hormeku, director 
of ATN, April 2005: 6.  
 
The above is supported by the ‘Anti-EPAs Campaigners’ such as Christian Aid, Oxfam GB, 
ATN
13
, and the Third World Network whose central message is that ’no African government 
has ever proposed the voluntary opening of its market to EU imports as part of a national 
development or industrialisation strategy’. Liberal critics view EPAs as an opportunity to 
negotiate better deals from the EU in formal regional negotiations rather than relying on the 
goodwill of European governments to grant them preferential schemes. While the above 
suggests grey areas for CSOs in ACP countries to intervene with specific advocacy activities, 
                                                 
13 Seatini, Mwengo, Zimcodd and Trade Centres are affiliated members of ATN. 
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 limited resources do not allow them to undertake research analyses that inform issues, 
interests, positions, and offers. 
 
Advocacy activities highlight the failure of past trade preferences to stimulate 
industrialisation, diversification of exports and market competitiveness in the ACP countries. 
Kamidza (2007, 9) supports the above argument by noting: 
 
Unprocessed commodities (such as diamonds, petroleum oils, sugar and tobacco) continue to 
make up the bulk of ACP’s exports to the EU. This means that countries are yet to develop 
and diversify their production structures and exports; add value to their exports; and increase 
their market share in line with the imperatives of globalisation. In particular, given the narrow 
industrial bases that characterise the SADC and ESA configurations, EPAs are likely to 
provide only limited options for increased exports into the EU. Kamidza, 2007 
 
Thus, CSO activism focused on growing perception and fears on the EPAs outcomes. Firstly, 
CSOs have been arguing that EPAs would limit the policy space needed for the development 
and protection of national infant industries. Secondly, they have been arguing that the 
outcome of the EPAs will either slow down the growth of infant industries or destroy their 
potential altogether, resulting in unemployment and social dislocation of families, households 
and communities. Thirdly, they have been expressing fears that EPAs may intensify and 
entrench the liberalisation of national and regional economies to an even greater degree than 
the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s. Fourthly, they have been 
expressing fear that further trade liberalisation will flood local markets with cheap imports 
from Europe and other global competitors. Lastly, they have been worried that the outcome 
of the EPAs may have the potential to dampen the ability of countries to create opportunities 
for human development in terms of skills training, innovation, research and development. 
 
The advocacy literature has assisted in evaluating the contribution of Zimbabwean civic 
groups who generally have had poor relationships with ruling elites but closed ranks with 
(Kamidza, 2009c) the EU on matters of governance, pluralistic democratic processes and 
human and property rights. This suggests difficult terrain for civil society advocacy on EPA 
processes in the context of glaring state shortcomings, frosty Zimbabwe-EU diplomatic 
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 relations, a conflict-ridden GNU and limited resources to engage the EU’s constituencies
14
. 
All this undermines the outlining of advocacy activities, especially with respect to 
forewarning negotiators of the dangers of locking the Zimbabwean economy into a pre-
determined pattern of liberalisation. 
 
This poor state-civil society relationship continued under the GNU while signatory parties, 
especially ZANU (PF), which more often than not displays a non-committal attitude to GPA 
provisions intended to support the country’s political and economic transitions, particularly 
the unlocking of funding support from the international community. In this regard, total 
disregard of GPA provisions has been a constant frustration to western governments, donors, 
and broad sections of civil society, hence their collective resolve to demand ‘clear and 
practical evidence of power-sharing’ (Kamidza, 2009a) before committing financial resources 
and technical assistance to the country’s socio-economic transition. Kamidza (ibid) notes that 
the above alliance had, prior to the signing of GPA, developed a set of benchmarks
15
 to 
evaluate the GNU’s commitment to political and economic transitional processes. In fact, this 
strategic activism was intended to unlock the necessary financial resources from the 
international community in support of projects, technical assistance, and budgetary 
expenditures. Unfortunately there has been no evidence of support in the ongoing EPA trade 
negotiations.  
 
In fact lack of funding denied more civic bodies the opportunity to become part of 
government delegations to RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings which were held in the region 
and in Brussels. This presents challenges to advocacy as the process lacks monitoring from 
within due to the absence of the ‘inside-outside strategy’. The plea for fair and just EPA 
outcomes remains largely unheard, which further weakens the advocacy of civic bodies and 
their “crying voice” (Deve, 2006) fails to influence the unbalanced and heavily biased match 
between a vulnerable Zimbabwean meltdown economy and an economically powerful 
European region. 
                                                 
14 This includes negotiators, parliamentarians, institutions (Director General (DG) Trade and DG Development) 
and a rotating presidency. 
15 These include full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; development of macro-economic stabilisation 
policies; restoration of the rule of law, judiciary and respect for property rights; releasing of all political 
prisoners as well as an end to political violence; respecting media plurality, democratic process, human rights 
standards, freedom of expression and assembly; and timely elections to be held in accordance with international 
standards. They are also demanding ‘no cherry picking’, meaning that ‘all the principles’ should be treated with 
equal importance as stipulated by the GPA framework. 
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 2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter debated the intricacies and related challenges and opportunities in the EU–
Zimbabwe trade negotiations within the context of state shortcomings and civil society 
advocacy. In this regard, several relevant theories underpinning trade negotiation were 
discussed in line with the study theme. This discussion was complemented by a discourse on 
the nexus between FTA and trade negotiations, and a discussion on civil society advocacy 
work on trade negotiations in particular and trade and development in general. The chapter 
further highlighted fault lines that constantly expose state shortcomings in economic policy 
formulation and the EPA process and challenges to the advocacy activities of CSOs. The 
chapter sets the tone for detailed discussions in subsequent chapters to expand on the notion 
of the EU onslaught to the Zimbabwean economy in the short to medium term through its 












This chapter discusses the research methodology employed to gather all relevant information 
in line with the study enquiry. Two sets of open-ended questionnaires
1
 were employed, 





 sampling trade related government portfolios, civil society 
organisations and private sector umbrella bodies. Zimbabwean government officials and 
representatives of private sector bodies and CSOs were approached for the purposes of 
administering a customised and structured questionnaire, and in some cases, to secure either 
formal or informal interviews. Willing representatives from institutions and organisations’ 
thus constitute ‘a unit of analysis’ in the study, providing information on the unfolding 
challenges of the EPA process, successes and experiences in the context of consultative state-
stakeholder fault lines and frosty bilateral relationships with the negotiating partner. Given 
Zimbabwe’s politically charged environment, previous professional fieldwork and research 
experiences assisted in devising counter-strategies (alternative ways) for sourcing 
information, especially from senior chief negotiators and politically insecure junior officials. 
These professional references also assisted in the development of research questions on 
which the thesis enquiry is premised with a view to unraveling and contextualising the 
Zimbabwean trade debate. The chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of the study 





                                                 
1 See Appendix: government questionnaire and civil society questionnaire 
2 Respondents in both governments and civil society were randomly identified based on their availability and 
readiness to be interviewed. 
3 Only respondents conversant with the EPA process between the EU and Zimbabwe were targeted for the 
interview. 
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 3.1.1 Government institutions 
 
The government-focused structured questionnaire was administered to the ministries of 
Industry and Commerce, Regional Integration and International Cooperation, other trade-
related ministries
4
 and the Zimbabwean embassies in Lusaka and Pretoria. The same 
questionnaire was also administered to two trade-focused para-statals: the Competition and 
Tariff Commission (CTC), and Zim-Trade. The questionnaire targeted officials who have 
been involved in the EPA process with a view to soliciting their opinions on the background, 
context and future of the EU-Zimbabwe trade and development cooperation relations in 
general and current trade talks in particular. These institutions are shown in Figure 31 below, 
which also includes names of two private sector bodies that are discussed below. 
 
Figure 3.1: Government related ministries and private sector bodies  
 
Source:  Own compilation from field data 
 
                                                 
















 Among the sampled state officials were former and current chief EPA negotiators who 
provided their perspectives via a structured questionnaire, and both formal and informal 
interviews, on the unfolding ESA-EU EPA process in general and EU-Zimbabwe trade talks 
in particular. The two former chief EPA negotiators (now with the Zimbabwean Embassy in 
Lusaka, Zambia, and Pretoria, South Africa) are Stella Nyagweta (2004-2005) and Angelina 
Katuruza (2006-2009), who directed the EPA process and led the Zimbabwean delegation to 
all the related RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the ESA region and in Brussels, 
Belgium - culminating in the sharing of the country’s positions and offers with the EU. The 
other official was Tedious Chifamba, currently the leading EPA negotiator of the re-
configured ESA group
5
, whose contribution and leadership skills have culminated in the 
signing of the iEPA by the Industry and Commerce minister, Welshman Ncube in Mauritius 
in 2009. Of the three senior government officials, only two agreed to give direct input into the 
study enquiry by responding to the structured questionnaire as well as making themselves 
available for one-on-one interaction to further clarify issues, concerns, interests and positions. 
For instance, the Pretoria based-former chief negotiator responded willingly to the 
questionnaire and provided additional information and insights on the government-NSA 
consultations in the EPA process as well as state-relations and synergies in the configuration. 
Both officials freely expressed opinions on EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations and state 
weaknesses and strengths within the context of the known fault lines
6
, particularly with 
respect to consulting with relevant stakeholders who are working on trade and development 
issues.  
 
Other trade related ministry portfolio officials were also solicited for their views via the 
structured questionnaire. However, most of them (junior government officials) were reluctant 
to either respond to the questionnaire or grant an interview. Their reluctance
7
 borders on 
perceived prevailing political intolerance with respect to CSOs’ activities and the associated 
fear of being construed as anti-government. The reluctance was also influenced by a section 
of the questionnaire that specifically indicated a comparison of strengths and weakness 
between the former ZANU (PF) government and the inclusive government
8
 in the EPA 
                                                 
5 See Chapter four - section 4.3.3.1 and section 4.3.3.2 for detailed discussion of the ESA split. 
6 See Chapter one – section 1.2.2 for references on Zimbabwe fault lines during the EPA process. 
7 Both Harare-based junior government officials and the Lusaka-based former negotiator refused to be 
interviewed without permission from senior government officials. 
8 This refers to GNU. 
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 process. This shows that most junior officials fear to be perceived as exposing state 
shortcomings. This can also be construed as implicit support for MDC formations.  
 
A poor response from most government officials, particularly the ministry of Industry and 
Commerce Directorate headed by Beatrice Mtetwa, necessitated two different approaches to 
harvest views and information on the ongoing EU-Zimbabwe trade and development 
negotiations. The first approach was to interview government officials when they were on 
official meetings outside the country on the assumption that they would then freely express 
their views
9
 on stakeholder consultative processes during the designing of economic policy, 
including EPA negotiations. This approach was largely influenced by the manner in which 
the former Pretoria-based chief negotiator responded to both the oral interview and 
questionnaire. However, the questionnaire was not administered to targeted government 
officials in regional meetings. This meant conducting interviews with officials without 
extensively recording notes from the discussions. This assured them that their opinion on the 
prevailing political polarisation, economic downward spiral and the ongoing EPA 
negotiations would not be for public consumption. The approach, which emphasised the 
confidentiality of information, generated sufficient confidence in government officials to 
allow them to express their opinion on unfolding political and economic sensitivities, state 
shortcomings in economic management - including trade negotiations and state-civil society 
relationships. The approach further encouraged government respondents to freely express 
opinions on sworn negotiating parties that politically and publicly cut off any direct formal 
engagement, except within the group. The second approach employs an IMF methodology
10
 
in which discussions on EPA issues with government officials were undertaken without 
necessarily and physically recording any notes (or responses) either on paper or tape, but 
rather memorising as much as possible the details of the discussion. It also entails informal 
discussions that may touch on areas considered politically sensitive while keeping track of 
the central issue. This approach enabled the respondents to be frank, critical and engaging 
while seemingly assuring themselves that their sentiments would remain outside the public 
domain. 
                                                 
9 The government officials when outside the country freely expressed their views knowing very well that they 
would not be quoted by media houses, especially the private media. 
10 When undertaking country mission with respect to sensitive social, economic and political developments in 
an autocratic country like Zimbabwe, IMF officials interact with government officials and other stakeholders 
without necessarily recording the discussions. This approach, which I coin “IMF method”, encourages free 
exchange of views regardless of the level of social, economic and political sensitivities, especially from state 
officials. 
50 
 The use of the above two approaches with respect to the two para-statals shown in the figure 
above produced mixed results. For instance, the outside the country approach failed to 
identify officials from the CTC but easily did so with respect to officials from the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZRA), among Zimbabwean delegates to regional meetings. This 
approach calls for the ability to build trust with targeted quasi-state institution officials before 
starting to interview them. But winning their trust was undermined by changes in the 
composition of government delegations in SADC meetings. The approach also suffered from 
another challenge of identifying the above quasi-state institution officials. The platform used 
to identify the aforementioned quasi-state institution officials (as well as government 
officials) was the SADC TNF, a biannual regional event according to SADC calendar. This 
SADC TNF handles trade related sensitivities between and/or among member states. In 
occasions that the approach was employed, the discussions were more often focused on the 
GNU’s decision to impose new surtaxes on regional products, especially from South Africa 
that should be at zero tariffs despite a derogation
11
allowing the country to delay 
implementing agreed SADC FTA tariff phase downs. The discussions more often became 
tense bordering on unkind despite allowed derogation and back-loading tariff liberalisation 
scheduling, with some remarks suggesting retaliation and/or questioning the rationality of 
such a decision. As a result, SADC TNF discussions introduced an environment that made it 
difficult to contemplate interviewing identified respondents. Nonetheless, SADC TNF 
facilitated informal discussions on the topic with the officials, though not in detail and 
without possibility for further discussion beyond the meeting platform. 
 
 
3.1.2 Private sector institutions 
 
A private sector-oriented questionnaire was administered to the Confederation of the 
Zimbabwean Industries (CZI) and the Zimbabwe National Chambers of Commerce (ZNCC) 
(see Figure 3.1 above). Specifically, the questionnaire solicited views from private sector 
umbrella bodies and their respective members on the objectives, rationale and context of the 
EPA negotiation process in Zimbabwe. In addition face-to-face interviews were arranged to 
clarify some sticking points as well as to allay fears of misuse of information given the 
prevailing political climate. The CZI chief economist, Dolphine Mazambani, responded to the 
                                                 
11 Article 3.1(c) of the SADC Trade Protocol defines derogation as a measure which allows for a delay in the 
implementation of a tariff phase down commitment by a Member State. 
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 questionnaire enquiry and also granted an interview which provided further perspectives and 
insights on the EU-Zimbabwe trade talk process, challenges and opportunities, while the 
ZNCC’s views remain unknown.  
 
 
3.1.3 Civil society organisations 
 
As mentioned above, a specific oriented structured questionnaire was administered to a 
number of civil society organisations and institutions that have been directly and/or indirectly 
involved in the EPA trade negotiations (as shown in Figure 3.2 below), with the intention to 
follow up on issues that required clarity. National CSOs and/or Harare-based regional CSOs 
that were part of the unit of analysis on state consultative approaches and civil society 
advocacy on the EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations are: 
 the Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute 
(Seatini); 
 Mwelekeowa NGO (Mwengo); 
 the Trade and Development Studies Centre –Trust (Trades Centre); 
 the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (Zimcodd); 
 the African Network on Debt and Development (Afrodad); 
 the Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT); 
 the Trade Capacity Building Project (TCBP); 
 the Alternative to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA); and  
 the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (Ledriz) - a 
research arm of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). 
 
The ideological conceptualisation and strategic dilemmas of ‘participation versus resistance’ 
articulated by McCandless (2011) and Raftopoulos (2005) in section 1.1 influences the 
degree of contribution of the above CSOs to the ongoing EPA debate in Zimbabwe. Thus of 
the above, Seatini, Trades Centre, Zimcodd, ANSA and Ledriz have been outstanding in their 
respective contribution to the EPA process - either as allies of state or working outside the 
government framework. Their importance is therefore further evidenced by quantifiable 
activity-related outcomes, outputs and mobilisation for and/or against the ongoing EPA 




Figure 3.2: EPA focused CSOs in Zimbabwe 
 
Source:  Own compilation from field data 
 
Responses were provided by Seatini, Mwengo, the Trades Centre, Zimcodd, ANSA, and 
Ledriz, while the other Harare-based CSOs and Malawi’s EJN failed to respond to the 
questionnaire inquiry despite numerous efforts. Here as well views were solicited from the 
relevant stakeholders through questionnaires, while additional information, perspectives, and 
insights were gathered through direct structured conversations. In some instances, 
representatives were identified and approached prior to dispatching the questionnaire while in 
other cases the questionnaire was directed to the head of the organisation. Additional data 
was also informally solicited from EPA chief technical advisors who were based at 
COMESA and SADC secretariats. All formal and informal informants had sound knowledge 
of the EU-Zimbabwe trade talks which had been taking place since 2004, as well as of the 
internal stakeholders’ consultative dynamics and challenges. In addition, the first set of 
benefits to the study were from direct involvement in EPA-related research projects 
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 Global Dialogue (Midrand, South Africa), EJN South Africa, Mthente Research and 
Consulting Services (both based in Cape Town, South Africa), and the Instituto de Estudos 
Sociais e Economics, (Maputo, Mozambique) - all of which culminated with publications 
(either trade policy articles or book chapters) and advocacy and capacity building workshop 
reports. The second set of benefits to the study were gained from participation in SADC TNF 
meetings, SADC EPA internal thematic technical working groups (TWGs) officials and 
senior officials meetings and joint EU-SADC EPA TWGs and senior officials meetings. The 
above meetings facilitated interaction with EPA officers, experts and negotiators as well as 
providing access to critical information and arguments that substantiate the dominance, 
influence and guerrilla mentality of the EU. The above meetings facilitated access to the EU 
Commission negotiating rooms (Figure 4.1) in Brussels, which helped to provide a better 
understanding of the EU’s approach to EPA negotiations with ACP configurations and/or 
individual countries as well as with other regions. Walking the corridors of the EU trade 
negotiating power assisted to provide a better understanding of the EU’s prioritisation of 
markets by both regions and countries, and its strategy of securing quick trade deals with 
small but politically ill-mannered counties like Zimbabwe. All the above assisted in the 
analysis of the study, including contextualisation of issues. The third set of benefits to the 
study relates to the organisation of EPA related capacity building workshops, which 
facilitates interaction with SADC private sector representatives, mainly from the SADC EPA 
configuration, SADC Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Trade and Development 




3.2 Research methodology 
 
The study starts from the premise that its study hypothesis of ‘An EPA negotiation is an 
economic onslaught to the Zimbabwean economy in the short to medium term’ (Section 
1.2.2), research problems (Section 1.2.1) and research questions (Section 3.3)are best tackled 
by utilising qualitative techniques toanalyse trade talk-related ideologies, issues, processes 
and procedures. In this way, the study utilises existing secondary documentary evidence to 
compare and contrast with field related information-driven context and analyses. This entails 
desk research, and reviewing all relevant secondary sources of information relating to trade 
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 negotiations in general, and the EU-Zimbabwe EPA trade talks in particular, with respect to 
state shortcomings in the following: 
 economic policy making 
 stakeholder relationships 
 stakeholders’ consultations and involvement in the process 
 stakeholders’ strategic networking and coalition formations and  
 CSO advocacy and lobbying 
 
Desk research also entails reviewing EU-ESA EPA-related formal documents (including 
impact assessment studies, communiqués, reports, proposals and offers); various scholarly 
documents on trade negotiations, FTAs and advocacy theories; CSO dialogue session reports 
and communiqués and academic policy research oriented papers; and public statements. 
 
The study notes the value of interviews in line with Vickers’ (2007: 49) observation that 
“people and their anecdotal experiences and recollections are important primary sources that 
may be used to confirm or invalidate secondary observations.” In this regard, the study 
benefited from interviews with civil society, the private sector umbrella bodies’ 
representatives and government officials. The study also benefited from formal and informal 
discussions with chief technical advisors (CTAs) based at COMESA and SADC secretariats, 
whose regional perspectives greatly enriched or validated existing observations and 
conclusions on EPA negotiation ideologies and the negotiation process. Lastly, the study 
benefited from both questionnaire responses and interviews, which either confirmed or 
refuted existing observations and conclusions. For instance, most unstructured interviews 
with government officials provided a fair assessment of the country’s agenda vis-à-vis the EU 
and state-NSAs’ relationships in the context of political poralisation and dysfunctional 
inclusive government. This approach avoided recording sensitive responses, especially from 
government officials who, due to the political poralisation in the country, were very careful 
not to delve into issues and processes that could have direct political consequences for their 
jobs and families.  
 
As noted in section 3.1.3, the study immensely benefited from several academic and practical 
oriented policy dialogue seminars, round-table discussions, workshops, and conferences 
which were either undertaken or facilitated or participated in during the gestation of this 
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 study in the region and beyond. The study further benefited from direct involvement in 
EPA-related research projects, most of which have been cited in this study. The study 
benefited from participating and/or facilitating internal SADC EPA member states and joint 
EU-SADC EPA negotiation meetings at various levels (2011-2013), lobbying missions to the 
EU’s economic, political and technical institutions (2005) and the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland (2011). Most importantly, the author’s professional 
experiences have all assisted in generating rich insights, understanding and perspectives often 
not in the public domain into the thematic focus of the study. In particular, the experiences 
exposed the nexus between dynamics and power politics of negotiations and profits and 
poverty, inequalities and underdevelopment. Furthermore, the experiences, which were 
complemented by extensive networking relationships with government negotiators and 
officials, lobbying civil society formations, academics and researchers in the region and 
beyond through many different pathways were in: 
 Civil society advocacy environment (in the region and beyond); 
 Commonwealth secretariat Hub and Spokes Project under the SADC secretariat 
(which is similar to COMESA) environment;  
 Public policy making environment (Southern African Political Economy Series 
(Sapes) Trust and Institute for a Democratic Alternative of Zimbabwe – (Idazim));  
 Trade negotiations and information sharing (Seatini);  
 Conflict negotiations and mediation (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution 
of Disputes- Accord);  
 Zimbabwe’s political and economic transition (Idazim); 
 Economic justice environment (EJN); and  
 EPA related research and publications (Pambazuka Online Publication, the Institute of 
Global Dialogue, EJN South Africa, Mthente Research and Consulting Services, and 
the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economics). 
 
The data collected from this process has been validated and analysed in line with the research 
hypothesis and questions. This entails capturing the views of Zimbabwe’s stakeholders 
including trade officials, parliamentarians, entrepreneurs, farmers, CSOs and individuals on 
state shortcomings and CSO advocacy in the EU-Zimbabwe trade negotiations process. This 
was complimented by institutional analyses with respect to mandate in particular of the 
negotiators and other state organs such as parliament. This was further complemented by 
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 analysis of civil society working on trade and development justices and knowledge gained 
from economic research institutions. Formal and informal discussions were conducted with 
EPA units’ CTAs at both COMESA and SADC secretariats who coordinate the EPA process 
in the ESA and SADC EPA configurations. All the above approaches assisted in clarifying 
and validating facts on the process and facilitated access to crucial reports, official documents 
and other relevant publications. 
 
 
3.3 Research questions 
 
The question whether or not ‘free trade’ is associated with superior growth and employment 
performance has attracted much debate and intrigue (Chizema and Masiiwa, 2011: 444). The 
debate supports the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) trade 
liberalisation agenda, and has in recent years influenced approaches, strategies and tactics in 
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations processes. In this respect, Bretton Woods 
Institutions argue that countries with more open markets achieve higher levels of economic 
growth, development and employment. In particular, the EU (1999), while explaining its 
approach to the WTO Millennium Round Conference, argues that trade liberalisation and 
strengthened multilateral trade system rules have resulted in significant contributions to 
global prosperity, development and poverty alleviation. A study by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1999) agrees that more open and 
outward-oriented economies not only consistently outperform restrictive trade and foreign 
investment countries, but also avoid choking off innovation and diminishing the possibilities 
of developing an information economy. This is further supported by Chizema and Masiiwa 
(Ibid: 445) who observe that trade liberalisation contracts inefficient sectors by realigning 
domestic prices of tradable goods with world prices, while expanding new and efficient 
productive structures. This supports Rodrik (1990) argument that political sensitivities and 
considerations sometimes compel governments to protect infant industries and inefficient 
sectors on account of national interests and current levels of revenues, from trade taxes. The 
above nuances sustain anti-trade liberalisation scholars’ argument for continued support to 
state intervention in directing the flow of foreign trade.  
 
The above global trade debates implicitly or explicitly influence the scope and content of the 
trade debate in Zimbabwe. However, this enquiry was necessitated by the fact that since 2000 
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 the trade debate in the country has been irrational, partisan and tense due to state-society 
relations, cold state-EU relations, politically induced social polarisation and economic 
policy contradictions. Indeed, the economic policy environment including trade, has greatly 
compromised relevant stakeholders’ constructive and collective consultations and 
engagements; the strategic synergy building and networking of stakeholders; and the 
advocacy of CSOs on the EPA process. As a result, the thesis enquiry was motivated by the 
following: 
 
 The 1990s trade liberalisation policy de-industrialised much of the Zimbabwean 
manufacturing sector. By the late 1990s the stage was thereby set for civil society 
opposition to state and/or donor-led trade policies, in conjunction with a world 
movement that emerged at the Seattle WTO summit. 
 
 The ZANU (PF) government was instrumental in both liberalising trade and (in the 
2000s) defaulting on debt obligations and imposing new financial and trade controls, 
until January 2009 when the currency collapsed. 
 
 The ZANU (PF) government’s revolutionary credentials (epitomised by guerrilla 
tactics and unorthodox reclaims of land and mining rights from erstwhile colonialists), 
which could not match the EU’s influence, dominance and divisive guerrilla 
negotiations strategies and tactics in pursuit of short to medium term offensive 
commercial interests in the Zimbabwean economy. 
 
 Civil society experience conflicts between a democratic wing and a redistributive 
wing, and although several economic justice organisations such as ANSA, Ledriz, 
Seatini, the Trades Centre, and Zimcodd straddle these wings, their first opportunity 
to influence both the ZANU (PF) government and the GNU on trade, had not had the 
desired impact. 
 
In reviewing the above, a number of research questions were employed focusing on three 
thematic areas which are at present poorly served by existing policy studies and academic 
literature, and which are central to the country’s economic transition. In this respect, the 
enquiry has focused on the EU-Zimbabwe trade relations; the state of play of the EPA 
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 process; and state shortcomings and civil society advocacy. The enquiry coincided with the 
recently (2012) launched trade and industrial policies that have yet to grapple with the 
complexities and contradictions with respect to re-capitalisation of the country’s industrial 
productive and export sectors, revamping industrial and export capacity utilisation, and 
improving the competitiveness of the country’s products at both local and EU markets. The 
enquiry also coincided with a mediated intra-state political alignment resulting in GPA and 
GNU, and subsequent challenges with respect to huge disagreements in ideologies and state-
society conflictual relationships caused by economic empowerment frameworks, including 
industrial policy, trade policy and trade negotiation. 
 
 
3.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Though data collection was planned to be concluded by June 2012, the prevailing suspicious 
political environment in Zimbabwe frustrated all efforts towards this goal. In particular, the 
director of the ministry of Industry and Commerce and other key senior and junior officials in 
trade-related portfolios avoided direct interaction with the questionnaire and did not grant 
time and space for further interviews or discussions. As a result, no appointments were 
secured and e-mail enquiries were not acknowledged.  
 
For instance, in a meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia in April 2012 with the previous EPA 
negotiator, Stella Nyagweta (2004-2005), now with the Zimbabwean Embassy in Lusaka, 
Zambia, she had a change of heart upon receipt of the questionnaire even though she had 
initially agreed to respond, claiming that clearance should be sought first in Harare before 
providing the requested information. This development undermined the expectation to 
unpack the government’s approaches to EPA negotiations with the EU during her leadership. 
This is a period during which the EU imposed smart sanctions and travel prohibitions during 
the relatively high frequency of ESA EPA internal and joint ESA-EU meetings, both in the 
region and in Brussels, including to the ACP-EU Ministerial meeting held in Gaborone, 
Botswana in 2004. 
 
Failure to get appropriate audiences with relevant government officials thus necessitated 
other tactics to get official views on the inquiry. This included frequent visits to Harare to 
employ the IMF method of discussing policy issues without recording the session but still 
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 absorbing many of the essential points. The second approach involved engaging trade 
officials in regional trade meetings organised outside the country where officials felt relaxed 
enough to discuss economic policy-related questions and issues and concerns in general and 
EPA process in particular, at length. However, in some instances the beyond the borders 
strategy did not help to gather all the relevant information, because the composition of the 
Zimbabwean delegation to SADC TNF kept changing, reflecting different ministerial roles 
and mandate between Industry and Commerce, and Regional Integration and International 
Cooperation. A combination of the above approaches yielded better results- respondents 
contributed to policy issues in a more open manner.  
 
Meanwhile, limited financial resources to undertake a field visit in Lusaka to formally and 
informally engage with the COMESA secretariat, the EPA unit CTA and/or a few Lusaka 
based civil society organisation, and a tight ESA EPA negotiation calendar in which the CTA 
was central, denied the study valuable insights and information. Two attempts secured 
through a formal appointment failed to produce an outcome because the CTA ended being 
busy elsewhere. For instance, despite a pre-arranged meeting during the joint ACP-EU 
Parliamentary Assembly for southern African help in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 2012, the 
CTA who was on the programme, could not make it. Another attempt to meet the CTA while 
on a SADC secretariat mission in Gaborone, Botswana, failed owing to time constraints 
associated with his consultative meetings. Meanwhile, the SADC EPA unit at the SADC 
secretariat was easily accessible but had no information on the EU-Zimbabwe EPA process. 
The only contribution was some general EPA arguments on the process and procedures, and 
the direct institutional collaboration with the Hub and Spokes Project to facilitate both the 





This chapter provided details of government-focused EPA institutions and structures, 
including para-statal entities meant to facilitate trade, and the legislature whose role in the 
ratification of the new trade regime with the EU is vital. The chapter further discussed private 
sector umbrella bodies whose mandates involve mainstreaming commercial interests in the 
country’s negotiating positions and offers, as well as those of civil society organisations as 
champions of pro-poor and pro-development advocates. Even though some of the above 
organisations and institutions failed to respond to the study enquiry, the chapter discussed 
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 them with a view to ensure that they are an embodiment of future institutional analysis in 
trade policy formulation, trade negotiations and/or trade negotiation study samples. The 
chapter also provided details on research methodology and research questions in which the 
hypothesis of EU onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy is premised and concludes by 
noting the limitations to the study of this nature in a politically charged environment, state-












After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe became a signatory to the Lomé Convention which 
since 1975 has proved the basic framework for economic cooperation between the EU and 71 
ACP countries (FAO Report, 2003
1
). Through the Conventions, the EU’s bilateral trade 
cooperation regime with ACP countries was characterised by non-reciprocal clauses, which 
entailed a range of trade preferences under DFQF market access that also guaranteed better 
market prices to goods originating from the ACP countries. Subsequently, Zimbabwe became 
a signatory of the Conotou Agreement, the successor of the Lomé Conventions, which is set 
to be replaced by the EPAs. Thus, the Europe-Zimbabwe bilateral relationship has been 
based on a predictable trade regime guided by negotiated trade and development 
cooperation principles and parameters of both the Lomé Conventions and Cotonou 
Agreement.  
 
The consequence of this is that the Conventions acknowledged different levels of economic 
development between the two parties, and within the framework of the ACP-Europe 
economic and political relationship in particular. This also meant that the trade regime 
reflected the geopolitical times during which the European Economic Commission (EEC), 
under the influence of MCs and TNCs capitalistic commercial interests, pursued a trade 
regime characterised by more access to cheap raw materials in agriculture and other 
extractive sectors than access to products in Zimbabwean markets and other ACP countries. 
In this relationship, Europe assumed explicit benign control over the trade and 
developmental agenda of all the ACP countries, but implicitly continued to set unchecked 
conditions that facilitated the entrenchment of MCs’ and TNCs’ capitalistic expansions, 
exploitative commercial tendencies and hegemonic influences on local domestic producers, 
exporters and, to some degree, the political leadership. It can be argued in the Zimbabwean 
                                                 
1 Study prepared for FAO by Tekere Moses with assistance from James Hurungo and Masiiwa Rusare, Trades 
Centre, Harare. 
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 case that its former coloniser (the United Kingdom) and other EU member states, through 
this bilateral trade relationship, maintained its dominance over the economy in ways that 
impact on future trade and development cooperation negotiations and/or relationships. In 
particular, Anglo-Zimbabwe relations adversely affected the economy, resulting in a 68% 
drop in the latter’s exports to the former (Chigora, 2006: 20). 
 
For Zimbabwe, the preferential market access has generally been positive. FAO Report 
(2003) agrees that for four consecutive years from 1994, the country enjoyed a balance of 
trade surplus with the EU. In this regard, Zimbabwe’s agriculture, manufacturing and mining 
export commodities to the EU covered both traditional and non-traditional product lines - as 
reflected in Table 4:1 below. From the table it is clear that agriculture has been central to any 
























 Table 4.1: Zimbabwe exportable commodities to the EU, 1980-2000 
Sector  Characteristics and remarks 
Agriculture  The preferential tariff quota under the Convention’s ‘Beef Protocol’ that allowed 
Zimbabwe to export 9,100 tonnes of beef annually into the EU market up to 
2011 (see footnote on page 93 in section 4.4.1). 
The sugar protocol under the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement that facilitated both 
refined sugar and raw sugar on two arrangements: the normal ACP-EU duty-free 
annual quota and the special preferred sugar arrangement. The protocol also 
benefited from Zimbabwe ESAP’s trade liberalisation policy and the 
enlargement of the EU market, both of which significantly improved the 
commodity’s market access situation in Europe. 
Horticulture: cut flowers, floriculture, fresh produce (mostly vegetables), herbs 
and spices, citrus and subtropical and deciduous fruits, whose combined total 
export value jumped from US$6 million in the 1986/1987 season to an estimated 
US$103 million in the 1996/1997 season. The horticulture industry enjoyed 
better production conditions including low costs, good climate, vast availability 
of suitable land, export processing zone status and a number of airlines servicing 
the industry. 
High-quality hand-picked cotton with very long fibres whose exports rose from 
18,797 tonnes in 1993 to 92,769 tonnes in 1997 before falling to 79,671 tonnes 
in 1998. Of the total cotton export, raw gin and fabric account for approximately 
80% and 5% respectively.  
About half of Zimbabwe’s tobacco crop, especially flue-cured tobacco, enjoys 
access to the EU market. However, tobacco production, which dropped from 
237 million kilogrammes in 2000 to 47 million kilogrammes by 2008, has since 
recovered to about 140 million kilogrammes by 2011. 
Fermented tea and coffee 
Manufacturing  Beverages, leather and textile articles.  
Mining  Precious or semi-precious metal scrap/stones, nickel and ferro alloys. 
Source: Compiled from various sources 
 
Notwithstanding the STABEX fund that sought to support export earnings due to a decline in 
prices of commodity exports, Zimbabwean export levels of most commodities gradually 
declined due to combination of factors: suppressed global prices in the late 1990s, the 2000 
fast-track land redistribution programme, increasingly volatile political environment, the 
ongoing diplomatic row between Harare and the EU and exchange rate policy inconsistency 
between policy and practice (that is, linking prices of goods and services with the parallel 
exchange rate than the official rate). In particular, horticulture after 2000 suffered from the 
withdrawal of major airlines that normally transported these products to the European 
markets, falling global demand on flower markets and prices, and the introduction of 
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 exchange rate controls. All the above significantly depressed production, and export 
volumes to the EU region. 
 
Meanwhile, the EU, by excluding non-ACP WTO member countries from the DFQF 
market access, violated the WTO principle of non-discrimination in global trade. This 
violation of the WTO rules paved the way for a time-bound
2
 EPA process between the EU 
and ACP configurations, whose outcome would determine the future industrialisation thrust 
of the latter, and in particular weak and vulnerable economies such as Zimbabwe. The 
outcome would also determine the former’s ability to protect its industries, producers, 
exporters, investors, farmers and consumers through negotiated tariff liberalisation and 
commitments on trade-related issues. Masiiwa and Chizema (2011: 465) warn that the EU’s 
demands for the inclusion of WTO-plus intellectual-property rules would make it difficult for 
Zimbabwe’s producers, exporters, and investors to access the knowledge and technology 
necessary for industrialisation and enhanced agricultural production. Such a development 
would only guarantee short to medium term markets for European products, especially in 
weak and vulnerable economies. For instance, Zimbabwe’s decade-long economic 
stagnation, continued political tension and politically motivated indigenisation and 
economic empowerment programmes would easily guarantee a viable market for the EU 
commercial products. 
 
This chapter interrogates the current EU-Zimbabwe relations being negotiated in a hostile 
political and economic environment. It starts by reviewing the socio-economic and political 
crises (1997–2008), focusing on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors whose products 
are certain to compete with those from Europe in both the EU and local markets. The 
investigation also provides pre-crisis context under each sector before discussing the 
transitional period under the inclusive government (2009-2012). This chapter also assesses 
the offensive and defensive capacities of the above sectors in both the national and EU 
markets. It further reviews the EU-Zimbabwe negotiation processes analysing, in the main, 
the former’s dominance and influence on the process through its economic and political 
leverage - not only within the context of the ACP and the ESA group, but also during the 
iEPA signing ceremony with the latter. The chapter concludes by examining related 
ideological and technical issues that dominated the EPA process. The chapter further 
                                                 
2 Initially, EPA negotiations between the EU and the ACP configurations were to be concluded by 31 December 
2007. 
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 introduce the discussions which follow in Chapter five (guerrilla negotiation approaches, 
strategies and tactics in the formulation of positions and offers) and Chapter six (emerging 
fears, implications, and policy options). 
 
 
4.2 The crisis period, 1997 – 2008  
 
Since the late 1990s the Zimbabwean economy has suffered from stop-gap economic 
management policies coupled with incoherent trade policy implementations. In particular, the 
government increasingly became hesitant to pursue neo-liberal policies and trade 
liberalisation that was discredited by civil society groups. Chitambara (2011) weighs in the 
debate by arguing that the growing hardship-induced discontent and rise of civil society from 
its slumber, forced subsequent government economic policies to be characterised by irrational 
controls, inconsistences and reversals, populist and knee-jerk implementation on the spur of 
the moment claiming in particular: 
 
A penchant for unbudgeted expenditures in the late 1990s: once off gratuity (US$4,167) and 
monthly pension (US$140) awards to each of the 50,000 war veterans of the liberation 
struggle at the end of 1997; military intervention in the DRC war estimated at US$33 million 
a month in August 1998; and between 69-90% salary increase for civil servants in January 
2000. Chitambara (2011). 
 
The above, coupled with disrespect of property and human rights, rule of law and deficiencies 
in governance and democratisation, worsened the relationship between Zimbabwe and its 
development partners to a degree that the country earned itself a high-risk profile (pariah 
status) (Kanyenze, et al., 2011). In response, donors and investors deserted the economy en 
masse, while by 1989 the country stopped accessing BOP support from IMF. Further slow 
export growth, a surge in imports and dwindling external financing and investment saw not 
only the overall BOP worsening from about US$200 million to an all-time low of about 
US$1.9 billion in 2009, but also accumulated areas on foreign-debt repayment, which rose to 
US$1.3 billion by December 2002 and about US$6 billion by December 2009. As a result, 




 The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) adopted 
in 1998, reflects a divergence between official policy and practice with (Structural 
Adjustment Programme Review Initiative Network) SAPRIN (2004: 45-6) observing policy 
contradictions with respect to 1998 tariff rationalisation, 2000 tariff mid-loading (application 
of tariff lines midway the agreed time-frame) under the SADC FTA, and the removal of 
several tariff exemptions on the one hand and proposed reintroduction of price controls on the 
other hand. This is supported by Masiiwa and Chizema (2011) who maintain that under both 
ZIMPREST (1998-2000) and Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) (2000-
2001), the official position on trade has been further liberalisation, yet in practice the 
government has taken several measures that indicated trade policy reversals. Kamidza and 
Mazingi (2011) observe that the Zimbabwean economic environment has suffered from 
perennial poor economic performance despite formulating five economic blueprints between 
2000 and 2007 which were unfortunately weakly implemented (see Table 6.4, section 6.4.1). 
The above illustrates how the ZANU (PF) leadership presided over an unprecedented melt-
down of the economy between 1998 and 2008 owing to political turmoil and economic 
mismanagement, resulting in large industrial and sectoral output losses and culminating in a 
hyperinflationary environment and a country-wide humanitarian crisis in 2008 (IMF Report, 
2011: 5). This reflects the dismal failure of both fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate an 
economic turnaround. In particular, extensive controls and regulations, especially with regard 
to the exchange rate that was fixed by the central bank at a highly overvalued rate, resulting 
in price distortions since the determinate of prices of goods and services was the parallel 
exchange rate. 
 
In supporting the above, Kamidza (2002: 26) highlights the limited choices policy makers 
had for dealing with high price instability and persistent inflationary pressures, declining 
business/investor confidence amid complete withdrawal of donor support, dwindling export 
competitiveness resulting in chronic shortages of foreign currency and erratic supply of fuel 
in an environment in which the prevailing political competition
3
 created conditions for 
populist short-term policies and/or policy interventions designed not to go beyond winning 
votes. Unfortunately, the policy makers’ focus was highly motivated by political contestation 
between the former ruling ZANU (PF) and the former opposition MDC formations. The 
highly polarised political environment further triggered politically motivated social and 
                                                 
3 The country’s intense electoral contestation include presidential (2002), parliamentary (2005), by-elections 
and mayoral and/or council elections. 
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 economic policies and/or programmes, and partisan public finance management. This 
contributed to conflictual bilateral relations between the negotiating parties and between the 
state and other stakeholders. The above therefore directly link the EPA process with gross 
violation of human and property rights and disregard of the rule of law, all of which 
undermined the economic export values of most sectors of the economy, especially in regard 
to agriculture and manufacturing as discussed below.  
 
The ZANU (PF) government’s often-repeated sanctions mantra at every local, regional and 
international platforms over this period increasingly became a major excuse for non-
performance in the economy, particularly in agriculture, and a convenient cover-up for 
inadequacies and corrupt activities in the diamond fields of Chiadzwa. The same mantra was 
also used to cover up glaring multi-stakeholders consultative weaknesses in economic 
policies and programmes, including the ongoing trade negotiations with Europe while the 
economy continued to suffer from unpredictable policies, uncertainty of political direction 
and the associated potential ramifications and huge challenges in social development. The 
search for a hard choices solution and the sanctions mantra are interrogated below in the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors that are certain to interface with products from Europe. 
These are the sectors that have the potential to offensively penetrate the EU market while 





The major constraint on the Zimbabwean economic growth from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s was industrial investment, which subsequently dampened manufacturing production 
and capacity utilisation (Bond, 1998: 125). The enacted import-substitution policy was only 
effective in textiles, metals and paper products, hence exports remained insignificant, making 
an impression only in textiles and metals. Meanwhile, domestic market expansion was driven 
by such sub-sectors as transport, beverages and tobacco processing, construction materials 
and pharmaceutical products and foodstuffs. While the manufacturing sector depicted 
stagnating trends, erratic but significant devaluation of the local currency negatively affected 
exports since the sector’s production equally depend on imported raw materials, intermediate 
production-related goods and capital equipment and machinery. As a result, the country’s 
BOP problems worsened thereby making it difficult to attract multi-national corporate 
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 investment to competitively produce for the regional and global export markets. Both 
Riddel (1990) and Bond (1989) blame manufacturing growth and development mainly on 
major political disruption and uncertainty, a series of poor agricultural seasons, the global oil 
crisis, a high dependence on foreign exchange in the manufacturing production processes and 
sanctions imposed on Rhodesian leadership. 
 
In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a relatively developed and diversified manufacturing sector, 
consisting of some 1,260 separate economic units producing about 7,000 different products 
(Doroh, 2011: 129). Therefore, the re-entry of Zimbabwe into the international community 
paved the way for access to new markets not only at the regional level (COMESA and 
SADC), but also Lomé Convention (which provided preferential entry for agro-exports into 
the EEC markets). Tekere (2001: 12) notes, however, that the Rhodesia-South Africa and 
Lomé Convention trade arrangements and guaranteed domestic market not only protected the 
sector from global competition, but also resulted in some firms becoming increasingly 
uncompetitive, especially on account of limited value addition and innovation. The sector has 
since been a central key driver of economic growth, contributing significantly to GDP, export 
receipts and employment creation. It has also developed strong backward and forward 
linkages with other key sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture (See Box 4.1) and 
mining. 
 
In the mid and late 1980s, the government replaced its import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy with a trade policy that protected local industrial development and the diversification 
of domestic markets through import restrictions and foreign-exchange controls (Rattso and 
Torvik, 1998). Doroh (Ibid) argues that the adopted deliberate policy of compressing imports 
in order to manage the BOP situation left capital stock in an obsolete and depleted state. 
However, the new policy failed to support sustainable economic growth as the industrial and 
export capabilities could not compete with global products. Hence by the late 1980s, 
investment was significantly depressed and resulted in stunted economic growth, foreign 
currency shortages, dampened productive sector expansion and increased unemployment.  
 
In response to the above, the country adopted the World Bank and IMF supervised and 
sponsored neo-liberal trade liberalisation policy, which inter alia, removed export incentives 
and import-license restrictions, resulting in sluggish performance from manufactured exports. 
Some domestic firms de-industrialised (scale down productive investments, and subsequently 
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 growths) due to a surge in competition from imported products. Doroh (Ibid) blames the 
weak response of non-traditional exports to price incentives generated by exchange rate 
depreciation, while Tekere (2001) laments the poor performance of both traditional and high-
technological
4
 industries. Kapoor (1995) bemoans the lack of corresponding measures to 
upgrade export infrastructure, providing export financing and developing market intelligence 
in support of exchange rate depreciation to achieve a structural shift towards exports between 
1991and 1996 period. Meanwhile, a high degree of political and economic uncertainty and 
patterns of extensive government restrictions discouraged any new investment in the 
economy. Thus, instead of becoming potential export-led growth, ESAP prescriptions 
contributed to export-led decline across key proactive sectors, particularly the manufacturing 
and agricultural sectors.  
 
Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector was the hardest hit by the trade liberalisation and 
market-led policy prescriptions under ESAP in the 1990s, since it had previously been 
protected and had to face up to new business conditions. As a result, the unlocking of GFIs’ 
funding could not sustain the sector’s growth and development in particular and the economy 
in general. The approach was radical (Rattso and Torvik, 1989) owing to increased political 
pressure to join the international trend of implementing liberal economic reforms, and 
assurances from the Bretton Woods Institutions that liberalisation would unlock funding 
(Chizema and Masiiwa, 2011:455). The sector suffered further from the consequences 
(and/or unintended consequences) of the unfolding politically-driven economic 
empowerment policies and/or programmes. It almost came to a halt largely due to a 
combination of factors, including scarce domestic production inputs; a lack of foreign 
currency to import production inputs and to replace aging tools, machinery and equipment; 
and a highly politicised operational environment characterised by threats to property rights, 
and macro-economic policy contradictions and uncertainty.  
 
In particular, the sector suffered from a significant collapse of investors (both domestic and 
foreign) and donor confidence, and subsequently a sudden and massive withdrawal of both 
investors (both domestic and foreign) and donors who opted for neighbouring countries 
(Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia) and the United Kingdom. The sector 
was also a major casualty of price distortions between 2000 and 2008, especially excessive 
control in terms of perpetually pegging the exchange rate at a highly overvalued rate at a time 
                                                 
4 This includes machinery, electrical machinery and transport. 
70 
 when the country’s industries were net consumers of imported inputs (raw materials, 
machinery, spare parts and equipment and intermediate goods). This illustrates how an 
inconsistent policy regime resulted in a significant fall in the country’s manufacturing output 
and exports. 
 
Kramarenko et al. (2010: 32) blames the fast-track land reform for triggering the inevitable 
collapse of the manufacturing sector, leading to a corresponding sharp decline in export 
earnings. The sector’s correlation with agriculture through strong backward and forward 
linkages (see Box 4:1) resulted in a drastic fall in its total contribution to foreign currency 
earnings from US$815 million in 2000 to US$210.3 million in 2008 (Doroh, 2011: 143), 
amid a significant surge in foreign competition on the domestic market. The combinations of 
a slump in manufacturing production and export capacities also resulted in foreign exchange 
rate instability and subsequently balance of payment pressures. This forced the country to 
default on many of its external obligations with the IMF and the World Bank, thereby 
accumulating more arrears. In an effort to ameliorate the situation, the Reserve Bank 
Governor, Gideon Gono, introduced multiple exchange rates, that is, a fixed exchange rate, 
managed two-tier exchange rate and foreign exchange auction, all of which faltered as aptly 
summarised by Kramarenko et al. (Ibid) thus: 
 
Zimbabwe performs poorly in terms of competitiveness, whether it is measured by 
governance (including rule of law, property rights and corruption), investment climate 
(including enforcement of property rights and infrastructure) or price indicators (Kramarenko 
et al., 2010:31).  
 
The CZI Reports (2008 and 2009) supported the above by citing limited competitive export 
markets, high cost of production, low capacity utilisation, lack of foreign currency and 
working capital as the main constraints in the sector. This is further supported by Kanyenze et 
al. (2011) who blames policy inconsistencies and reversals, volatility and unpredictability of 
the exchange-rate system, lack of secure and predictable property rights, degradation and 
collapse of infrastructure, severe human-resources deficits emanating from out-migration, 
serious governance deficits, hostile investment climate and severe shortage of essential inputs 
(fuel, raw materials and intermediate inputs).  
 
Furthermore, the economy in general and the sector in particular suffered from price 
distortions owing to the introduction of price controls (especially between 2000 and 2008) 
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 that deliberately ignored the fact that the sector sourced scarce foreign currency, mainly 
from a parallel market, to import the necessary inputs. Ultimately, industrial capacity 
utilisation and competitiveness plummeted, triggering a subsequent drastic fall in export 
receipts. The above contributed to the falling in the sector’s production and export 
capabilities to the lowest ebb in the country’s living memory
5
. Sibanda (2012: 1) observes 
that the country’s manufacturing exports to South Africa, the regional main trading partner, 
declined from 30% to 12%. The above shows that the sector was not only a total shadow of 
its past well-diversified industrial and export base in terms of regional and global links, but 






Land is the centre stage of development in Zimbabwe because the economy is agro-based, 
and also an influential factor in the country’s political development since colonial rule. At 
independence, ZANU (PF) inherited a highly developed, sophisticated and largely 
commercially driven agricultural sector (Matondi, 2011). The sector had a relatively 
developed infrastructure and capabilities for farming that also attracted significant levels of 
confidence and investment. The sector was also supported by prudent government policies, 
and complemented by the Lancaster House Agreement’s ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ 
constitutional clause, both of which successfully ring-fenced the sector as the anchor for the 
economy. Subsequently, the agricultural exports in real value increased from Z$409.2 billion 
in 1981 to Z$1.1 billion in 1988, with tobacco, cotton and sugar accounting for about 75% of 
the total income generated. The 1990s also witnessed strong intensification of producing and 
exporting commercial crops including cotton, maize, tobacco and wheat and diversification 
into horticulture and other new income streams (including ostrich-farming and game-
ranching).  
 
ZANU (PF)’s fast waning public support in the late 1990s amid an equally fast rising 
popularity of the new political party – the MDC – caused its leadership, in league with former 
freedom fighters and some villagers, to evoke ideals that underpinned mass mobilisation 
during the liberation struggle, and violently removed legal white commercial farmers from 
their land. The guerrilla unorthodox strategies and tactics disregarded the country’s rule of 
                                                 
5 See section 1.1 in which Nyakazeya (2009) estimated 4 and 10% industrial capacity utilisation.  
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 law and bi-lateral protection guarantees. The distribution of the acquired land was largely 
partisan
6
, populist and politically motivated. However, the unfolding process disregarded 
the sector’s historical importance as the backbone of the economy, highly correlated with the 
production processes of the manufacturing sector, and the main source of people’s 
livelihoods. This is explained by the African Development Bank (AfDB) (2011) in Box 4.1 
below. This also disregarded the importance of farm management abilities, skills training, 
experiences, a known track record in agricultural production and motives and commitment to 
agriculture as a business.  
 
Box 4.1:   Linkages between agriculture and manufacturing 
The manufacturing sector has always had strong linkages with the agricultural sector, with 
agriculture sourcing from it over half of intermediate goods - including insecticides, stock 
feeds and fertiliser - while half of agricultural produce is supplied to the manufacturing 
sector. The performance of the two sectors has historically been closely correlated. Therefore, 
the collapse of agricultural activities associated with the implementation of the fast track land 
reform programme by the former government had a devastating impact on the manufacturing 
sector, which experienced a cumulative decline of 92% between 1999 and 2008. 
Source: African Development Bank (2011: 4) 
 
As a result, agricultural production suffered across the range of commercial commodities. 
New Agriculturist (June 2011) confirms a significant reduction in coffee production from 
10,000 tonnes in 2002 to 300 tonnes in 2010 following diversification of new farmers to 
maize. Further, Zimbabwe (which by end of 2000 was the world’s third-largest producer of 
flue-cured tobacco), recorded a 56% reduction in both the area put to the crop and the 
corresponding production in the 2001/2002 season, compared with the 1990s (Matondi, 
2011). The overall reduction of area, yield and output of the traditional major foreign-
currency earner (tobacco) and cotton are reflected in Table 4.2 below. Although new farmers 
seem to have shown resilience in cotton production, the global price fall is forcing them to 
diversify to tobacco whose production levels falls short of yesteryear farmers. Meanwhile, the 
EU’s efforts to rejuvenate the declining sugar cane production with an estimated €45 million 
in funding support between 2008 and 2013 towards rehabilitating abandoned cane fields and 
                                                 
6 Including cabinet ministers, ZANU PF parliamentarians, war veterans, army generals and senior civil servants. 
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 improved infrastructure has yet to increase production from 300,000 tonnes in 2009  to the 
projected 1 million tonnes by 2013. 
 












1999/2000 415,000 850 353,000 85,000 2,770 236,000 
2000/2001 397,000 840 337,000 76,000 2,650 202,000 
2001/2002 229,000 850 195,000 71,000 2,330 166,000 
2002/2003 282,000 850 240,000 54,000 1,510 82,000 
2003/2004 389,000 850 331,000 41,000 1,580 65,000 
2004/2005 350,000 560 198,000 56,000 1,330 75,000 
2005/2006 300,000 860 258,000 27,000 2,030 55,000 
2006/2007 354,000 840 300,000 53,000 2,160 79,000 
2007/2008 431,000 520 226,000 62,000 1,100 70,000 
2008/2009 338,000 730 247,000 48,000 1,330 64,000 
 Source: Adopted from Matondi (2011: 102) 
 
Thus, across all the commodities (commercial and non-commercial), the sector’s productive 
and export performance fell to its lowest ebb in living memory in terms of providing food 
security and food sovereignty, ensuring forward and backward linkages with other sectors of 
the economy; and generating foreign currency, job opportunities, incomes and livelihoods. As 
a result, displaced former commercial farmers who opted for neighbouring countries (mainly 
Mozambique and Zambia) and beyond (Nigeria) not only caused a collapse in agricultural 
activities, but also significantly distressed the manufacturing sector in the past decade. 
Subsequently, agricultural exports were overtaken by minerals and low processed industrial 
raw materials as the country’s leading exports, even though the volumes exported had 
contracted (Kaminski and Ng (2011). 
 
The above is supported by Coorey et al. (2007:4) who argue that the chaotic seizure of 
commercial farms and unresolved property rights issues relating to security of land tenure 
fueled the country’s hyperinflationary environment and an estimated 30% contraction of the 
economy since 1999. Coorey et al. (Ibid: 12) further note that the country’s commercial 
banks find it difficult to provide finance to new farmers under existing 99-year lease 
arrangements that do not provide adequate security of land tenure. The fast-track land reform 
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 programme not only triggered a loss of confidence in the economy
7
, but also paralysed the 
backbone of the economy by essentially weakening forward and backward linkages with 
socio-economic sectors of the economy. In particular, the sector’s linkages with the rest of 
the economy both qualitatively and quantitatively had been on a perennial downward spiral 
since 2000 as was evident by the low downstream agro-processing industries and other 
agricultural-related economic activities. This severely compromises the capacity to produce 
agricultural commodities to constantly feed into agro-processing industrial capabilities and 
offensive export drive into the EU market in the short to medium term. Current agricultural 
outputs and exports both by volume and value reflect the lack of business acumen and 
commitment on the part of most new farmers. Indeed, the sector’s capacity to generate 
foreign currency through cash crops such as cotton, sugar and tobacco significantly scaled 
down in both volume and value. For instance, tobacco, once the main traditional earner of 
foreign currency in the country, is still struggling to improve the quality of its gold leaf. 
Further, country-wide disruption in the beef sub-sector largely due to foot and mouth disease 
cost the country its previously guaranteed and uncontested market share of beef in European 
cities.  
 
The above is supported by Sandrey and Vink (2011: 18) who argue that Zimbabwe, once 
regarded as the bread-basket of Africa, is a tragic example of the consequences of economic 
mismanagement of the sector, quoting Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) data showing 
an average annual decline of about 0.7% in agricultural production between 1990 and 2007. 
The above mirrors the decline in foreign currency earned by tobacco and cotton from US$566 
million and US$174 million in 2000 to US$245 million to US$95 million in 2007, 
respectively. Dismal trade performances in tobacco and cotton are mirrored in production 
decline estimated at two-thirds and a third respectively over the same period. Sandrey and 
Vink (2011: 19) further argue that commercial farms are now largely occupied by people who 
are unable and unwilling to make productive use of the land. Since 2000, all categories of 
farmers (A1 Model, A2 Model and peasant) perennially failed to produce enough 
agricultural-related quantities of foodstuffs and products to satisfactorily feed the nation and 
its industrial economic activities. As a result, and embarrassingly so, the nation increasingly 
become a perennial recipient of humanitarian food assistance or parcels, ironically from the 
EU and other western governments and donors.  
 
                                                 
7 Donors and investors (both foreign and domestic) significantly withdrew from the economy. 
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 Indeed, in recognising the sector’s importance, the government adopted supportive 
mechanisms in the form of agricultural schemes including seeds, fertilisers, all types of fuel, 
chemicals, and ploughs and tractors, administered by the Zimbabwean Central Bank 
Governor, Gideon Gono. These quasi-fiscal interventions by Gono reflected a high degree of 
encroachment into the policy jurisdiction of the ministry of Finance, and an equally high 
degree of poor governance in public finance management which only benefited country-wide 
farmers aligned to the ZANU (PF) party, regardless of their potential commitment and 
capacities to utilise the land to levels that emulate the condition under previous owners. Since 
then, the sector has continued to struggle to come closer to its pre-2000 performance in terms 
of production and productivity levels, despite farmers having access to and/or control of the 
best soils and vast tracks of land, and is now a perennial recipient of government assistance. 
This shows that the decade-long and consistent direct financial support from the government 
was not an answer to the revival of the sector. It calls for additional interventions such as the 
business acumen, commitment, training and skills development in the sector, farm 
management and depoliticisation of the sector. In this respect, the study hopes that proposals 
to reorganise agricultural-related settlements may point in the right direction.  
 
In spite of the above production and export-related challenges, the weak agricultural sector, 
under the new trade regime, is set to compete with EU farmers that are largely protected by 
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) from external competitors through direct subsidies, a 
development in which the EU always argues that its support for the agricultural sector is 
WTO compatible. But Goodison (2007) argues that EPA-related outcomes and implications 
have the potential to undermine government revenues (loss of state revenues generated from 
tariffs) as well as efforts to promote national exploitation of economic resources. This is 
supported by Bilal and Rampa (2006) who point to the EU’s unfulfilled promise to assist 
ACP countries, not only to develop new sources of government revenue to replace the tariffs 
that were removed, but also to improve the competitiveness of the productive sector in order 
to face off cheaper imports. Indeed, an EPA-led tariff phase-down in this sector compromises 
its contribution to fiscal revenue generation, and subsequently, support for agricultural related 
production capacity initiatives, including research and development. Already, a combination 
of perennial agricultural low production and productivity and social and humanitarian crises 
have triggered agricultural import surges from Europe and other emerging economies such as 
Brazil, ranging from poultry to dairy, cereals and processed agricultural products. However, 
the import surges cannot at this stage be linked to the signing and ratification of the iEPA. 
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 This development accelerates and sustains de-industrialisation as well as discourages first-
stage processing of agricultural commodities before export to the EU market and other 
potential markets. This means that cutting trade barriers and opening markets alone does not 
necessarily generate development, especially in developing countries in general and 
Zimbabwe in particular.  
 
 
4.3 The transitional period, 2009 – 2012 
 
The IMF Report (2011) for the country notes that the economic growth, which started on a 
low base, concentrated on primary commodity sectors such as mining and agriculture, both of 
which are sensitive to exogenous shocks. The economy stabilised following the introduction 
of the multi-currency system and stronger fiscal discipline by the GNU administration, 
resulting in renewed capital inflows, an accommodative external environment and economic 
growth of 9.0% and 5.5% by 2010 and 2011 respectively (IMF, 2011 and 2012). While the 
economic recovery steadily gathered momentum, challenges still persists that poison the 
economic climate, especially with regards to much needed investment. Since the birth of the 
GNU, investors (both domestic and foreign) continue to sit on the fence. Other challenges 
include: macro-economic policy setbacks, contradictions and uncertainties; political tensions 
within the governing coalition parties on account of pre-election debates and the 
implementation of GPA provisions; recent pronouncements of fast-track indigenisation and 
economic empowerment programmes
8
 of the mining sector (Government of Zimbabwe, 
2011); and structural bottlenecks including rigid labour market legislation, lack of security of 
land tenure and poor governance in the diamond sector. Unclear structural prospects for 
redressing the above challenges and structural bottlenecks continue to cloud short to medium 
term economic prospects. 
 
These setbacks expose the vulnerability of the industrial sectors in particular and the 
economy in general. Structural impediments continue to weigh heavily on manufacturing and 
utilities, past engines of economic growth and development and employment creation. The 
                                                 
8 Indigenous is defined as a person who before 18 April 1980 was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such person, and includes any company, association, syndicate 
or partnership of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members holding the controlling 
interests. For the avoidance of doubt, this refers to indigenous black Zimbabweans. ‘Ownership requirements 
under the indigenisation programme stipulate that 51% of equity of companies with assets exceeding 
US$500,000 belong to indigenous Zimbabweans. While there is broad agreement in the government of the 
policy, there exist significant differences of opinion regarding pace and modalities of the policy.’  
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 economy is yet to record steadfast progress in the manufacturing sector in terms of 
restructuring and improvements in export industries. The sector holds great expectations for 
improvement in predictable policies, access to finance and working capital, inputs into 
production processes and infrastructural developments (roads, energy, and water utilities).  
 
A recent survey done by CZI has found that local products continue to struggle to compete in 
national, regional, and global markets due to a combination of factors including a shortage of 
working capital to meet orders, high costs of production and failure to identify potential 
external markets. There are also structural problems in the manufacturing sector, particularly 
regarding the employment of obsolete capital equipment in the production processes, largely 
due to foreign currency shortages. However, the recently launched industrial policy pledges 
to remove controls in interest and exchange rates as well as to liberalise foreign currency to 
buttress the sector’s performance as the new engine of economic growth (SADC secretariat, 
2000). Though the country is surrounded by fast-growing regional economies, it is yet to 
benefit from such growth. In the mining sector, all inputs are imported while nearly all 
outputs are exported without processing or value addition. 
 
In many instances, the Zimbabwean GNU had failed to develop and implement practical 
implementable and inclusive stabilisation policies and programmes. The inclusive 
government has also ignored calls for a conducive economic and political environment 
anchored in comprehensive structural reforms, predictable policies, recapitalisation 
programmes covering all industries, inclusive broad-based land reform and indigenisation 
and economic empowerment programmes. Success in the above could have restored investor 
and donor confidence much sooner, and subsequently unlocked international financial and 
technical resources. This could also have assisted in the recapitalisation of the industrial and 
export sectors thereby expanding the economy, creating jobs and ensuring pro-development 
and pro-poor EPA outcomes.  
 
As the manufacturing sector remained under severe stress and SMEs struggled to emerge 
from a decade-long economic slumber, many economic units and consumers relied more on 
informal cross-border imports. The GNU administration did not make a difference to the 
former ZANU (PF) government’s economic operational environment since the rate of 
recapitalising the sector remains very slow largely due to resource constraints, in addition to 
unpredictable and uncertain policies and economic empowerment programmes such as the 
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 indigenisation programme. The economy’s high dependence on imports including food 
items is well captured by the Industry and Commerce minister, Welshman Ncube, who says: 
“Brazilian chickens are finding their way on the local market disguised as South African 
products.” (The Herald, 5 March 2010). CZI president, Joseph Kanyekanye weighs in by 
claiming that “Zimbabwe has opened her market too much to foreign players. How do you 
justify importing canned food?” (Bhebhe, 2012). 
 
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector also struggles to shake off the negative implications of 
irrational and unorthodox policies and the subsequent partisan distribution of land and 
agricultural support inputs. The nation continues to depend on humanitarian assistance to a 
large degree which means that the sector’s contribution to socio-economic development 
(through tariff revenues), employment creation, livelihoods sustenance (food security), 
foreign currency generation and backward and forward linkages with other economic and 
social sectors, remains subdued. Even though the GNU administration acknowledged the 
importance of agriculture in socio-economic transformation, there are visible signs of 
politicking. Resources and capacity to add value in agricultural products through agro-
processing activities targeting mainly crops and livestock products remain limited. The 
country continues to experience food insecurity and limited agricultural input into other 
sectors, a development that questions the ability and capacity of new farmers to compete with 
the EU farmers under the new trade regime in both EU and local markets. It appears that both 
new and smallholder farmers are under threat from EPA outcomes, judged by the list of 
sensitive products, including agricultural products, submitted to the EU. The list of 
agricultural sensitive products is not only narrow but also not very ambitious, clearly 
indicating the negotiator’s failure to contextualise them properly. This confirms the study 
argument that the negotiation process suffered from a lack of in-put from farmer 
organisations, which have been dysfunctional since 2000 (see section 5.4). This confirms that 
Zimbabwe has not sufficiently protected her offensive and defensive agricultural interests in 
both the EU and local markets, a development that has serious implications for the economic 
life of the radicalised new farmers. The country should have articulated its commercial 
interests and long-term agricultural vision for growth and expansion in the EU and other 
global markets. Agriculture should have been the compelling pressure point for Zimbabwean 
negotiators to aim for more concessions for the sector, which has huge potential despite sour 
relations with the EU.  
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 4.4 EU - Zimbabwe trade negotiation process 
 
4.4.1 EU’s dominance in the EPA process 
 
EU dominance in this relationship is largely driven by MCs and TNCs, which are ever 
ready to exploit every market opportunity in Zimbabwe to advance their respective modes 
of production, usually represented by outward expansion of the production frontier (Figure 
5.2, section 5.3), that is, continued increase in the supply of goods and services. This 
dominance under the EPA framework seeks to intensify the searching for markets in ACP 
countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular in order to sustain overproduction or high 
productivity of goods in Europe as well as employment opportunities and profit margins. 
This dominance is apparently a feature of most post-colonial ACP states including 
Zimbabwe. According to the FAO Report (2003), EU dominance is enhanced by MCs’ and 
TNCs’ agribusiness companies which have privileged access to crucial market information 
that very few other constituencies (including most developing governments) can aspire to.  
 
The mutual relationship between the EU, and MCs and TNCs in ongoing EPA negotiations 
is reflected in Figure 4.1 below, illustrating that their respective powers are multi-faceted, 
ranging from concentrating on marketing environments to influencing global economic 
policy making processes and frameworks, including bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade 
negotiations. In this respect, MCs and TNCs’ businesses pursued unbalanced EPA outcomes 
by extensively and consistently lobbying European institution, the EU Commission, the 
European Parliament and EU member states, to simultaneously deliver a new trade regime 
that opens new sustainable markets in Zimbabwe while limiting import surges from European 
markets. It can also be argued that the EU’s imposition of smart sanctions and travel bans on 
the ZANU (PF) leadership and associated companies were in sympathy with the total 
disregard of MCs’ and TNCs’ commercial interests, especially in the agricultural sector, by 
the former government. The MCs and TNCs have leverage to lobby the Bretton Wood 
Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) in support of market-led policies and trade 
liberalisation agendas in the developing economies to levels that resonate with the EPA 
process. The Zimbabwean trade liberalisation agenda in the 1990s was a case in point. Linked 
with the above are the MCs’ and TNCs’ lobbying efforts directed at bilateral and multilateral 
donors such as the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank. This resulted in the suspension of 
critical aid from the IMF and World Bank at the peak of Zimbabwe’s shortages in foreign 
currency to support industrial productive capacities, export competitiveness and fulfillments 
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 of debt obligations. It can further be argued that the MCs and TNCs successfully exerted 
pressure on the EU thereby contributing to the lack of movement during the WTO Doha 
Development Round (WDDR) in order for the bloc to first secure EPA markets in ACP 
economies. This was done in the knowledge that most weak and vulnerable countries, 
including Zimbabwe, have limited financial and human resources to simultaneously negotiate 
both EPA and WDDR processes in ways that provide meaningful resistance to future 
commercial interests from both the EU market and countries where they have a commercial 
presence. All of the above supports EC’s capacity to articulate its mandate and approach in 
the EPA process in line with Rothstein’s (1979) appreciation of the EU’s cohesive procedural 
and substantive unity based on ideological principles and the sum-total of the group’s 




























































1.  Zimbabwe government under pressure from both EU governments and principles (World Bank, IMF 
and donors; 
2.  Dotted lines represent weak structure; 
3.  Continuous line represents powerful structure; 
4.  Resistance (anti-EPA) EPA focused NGOs were not funded by EU compared to collaborative and 
adaptive counterparts working on governance, democratization, human rights and humanitarian 
assistance; 
5.  Media in Zimbabwe weak, focusing more on political developments than EPA process  
6.  CR stands for Committee Room(s) 
 
Source:   Own compilation 
 
Figure 4.1 reflects Zimbabwe’s weak and uncooperative private sector and divided  media 
accused of being anti-ZANU (PF) government. For instance, a continued economic 
downward spiral coupled with visible signs of mistrust between the state and the private 
sector generally undermines the latter’s membership participation in the ongoing trade 
talks. The figure also reflects resistant CSOs, most of which have uneasy relationships with 
the government. While the diagram reflects the importance of the people, the process has 
failed to involve them through representation in parliament. Indeed, owing to her weak and 
vulnerable economic position, Zimbabwe could not financially support the participation of 
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 the national parliament through the TDC membership. Politically, the composition of 
members of parliament (MPs) in the TDC reflects two distinct groups, namely the anti-EU 
sanction and those whose party has been supportive of the EU’s economic and political 
measures against the former governing party. These financial limitations and political 
polarisation vis-à-vis the EU undermines the Zimbabwean parliament’s ability to 
proactively resource their participation and involvement in the EPA process, as was the 
case in previous economic paradigm such as the ESAP and ZIMPREST. During the ESAP 
and ZIMPREST process and implementation, Zimbabwean MPs actively engaged other 
relevant stakeholders. However, the above shows that the EPA process was in the anti-
Zimbabwe camp’s commercial and political interests.  
 
The FAO Report (2003) further observes that TNCs agribusiness firms have access to 
enormous sums of capital necessary to cover futures marketing contracts of some agricultural 
commodities, thereby influencing the prices at which trade-policy-mediated domestic support 
and export subsidies are set. Such interventions obviously benefit TNC firms and reflect how 
the global nature of the TNCs and MCs operations give them political and economic 
leverage. It also allows them to be the dominant and manipulative presence in dozens of weak 
and vulnerable countries, thereby creating a powerful force to influence economic policies in 
support of their own commercial interests. In this regard, it is possible that MCs and TNCs 
through their close relationships with national political leadership may influence the adoption 
of a trade regime that limits competition by creating barriers to entry in the market in which 
they enjoy monopolies’ status. Although the MCs and TNCs currently have no monopoly 
(having been displaced by the ZANU (PF) regime), their influence and dominance in the 
process would open future commercial opportunities in the country. The thesis therefore 
argues that the yesteryear MCs and TNCs firms would potentially and easily exploit 
prevailing socio-economic conditions and emerging commercial opportunities in the country. 
However, the outcome would result in a market-led onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy 
in the short to medium term. 
 
The above dominance of MCs and TNCs have since the colonial era been the main feature 
of the Zimbabwean economy. It is therefore the cornerstone of Europe’s capitalist expansion 
which ensures economic integration with industrial process in Zimbabwe through the EPA 
regime. Europe has remained Zimbabwe’s leading trade partner despite strained bilateral 
trade and development relationships that coincide with EPA negotiations. These conflictual 
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 relationships have largely been influenced by the EU’s imposition of smart sanctions on the 
ruling elites and their associated companies on account of ZANU (PF)’s serious deficiencies 
in governance and democratisation practices. This confirms the study hypothesis that the 
EPA process is potentially an onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy in the short to medium 
term as reflected in the following two scenarios:  
 
o Firstly, the EU blames the former Zimbabwean government’s poor record of 
governance, democratic values, human rights, electoral processes and selective 
application of law for directly undermining stakeholder consultative engagement and 
transparency in the participatory processes. However, such public grandstanding on 
the part of the EU has from the outset been designed to shield its institutions and 
structures, as well as member states, from public judgment and condemnation if the 
EPA outcomes fail to satisfy well-known pro-poor and pro-development objectives, 
especially those of a developmental nature. As a result, those constituencies that are 
fighting for a new Zimbabwe with acres of lobbying and activism would absolve the 
EC from any bad EPA outcome, and rather blame state shortcomings. Given the slow 
pace of political transition to a pluralistic and constitutional democracy, the civil 
society voice that is ready to protect the EU from any wrongdoing continues to be 
justified. This means that a significant proportion of the population has not yet, and 
might not in the future, understand and acknowledge the contribution of the EU to the 
EPA outcome that for a short to medium term may not necessarily support a 
sustainable social and economic development process as explicitly warned in the 
study hypothesis. 
 
o Secondly, the ZANU (PF) government accuses the EU of meddling in political 
processes of the sovereign state by supporting CSOs that have been strong allies of 
MDC formations; that have always been vocal against state-led macro-economic 
policies and programmes (especially the indigenisation economic programme) and 
macro-economic transformation (fast-track land reform); and that have been lobbying 
for the imposition of smart sanctions against ZANU (PF) leadership and associated 
companies. This has sustained the anti-colonial agenda (especially economic 
emancipation project) as well as portrayed the EU as a predatory negotiating 
counterpart ready to exploit internal consultative weaknesses to ring-fence the 
commercial interests of member states in the proposed EPA deal.  
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Table 4.3: Zimbabwe’s trade with main partners, 2011 
Rank Import  €Million % Export  €Million % Trade €Million % 
1 South 
Africa 
2,045.7 55.5 EU (27) 419.0 22.3 South 
Africa 
2,373.1 42.7 
2 China 336.6 9.1 South 
Africa 
327.5 17.5 EU (27) 661.8 11.9 
3 EU (27) 242.9 6.6 China 318.0 17.0 China 654.7 11.8 
4 Zambia 127.4 3.5 DR Congo 220.5 11.8 Botswana 315.4 5.7 
5 India 120.7 3.3 Botswana 196.8 10.5 DR Congo 263.9 4.7 
Source: Adapted from European Commission, DG Trade Statistics and EUROSTAT, 2012 
 
 
All Zimbabwean economic sectors - including agro-processing, mining, manufacturing and 
services - are vertically linked to EU industrial processes. In particular, services such as 
banks and insurance perpetuate the reproduction of capitalist modes of production by 
facilitating the extraction and exploitation of the country’s natural resources, and exportation 
of the country’s commodities to the EU market and other developed economies at 
predetermined international prices. Economic dominance has ensured that Europe, and 
particularly the United Kingdom, remains a major Zimbabwean trading partner, despite loud 
rhetorical and collective voice linking the economic performance with the imposed economic 
sanctions against ZANU (PF). The United Kingdom also remained the largest development 
aid donor to Zimbabwe via the Department for International Development, increasing it from 
£12 million in 2000 to £18 million in 2001 and to £23 million in 2002 (Chigora, 2006: 17). 
 
As seen in Table
9
4.3 above, the ranking of five Zimbabwean major sources of imports, major 
destinations of exports and trading partners reveals a healthy EU-Zimbabwe trading 
relationship: 27 EU member states as a bloc is the second major overall trading partner, 
leading major exporter of goods and services and third major consumer of Zimbabwean 
products. This is supported by Table 4.4 below, showing the real value of the main EU-
Zimbabwe products traded between 2007 and 2011, a period that mirrors that of 2000 and 
2006. The table shows that Zimbabwe’s main exports to the EU continues to be dominated by 
                                                 
9 Since ZANU (PF)’s rhetorical argument on EU economic sanction has not changed, the table data for 2011 is 
used as a proxy of 2000-2008, the period prior to the formation of the government of national unity. 
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 vegetable products, prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, vinegar, tobacco, mineral 
products, base metals, and articles of base metal. Conversely, the country’s imports over 
this period were and still are dominated by machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical 
equipment, vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment and products of 
chemical and allied industries. The table further shows the negative impact of disruptions in 
the agricultural sector with respect to trade flows of beef-related products (animal or 
vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products, footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas and walking-sticks) owing to the country-wide outbreak of foot and mouth 
disease
10
, resulting in the cancellation of the Zimbabwean 9,100 beef quota
11
 to the EU 
market in 2001. This means that the fast-track land reform greatly undermined Zimbabwean 
capacity to supply most agriculture-related products, including beef, sugar, cotton lint, textile 
articles and clothing, as well as horticultural products that, prior to 2000, were competing 
favourably on the EU market. The table also confirms the EU pronouncement of banning any 
trade of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories thereof between the negotiating parties 
and long-standing trading partners. Meanwhile, at the current level of industrial and export 
development, economic integration over the past decade means that the country derives low 
value added and decreasing returns from export commodities to the EU markets compared to 
high value added increasing returns on imported products and services from the same market. 
Zimbabwe has little or no choice in the regulation of external trade affairs, particularly with 
its former colonial master whose capital base has direct and indirect links with companies or 









                                                 
10 The fast-track land reform created laxity conditions in controlling the mingling of domestic animals (cattle, 
sheep, goats and pigs) with wild animals (water buffalo, antelope, deer, bison, hedgehogs and elephants), 
resulting in country-wide outbreak of foot and mouth diseases.  
11 Madambi (2013) reports that Zimbabwe is one of the largest suppliers of bovine beef to the EU. This despite 
the fact that the country’s beef quota is still not authorised by the bloc because other internal regulations of the 
European market requires Harare to comply with all sorts of stringent measures which Zimbabwe could not 
afford, particularly controlling the movement of cattle from one zone to another and technical provisions in 
several areas: animal health, general hygiene residue monitoring and organisation of official controls to these 
areas. While the EU institutions are yet to certify Zimbabwe’s improvements in these areas, drought, destocking 
by commercial farmers uncertain about land tenure, shortage of breeding stock, high in-put costs and the 
deregulation of slaughterhouses are hindering the rebuilding of the national herd.  
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 Table 4.4: EU trade with Zimbabwe, 2007 – 2011, € Million 
Product\Year  Imports Exports 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total  358 314 236 299 444 148 130 108 189 232 
Live animals and animal products 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 7 2 
Vegetable products 60 40 35 46 33 1 6 0 3 1 
Animal or vegetables fats and oils 
and their cleavage products 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, 
spirits and vinegar, tobacco 
77 73 98 75 185 1 2 4 4 3 
Mineral products 43 35 19 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Products of chemical industries 1 0 0 0 0 24 10 10 12 18 
Plastics and articles thereof, 
rubber and articles thereof 
     6 5 6 3 4 
Raw hides and skins, leather, fur 
skins and articles thereof 
8 11 8 12 18 0 0 0 0 0 
Wood and articles of wood, wood 
charcoal, cork and articles of cork 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material, paper or 
paperboard 
0 0 0 0 0 10 12 2 3 4 
Textiles and textile articles 16 12 11 13 15 2 2 2 4 5 
Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, 
sun umbrellas, walking-sticks 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar material 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious stones 
13 20 15 26 23 2 3 1 0 1 
Base metals and articles of base 
metal 
126 115 43 106 142 6 3 2 5 6 
Machinery and mechanical 
appliances, electrical equipment 
4 0 1 1 1 68 62 60 112 126 
Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and 
associated transport equipment 
0 0 0 0 0 13 15 8 22 45 
Optimal, photographic, 
chematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision products 
0 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 6 9 
Arms and ammunition, parts and 
accessories thereof 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Works of art, collectors pieces 
and antiques 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 4 2 3 2 7 7 4 4 5 3 
Source:  Adapted from European Commission, DG Trade Statistics and EUROSTAT, 2012 
 
This table further highlights the correlation between economic sanctions and the access to 
and control of the means of production under the economic empowerment dispensation. It 
also brings to the fore the logic of the theories which underpin the sanctions arguments and 
the necessity for a rational debate and assessment of why targeted sanctions and travel bans 
became punitive measures that viciously hurt the entire economy. 
 
According to Zimbabwe’s chief negotiators, Angelina Katuruza and Tedious Chifamba, the 
above EU dominance trends in trade direction and flow largely influenced the decision to 
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 negotiate the proposed new trade regime with Europe in spite of the ZANU (PF) leadership 
rhetoric of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Zimbabwe’s chief negotiators and 
government officials view the decision as a survival balancing act intended to guarantee the 
country a viable, predictable and sustained future trade regime that can withstand politically 
motivated bi-lateral tribulations. The rationale to negotiate with the EU (despite the fallout in 
bi-lateral political relations) was based on historical and colonially bonded economic linkages 
between the negotiating parties. This also reflects state shortcomings in marshaling the 
business sector towards economic trade agenda realignment with respect to the ‘look east 
policy’ as frequently articulated by politicians in domestic, regional and global public forums. 
 
Figure 4.2: EU merchandise trade flows with Zimbabwe, percentages, 2005 – 2010 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from European Commission, DG Trade Statistics and EUROSTAT, 2012 
 
Figure 4.2 not only illustrates the historical importance of Europe to the Zimbabwean 
economy based on colonial bonds, but also vindicates the sentiments of both Angelina 
Katuruza
12
 and Tedious Chifamba
13
, the past and present chief EPA negotiators, that “the 
decision to negotiate an EPA is the only guaranteed way to secure a future and predictable 
market for the country’s products while allowing imported EU products into the country in 
the post conflictual EU-Zimbabwe bi-lateral political and economic development cooperation 
as espoused in the Conotou Agreement”. Zimbabwe has thus succeeded in sustaining export 
                                                 
12Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg South Africa, 28 May 2012.  
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 flows to the EU market in ways that confirms it as the only realistic option of generating the 
much needed foreign currency to meet growing national import demands, ranging from fuel 
- the lifeline of any industrial and commercial activity - to basic consumable commodities. 
Indeed, in spite of dwindling exports in volumes and value terms to European markets, the 
latter has increasingly become the only viable and predictable option for generating foreign 
currency, following the decision by the IMF and the World Bank to suspend Zimbabwe from 
receiving development assistance, and the withdrawal of both foreign investors and donors 
from the economy. However, continued dwindling of total volumes and values of 
Zimbabwean exports destined for the European market translates into low foreign currency 
in-flows to support industrial development, industrial production and export and market 
competitiveness. 
 
It seems that Zimbabwe, as a fractured economy owing largely to its body political delusions 
and economic mismanagement, is set to continue facing challenges relating to weak industrial 
productive capacities across all sectors - and export competitiveness in the European market. 
There is also a strong possibility that the dominance of MCs and TNCs - coupled by 
relentless pressures from global institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO) - will 
guarantee strict implementation of iEPA outcomes in order to ensure trade openness policies. 
Indeed, such possibilities support the study hypothesis that the EPA process is an onslaught 
on Zimbabwean’s future economic performance. The country already has memories of how 
the MCs and TNCs benefitted from the dominance of Bretton Wood institutions ‘one-size-fits 
all’ neo-liberal policies, including trade liberalisation imposed and implemented without 
thorough analysis of the political ramifications. The possibility of economic and political 
implications are expected from the ongoing EPA process, whose framework is firmly 
premised on a neo-liberal paradigm seeking to entrench global and commercial institutions in 
Zimbabwe through a trade liberalisation agenda as informed by agreed tariff liberalisation 
schedules and commitments. Already the Zimbabwean economy has been a victim of the 
above global policy and commercial institutions, and since 2000, been a victim of massive 
foreign and domestic investors’ withdrawals and donors’ financial withdrawals. The 
economy has since 2000 been suffering from poor state-civil society relationship, resulting in 
anti-support of any economic policy and programme proposed by ZANU (PF) government. 
The economy has further been constantly subjected to highly politicised national body politic 
and tense bilateral relations with the negotiating partner. As a result, it is feared that the 
outcome may not necessarily improve industrial and export capacities in the short– to 
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 medium term even though the EPA objective of a ‘win-win’ outcome suggests potential 
market opportunities between negotiating partners. It is further feared that the overall 
outcome is likely to have painful short to long term consequences in most sectors of the 
economy or indeed for the economy as a whole. 
 
 
4.4.2 EU’s influence in the EPA process 
 
4.4.2.1  Introduction 
 
The EU influences the EPA process on three levels - ACP, configuration, and respective 
country - with each stage producing a desired outcome aimed at delivering a better deal to the 
EU member states. The nature and extent of this influence, with specific reference to 
Zimbabwe, is discussed below. 
 
 
4.4.2.2  At the ACP level 
 
Since the Lomé Conventions, the EU has provided developmental assistance financial 
packages to ACP countries aimed at redressing production and export-related constraints, 
including supply-side bottlenecks, as discussed in section 6.4.3. Such benign partnership 
support from the EU to ACP countries has been extended through the EDF development 
envelope window covering a period of five years. At the conclusion of each round of trade 
negotiations with ACP countries, the EU always announces the total allocations within the 
EDF window, which has since reflected incremental nominal values, to be available for those 





allocation cycle are reflected in Table 4.5 below which shows, contrary to any development 
wisdom, that all the ACP economies have absorbed less than 43% of the total allocations per 
each five-year cycle window since 1975. The table also shows that the accessibility trend 
continued to decline since the 6
th
 EDF allocation window, reaching 20% of total resources of 
the 8
th
 EDF allocation before a marginal improvement to 28% in the following funding cycle. 
From the above, it can be inferred that the EU refers to developmental aid allocations without 
necessarily having the actual amounts ready for disbursements to deserving ACP countries. It 
can further be inferred that the EDF allocations are a function of improved EU trade in value 
terms, within the ACP region.  
90 
 Table 4.5: Funds allocated versus funds spent during each five-year EDF financing 
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15 200 3 131 4 239,0 28 
Source:  Adapted from Grynberg, R. and Clarke, A. (2006). 
 
The table shows that since the introduction of the EDF financial windows the ACP countries 
have experienced extreme challenges with respect to accessing promised resources intended 
to improve their respective productive capacities, export competiveness and supply-side 
bottlenecks. This is supported by Draper (2007), who comments on the EU institutions and 
respective government’s complex bureaucratic requirements or demands associated with the 
approval of ACP member states’ requests for industrial and supply-side related projects to be 
financed through EDF development envelopes. Kamidza (2007: 8) maintains that the ACP 
countries continue to encounter numerous difficulties including unreasonable administrative 
requirements of both EC and the EU member states that preclude or restrict them from 
accessing promised EDF funds. This reflects the lack of meaningful industrial transformation 
of most ACP economies and a continued presence of supply-side bottlenecks in spite of huge 
financial promises from the benevolent bi-lateral partner. It can thus be argued that these 
constraints are one of the reasons why most ACP economies fail to significantly exploit non-
reciprocal trade preferences including ‘everything-but-arms’ and DFQF market access. 
Indeed, given the prevailing industrial and supply-side constraints and the surge in 
concluding bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade negotiations in most ACP economies, the 
availability of such a huge funding window could have triggered a corresponding huge 
appetite to develop bankable projects. While it is true that some countries might have a dearth 
of technical expertise and/or capacity to develop acceptable project proposals, it could also be 
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 argued that such developments would have equally inspired the solicitation of technical 
assistance from other development partners,  
 
Ironically, the EU continues to apply the same bait during each negotiation round. While the 
allocations shown in the table above were meant to support all ACP countries under the EPA 
process, the EU has proposed an EDF funding window totaling €1.783 billion which is 
further split into six allocations covering six years (as shown in Figure 4.3 below) which 
illustrates that ECOWAS has the largest share of the funding followed by ESA, CEMAC and 
CARIFORUM, SADC, and the PACIFIC.  
 
Figure 4.3: Indicative 10
th
 EDFprogramme 2008-201, € Million 
 
Source:  Adapted from EC Staff Working Paper (2011) 
 
The EC Staff Working Paper (2011) spells out that the 10
th
 EDF financial window supports a 
mainly regional economic integration agenda including broad-based support for economic 
integration and trade policies, structural reforms, infrastructural development, food security 
and the environment. These areas are conceived as flanking measures in support of the EPA 
implementation. The areas are also expected to sufficiently improve the coherence between 
regional and national development plans or activities within the context of overlapping 
memberships, that is, sub-regional countries belonging to various RECs with similar 
mandates. It is argued here that all sub-regional RECs have expressed commitment to 

















 creating complementarities between national economies, thereby reducing heavy 
dependence on a small number of export commodities. The allocations to regional 
infrastructural developments are also expected to improve interconnections, thereby reducing 
excessively high costs for intra-regional transport and utilities. Furthermore, the funding is 
expected to improve ownership and institutional capacity at regional and national levels by 
redressing challenges relating to inadequate mandates, the absence of legal and political tools 
for effective policy implementation and insufficient ownership by stakeholders, particularly 
civil society and national administrations.  
 
However, by agreeing to engage with fragmented African configurations that are outside 
existing regional integration mandates, the EU clearly demonstrates its economic prowess 
and manipulative strategic craftiness aimed at delivering a better deal to the 27 member 
countries. Just like in previous EDF allocations to the ACP region, the 10
th
 EDF attempts to 
identify specific areas of support at configuration and national levels, but there are 
possibilities that some deserving economies may fail to access the announced resources. In 
addition, the fact that configuration indicative allocations are publicised before the conclusion 
of the EPA process reflects the direct EU influence on the process and outcome and points to 
potential challenges with respect to linking allocations with the particular needs of the group. 
While the EU used the publicised allocations to prove its benevolent gesture to weak, 
vulnerable and fragmented configurations, memories of the dismal failure to access previous 
allocations are still fresh in the minds of all the stakeholders in the various configurations. 
Furthermore, while African countries have been insisting that any EPA should be 
accompanied by a robust development package that can support countries in coping with the 
negative effects of implementing the new trade regime, the EU has never wanted to bind 
these commitments beyond the 10
th
 EDF five-year cycle. South Centre, (March 2010) 
observed that the EU does not provide new sources of funds that are binding and permanent, 
despite the fact that African countries in bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade negotiations end up 
making permanent binding liberalisation commitments. This compels civil society groups in 
their advocacy to consistently point out the falsehood that there would be new money from 
the EU rather than a re-allocation of existing budgets.  
 
The ICCO Report (2008) observes a key rhetorical feature of the EU’s negotiations with the 
ACP states, claiming that EPAs support existing regional integration initiatives and that 
93 
 regionalism is a development strategy that essentially assists the integration of ACP 
countries with the EU market. It is on this basis that the EC’s Council reiterated in May 
2007 that: 
 
EPAs should primarily build upon, foster and support ACP regional integration processes by 
recognising existing political and economic realities and existing regional integration 
processes, thus providing flexibility. ICCO Report, September, 2008. 
 
The above is supported by promises of developmental aid funds mentioned by the EU during 
the start of the EPA process, only to those regions or group of countries ready to negotiate 
with an enlarged, economically powerful counterpart. Indeed, by dangling developmental aid 
envelopes, the EU facilitated the following:   
 a split of ACP regions into six configurations 
 a split of Africa into four groups 
 a split of the SADC region by allowing the DRC to negotiate under the CEMAC 
group, seven countries
14
 to negotiate under the ESA group and seven countries
15
 to 
negotiate under the SADC configuration 
 a split of ESA by allowing EAC countries to continue negotiating as a bloc while 
other group countries
16
 presented iEPA market access offers as individuals.  
 
This funding window thus highlights the challenges associated with regional overlapping 
memberships and the divisive EPA process that created configurations outside existing 
regional initiatives in southern Africa in particular. The above demonstrates the success of a 







                                                 
14 Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
15 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland 
16 Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe 
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 4.4.2.2  At the regional level 
 
As argued in section 4.3.3.1, the EU’s strategy of dangling a developmental assistance 
envelope reflects that its political and economic commitment to fund and advance the 
regional integration agenda in the ESA sub-region, was largely intended to secure a better 
deal with a configuration that is diverse but still offers huge economic opportunities. Through 
its economic influence, the EU, despite adopting a joint roadmap with the ESA group in 
February 2004, continued to allow configured member states to realign with other 
configurations for the purposes of EPA negotiations. The EU shields itself from criticism by 
arguing that it is a sovereign decision for a country to choose configurations for the purposes 
of negotiating EPAs. It further sweetens ESA group countries by financing impact 
assessment studies that inform them during the negotiations, developing the terms of 
reference to guide the studies, and presiding over the selection of technical institutions 
through an open tender system. The EU knew that the ESA group comprising of countries 
from various RECs
17
 - some of which have no or limited common historical political, 
economic, and social bonds
18
 - has natural fault-lines, which, given the fast-pace of the 
process, would likely cause divisions and eventually split the high-breed configuration, 
thereby undermining the integration of these economies with Europe. This strategy was 
vindicated when in 2005 the DRC pulled out of the group to join CEMAC while Tanzania, a 
former member of the SADC EPA configuration, joined the EAC group. In addition, towards 
the end of 2007, the ESA group split into two groups. The first group comprised the EAC 
countries, which failed to initial and sign an iEPA with the EU though continued to negotiate 
comprehensive EPA as a bloc. The other group constitutes the ESA configuration, of which 
four economies
19
 individually signed iEPA market access offers with the EU in 2009. The 
iEPA economies are now integrated into the European market under different trade 
liberalisation commitments that are also not in line with regional integration commitments.  
 
Thus, the EU, through funding, influences the creation of another layer of overlapping 
regional EPA integration membership with distinct commitments only to itself as the 
dominating negotiating partner. In this regard, the SADC Secretariat Report (2011) reports 
that the 10
th
 EDF financial window supports mainly regional economic integration agendas. 
                                                 
17 COMESA, EAC, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Community (IOC) 
and SADC 
18 Especially between some IOC, IGAD and southern African countries. 
19 Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe 
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 The SADC secretariat study (2012) allocated €92.8 million of the €116 million to support 
regional economic integration to the SADC EPA group as follows: SADC EPA member 
states (€52.8 million), regional economic integration (€20 million) and regional infrastructure 
development programmes (€20 million). Configurations through these allocations are 
expected to redress challenges relating to both regional and national institutional, productive 
and export capacities. This 10
th
 EDF regional integration financial window is a separate 
initiative from the general EU funding to existing regional integration initiatives
20
 in the sub-
region, a development that exerts more pressure on existing limited institutional capacities. 
However, agreed different levels of iEPA trade liberalisation may fail to facilitate regional 
integration of configured economies in spite of the above clear financial allocations for that 
purpose. While it is unclear why the EU is sacrificing the very regional integration initiatives 
that it has since its inception been bankrolling, it is clear that de-legitimising existing regional 
integration agendas satisfies its desire to exploit EPA-related short to medium term 
commercial interests in the sub-region, particularly in vulnerable economies such as 
Zimbabwe which is still struggling to rejuvenate its fragile economy. 
 
While the EU has for several decades demonstrated unwavering commitment to bankrolling 
sub-regional regional integration schemes, it has ironically signed iEPAs with four countries, 
a development that points to a hasty conclusion without necessarily matching agreed tariff 
schedule liberalisations with existing regional integration initiatives commitments. As a result 
the tariff scheduling and liberalisation commitments of individual member states have the 
potential to undermine the agreed-on targets of various regional integration schemes. This 
unfortunately confirms the divisive character of the EPA process that has the potential to 
derail prospects for higher economic growth and development in many regional economies. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, this suppresses economic recovery to pre-2000 levels when the 
country’s products were offensively and aggressively competitive in the national, regional 
and the EU markets. 
 
The above reflects the level of EU influence as a donor that irrationally created weaker and 
vulnerable configurations to negotiate a WTO compatible new trade regime with Europe. 
This also reflects success in ensuring that the new trade regime framework is superior to 
existing regional economic integration initiatives, hence no effort was made to ensure that the 
                                                 
20 COMESA, EAC and SADC. 
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 iEPA links with RECs’ commitments. This further resulted in creating weaker and 
vulnerable configurations with equally weaker institutions and structures in terms of depth 
of requisite technical capacities and skills to square up with an enlarged Europe - with its 
massive financial, human, and technical resources - in negotiating a new trade regime. 
Ultimately, Europe’s commercial interests through MCs and TNCs are secured, especially in 
vulnerable economies such as Zimbabwe. 
 
 
4.4.2.3  At the national level 
 
Europe’s economic influence in Zimbabwe has since independence been sustained by its 
benevolent, philanthropic and developmental aid assistance covering all three pillars of 
state
21
, the private sector and civil society groups. This support was made possible by a series 
of EDF financing windows as well as other funding options based on a beneficially mutual 
relationship between Zimbabwe and the EU as a bloc, as well as with individual EU 
countries. Indeed, over the years the EU has been a leading bi-lateral donor complementing 
government fiscal spending, and financing government-related projects; bankrolling broad 
sections of civil society activities focusing on economic policy (including trade negotiations) 
and financing business sector initiatives.  
 
However, owing largely to questions about pluralistic democratic and governance values and 
economic policies and programmes, Zimbabwe is no longer a recipient of any funding from 
either the EU bloc or EU countries. In fact, the EU and other western governments suspended 
all forms of direct developmental funding assistance to the ZANU (PF) administration, a 
decision that also denies funding to private sector initiatives. While ideologically the EU 
cannot exclude Zimbabwe from the 10
th
 EDF funding cycle designed to benefit all ACP 
countries, the European Council adopted measures covering the period 2002-2010 which re-
oriented financing towards social sectors, democratisation, respect for human rights, and the 
rule of law. This decision maintained funding relationships with broader sections of civil 
society that internally have been traditional allies of the MDC formations. In this respect, the 
key provisions of the council decision are:  
 
                                                 
21 The Executive (government), the Legislature and the Judiciary. 
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 Financial support for all projects is suspended except those in support of the population, in 
particular in social sectors and those in support of the reforms contained in the GPA. 
Financing shall be re-oriented in support of the population in particular in social sectors and 
in support of the stabilisation process of the country, in particular with regard to 
democratisation, respect for human rights and the rule of law. EC Staff Working Paper 
(2011) 
 
Bi-lateral tension between the negotiating parties increases the uncertainty of aid delivery to 
Zimbabwe. As a donor, the EU has the final say over the 10
th
 EDF development aid delivery 
to the country, which it clams, still lacks credible governance and democratic values and 
practices. Indeed, the EU continued to deny funding to the GNU administration in general. 
However, it only allows funding based on annually formulated comprehensive short-term 
strategies in support of food security, rural development, social sectors and governance and 
human rights activities. The above funded areas fall under the portfolios of the MDC 
formations. The EU continues to provide humanitarian assistance to country-wide poverty 
stricken people through NGOs, a decision that not only continuously infuriates the ZANU 
(PF) leadership and its allies, but also fuels suspicion of the regime change agenda through 
NGO distribution of donated material goods, including food provisions. Further, the EU and 
other western government decisions to continue significantly funding anti-ZANU (PF) civil 
society groups, especially those implementing pluralistic democratic and governance 
activities, fuels the tensions between Harare and Brussels. Even though Zimbabwe was the 
fourth country to sign the iEPA, the levels of suspicion remain high owing to the continued 
imposition of smart sanctions and travel bans on Mugabe and his inner circle and associated 
firms relating to charges of human rights abuses. The above shows how funding 
developments since 2000 have sustained EU-ZANU (PF) leadership tensions, compelling the 
latter to maintain a regime change mantra at the expense of collectively rallying resources 
and energies for a better EPA outcome. Also excluded from funding are CSOs working on 
trade and development (including the EPA process), in spite the fact that trade negotiations is 
an integral component of Zimbabwe’s economic policy. This means that the six-year 10
th
 
EDF financing window will continue denying resources to EPA-related activities. All of this 
illustrates how EU leverage in the process closes off all possible flows of funding towards 
adequate preparations in trade negotiations in an environment that is well known for state–
NSA conflictual and suspicious relationships where government economic programmes and 
policies are concerned. 
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 Interestingly, in spite of the bilateral stand-off - epitomised by the imposition of smart 
sanctions and travel bans on the ZANU (PF) leadership - the EU benignly provided 
financial resources that facilitated the participation of government officials in all EPA-related 
RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels. Because the EU had 
special interests in the outcome, travel ban rules were ignored in all instances that demanded 
the presence of the former minister of Industry and International Trade, Samuel 
Mumbengegwi
22
, at EPA meetings in Brussels prior to the formation of the GNU in February 
2009. While financial support was made available to a private sector representative to 
participate in all EPA-related regional and Brussels meetings, in some instances the support 
ended up being given to a government official. The EU also bankrolled Zimbabwe’s EPA 
negotiation preparatory processes, including financing impact assessment studies, and EPA 
related stakeholder workshops held in Harare and Bulawayo. 
 
While financial support to all EPA-related activities is appreciated, such a benign donor-
recipient relationship between negotiating parties allows the former (dominant) party to 
ensure that its negotiating issues, interests, and options are imposed on the weaker (latter). 
EU negotiators, according to Benoliel and Hua (2009:26), invest in building good 
relationships with counterparts in order to ‘oil’ the negotiation process and make it sound 
mutually beneficial. 
 
Meanwhile, the EU financially supports developmental projects in sub-regional member 
states that not only buttress existing regional integration efforts, but are also linked to 
national economic projects and programmes. While this has enabled other EPA negotiating 
countries to access capacity and skills development support, Zimbabwe has unfortunately not 
been a recipient of this regional funding window owing to strained bilateral relations with 
Europe. This means that Zimbabwean negotiators and government officials have not been 
able to benefit from EU-funded trade negotiations training programmes offered within the 
context of existing SADC or COMESA frameworks. As a result, Zimbabwean government 
negotiators and officials have missed out on opportunities to exchange ideas, experiences and 
best practices with fellow colleagues in both SADC and COMESA regional blocs, as well as 
to develop innovative negotiation skills, styles, strategies and tactics to improve the country’s 
                                                 
22 Following the imposing of EU travel bans on ZANU (PF) top leadership and government officials on 26 July 
2002, the former Industry and International Trade minister, Samuel Mumbengegwi was allowed to participate in 
Brussels EPA meetings on 28 September 2002, 16 May 2003, and 19 August 2004. 
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 bargaining position in the on-going negotiation process. This further undermines the 
authorities’ efforts to support not only regional integration efforts in the country’s favour, 
but also the economic transition of a decade-long economic meltdown.  
 
In spite of well-known institutional and technical inadequacies, the ESA group in general and 
Zimbabwe in particular, have been engaging with a financially well-resourced EC and layers 
of technical, legal, social, economic, and political experts backing up a pool of competent, 
knowledgeable and seasoned negotiators and officials. The EC also has well-established and 
competent technical institutions whose research findings and outcomes either directly 
strengthen Europe’s negotiating positions, strategies and tactics or provide insights into the 
ESA economies in general and Zimbabwe in particular. According to Medicine Masiiwa
23
, a 
lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe who led a delegation of four CSO representatives on a 
lobbying mission of EU institutions, various EC directorates
24
 and the EU presidency and 
parliament, the EU revealed that “due to its technical and financial capacity, it has been able 
to undertake 50-year focus studies on each ESA participating country”. This is instructive 
because it reflects the EU’s capacity to know Europe’s negotiating counterparts’ strengths 
and weaknesses, which can then be exploited during the negotiation process. Zimbabwe has 
been negotiating without such strategic and intrinsically valuable information. Again, this 
demonstrates the economic might of the EU vis-à-vis an economically weak and politically 
vulnerable Zimbabwean negotiating partner. 
 
Throughout the negotiating process the EC has had access to information and research 
findings on Zimbabwe’s state shortcomings in the process, including conflictual state-civil 
society relationships, an uncooperative private sector and a bullying government bent of 
crushing voices of dissent in political and economic discourses. As a result, the EU 
negotiators have been better prepared and therefore able to out-maneuver their Zimbabwean 
counterparts at every stage of the negotiations. This further reflects the EU’s ability to 
skillfully ensure that the imposition of travel bans on top ZANU (PF) officials, coupled with 
no formal direct contact with Zimbabwe senior officials, secures uncontested short to 
medium-term market access. It is a fact that Zimbabwean products (currently composed of 
largely unprocessed and mineral related commodities) are uncompetitive vis-à-vis European 
                                                 
23 Interview discussion with Medicine Masiiwa, Gaborone, Botswana, 25 August 20012. 
24 Director – General Trade and Director-General Development. 
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 products in both markets (the EU and local). All the above illustrates the EU’s economic 
influence in the process. 
 
 
4.5 EPA technical and ideological issues 
 
Negotiating an EPA with Europe is locking ESA countries in general and Zimbabwe in 
particular into an unhealthy post-colonial dependence on Europe for development aid, fiscal 
support and market access. This also has a direct bearing on sensitive sectors and infant 
industries that still need protection from intense competition in an environment dominated by 
powerful producers and investors, including MCs and TNCs. In particular, Zimbabwean 
agricultural producers and exporters require more protection from Europe’s MCs and TNCs if 
they are to graduate to the level of commercial farmers. Figure 5.2 illustrates how Europe is 
ideologically set to solve its twin crises of over-production and profitability by indirectly 
opening up more markets for its products in the ACP regions, targeting mainly weak and 
vulnerable economies like Zimbabwe. This guarantees a significant proportion of European 
products easy access into the Zimbabwean economy. This offers solutions to the on-going 
Eurozone crisis, by potentially linking European investors, producers and exporters with 
Zimbabwe’s consumers and industries and confirms the EPA process framework as 
essentially 'free trade areas' between economically unequal partners (Burnett and Manji, 
2005, Deve, 2006 and Kamidza, 2007). The EPA process is also a reminder of the 1990s 
trade liberalisation policy which forced Zimbabwe to open her market to competitive 
products in the region and beyond, resulting in the closure of some productive sectors, 
unemployment and state-society tensions. 
 
Through this ideological framework, the EU-Zimbabwe trade relations, which were non-
reciprocal for several decades, are set to be confined within the reciprocity principles, thereby 
risking the removal of the pro-developmental values by the EPA process. For instance, one of 
the EPA’s objectives is essentially to replace past special preferences of DFQF market access 
and EBA initiatives with WTO-compliant and competitive clauses. For instance, having 
noticed a reluctance in individual iEPA signatories to sign while still negotiating a full EPA, 
the EU’s three
25
 political structures in early 2012 unanimously agreed to withdraw the 
                                                 
25 The European Parliament, the EC and the European Council of Ministers. 
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 Market Access Regulation
26
 (MAR) 1528 of 2007 that was unilaterally put in place to allow 
trading between the two parties while negotiating a WTO compatible trade regime by 1 
October 2014. The EU is emphasising the illegality of the current trading arrangement with 
iEPA economies. Given that the EU remained Zimbabwe’s major trading partner (Table 4.1) 
despite public spats and bilateral fall-out, this decision resulted in the country’s signature in 
September 2009. The signing and subsequent ratification of iEPA allows the EU to easily 
secure its mercantilist and political interests
27
 in Zimbabwe. The above outcome also 
resonates with the 27 member body, which is becoming increasingly sensitive to the demands 
of the new member states that are reluctant to be tied to a trade regime with ACP countries on 
the basis of past colonial relationships (Kamidza, 2008).  
 
On the basis of the implementation of iEPA, Europe is fortifying its vertical links with 
Zimbabwe in particular and the ESA region in general in the context of EPA negotiations. 
This has led to consensus building among some Zimbabwean CSOs, who are infuriated by 
the fact that the EPA process has failed to take into account differences in industrial 
productivities, import and export capabilities, resources and technological capacities, and 
socio-political developmental conditions between antagonistic negotiating parties. While the 
outcome guarantees economic integration with Europe, it is unlikely to facilitate industrial 
productive innovation, export diversification and competitiveness and social transformation 
and development in Zimbabwe.  
 
Makanza (2007), while addressing the SADC MPs in the TDC during their annual meeting 
on regional integration and trade, argued that “the EU’s push for EPAs is inextricably linked 
to the WTO’s political processes, where decisions are based on a one-country, one-vote 
consensus.” So, EPA agreements coupled with EPA-related assistance create conditions for 
strategic alliance between the EU and signatories of the new trade regime. This development 
politically assists the EU in fostering a community of interest between itself and ACP 
countries in future WTO negotiations. This means that the ACP-EPA negotiations with the 
EU provide an ideal political framework for the latter (EU) to neutralise any potential 
opposition to its future agendas in WTO ministerial dialogue sessions. This argument is based 
                                                 
26 This is a unilateral scheme put in place by the EU with no contractual basis.  
27 EPA induced market competitiveness has potential to sustain politically induced tensions thereby fuelling the 
regime change agenda. 
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 on the fact that of the 157 WTO membership
28
 countries, 116 belong to the ACP region (89 
countries) and the EU (27 countries). Assuming that the EPAs processes and outcomes 
generate bilateral consensus on trade and development-related issues between the negotiating 
regions, Europe as a developed region will have enough allies to neutralise any potential 
opposition to its agendas at multi-lateral trade negotiations levels. This has the potential to 
assist the EU politically by fostering a long-term trade and development bond based on the 
vertical economic integration with its former colonies
29
 in future WTO negotiations at the 
expense of the configured countries’ sustainable social and economic development. For 
Zimbabwe this has created negative political ramifications that has not only led to current 
state-civil society conflictual relationships, but also poisoned the economic policy-making 
environment since the launch of the EPA negotiations.  
 
It seems as though the dominant negotiating partner is deliberately avoiding the political will 
to defend future pro-ACP trade related positions in multi-lateral trade and development 
platforms. The huge presence of the EU’s interests in the process has emotionally touched 
Tandon (2004), who describes the plethora of EPA configurations across Africa as worse 
than the 1884 Berlin Conference which carved the continent into small, weak and vulnerable 
but controllable states solely for the commercial, political and social benefit of Europe:  
 
This is an integral and active part of a new scramble for Africa, in which the EU competes 
with the US and emerging economies such as China to gain access to and/or secure control 
over markets and resources for their own interests (Tandon, 2004). 
 
The on-going EPA negotiations are taking place in the context of a skewed economic 
relationship between Africa and Europe that is already blamed for hindering socio-economic 
development prospects, and indirectly fermenting tensions between state structures and broad 
formations of civil society groups and the business community. This characterises 
Zimbabwean stakeholder relationships over the period under review. Kamidza (2005), on the 
basis of this economically skewed economic integration relationship, predicts a victory for 
the EU in this round of negotiations, arguing that the dominant partner has ensured that the 
process firmly protects its commercial and political interests. Indeed, the visible commercial 
and political pressures from EU institutions and structures characterise EU-Zimbabwe 
                                                 
28 WTO now has 157 member countries following the entry of Russia and Vanuatu in 2012. 
29 All ACP countries are former colonies of the majority of the current EU Member States. 
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 bilateral trade relations over this period. As Europe fortifies its vertical economic and trade 
links with Zimbabwe through the iEPA tariff liberalisation scheduling and commitment, the 
outcome is unlikely to facilitate industrial development and export competitiveness in 
Zimbabwe in the short to medium term. This outcome has to be measured against the spread 
and severity of the country’s social and economic stress due to political dynamics (tension, 
suspicions, and uncooperativeness between the main political parties), the melting down of 
the economy and the former government’s isolation from the EU and other western 
governments and donors. Thus, the pursuant of an asymmetrical power relationship causes a 
politically undesirable, economically unsustainable and socially unjustifiable process that is 
likely to produce an unequal trade and development partnership while being inimical to 
poverty alleviation strategies embedded in a rational and mutual pro-development trade 
regime. The above means that the EU is exploiting its superior bilateral bargaining power to 
drive for an EPA outcome that maximises the commercial interests of its investors, exporters, 
and producers. 
 
While government negotiators argue that engaging the EU enabled the country to secure a 
future trade regime along with the rest of the ACP countries, some studies have shown that 
the TNCs currently facing a profitability crisis
30
 in Europe have over the last decade been 
intensifying a search for alternative and sustainable markets in poor and vulnerable 
economies. The Zimbabwean economy offers just such a market. Currently, economic and 
political developments - characterised by unpredictable economic policies, uncooperative 
between state and other stakeholders and conflictual body-politic - all point to longer 
economic recovery phase, a development that suits the EU commercial interests. Indeed, at 
this stage the political environment does not inspire confidence in economic actors and policy 
activists. The GNU administration continued to reveal tendencies of politically motivated 
public policies and programmes, and intolerance towards civil society activism and advocacy 
in general. In particular, the GNU had not inspired confidence in the new commercial farmers 
and the agro-processing sectors to compete with the heavily European subsidised farmers 
who are intensely looking for markets in poor and vulnerable economies such as Zimbabwe. 
Indeed, Zimbabwe’s productive agricultural capacity has yet to show signs of improvement 
since the fast-track land reform programme was implemented. This means that in the short to 
medium term, the country continues to rely on imported food products and other agricultural 
                                                 
30 This is evidenced by a vicious cycle of falling demand, scaling down in industrial production leading to 
growing unemployment, and domestic and external borrowing. 
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 consumables from the EU and other trading partners. The EU is therefore set to gain and 
Zimbabwean farmers and agro-processing entrepreneurs - who lack the requisite 
technological innovation, skills, and financial and human resources - are unlikely to benefit 
much from the proposed new trade regime. 
 
While the configured countries were mostly concerned about how to access the promised 
‘developmental assistance resource envelope’ to redress trade and development- related 
challenges within the broad framework of the Cotonou Agreement, Europe has since  been 
busy prioritising issues within the six clusters (development, agriculture, services, trade-
related issues, fisheries, and market access) to be negotiated. In particular, the EU has been 
working extremely hard to bring back rejected WTO ministerial Singapore issues, including: 
competition policy; services and investment; public procurement; protection of intellectual 
property; taxation (tax governance) and sustainable development. For instance, during the 
joint EU-SADC EPA member states negotiations held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 
March 2013, the EU commission’s deputy director general of trade and the chief negotiator, 
João Aguiar Machado, argued: 
 
…. negotiating sustainable development is a standard requirement by the European 
Parliament which eventually approves the new trade regime, and this delegation insists on 
negotiation clauses of  this important area in the EU’s interests despite your lack of political 





This chapter traced the trajectory of the EU-Zimbabwe conflictual bilateral trade relations in 
the context of the country’s internal political dynamics. While the negotiating parties 
relentlessly and publicly blame each other for political developments in the country, bringing 
complexities of governance and pluralistic democratic values to the economic and trade 
debate, the economy continues to underperform in all respects and has a record of eight years 
of negative growth despite adopting five economic blueprints within seven years (Table 6.4). 
Focus and energies have been expended on costly and elusive political questions under the 
supervision of the SADC region, with support from the AU. 
                                                 
31 Observation during the joint EU-SADC EPA member states negotiations, Johannesburg, South Africa,      
20-22 March 2013. 
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 It is not surprising therefore that since 2000, Zimbabwe has been silent on industrialisation, 
diversification of productive and export structures, value addition
32
 processes and the 
establishing of downstream industries. This illustrates not only an uncooperative 
government–business relationship, but most importantly a lack of resources (financial and 
technical) and investment in industrial innovation and development. Current EU-Zimbabwe 
trade relations differ from pre-2000, when bilateral trade relations were directly linked to the 
country’s economy and/or relevant stakeholders including the private sector, CSOs in the 
economic sector and MPs in the TDC. This indicates the crucial coincidence between 
deteriorating EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations and state-NSA relationships, juxtaposed with 
the EU’s dominance in pursuit of its own commercial interests during the negotiations.  
 
Zimbabwe’s level of ambition in this round of negotiations has been undermined by the 
persistence of limited economic activities. As a result, throughout the negotiation process the 
economy has continued to suffer from dwindling revenue flows thereby dashing hopes of 
industrial development to anchor forward-looking innovations, production and/or export 
diversification and market competiveness, as well as a revival of industrial capacity 
utilisation, and sustainable modernisation programmes. These limitations have been linked to 
the sectoral interests of agriculture and manufacturing which in the short to medium term are 
set to interface with the onslaught of EU products in the local market.  
 
The chapter further interrogated the EU’s dominance and influence on state-stakeholder 
relationships making it difficult to collectively and proactively develop strategic interventions 
in the economy with a view to building confidence in the business community and broader 
sections of civil society. The chapter also analysed EU dominance and influence at the level 
of ACP region, ESA configuration and Zimbabwe. The analysis also illustrated Zimbabwe’s 
challenges in terms of identifying economic activities and/or sectors with potentially strong 
domestic and export value chains in the short to medium term. Equally elusive has been 
constructive efforts to promote institutional framework and/or policy interventions to revive 
the country’s industrial capacity utilisation and/or market competitiveness.  
 
EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations in the context of the EU’s dominance and influence in the 
process illustrates how the nexus between politics and economic development since 1998 has 
                                                 
32 New Agriculturist (June 2011) claims that “with very few agro-processing facilities, there is little value 
addition in the agricultural sector”. 
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 remained an unresolved puzzle. For instance, prior to 2008 the country’s economic and 
social crisis was a function of internal political contestation, while the current agricultural 
and industrial capacity utilisation levels are a function of GPA commitment - which 
unfortunately has not and is not likely to be implemented in full. Similarly, the 
implementation of the 2012 ratified iEPA remains largely a function of the forthcoming 
electoral contests between the belligerent parties. While it is probable that the iEPA will risk 
suffering from insincere implementation against a backdrop of an economy struggling to 
recover from many years of slump, failure to compete with European products (See Table 
4.4) at the local market in the short to medium term is a certainty. 
 
This discussion anchors subsequent discussions linking bilateral conflictual relationships with 
the EPA process, especially the negative impact on the private sector and CSO involvement 
in this process. It also positions subsequent discussions relating to state-stakeholder 
challenges with respect to the collective articulation of issues, interests, positions and offers 














Zimbabwe opted to negotiate EPA under the ESA, a configuration of countries incongruously 
grouped together, some of them without social, economic or political historical bonds. Since 
February 2004 the ESA-EU has been negotiating an EPA that initially focused on six sectors, 
namely: agriculture, development co-operation issues, fisheries, market access, services and 
trade-related issues. As the process progressed, dispute avoidance and settlement as well as 
institutional and final provisions were included for negotiation. These negotiations seek to 
enhance the respective countries’ economic performance, competitiveness and value chains, 
leading to economic transformation, sustainable development and meaningful integration, 
both individually and collectively, into the global economy. In addition the negotiations seek 
to ensure that EPA outcomes are not only compatible with WTO rules, but also take into 
account the different needs and levels of development of ESA countries vis-à-vis those of the 
EU.  
 
Besides the countries being members of COMESA, the ESA group of countries (including 
Zimbabwe) which are negotiating with the EU, do not have legal status or formal structure as 
a bloc. Within the configuration, there are four secretariats of regional economic integration 
communities: COMESA, the EAC, the IOC and the IGAD. The COMESA secretariat is the 
leading institution that drives the ESA group’s EPA processes, with moral support from the 
other three secretariats. This also means that the COMESA secretariat coordinates the process 
and resources from the EU meant to support the process.  
 
Of the 16 ESA countries, EAC as a bloc initialed the iEPA while four individual countries, 
namely Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe signed the iEPA that has since 
been ratified and entered into force from May 2012. This has assured the aforementioned 
countries access to European markets following a unanimous decision by the three
1
 political 
                                                 
1 The European Parliament, the EC and the European Council of Ministers. 
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 structures of the EU in early 2012 to withdraw MAR 1528 of 2007 by 1 October 2014 
which allowed trading between the EU and ACP countries while negotiating to conclude a 
WTO compatible trade regime. The signing indicates significant bargaining power and 
influence thereby ensuring that individual iEPA member states remain locked in an unhealthy 
post-colonial dependence on EU’s institutions and individual EU member states for fiscal 
projects and/or programmes’ financial and technical support as well as funding human capital 
development, public policy design and implementation, entrepreneurial modernisation 
initiatives and supply-side improvement - all of which facilitates better access to the 
European market while improving the level of competitiveness in the domestic market. Other 
ESA countries, which are LDCs, are not under pressure to sign the iEPA since they are 
assured of access to the European market under the EBA regime (see Table 5.2). Meanwhile, 
all ESA countries are committed to negotiating a full EPA
2
 which is expected to be 
concluded before the withdrawal of MAR by 1 October 2014. In order to give impetus to the 




 ESA Council held in Kampala, Uganda in November 2012 underscored the need 
for sustained continuous and robust engagement with EU at all levels that EPA negotiations 
supporting regional integration and development be concluded timeously. …. the Council 
further underscored the need to dedicate technical and financial support mainly to support 
formulation of country and regional positions and facilitate negotiations (Tekere, 2012: 2).  
 
The above process has been guided by the ESA-EPA roadmap which endorsed two levels of 
‘negotiating institutions and structures’, as stipulated by the Cotonou Agreement. The 
roadmap agreed on the composition of stakeholder participation subject to the discretion of 
specific countries. Key stakeholders in this instance include government officials, NSA
3
 
representatives and officials from COMESA, who manage the process with moral and 
institutional support from the EAC, IOC and IGAD secretariats. The roadmap also agreed 
that the negotiating institutions and structures at the national level would be undertaken by 
the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) and at the regional level by the 
Regional Negotiation Forum (RNF). 
 
                                                 
2 This is sometimes referred to as “comprehensive or inclusive EPA”. 
3 The private sector, civil society groups/non-governmental organisations, the media, community based 
organisations, religious organisations and trade unions. 
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 During the process, Katuruza (2012
4
) observes that ‘the EU has legal status supported by 
institutional structures including the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament’. It 
is further observed that the EU has a powerful functioning bureaucracy based in Brussels and 
manned by a large team of skilled negotiators and a host of experts under the authority of a 
single negotiator, the EC Trade Commissioner. This gives the EU negotiating team a mandate 
to carefully navigate and balance existing and potential contradictions and divisions amongst 
EU member states before their chief negotiator, the trade commissioner, faces negotiating 
counterparts (the outside world) with a single voice as Box 5.1 on EU step by step trade 
negotiations below explains. 
 
  
                                                 
4 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 May 2012. 
110 
 
Box 5.1:      EU step by step trade negotiations  
Who negotiates EPA agreement? 
 The EU’s trade policy empowers the EC to negotiate EPA with Zimbabwe on behalf of 
individual bloc countries. However, the EC closely cooperate through regular contact with the 
Council of the EU and European parliament, which ultimately approve the overall agreement.  
How did EC prepare for negotiations? 
 The EC conducted impact assessment studies including holding public consultation on the 
content and options for the proposed EPA on the EU and on the other country. The Council then 
gave the EC negotiating directives, spelling out general objectives to be achieved, which would 
be shared with EU Parliament.  
What were the negotiating content and level of ambition? 
 Opening new markets for goods and services 
 Increasing investment opportunities and protection of investments 
 Making trade faster by facilitating transit through customs and setting common rules on technical 
and sanitary standards 
 Making the policy environment more predictable by taking joint commitments on areas that 
affect trade including intellectual property rights, competition rules and public procurement 
 Supporting sustainable development by fostering cooperation, transparency and dialogue with 
partners on social and environmental issues. 
 The level of ambition depended on the development and capacities of ESA group or Zimbabwe 
and offer flexibilities as determined by ESA group or Zimbabwe needs and capacities. 
What was the negotiation process? 
 Chief negotiator, usually DG Trade, leads negotiating teams including experts covering all 
different topics under negotiation drawn from across the commission.  
 Chief negotiators (EU and ESA group {not Zimbabwe}) are expected to regularly contact each 
other including meeting outside formal negotiation rounds.  
 Negotiations were based on a policy of ‘negotiation is not over until everything is agreed’, that is, 
draft negotiations texts were not made public during the process even when certain chapters (or 
topics) were closed. 
 When negotiations reached technical finalisation stage, the EC immediately informed the 
European parliament and the Council, after which finalised texts were sent to both institutions. 
Source:  European Commission, (June 2013) 
 
On the other hand, Zimbabwe trade negotiations are headed by a government chief negotiator 
without sufficient experience, skills or capacities to match the EU counterpart. The 
government chief negotiator also lacks institutional memory of previously agreed on or 
contestable issues and positions. In addition, the government chief negotiator engaged 
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 without a clearly articulated mandate
5
 from both cabinet and parliament based on informed 
scoping research analysis in line with national developmental goals or public opinion 
through consultation on the content and options of the proposed new trade deal on the 
economy prior to the engagement. Consulting a wide variety of stakeholders contributes 
positively towards a more realistic and innovative methodology geared to finding common 
positions and offers, and to creating mechanisms for engaging citizens in general on the 
process (Roux, 2008). Furthermore, the country has a huge deficit of seasoned and 
experienced teams as is evident from a high rate of staff turnover in government, especially 
during the period under review. For instance, since the EPA process started in February 2004, 
the country has a record of three different chief negotiators, two of whom were recalled and 
deployed to Embassies in Pretoria, South Africa and Lusaka, Zambia. The Trade and Industry 
ministry (now Industry and Commerce) also saw senior trade officials leaving government 
for ‘greener pastures’, and changes in ministerial portfolios
6
 and ambassadorial postings in 
Brussels – the nerve centre of EPA negotiation processes. The domestic process also suffered 
from lack of serious technical support from business and economic intelligence gathering and 




Government was very late to realise that economic intelligence gathering is a critical in-put in 
trade negotiations. For instance, the president’s office - where most intelligence operations 
are based - was completely out of direct involvement in terms of gathering key economic 
information that would have empowered technocrats from the relevant trade-related 
ministries. As a result, negotiators lacked crucial information about their EC counterparts 
including composition of negotiating team, character and attitude of negotiators and other 
crucial negotiating secrets of the EC negotiating team.  
 
In addition, Zimbabwean MPs in the TDC, who are responsible for constitutionally handling 
issues of trade and trade agreements, have not been involved in the process with a view to 
preparing them for eventual ratification should there be an agreement. Excluding MPs in the 
TDC in the process confirms that the legislative body has not given the process national 
strategic direction, based on shared national ethos and imperatives in line with the 
redistribution of economic resources through land reform and economic empowerment 
                                                 
5 Interviews discussion with chief negotiators reveal that the negotiations process was not guided by minimum 
threshold beyond which the team could consider walking out of the negotiating room. 
6 Welshman Ncube of the smaller function of the MDC formations took over the Trade and Industry ministry 
from Samuel Mumbengegwi, ZANU (PF) in the GNU. 
7 Interview discussion with Elijah Munyuki, Gaborone, Botswana, 25-26 August 2012. 
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 programmes. Non participation of MPs in the process was further complicated by the fact 
that, since 2000, the political contestation and dynamics in the country resulted in changes 
in the composition of TDC membership at each electoral period. Meanwhile, fiscal 
constraints and the lack of donor funding means that the MPs could not benefit from related 
trade negotiations and international agreements, capacity building activities or programmes.  
 
The sections below discusses national and regional institutions and/or structures that have not 
only guided the EU-ESA negotiations process - culminating in some non-LDCs, including 
Zimbabwe, individually initialing and eventually signing the iEPA with the EU - but are still 
guiding the on-going ‘comprehensive
8




5.2 EPA negotiations: institutions and structures 
 
5.2.1 National development trade policy forum 
 
Zimbabwe negotiated EPA with the EU under an ESA configuration, comprising sixteen 
countries (see section 1.1). The negotiations, which focused on six clusters
9
, were jointly 
launched in February 2004 by the EU and ESA countries. The joint EPA roadmap directed 
every ESA member state to establish the NDTPF comprising all the relevant stakeholders 
including government officials from all the trade-related ministries, and representatives from 
the business community, civil society and labour. In line with this, the Zimbabwe ministry of 
Trade and Industry established NDTPF in 2004 as a strategic structure that would provide an 
environment for constructive and inclusive engagement in any subsequent EPA-related 
preparatory work. This platform is meant to facilitate multi-stakeholder discussions on the 
country’s research, including impact assessment findings that can subsequently feed into the 
national perspectives during RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in 
Brussels. The NDTPF’s main function has been assumed to be that of developing national 
positions and offers for subsequent discussions at RNF meetings.  
 
                                                 
8 This is sometimes referred to as “full and inclusive EPA”. 
9 Agriculture, development issues, fisheries, market access, services and trade-related issues. 
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 As a cluster-inclusive and multi-sectoral structure, the NDTPF was expected to ensure 
wider and deeper consultations and involvement of all the relevant stakeholders, 
unorganised constituencies and citizens in the process. This suggests that the NDTP has been 
providing an interactive platform for all the relevant stakeholders to effectively participate in 
all EPA-related national dialogue sessions (conferences, seminars, and workshops) convened 
to review EPA-related research methodologies and the findings of sustainable impact 
assessments and other related sectoral studies. This also implies that the NDTPF as a 
preparatory negotiations platform has been facilitating stakeholder consultations on EPA 
issues, interests, positions and offers. National stakeholders, through this platform, have been 
expected to collectively strategise and produce progress reports detailing both offensive and 
defensive positions and offers within the context of national economic and political 
(industrial transformation and broad-based economic empowerment) interests while building 
networks, coalitions and synergies before subsequent RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings are 
held in the region and in Brussels. 
 
In line with the above, the Trade and Industry ministry appointed an officer to coordinate all 
related activities of the NDTPF. Figure 5.1 presents the two-way interaction between the 
NDTPF and trade related ministries, between the NDTPF and the Brussels-based 
ambassador, and between the NDTPF and the private sector. The structure has been 
interacting with the cabinet through the Minister of Trade and Industry. The figure also 
shows minimal interaction between the NDTPF and the sections of civil society working on 
trade and development, as well as between the NDTPF and research and academic 
institutions. In this respect, most CSO representatives, while noting requests from the 
structure for interactions prior to trade-related meetings at the RNF and Brussels levels, 
decried the lack of rigour in the engagements and inputs. Similarly, some academic 
institutions with previous undisputed track records
10
 of interrogating fundamental macro-
economic processes such as the implementation weaknesses of the ESAP paradigm, including 
trade liberalisation policy, have not deeply engaged the structure and the responsible ministry 
with a view to contributing towards a better trade deal. Another weakness from the figure is 
limited two-way interaction between NDTPF and MPs, whose constitutional function entails 
ratifying and monitoring the implementation of the new trade regime by the executive. In 
                                                 
10 Such as publications and public dialogue sessions on policy process and impacts thereof 
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 addition, a lack of shared reports on proceedings makes it difficult to verify the true 
functionality of the structure in terms of harnessing stakeholders’ input into the process. 
 


















Source:  Own compilation based on various sources 
 
However, some critical voices are excluded from interacting with other stakeholders at all 
levels. This means that the NDTPF structure has been suffering from limited democratic 
space to potentially amplify pro-poor and pro-development voices during the preparatory 
stages of the EPA negotiations. Furthermore, some civil society representatives even question 
and/or doubt the inclusiveness of all the relevant stakeholders working on the EPA process in 
the NDTPF platform. The exclusion of critical voices is supported by the sampled civil 
society groups and research scholars who confirm that the country’s NDTPF suffers from 
lack of wide and deep consultations and/or involvement of all relevant stakeholders and 
citizens including poor constituencies. The exclusion of critical voices further compromises 
collective articulation of strategies, tactics, synergy building, coalition formations and options 



































 As a result, some civic bodies blame the prevailing political polarisation in the country, the 
general conflictual relationship between ZANU (PF) and civic bodies, and the frosty 
relationship between ZANU (PF) and the EU, for undermining the potential of the NDTPF 
platform to deliver positive EPA outcomes. Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that some 
national, regional and global civic bodies, including those working on the EPA processes, 
have over the period under review lost trust and confidence in the ruling governing party to 
provide leadership in economic policies and programmes including EPA negotiations with 
Europe. Therefore, they constantly question perennial economic mismanagement as reflected 
by decade-long economic meltdown, short-lived macro-economic policies and coordination 
of the EPA process, especially with respect to formulation of positions and offers. The 
questioning by anti-ZANU (PF) civil society groups, in some instances, has over the period 
under review been construed as a strategy of discrediting the former government while 
mobilising donor funding in support of regime change project. In fact, the authorities and 
their allies viewed any questioning of state shortcomings in economic management as anti-
indigenisation and economic empowerment. Further, ZANU (PF) leadership views any 
criticism of its shortcomings on economic management as not only a grandstanding political 
strategy meant to dislodge its hegemony as a champion of indigenisation and economic 
empowerment agenda, but also a strategy for buttressing the EU’s unjustified sanctions 
against the people of Zimbabwe.  
 
Unfortunately, the above tension and mistrust between the state and civil society groups has 
impacted negatively on the work of the NDTPF. The level of CSOs’ criticism to Gabriel 
Mugabe’s administration has in many ways linked the EPA process with the prevailing 
governance malpractices and endemic contestable electoral systems and practices. As a 
result, all critical civil society voices against socio-economic policies and unfolding political 
conditions were deliberately excluded from the EPA-related processes and the general socio-
economic transformation debate. Indeed, a significant number of trade-focused CSOs were 
excluded from most EPA-related meetings and had no access to EPA-related information 
before and after the RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels. Of 
all the EPA-focused CSOs, only the Trades Centre and Seatini enjoyed a sound working 
relationship with the ministry of Trade and Industry. The National Association of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NANGO), the umbrella body of most NGOs in the country, 
participated initially but withdrew as the process progressed largely due to limited financial 
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 resources, and the reallocation of available human and financial resources towards the 
governance and human rights agenda.  
 
This sour ZANU (PF) government-civil society relationship filters into the work of NDTPF 
amid claims by a Zimcodd representative that: 
 
…the ZANU (PF) government deliberately excludes some representatives of civic bodies 
based in the country, who are perceived to be critical to the politically motivated 
indigenisation and economic empowerment agenda, from attending RNF and Brussels EPA 
meetings. This is despite the fact that most country-based regional EPA focused 
organisations’ representatives have since the launch of the negotiations been doing sterling 
EPA work that generated strategic tactics, positions and interventions that were well 





This suggests that EPA-focused CSOs have over this period distinguished themselves as 
‘fountains of sound analysis and advocacy’, (Seatini, 2004) questioning the EPA’s ideology 
and the rationale of ‘fast tracking the process towards predetermined deadlines’ (Deve, 2006 
and Kamidza, 2008) in spite of widespread evidence of the country’s unpreparedness to 
negotiate a better deal. However, in many instances limited funding generally renders civic 
bodies inactive and very weak to mount serious and critical engagements in NDTPF’s 
activities. This has also resulted in low mobilisation of citizens and equally weak possibilities 
of forming strategic alliances with other key stakeholders, especially the private sector and 
MPs. 
 
Given limited industrial and trade capacities, Zimbabwe CSO representatives and their 
strategic allies mobilised resources for lobbying various EU institutions against fast-tracking 
the process in spite of growing evidence to ignore the ’EPA’s objective of wide and deep 
consultations’ (Kamidza, 2007) amid emerging fears of worsening poverty and social and 
economic underdevelopment in the short to medium term. Some of the above CSO 
representatives were very active in the continental “Stop to EPAs” campaign, which 
influenced the decision to move the deadline given by the EU to conclude a WTO compatible 
EPAs trade regime by 31 December 2007 to December 2010. Even the extended deadline 
                                                 
11 Interview discussion with Richard Mandebvu, Harare, Zimbabwe, 24 June 2011. 
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 could not foster the conclusion of these trade talks, which are now expected to be concluded 
by 1 October 2014 when the MAR 1528 of 2007 withdrawal takes effect. Thus, the EPA 
processes lack of wide and deep involvement of critical stakeholders, particularly poor 
constituencies, exposes significant national institutional weakness in collective, inclusive and 
constructive engagements in the EPA negotiation process. This also reflects the low 
mobilisation of citizens, and particularly poor constituencies as well as weak strategic 
networking, synergy building and coalition partnerships between government officials and 
NSA activists in support of the process. The exclusion of critical CSOs’ inputs, has in many 
instances contributed to less ambitious EPA outcomes with respect to Zimbabwe and other 
EPA signatory countries in the same grouping. Many individuals in the civil society 
movement made harsh remarks about the process and questioned the wisdom of signing the 
iEPA when the economy was struggling to resuscitate its industrial capacity utilisation. 
Indeed, Zimbabwe’s weaker articulation of issues, positions and offers, vis-à-vis the EC, 
resulted in a dangerous and unviable EPA outcome that is likely to fail to support the 
country’s social and economic transition in the short to medium term. Further, the iEPA 
implementation risks becoming a vicious onslaught on the economy in general, and on new 
farmers, new entrepreneurs and small to medium enterprises (SMEs) operators in particular, 
whose market competitiveness may not withstand technology-based EU products (see Figure 
5.3).  
 
Critics have linked signs of weak institutional EPA processes to poor management and 
oversight of the COMESA secretariat’s EPA Unit, the regional institution driving the process. 
In particular, civic bodies claim that the COMESA secretariat’s EPA Unit has failed to 
monitor how countries such as Zimbabwe comply with the EPA joint roadmap rules and 
procedures of engagement in the process. They argue that the regional institution should have 
insisted that group countries submit reports prior to RNF meetings’ a strategy that could have 
allowed interested configuration stakeholders to review the process and understand the 
dynamics at each NDTPF platform and subsequently during the RNF negotiation process. 
This could have encouraged national, regional and international scholars to access country 
reports at various stages during and after the process, thereby better informing Zimbabweans 
regarding the dynamics of the process. Indeed, without publicity and close scrutiny, it 
becomes difficult to assess the NDTPF’s accountability, transparency, democratic process 
and inclusiveness of the most relevant civic bodies in the process. 
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 Due to deliberate exclusion of civic bodies from the process, publicity surrounding the 
Zimbabwean EPA process has remained largely low-key and unsatisfactory to most 
constituencies and citizens. Most respondents have observed that EPA-related events and 
activities have increasingly taken place without media notice at the level of the NDTPF, the 
RNF and Brussels. There have been no report back sessions by government officials - either 
prior to or after participating in the above meetings. In particular, the Industry and Commerce 
Minister, Welshman Ncube, did not address the nation or consultatively confide with the 
other key stakeholders after signing the iEPA. This development renewed state-civil society 
suspicion on the EPA process, with the latter lamenting a lost opportunity to engage 
interested constituencies and citizens in identifying potential inherent weaknesses of the new 
trade regime with Europe as well as facilitating their monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of EPA outcomes. 
 
 
5.2.2 Regional negotiation forum 
 
The Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) is a structure that brings together representatives 
from the NDTPF, four regional secretariats
12
, a regional civic body
13
, Brussels-based 
ambassadors, especially cluster lead spokespersons, and selected observers, to exchange 
views on issues, interests, strategies and tactics and to ultimately prepare EPA positions and 
offers for the ESA configuration in their engagement with the EC. The COMESA secretariat 
coordinates all EPA-related work, including impact assessment studies undertaken in ESA 
countries with moral support from the EAC, the IOC, and IGAD secretariats. The COMESA 
secretariat also organises and facilitates RNF meetings and monitors the implementation of 
agreed positions and decisions. The COMESA leadership including the Secretary General, 
Deputy Secretary General, Director of Trade, and EPA Unit CTA have not only been very 
active in the negotiations, but have also directly supervised the process. 
 
Nalunga (2004) observes that since the launch of the EPA roadmap RNF negotiations have 
become increasingly complex amid organisational deficiencies in terms of both technical and 
financial capacities at the level of the COMESA secretariat and participating countries. Thus, 
the funding from COMESA, secured from the EU, has since the launch of the EPA process 
                                                 
12 COMESA, EAC, IOC and IGAD. 
13 Seatini between February 2004 and 31 December 2005. 
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 supported three delegates (two government officials and a representative of the private 
sector) from each ESA country. This financial support has ensured the participation of all 
ESA-EPA countries at both the RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in 
Brussels. Zimbabwe has received this level of financial support (the only financial 
relationship) regardless of the bilateral standoff with the EU, and it is condoned by ZANU 
(PF) leadership. In addition, some well-resourced and strategic ESA countries have 
sponsored the participation of additional state officials (from trade and trade-related 
Ministries) and MPs. For instance, some countries (such as Kenya) supported the 
participation of MPs in both RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in 
Brussels, while those from Zimbabwe have not been part of the government delegation to the 
above meetings since the start of the process in 2004. Similarly, some ESA member state 
delegations supported their respective civil society groups and private sector representatives 
with resources to join them in all EPA-related meetings. 
 
The COMESA secretariat has ‘more often been accused of circulating crucial documents’ 
(Kamidza, 2004) during meetings. This practice compromises the quality of internal group 
engagements, as well as the quality and eventual submission of national EPA progress reports 
on stakeholder preparations and outcomes. This is contrary to the joint EPA roadmap which 
emphasises that NDTPF consultative reports be submitted to the COMESA secretariat well 
before RNF meetings in order to allow officials to adequately prepare the meetings by 
allowing translation of documents into the official languages of the ESA group, taking into 
account national and regional dynamics and perspectives associated with the planning of 
future meetings. This is supported by Seatini’s (2005) observation that all ESA countries 
systemically failed to remit reports of their respective consultations to the COMESA 
secretariat prior to the RNF meetings. This means that most delegations who participated in 
the meetings were unprepared while national consultations in some countries, especially 
Zimbabwe, were severely compromised. For instance, high levels of Zimbabwean state 
shortcomings, coupled with conflictual state-CSO relationships, greatly undermined the 
collective articulation of issues and reinforced the development of offensive and defensive 
positions and offers. This development not only compromises the depth of engagements 
within the configuration, but more often derails the process that pledges to achieve positive 
EPA outcomes.  
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 With respect to Zimbabwe, the above non-remittal of NDTPF reports to the COMESA 
secretariat presents challenges relating to the strategic coordination of stakeholder inputs, 
the effective consultations of stakeholders and collective stakeholder decisions with respect 
to national interests, positions and offers. It not only reflects a lack of preparedness, 
collective stakeholder participation and strategic contribution to the process, but also high 
levels of politicisation of issues, process, procedures, and expected outcomes. Furthermore, 
continued high levels of political polarisation amid dwindling international friends makes it 
difficult to have collective articulation of national positions, decisions and offers; a 
development that has also undermined the country’s effectiveness in RNF meetings. In spite 
of this, the country concluded the iEPA that was signed in Mauritius in 2009 by the GNU 
minister of Industry and Commerce, Welshman Ncube. Limited technical depth to negotiate a 
balanced trade regime with the EU, coupled with weak consultations involving all the 
relevant stakeholders, were exposed by Angelica Katuruza, the former government chief 
negotiator during the combined ESA and SADC configurations’ EPA workshop held in 
Harare in 2009. At the time she pleaded with the Zimbabwe business community to respond 
to the government’s request for additional industrial-sensitive products to be shared with the 
EU well after the country has initialed the iEPA, saying: ‘Although Zimbabwe has submitted 
its offers to the EC, the door is still open for the business sector to submit individual lists of 









                                                 
14 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 May 2012. 
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 5.2.3 Other negotiation institutions 
 
5.2.3.1 Regional preparatory task force  
 
The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) is an informal body of experts which allows 
both sides (the EU and the ESA) to get a better technical understanding of the counterpart’s 
position or better interpretations on certain issues and developments pertaining to the EPA 
process. The main objective of the RPTF is to prepare for the meetings of the leading 
ambassadors and EC senior officials in terms of scheduling meetings, agenda preparations, 
and identification of venues. The RPTF also facilitates the exchange of information with 
respect to negotiations issues, views and positions, and the identification of areas of 
divergence and convergence between the negotiating parties, thereby enabling each side to 
adequately prepare for meaningful participation. This structure also prepares ESA ministerial 
and EU commissioners’ meetings. Thus, the RPTF is intended to enable parties to obtain 
smooth negotiating positions before tabling the same with other stakeholders.  
 
From the ESA side, representatives of the RPTF comprise Brussels-based ambassadors and 
their respective officials, the COMESA secretariat officials, including the EPA and CTA, and 
representatives of the ACP secretariat. The RTPF decisions and process-related agreements 
are expected to add value to ongoing EPA negotiations outcomes. This structure has a 
profound impact on the sequencing of negotiating positions within the configuration, and 
between the configuration and the EC. On the EC side, the representatives of the RPTF are 
mainly drawn from representatives of the EU Directorate of Trade. 
 
Seatini notes that the RPTF only became active towards the initialing of the iEPA in terms of 
forming part of the deliberations that assisted in sequencing the negotiations. The 
organisation further observes that this structure (RPTF) has not been engaging regional 
CSOs, including their representatives who occasionally undertake missions to lobby EU 
institutions. This suggests that the primary cause undermining the interaction process 
between the two important relevant stakeholders (RPTF and CSOs) is caused by different 
locations - with the RPTF representatives all based in Brussels, and the CSOs based in ESA 
capitals. Further, in cases where RPTF representatives participated in regional meetings 
taking place in any of the ESA towns, ESA CSOs failed to either formally or informally 
interact with them. This reflects on a poor relationship between COMESA secretariat’s EPA 
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 Unit, the convener of the RNF meetings, and the CSOs, usually on account of perceptions of 
unruly behaviour on the part of the latter. The study confirms this by observing that ‘no 
meeting was organised throughout the EPA process to facilitate the interaction between 
RPTF representatives and regional CSOs’ (Machemedze, 2011
15
 and Makanza, 2011
16
). The 
study notes that following the withdrawal of the Seatini representative in December 2004 
from official ESA EPA meetings at all levels, the interaction of CSOs with other ESA 
structures was paralysed. The study further confirms that all the COMESA organised EPA 
meetings had congested agendas that did not allow regional CSOs a formal slot for debriefing 
purposes with RPTF representative(s), on the process. Failure of this structure and the 
regional CSOs to interact on the EPA process reflects the organisational weakness and/or a 
poor working relationship between the COMESA secretariat and regional CSOs. This can 
also be a reflection of the CSOs’ weak advocacy strategies. In the final analysis, regional 
CSOs missed the opportunity to lobby the RPTF that was at the centre of the EPA processes 
in addition to holding a number of consultative meetings with the EU.  
 
Kamidza (2004) recalls how the RPTF sequencing of negotiation issues in July 2004 was 
rejected by the ESA capitals during the meeting held in Antananarivo, Madagascar, which 
caused some member states delegates to wonder: 
 
Are we already agreeing to sequence cluster negotiations when national impact assessment 
studies are yet to be completed? Who prioritises the sequencing of cluster negotiations? Who 
should provide guidance to this structure in order to synthesise contributions of all relevant 
stakeholders in this process? Why, in particular, has agriculture, the backbone of many ESA 
economies, not been prioritised together with fisheries, development issues and market access 
for the period July 2004 and March 2005
17
? (Kamidza, 2004: 3).  
 
While RPTF sequencing of negotiations has the potential to confuse the process and to create 
divisions within the configuration, a development that may result in a bad EPA outcome, 
regional CSOs could have sharpened their advocacy with this structure with a view to 
influence logical sequencing of the negotiations. For instance, the regional CSOs knew where 
the meeting venues were, and some of the delegates at the meetings, a development that they 
                                                 
15 Interview discussion with Rangarirai Machemedze, Harare, Zimbabwe, 25 June 2011.  
16 Interview discussion with Tendayi Makanza, Durban, South Africa, 10 August 2011. 
17 Para 74 of the adopted 3rd RNF meeting report 
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 could have used to interact with the representatives of the structure. Indeed, a conventional 
lobbying tactic would have facilitated interaction.  
 
The regional CSOs could have also assigned their European counterparts to lobby RTPF 
structure in Brussels. Already, regional CSOs in the sub-region have developed strategic 
networking and funding relationship with Europe’ collaborative CSOs such as Action Aid, 
Christian Aid, (Holland) Humanistic Institute for Development Cooperation (Hivos), Oxfam 
Novib, Oxfam America and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (see Table 6.2). The above 
organisations had also facilitated sub-regional CSOs’ lobbying mission in Europe, the 
exchange of strategic information and the convening of and/or participation in EPA-related 
dialogue sessions: conferences, seminars, workshops and roundtable discussions (Table 6.2). 
This philanthropic funding created space and opportunities for CSOs to lobby EU institutions 
and citizens on the process and the potential implications thereof in ESA economies. For 
instance, Christian Aid in May 2005 funded selected CSOs’ representatives from Africa’s 
four configurations on a lobbying mission in Europe, targeting the EU Presidency (United 
Kingdom), the EU Parliament, various EC Directorates and ACP secretariat. Unfortunately, 
the organisers of the lobbying mission (Christian Aid) missed an opportunity to facilitate 
direct interaction between RPTF representatives and African CSOs’ lobbyists, two of whom 
were from the ESA region. Indeed, conventional lobbying strategy and tactics would have 
facilitated engagement with RTPF structure, an outcome that would have facilitated more 
interaction in subsequent ESA EPA meetings in the region. 
 
 
5.2.3.2 ESA EPA unit 
 
At the Entebbe and Antananarivo meetings the ESA group, agreed to establish a technical 
office similar to that of the EC, with a mandate to assist in the negotiations at the technical 
level. Eventually, this EPA technical office was headed by the Chief Technical Advisor, 
whose mandate has been EPA technical work, including preparations of ESA meetings, 
providing technical advice to ESA member states on EPA issues and sequencing negotiations 
with other EPA structures outside RNF such as RPTF and the Council of Ministers. The CTA 
has also been assisting national negotiators during the process as well as working closely with 
different cluster negotiators based in Brussels. However, some ESA member states were 
unwilling to contribute financial resources to support this important office, resulting in the 
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 EC’s funding of the operational and function bills itself. This not only exposes lack of 
strategic positioning vis-à-vis the EU, but also the dependency syndrome of wanting all 
EPA crucial milestones to be financially supported by the negotiating counterpart.  
 
However, over the negotiation period the EPA unit has remained under-resourced in terms of 
personnel. It was manned by the CTA and a secretary to assist in the preparation of meetings 
in terms of documentation, logistics and facilitating the office. The operation of this office 
and staff emoluments are funded by the EU. Lack of expediency has seen the ESA member 
states failing to contribute resources in support of the work of this unit, given the frequency 
of meetings and engagements in various structures involved in the process. Contributions 
from ESA countries would at least have enabled the hiring of additional staff such as an 
assistant to the CTA, thereby improving the coordination and facilitation of the process, 
especially given the spread of the group. It is assumed that the regional CSOs in general, and 
Zimbabwe-based CSOs in particular, would have taken advantage of the unit in terms of 
contributing to the process, regardless of the perceptions that might exist within the 
COMESA secretariat. Further, a close working relationship with the EPA unit would have 
given the CTA more time to interact with other relevant stakeholders. In particular, a working 
relationship with Zimbabwe CSOs could have enabled the CTA - given his long-standing 
relationship with national, regional, and continental CSOs prior to joining the unit - to 
harness in-put from this sector. The CTA, being a Zimbabwean, could have provided the 
right platform to lobby for national CSOs direct involvement in the process, regardless of the 
conflictual relationship with the state. However, it would appear that relying on the EU to 
fund the unit indirectly delivers the negotiating engine of this group into the manipulative 
process and control (through funding and agenda setting) of the counterpart – the EU, a 
development that reflects strategic deficiency. 
 
 
5.2.3.3  Committee of ambassadors 
 
The Committee of Ambassadors comprises leading cluster spokespersons who are supposed 
to liaise with the EC on all EPA-related matters as well as work closely with other 
ambassadors from the ESA configurations. Given the layer of structures involved in these 
negotiations, it was/is very crucial for this committee to work harmoniously with other organs 
of the ESA-EPA. However, the Committee of Ambassadors has not provided regional CSOs 
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 with enough space to undertake their respective advocacies on this process. As noted above, 
different locations make it difficult for regional CSOs to lobby this structure. Equally 
important is the admission by the group’s CSOs that they failed to explore other ways of 
lobbying to promote convergence of ideas on the process technical input on issues, and the 
building of bridges with EU institutions and structures. Such a working relationship could 
have facilitated physical and/or email-based advocacy between the group’s CSOs and the EU 
institutions as well as other relevant structures and institutions involved in this process. This 
would have assisted in prioritising issues for engagement.  
 
 
5.2.3.4  Council of ministers 
 
This comprises all the ministers of Trade, Industry and Commerce in the ESA configuration, 
and is a structure that gives political direction to the negotiations, especially with respect to 
the mandate as informed by unfolding social, economic, and political sensitivities and 
dynamics. In particular, this structure gives political direction to the process in the event of a 
declared stalemate on some issues and positions. In this regard, the structure only met when 
necessary either in the ESA region or in Brussels. With respect to the Brussels meetings, 
Samuel Mumbengegwi, the former ZANU (PF) Trade and Industry minister, was always 
allowed to travel and participate in EPA-related meetings despite being on the EU travel ban, 
a development that reflects the EU’s long-term strategy of securing access to the 
Zimbabwean market. Allowing Mumbengegwi’s entry to Brussels also reflects the guerrilla 
strategies and tactics of preserving ESA unity, especially during the formative stages of the 
negotiations, but knowing full well how to wreck it by isolating the decade-long political 
nemesis towards the conclusion of the negotiations (see section 5.5).  
 
The ESA trade ministers also engaged the EPA negotiation process through other platforms, 
namely the ACP Council of Ministers, organised either in the ACP region or in Brussels, and 
the AU ministers of trade meetings taking place either in Ethiopia, the Headquarters of the 
AU, or the capital city of the current AU Chair. However, as observed above, regional CSOs 
have not engaged with this structure, thereby reflecting their failure to exploit past 
negotiation strategies and tactics - including forming or building strong alliances with trade, 
industry and commerce ministers and their respective permanent secretaries, capitals-based 
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 officials, Brussels-based ambassadors and other technical states’ institutions established to 
support the process. 
 
 
5.3 EPA process and guerrilla negotiation approach  
 
Collins (2009: 17-23) summarises guerrilla negotiation tactics as precise and strategic 
pressures designed to discourage a counterpart’s negotiation efforts. Usually, this takes the 
form of strategic silence on certain issues, flashing cash in support of the process, distracting 
the counterpart to focus on issues, and taking advantage of the counterpart’s goodwill. This 
largely informs the EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiating process. Benoliel and Hua (2009:6) 
describe negotiation as challenging, unique, complex and exciting and requiring a mixture of 
knowledge, skills, experience and intuition. This entails a combination of moves and 
countermoves, principles, tactics, strategies, attitudes, mindsets and confidence building, 
driven by specific commercial interests and social and political considerations. It also entails 
understanding the fundamental dilemmas and myths which surround negotiation and the 
counterpart’s power, systematic processes, strengths and weaknesses within the context of 
national interests and defined roles, goals and limits. In addition it means that in managing 
the negotiation process, parties must avoid common mistakes, including underestimating 
risks associated with poor preparation as Benoliel and Hua (2009:16) state: 
 
The negotiation process involves managing information and communications during the 
discussions, planning and re-planning, coordinating efforts between negotiators, making 
moves and counter-moves and making important decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
and time pressure. Benoliel and Hua (2009:16) 
 
Following the above, the EU employs a two-edged sword approach. These are categories of 
political and economic conditionalities on the one hand and relentless, persuasive and 
offensive commercial interests aimed at securing short to medium term market opportunities 
for its producers, exporters, investors and consumers in Zimbabwe on the other. This means 
sustaining outward expansion of a European capitalist industrial production frontier, thereby 
summarily increasing the supply of goods on European markets with any excess production 
having already been assured of a ‘secure market’ outside the EU (that is, in EPA economies, 
especially those with weak productive capacities like Zimbabwe). This development not only 
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 sustains profit margins and employment levels in the EU, but also entrenches capitalist 
tentacles in external markets, especially vulnerable economies like Zimbabwe. This scenario 
is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below: technologically advanced producers, including MCs and 
TNCs in Europe, increase their respective supplies of goods to EU markets (from S0 to S1) 
but prevent a corresponding fall in price (P0 to P1) in the same European market by exporting 
a corresponding increase in output (surplus Q0Q1) to iEPA economies. The fact that the price 
remains unchanged following the export of excess production means that the profit levels and 
employment opportunities in Europe have been secured by the EPA trade regime. Indeed, 
(Q0Q1) surplus output is a competitive proxy of a secured market share in iEPA economies. 
In an economy like Zimbabwe that is still struggling to stimulate industrial capacity 
utilisation beyond 20%, the EU’s Q0Q1 surplus output is assured of market share in the short 
to medium term. During the SADC EPA ministerial meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, Rob 
Davies, the South African trade minister, remarked: 
 
EU mercantilist interests and high levels of ambition displayed in the EPA process are 
certainly poised to displace domestic products with competing and heavily subsidised 
European products. Sadly, most EPA signatories have not developed countervailing measures 
to deal with subsidies’ induced competitiveness and increased penetration of European 





                                                 
18 Observation during the SADC EPA member states ministerial meeting, Gaborone, Botswana, 20 May 2013.  
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As demonstrated elsewhere in the study, Zimbabwe is set to become a recipient of Europe’s 
access in production and productivity, largely due to the near collapse of its industrial and 
export capabilities, estimated at between 4% and 10% of the national industrial capacity 
utilisation, (Nyakazeya, 2009) when the GNU was formed; the subsequent economic policy 
contradictions and rhetorical public political posturing (known as GNU’s dysfunctionality) 
and uncertain EU-Zimbabwe bi-lateral relationship, in which the former disputed the latter’s 
victory in July 2013 harmonised presidential, legislative, mayoral and councillor elections 
despite overwhelming endorsement by African governments. The above suggests that, in the 
short to medium term, Zimbabwean consumers and industrial firms guarantee European 
producers and exporters an open market. This onslaught on the economy is set to largely 
benefit European MCs, TNCs and business lobbies. By signing and ratifying iEPA, 
Zimbabwe opened 45% of the economy through tariff lines reduction to EU products by 2012 
(see Table 6.6, section 6.4.4). Such a development reflects a high probability of entrenchment 
of Europe’s mercantilist and capitalist interests in the Zimbabwean economy in the short to 
medium term through the invisible control of demand and supply forces. It is also a warning 
signal to the new ‘indigenous economic empowerment entrepreneurs, particularly the new 
farmers’ of future tough competition from the European products. Such a development is 










 ‘made in Europe’ market tsunami and a corresponding fall in associated economic profits of 
local entrepreneurs, as reflected in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3: Potential scenario of trade flows between EU and Zimbabwe under iEPA 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Zapiro, 2006 
 
Zimbabwe’s industrial base has since the onset of the trade flows between the EU and 
Zimbabwe (the Lomé Conventions and Cotonou Agreement) been largely oriented towards 
exporting raw commodities while remaining a net importer of EU’s products and services. 
The trade imbalance between the negotiating parties (see Figure 4.2) is reflected in Figure 5.3 
above. In particular, this exposes the agricultural sector that is now largely indigenised to 
corresponding competitive European products. Zimbabwe’s new A1 and A2 farmers are 
currently characterised by very low production and productivity levels, compared to the 
heavily protected and subsidised EU farmers. Estimates show that a cow in Europe receives 
about US$3 per day compared to over 50% of the ACP population who live on less than 
US$1 a day (Seatini, 2004). This study further argues that newly settled farmers are not only 
failing to improve production and productivity levels of almost all their products to pre-fast 
track land reform era, but are also unlikely to defend the local market from highly 
competitive EU products. Such a development displays the EU’s guerrilla strategies and 
tactics of carving markets from a political antagonist seeking future trade regimes with 
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 member states. Guerrilla negotiation strategies ensure that European producers, exporters, 
and investors remain for the short to medium term, an onslaught on ‘Zimbabwe’s weak, 
narrow and vulnerable industrial and export capacities’ (Machemedze, 2011
19
). In particular, 
the strategy has the potential to ensure that the ‘made in Europe’ tsunami drives new 
indigenous entrepreneurs, farmers and SMEs out of business, thereby creating opportunities 
for displaced former farmers, mining rights owners and other foreign investors (on account of 
global connections) to bounce back in the economic life of Zimbabwe. Such a development 
will signal the failure of ZANU (PF) guerrilla strategies and tactics of reclaiming land rights 
and make them realise that real economic battles are won in ‘negotiating green rooms’ where 
agreed tariff liberalisations are implemented through the demand and supply of goods and 
services. 
 
In spite of the above, the EU has in all previous trade negotiations with ACP countries 
presented itself as much less driven by its own offensive commercial interests, but rather by a 
desire to pursue development-friendly policy objectives, especially sustainable development, 
building regional markets
20
 and implementing poverty alleviation. An ICCO Study
21
 (2008: 
3) entitled ‘Dialogue of the deaf’ states: 
 
In trade negotiations, the EU frequently portrays itself as the ally of developing countries – 
sensitive to their concerns and looking out for shared interests as a partner in talks; and 
presents itself as a more benign negotiating partner not ready to leverage concessions or use 
strong-arm tactics to achieve its political and economic goals. ICCO Study, 2008: 3. 
 
Negotiating parties used the above to develop strategies and tactics aimed at securing a better 
trade regime. In this respect, the EU’s broad strategy is to develop Europe’s global 
competitiveness while opening up new opportunities for the industrial exporters and investors 
(see Figure 5.2 above). This strategy advances the commercial interests of the EU and is 
usually supported by a disguised ‘developmental aid envelope’ designed to entice ACP 
countries into the negotiating room, in the hope of accessing resources to redress supply-side 
                                                 
19 Interview discussion with Rangarirai Machemedze, Harare, Zimbabwe, 25 June 2011. 
20 Building regional markets to support development is a formal objective of the negotiations, laid out in the 
governing treaty, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
21 A ICCO study that involves a fairly representative sample of thirteen ACP negotiators of whom nine felt 
EPAs did not support regional integration, eleven confirmed EC pressure to negotiate trade-related issues, 
eleven confirmed EPAs forced ACP countries to liberate their trade, ten confirmed that aid was made 
conditional on signing of an EPA, eight confirmed that the EC does not listen to ACP concerns or proposals and 
only confirmed EPAs as instruments for development. 
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 bottlenecks, industrial productive structural capacities, export capabilities, and improvement 
in trade policy space and state-NSA consultative processes on macro-economic 
environment, including the EPA process. While advancing the above strategy, Europe argues 
that it trades very little with ACP countries, thereby giving the impression that its 
industrialists and investors are not very interested in the economic fortunes of the counterpart. 
In particular, while publicly displaying little interest in Zimbabwe, the mere fact that the bloc 
agrees: 
 
… to financially support impact assessment studies and the participation of three Zimbabwe 
delegation (two government officials
22
 and one private sector representative) in all RNF and 
joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels, and to ignore the travel ban on the 
former Trade and Industry minister, Samuel Mumbengegwi in order to allow his participation 
in Brussels meetings, points to a well calculated strategy of securing commercial 




While Katuruza attests that the poor bilateral relationship with the EU gave Zimbabwe 
uncontrolled space to speak its mind without publicly being manipulated in one-on-one 
meetings, the fact remains that the country had no opportunity to bilaterally iron out critical 
and sensitive issues outside the group gathering. The fact also remains that Zimbabwe was 
among the first group of countries in Africa to be congratulated by the EU Trade 
Commissioner for signing an iEPA (regardless of the prevailing economic situation), points 
to the guerrilla divide and rule tactics, surprises, shrewdness and manipulative capacity of the 
seasoned and experienced EU negotiators. 
 
While publicly the colonial bloc refutes claims of having offensive commercial interests in 
the ongoing EPA negotiations, the ICCO Study (2008: 3) disagrees, noting that the EU 
always takes pride in its three pillar approach to its external relations, that is, flanking trade 
agreements with a political cooperation and development assistance envelope in order to 
maximise benefits and complementarities. ICCO Study (2008) further accuses the dominant 
partner for not only ignoring past failures of economic and political conditionalities, but also 
imposing its views on development policies via trade negotiations, especially on 
economically stressed economies like Zimbabwe. In this respect, the study notes: 
                                                 
22 Initially, EU funding supported two government officials (a trade negotiator and a trade official) and one 
private sector representative, but later support was given to three government officials. 
23 Interview discussion with Richard Mandebvu, Harare, Zimbabwe, 24 June 2011. 
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 The EC Council emphasises the close interdependence between trade policy, development 
policy, economic development, food security, good governance and democracy, rule of law 
and legal security and calls on the parties to strengthen coherence between these areas (ICCO 
Study, 2008:3).  
 
Meanwhile, the EC negotiators have been sensitive and clever enough not to express opinions 
on Zimbabwe’s internal political, social and economic deficiencies. This avoids further 
straining the Europe-Zimbabwe bilateral relationship in front of the negotiating group. The 
EC also avoided any expressions and behaviours that might have been construed as meddling 
in bilateral political disputes in trade talks (Chifamba, 2012 and Katuruza, 2012
24
)in line with 
ZANU (PF)’s public accusation of wanting to effect the regime change agenda. This gives 
the EU leverage in negotiations. As a result, the EU has earned the respect of ESA countries’ 
officials in general and Zimbabwean officials in particular thereby enabling it to exploit 
superior bilateral bargaining power, as evidenced by the iEPA outcome that mirrors the 
process in the on-going WDDR negotiations. As a result, the EU’s negotiating leverage fast-
tracked the EPA process with a view to conclude the process by 31 December 2007 in line 
with the expiry of the current WTO waiver. However the deadline, continues to be pushed 
forward, resulting in Zimbabwe initialing the iEPA in 2008. 
 
Using guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics, the EU unilaterally violated the principle of 
partnership in the EPA trade talks by forcing negotiations on controversially trade-related 
issues - including services and investment, competition, intellectual property protection, and 
public procurement as binding commitments on WTO rules and regulations - despite the 
available option to negotiate in non-binding and cooperation language (Chizema and 
Masiiwa, 2011) and (Masiiwa, 2012
25
). The EU use of language in the negotiations 
increasingly became synonymous with binding commitments (Katuruza, 2012
26
) thereby 
compelling Zimbabwe to make difficult choices, opting to forego revenue inflows and the 
protection of sectors that contribute towards job creation, poverty alleviation or food security 
and/or food sovereignty. Meanwhile, some ESA countries have throughout the process been 
paraded as having the potential to retain flexibility with regards to developing new industries 
in line with the dictates of national, regional and global investment trends and domestic 
                                                 
24 Interview discussions with both chief negotiators – Chifamba and Katuruza based in Harare, Zimbabwe and 
Johannesburg, South Africa respectively. 
25 Interview discussion with Medicine Masiiwa, Gaborone Botswana, 25 August 2012. 
26 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 May 2012.  
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 political environment and socio-economic considerations. However, this disqualifies 
Zimbabwe, at least in the short to medium term, due largely to its huge economic 
challenges, political polarisation and social development burdens during the period under 
review.  
 
These guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics further allow the EC to exploit Zimbabwe’s 
lack of negotiating capacity or disjuncture in negotiating structures. The EU is masterly in 
exploiting any information gap by deliberately presenting strategic and essential EPA issues 
differently to both the political leadership and negotiators, especially knowing that 
Zimbabwean negotiators could not bilaterally verify the facts and issues. The above entails 
exerting pressure at the highest political levels within the context of ACP-EU or AU-EU 
summits by taking advantage of the information gap that may exist between the negotiators 
and the political leadership (ICCO Study, 2008), as well as ZANU (PF)’s rhetorical grand 
standing at such a gathering. The EU was also aware that, without direct bilateral contact, 
there were no opportunities to clarify group platform related sentiments within the framework 
of ongoing trade talks. Katuruza (2012)
27
, the former chief negotiator, confirms that there 
were no one-on-one meetings between the parties outside the ESA institutional platforms. 
This allowed the EU to peddle issues, including controversial proposals, knowing very well 
that there were close to zero chance of verifying both the facts and the implications thereof 
outside the ESA platforms. Indeed, following the bilateral impasse between Brussels and 
Harare, the only practical interaction platform between the parties has been the EPA process - 
that is, engaging the Zimbabwean EPA delegation within the context of ESA group and the 
political leadership within the context of both the ACP-EU ministerial and AU-EU EPA 
summit meetings.  
 
While the partnership principle has allowed the widely publicised development aid envelope 
to be used as an incentive for EPA participating countries, past failure to access EDF 
resources since the Lomé Conventions
28
 clearly indicates a deliberate violation of the 
partnership principle which states: 
 
                                                 
27 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 29 May 2012. 
28 Documentary evidence show that ACP countries have only utilised less than 50% of available EDF resources 
since the Lomé Conventions (see Table 4.3). 
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 … a partnership would imply that the EPAs truly included the concerns of the ACP parties, 
rather than the EU framing negotiations primarily and solely in the context of their own needs 
and constraints. The balance of power in terms of economic clout and resources (including 
experts) is horribly tilted against the ACP configurations. So, it is very hard to see how to 
have a balanced negotiation in the circumstances. Tandon, 2004. 
 
The guerrilla negotiations approach to the EU–Zimbabwe trade talks has resulted in the 
former becoming increasingly hesitant to consider alternative access to the EU market in 
good time. The EU seems to have its basis in the belief that an arrangement that makes the 
ACP countries swallow the bitter pill of trade liberalisation is superior to preference schemes 
that have not delivered. The second reason for EC apathy to alternatives is the political cost; 
improving or extending preferences to ACP countries proved to be a harder sell in a 27 
member state EU where the majority lacks historical colonial ties with these countries. The 
cost of a waiver or other accommodation at the WTO was clearly distasteful to the EC, and 
they refused a direct request from ACP countries to seek this. Without warning, as noted in 
section 5.1, the withdrawal of MAR by 1 October 2014, a development that is seen as 
exerting pressure on the countries that initialed iEPA, to sign and rectify the agreement while 
negotiations for the full EPA continued or they risk losing the EU market. It can be inferred 
that the announcement to withdraw MAR significantly contributed to Zimbabwe’s signing 
and ratifying the iEPA, a development that exposes the country’s lack of political will to 
explore alternative market access to the EU market. For instance, in an effort to secure the 
legality of existing trade preferences to EPA member states, pending the conclusion of the 
negotiations, the EC should have submitted a formal request to extend the WTO waiver or 
issued a formal assurance that, should the deadline be missed, tariffs would not be raised. 
Instead, the EC was adamant that the deadline would be respected, despite the enormous 
pressure and strain on ACP relationships that this involved. Clearly, such developments 
signify unpredictable negotiating tactics. 
 
ICCO (2004: 3) argues that a country going into the negotiation needs to know a lot about the 
main interests of the negotiating counterpart: know your counterpart’s arguments. In this 
respect, the EU, through its 50-year scenario assessment of the potentiality of each ACP 
economy (including Zimbabwe), coupled with public information - inter-alia the country’s 
challenges in the body politic, the downward spiral economy, the conflictual state-CSO 
relationship, and mistrust in the state-private sector relationship - has significant knowledge 
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 about the interests of its counterpart. Indeed, a significant portion of the guerrilla 
negotiating strategies and tactics of the EC is based on the above knowledge and factual 
analysis of Zimbabwe’s ability to resist the relentless onslaught. Through such scenario 
assessments, the EC might have evaluated the economic strengths of the new entrepreneur, 
especially farmers, to hold on to their properties in the event of failing to make profits as a 
result of tough competition from the EU and other global and regional producers. Strategies 
and tactics aimed at maximising the EU’s interests include the following: 
 
 The EU’s unilateral decision to withdraw market access provisions in the middle of 
negotiations, which put pressure on the Zimbabwean parliament to hastily ratify the iEPA 
in 2012. The EU emphasised the illegality of granting trade preferences since December 
2007 when the WTO waiver expired, hence the decision by all 27 member EC Councils, 
the EC, and the EU Parliament to terminate MAR 1528 of 2007 by October 2014. In this 
respect, the EC chief negotiator, Machado, while jointly negotiating with the SADC EPA 
group stated: 
 
The EU is the biggest trading partner under WTO, and does not want to be seen to continue 
breaking the rules. … The EU is the only trading bloc (partner) in the world that willingly 
continues giving trade preferences and market access even before concluding the on-going 
EPA negotiations. Thus, the EU must not be viewed as failing the SADC EPA group by 
unilaterally and arbitrarily setting the date to withdraw market access provisions. In any case, 
these market provisions were unilaterally given to ACP countries as a transition support 
mechanism while negotiating EPA, initially expected to have been concluded by 31 




 The EU often announced from the onset of the negotiations that ‘other configurations 
have agreed to some provisions, and therefore, it would be difficult for the EC Council 
and EU parliament to accept this group position and offer that is different from other 
configurations’ (Machado, 2013
30
). This strategy is usually linked to market access (rules 
of origin and tariff offers) or trade-related issues where EPA counterparts may not have 
the mandate or the capacity to meaningfully negotiate sustainable development, as more 
                                                 
29 Observation during the joint EU-SADC EPA countries negotiations, Johannesburg, South Africa, 20-22 
March 2013. 
30 Observation during the joint EU-SADC EPA countries negotiations, Johannesburg, South Africa, 20-22 
March 2013. 
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 often, the EU chief negotiator would pronounce at the start of negotiations that ‘the 
contentious issues or market access is the make or break of these negotiations.’ Tekere, 
2012. This puts pressure on the group or country to concede more concessions. For 
Zimbabwe, which since 2000 has been facing other EU applied pressures, the outcome 
was not only to concede more concessions, but also abruptly agreed to individually sign 
and ratify iEPA regardless of the short to medium term implications to the economy and 
society.  
 
 Singling out a member state or group of countries within a configuration for taking the 
negotiating process forward in a joint meeting is a strategy aimed at creating division 
while exerting pressure on those perceived as bent on resisting Europe’s strategy. For 
instance, in a joint meeting with the SADC EPA group, held on 19-22 March 2013 in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, the EU chief negotiator, Machado, harshly criticised the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) exclusion lists as insincere and far from 
Europe’s expectations while heaping praises for a job well done on Mozambique. 
Factoring the capacity levels between SACU countries and Mozambique, the strategy was 
meant to divide the cohesion of the group, and most importantly, sharpen swords directed 
at SACU, and in particular South Africa. Unfortunately, the EU’s efforts to wreck the 
unity of SACU are failing because the countries are bonded together on account of 
existing revenue sharing formulas. The other reason is the expressed desire by SACU 
member states to correct the 1999 error in which South Africa signed and implemented 
the Trade Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with EU leaving out other 
SACU customs union countries. This was not the case with ESA. Countries have no 
common economic and political bonds that would compel them to stick together under 
EU divisive pressures. Though no insightful information is available on the developments 
that split the ESA group and subsequently saw individual countries signing an iEPA with 
the EU, it can be inferred, on the basis of anecdotal evidence critiquing the EU, that 
divisive tendencies might have been employed.  
 
Similarly, Zimbabwean negotiators, despite the prevailing circumstances devised negotiating 
strategies and tactics at both national and regional levels in order to position the country 
within the various negotiation platforms. At the national level, the political leadership 
constantly heaped praises to the ‘look east policy’ as an alternative to the traditional trade and 
development relationship with Europe. While sounding contradictory, the negotiators kept on 
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 emphasising in public the importance of ensuring that the EPA process rested on the 
compassion of the successive trade regimes with the EU (Lomé Convention and Cotonou 
Agreement) in which industrialists continue to appreciate the level of economic integration 
through historical trade relationship. This strategy assisted in minimising the level of mistrust 
between the state and the business community. Most importantly, while the political 
leadership continued its anti-colonial crusade, they were very careful not to discredit the EPA 
process thereby disrupting the historical trade relationship with Europe. This strategy ensured 
that at all the EPA engagements, Zimbabwe had allies it identified with on the EPA process, 
and that its discord with the negotiating bloc did not filter into the process. This was 
supported by Munyuki (2012)
31
 who claims that: 
 
There was no visible sign that EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations were strained as the two sides 
dealt with political cooperation and economic cooperation separately (at least in public). Both 
sides also realised that nothing would be gained by either side in linking political and 
economic aspects of the Cotonou Agreement, as this would expose and isolate Zimbabwe 
thereby slowing down the ESA EPA processes. Both sides further behaved as if the political 
impasse did not exist.  
 
The country’s strategies and tactics in the EPA process are summarised in Table 5.1 below. 
In this respect, the government through COMESA managed to access EU financial 
assistance, thereby facilitating the participation of two
32
 or three government officials in the 
RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels despite the country’s 
suspension from the 10
th
 EDF financial assistance. In addition, the table reveals that the 
government, through the COMESA secretariat, successfully mobilised resources to undertake 
a study on external common tariffs as well as the national consultation between the 
government and stakeholders interested in the EPA process. Zimbabwe also adopted a 
strategy of speaking directly with the EU in the context of ESA group (the only contact 
between Brussels and Harare at government level), thus compelling the former not to cloud 
the process with conflictual bilateral issues. This removed bilateral politics from the process 
thereby allowing the cohesion and unity in the ESA group throughout the process as well as 
ensuring mutual respect between the EU and Zimbabwean negotiators. Zimbabwe also 
                                                 
31 Interview discussion with Elijah Munyuki, Gaborone, Botswana, 25 August 2012. 
32 According to funding criteria, each ESA country receives funding support for two government officials and 
one for the private sector representative. However, in some instances, the government ended up taking funding 
support for three. 
138 
 successfully stuck with the group in spite of the many differences, some of which were 
externally driven, on perceptions of unfolding political and democratic developments in the 
country and the EU’s imposition of smart sanctions and travel prohibitions on ZANU (PF) 
leadership, including the Industry and Commerce minister. The table also shows that at the 
regional level, Zimbabwe confirmed the importance of maintaining the group’s position 
including telling the EC that there were ‘non-negotiable regional positions’ (Katuruza, 
2012)
33
. The table further reveals the group’s strategy of alternating the thematic negotiators 
in order to persuade the EC chief negotiator, Machado, who might have come to the 





                                                 
33 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 May 2012. 
34 Observation during the joint EU-SADC EPA group negotiations, in which Machado always focus on Xavier 
Carim and Malan Lindeque, chief negotiators of South Africa and Namibia, respectively. 
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 Table 5.1: Zimbabwe’s national and regional strategies/tactics for the EPA process 
National strategies and tactics  Regional strategies and tactics  
o Holding preparatory meetings with relevant 
stakeholders ahead of each round of 
negotiations (RNF and joint ESA-EU). 
o Agreeing on strategies and tactics with other group 
countries ahead of each round of negotiation with 
the EC. 
o Pushing for national position reflecting 
national interests at RNF meetings. 
o Postponing negotiation on areas where the group 
feels not ready to engage with the EC. 
o Requesting the COMESA secretariat to 
undertake certain studies such as the 
common external tariff and impact 
assessment using own resources, as well as 
funding national level consultations. 
o Learning to avoid EU’ surprises by deferring any 
matter that is introduced without prior notification 
and/or consultation to future round of engagement 
thereby allowing both national and group 
consultations. 
o Making use of analytical work done at 
ministerial levels and the different 
viewpoints of CSOs
35
with resources and 
time to participate in the EPA process. 
o Understanding the merit of what other ESA 
countries are putting on the table as well as 
lobbying them with a view to form specific short-
term strategic alliances. 
o Inviting media to EPA meetings held in 
Zimbabwe for purposes of disseminating 
information to various constituencies. 
o Proposing to defer contentious issues to the next 
round of negotiations in order to allow further 
consultations at both national and regional levels. 
o Undertaking mini-studies and analytical 
work at ministerial level in order to input 
into the national positions before shared 
with other ESA countries. 
o Being wary of EC’s tactic and strategy of 
deliberately leaking information with a view to 
gauge the group’s views in some areas. 
o Holding debriefing sessions after each RNF 
session or joint ESA-EC negotiating round. 
o Changing the group’s negotiators from time to 
time in response to the EC’s arm twisting 
strategies and tactics. 
o Keeping the EPA team intact for the sake of 
continuity (the team has not changed much 
despite the challenges facing the 
government). 
o Ensuring that the chief negotiator for a particular 
thematic area is not deviating from agreed regional 
position(s). 
 o Categorically spelling out ’no go areas’ during 
joint rounds of negotiations. 
o Using regional studies to support decision making 
processes. 
Source:  Own compilation from interview discussion with Katuruza, 2012 
 
At the national level, however, there is no indication of stakeholder consultative engagements 
in the process. Anecdotal evidence reveals challenges in forming reliable and predictable 
government–NSAs strategic alliances on the EPA process, and directly involving other state 
institutions such as the MPs in the TDC in particular and other MPs and Senators in general. 
The former chief negotiator, Katuruza, acknowledges challenges facing the government in 
general and the Industry and Commerce ministry in particular including perceptions of 
                                                 
35 Particularly Trades Centre and Seatini 
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 confusing EPA issues with conflictual bilateral relations with the EU, fiscal related 
constraints, high rate of staff turn-over in trade related portfolios and EU’s economic and 
political isolation policy to ZANU (PF) government and leadership over this period. 
 
Meanwhile, the EU has throughout the process constantly reminded the ESA countries that 
the EPA outcome would produce a ‘mutually beneficial developmental and regional 
integration supportive agreement’ (Nalunga, 2004). Many of the EU strategies and tactics 
have unfortunately not only caused a lot of disquiet among Zimbabwean key relevant 
stakeholders and constituencies, but also impacted enormously on the economic partnership 
the EU has been building for decades and had a detrimental effect on trade and development 
bilateral relations. For instance, the ESA countries claim that the EU wants to disturb the 
development of regional industries by ensuring that tariff lines remain generally low, while 
tariff liberalisation commitments have not been harmonised within the configuration (see 
Figure 5.3 in section 5.5) and within the existing regional integration initiatives. This gives a 
lot of scope for additional opening in these economies, which the EU is set to exploit without 
necessarily competing with sensitive sectors and/or products. Already, there is high 
penetration of EU products into the configuration, and into regional and Zimbabwean 
markets, as is evident from the growing trade deficit with the EC. This trend feeds into the 
worries of industries or operators. However, as shown in Box 5.1 below, Zimbabwean 
negotiators claim success in protecting sensitive products and sectors, avoiding agreements 
that include binding commitments on trade-related issues, back-loading 35% of tariff 
liberalisation commitments, securing export safeguards that also cover sugar and beef, and 
securing concessions awarded to other configurations. However, these success claims had to 
be judged within the context of the current state of the economy, the dysfunctional GNU 
administration, and the fractured national body-politic that is struggling to adhere to the 










Box 5.2:       Multiple challenges and Zimbabwean negotiators’ achievements 
In spite of multiple challenges, Zimbabwean negotiators have: 
o Managed to protect about 20% of the products which are sensitive to Zimbabwe. 
o Avoided paying customs duties in the EU thereby safeguarding exports including sugar and beef 
quotas. 
o Avoided an agreement that includes binding commitments on trade-related issues as requested by 
the EU on such issues as competition, government procurement and investment, which were 
rejected by developing countries at Singapore WTO ministerial conference. 
o Negotiated for longer time frames. 
o Managed to back-load tariff liberalised commitments, and 
o Succeeded in demanding concessions given to other configurations from the EU. 
Source:  Own compilation from interview discussion with Katuruza 
 
 
5.4 Zimbabwe’s formulation of negotiating positions and offers 
 
The EPA process in Zimbabwe presents an era of distinctive features, all of which directly 
affect state-stakeholders’ consultations, subsequent articulation of national issues and 
interests, and the formulation of national positions and offers. As discussed in section 1.1, 
these distinct features, which limit deep and wide consultations, include tense state-society 
relations, a contradiction-ridden macro-economic policy environment, politically-induced 
polarisation with distinct internal and external allies, a conflict-ridden GNU, cold bilateral 
relations which fuel state-society tensions and stakeholder limited resources. All of the 
aforementioned constantly generates flashes of mistrust, uncooperativeness and frustrations 
among key stakeholders, thereby undermining the inclusiveness of the consultation process. 
This poisons the working relationships between negotiators and relevant stakeholders. As a 
result, some critical voices have been left out of the process which formulated national 
positions and offers that were subsequently shared with the EC.  
 
The EPA process suffers not only from unorthodox approaches to the redistributive agenda of 
the country’s natural resources, but also from a prevailing economic environment that has 
over the review period been characterised by partisan economic policies and programme 
consultative engagements. This development exposes the state shortcomings of (both the 
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 former government and the current GNU) calming the fears of the private sector with 
respect to tampering with sensitive sectors and excluding product lists or lines
36
 from tariff 
liberalisation. Equally important is calming the fears of the private sector with respect to the 
manner in which politically motivated indigenisation and economic empowerment 
programmes
37
 in specific sectors of the economy (agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) 
continue to be implemented, without due consideration to the implications on the country’s 
economic recovery, especially its industrial and export capacities. These grand revolutionary 
economic empowerment programmes are largely partisan, irrational, unconventional and 
outside both the theoretical jurisdiction of economic development models. They are also 
outside any scientific analysis of the impacts and implications on the economy’s capacity to 
compete with other economies, including the EU in both internal and external markets. 
Critics of ZANU (PF) driven economic transformation programmes lament the lack of 
business acumen, competence, commitment, capacity, skills and financial resources. They 
also decry the government’s open tolerance of perennially low production and/or productivity 
levels under the ZANU (PF) partisan and emotional slogan ‘Zimbabwe’s natural resources to 
indigenous Zimbabweans’. While this has contributed to low levels of ambition in the 
negotiating round, it equally exposes the vulnerability of the economy in both domestic and 
external markets. The EPA process’s consultative environment thus continues to be 
characterised by mistrust among key stakeholders, resulting in paralysis in internal 
engagements between government negotiators and officials on the one hand, and other state 
institutions such as parliament and other relevant stakeholders on the other. As a result, the 
articulation and formulation of the country’s issues, and offensive and/or defensive interests, 
positions and offers was undermined - an outcome that could be inferred to have benefited 
the EU negotiators. 
 
Ideally, consulting and involving CSOs and the business sector should have started 
immediately after the launch of the EPA roadmap for such input to significantly contribute to 
the country’s strategy, the articulation of issues and interests, and the formulation of national 
positions and offers. Firstly, this inclusive consultations and engagements would have 
assisted in collectively aligning national interests with central objectives of EPA negotiations 
in a collective manner. Secondly, this inclusive consultations and engagements would have 
                                                 
36These product lines are identified by an HS Code at agreed digit levels, usually 6 or 8 digit levels. The parties 
also have to agree on the data sources with respect to the product tariff lines. 
37 Land reform and economic indigenisation programmes 
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 allowed government and stakeholders to build confidence, coalition, and strategic synergies 
in all the EPA related activities and processes including the development of national issues, 
interests, positions and offers. Given the fact that Zimbabwe has been engaging with the EC, 
which has huge resources at its disposal, reason should have prevailed to involve and/or 
harness all relevant stakeholders at all levels. The study appreciates the involvement of trade 
related cluster ministries, other state institutions, private sector umbrella bodies and trade and 
development-focused CSOs and research institutions (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). However, it 
decries the exclusion of the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ), a body which represents 
the interests of consumers, CSOs which sternly critique the ZANU (PF) government’s 
approaches to economic policy frameworks, the ZCTU (despite being an ally of the MDC 
political party) and academia and research institutions. Such omissions reflect major state 
shortcomings given the known strengths of the EU’s negotiating guerrilla strategies and 
tactics in league with GFIs. This also reflects the CSOs’ weak advocacy in uniting all the 
relevant stakeholders in the process.  
 
Seatini (2005) argues that the ‘process gives national governments and/or citizens limited 
space to breathe and think for themselves.’ Political polarisation and a state-civil society 
unfriendly relationship means that important state institutions and civil society groupings 
have remained outside the process for the greater part of the EU-Zimbabwe EPA journey 
(both the former ZANU (PF) government and the GNU administration). Interaction with 
some CSOs reveals deliberate government practices of excluding critical broad sections of 
CSOs from any level of consultation on economic policy matters. This exposes state 
shortcomings in building strategic synergies, networking and partnership, with most CSOs 
working on trade and development and the totality of the business community. But Katuruza 
(2012)
38
, ‘claims government success at different levels of national level consultations, sector 
specific meetings, provincial consultative sessions, and parliamentary portfolio workshops in 
the formulation of national negotiating interests, positions, and offers’. However, this 
assertion was rejected by a significant proportion of the CSOs’ representatives who described 
the EPA era as ‘reflecting a significant lack of government’s political will to meaningfully 
and extensively consult them on economic policy including trade negotiations
39
’. Godfrey 
Kanyenze, director of Ledriz, the research wing of the ZCTU, laments the dysfunctional 
nature of the Tripartite Negotiation Forum (TNF) - comprising government, the private sector 
                                                 
38 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 May 2012. 
39 Comment by some CSOs representatives during the interview discussions held between 2011 and 2012. 
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 and labour - with regard to facilitating EPA consultations, at least within this framework in 
line with its mandate. Such consultations would have mirrored best practices of 
neighbouring democracies with high levels of offensive and defensive ambitions in the EPA 
process. For instance, South Africa, a major competitor to the EU’s commercial interests in 
Zimbabwe, uses the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
comprising the representatives of government, labour, business and community organisations 
(CSOs) to articulate and develop EPA-related national issues, interests, positions and offers.  
 
This state consultative weakness is supported by Willie Shumba (2012)
40
, the former 
Zimbabwean revenue commissioner and a former regular government delegate to EPA-
related meetings, now SADC secretariat’s customs senior programme officer, who describes 
government’s consultations with CSOs since the launch of the joint roadmap in 2004 as 
‘unstructured, selective and a function of a polarised national body politic’. Indeed, the 
process excluded the participation of CSOs who were perceived as anti-ZANU (PF)’s 
economic empowerment and governance practices on account of being strong allies of 
western governments and donors. But some of the excluded CSOs have programme activities 
that interact with people in communities and rural areas. Such exclusions reflect the lack of 
constructive consultations in the articulation and development of the country’s issues, 
interests, positions and offers before being shared within the group and with the EC. Such 
exclusions also denied respective CSOs an opportunity to share the EPA process and the 
implications thereof with the communities and rural people. 
 
While CSOs often decry the difficulties they experience in accessing responsible ministers or 
trade directors, the study observation dismisses this notion by noting that ‘EPA preparations 
and negotiations have all along been done by technical experts in trade related ministries, 
who generally do not require appointment first before interact with outside stakeholders’. 
This situation not only questions the CSOs’ advocacy approach (in light of the prevailing 
political obstacles), but also exposes deficits in their lobbying and advocacy approaches, 
strategies and tactics in this regard. Focusing on lower structures in the process would have 
facilitated the filtering of the CSOs’ views in the process. While it is appreciated that the 
prevailing political environment makes routine engagements with government officials 
somewhat difficult because they are constrained to express their own opinion on certain 
                                                 
40 Interview discussion with Willie Shumba, Gaborone, Botswana, 14 March 2012. 
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 policy directives and process, CSOs should have considered approaching them outside the 
country or asking their counterparts in the region and beyond to undertake these 
assignments. Again, this reflects the CSOs’ failure to devise a strategy capable of achieving 
its goal through regional networks. Regional networks should have lobbied their positions 
with a view to contributing input to the process. Indeed, advocacy as a strategy and tactic 
seems to have failed, and CSOs should not hide under the cloud of the prevailing political 
environment and tense relations with the state. Even though the ESAP context might have 
changed somewhat, the CSOs’ advocacy work should have borrowed experiences of that era, 
which mobilised both resources and people to successfully discredit the programme. The 
CSOs’ advocacy work should have employed some of the strategies of their counterparts 
working on humanitarian areas, who succeeded in influencing the former government to 
cooperate for the benefit of the people and country.  
 
While funding was a significant constraint on the CSOs’ participation in the RNF and joint 
ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels, they should have created dialogue 
platforms, calling for fair and mutual EPA outcomes within the confines of sovereign 
political rights and obligations to drive social and economic development through trade. This 
creation of national dialogue is more so given that the EU was not funding any CSO working 
on the EPA process. Thus, the CSOs through such platforms should have considered 
advocating the implementation of asymmetrical trade openness with the EU based on human-
centered development benchmarks, some of which were shared with the EU. The call for 
human-centered EPA development benchmarks, should have given the government the 
assurance that CSOs are not only critical of certain policy frameworks and programmes, but 
also supportive of the government’s economic developmental agenda. Indeed, an approach 
that takes into account variations in development levels between the EU and Zimbabwe has 
all the reason to dampen state-civil society tensions, regardless of the prevailing economic 
and political challenges. In addition, Munyuki (2012)
41
 has observed:  
 
A major weakness of CSOs was their failure to build technical expertise in order to make 
better informed criticism of the EPA process. Although CSOs were invariably opposed to the 
process, they did not have strong technical justifications for opposing the process as a lot of 
their objections were general allegations against the EU motives. For instance, the Stop-EPAs 
campaign was launched without any practical idea on what would be the alternative or 
                                                 
41 Interview discussion with Elijah Munyuki, Gaborone, Botswana, 26 August 2012. 
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 options for a country like Zimbabwe. For instance, Zimbabwean civil society EPA-related 
slogans, campaign messages and debate should have been framed within the context of 
economic rights, thereby moving closer to government’s wealth redistribution agenda. Most 
CSOs arguments were emotional and packaged without proper socio-economic analysis. 
Further CSOs perceived that government negotiators were not sympathetic to their concerns 
thereby worsening the level of mistrust between them and government. As a result, state-
CSOs relations in Zimbabwe were very volatile and directly linked to the political 
polarisation. 
 
Observations based on interacting with some MPs in the TDC identify excluding MPs as a 
major omission given their three constitutional roles of being a monitor of the executive 
(government), representatives of the people and legislature of national laws including trade-
related and associated regulations. The omission further ignores the importance of MPs in 
terms of domesticating regional and international trade and development agreements and 
their implementation. This means that the MPs - by ratifying both bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements within the confines of the country’s national constitution - allow trade 
between parties to take place. Indeed, both the Lower House and the Upper House ratified the 
iEPA which the WTO was notified of on 9 February 2012. Commenting on the ratification 




Firstly, the MPs were pressured to debate and ratify iEPA within a short space of time and 
without due consideration to the fact that they had not been participating consistently in the 
process as an institution. Secondly, the pressure ignored the fact that some MPs had only been 
with the legislature for less than 5 years
43
. Lastly, the pressure discounted the fact that this 
new trade regime, like any other bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, are embedded 
with socio-economic and political theoretical and technical concepts - all of which would 
have required more time to unpack before allowing enough time to debate the process, 
outcome and subsequent implementation. This would have also linked the process to various 
commercial and political constituencies and the generality of the population. 
 
Although Katuruza claims hosting parliamentary TDC portfolio workshops, the political 
dynamics in the country has since 2000 seen new people after every parliamentary election in 
the TDC portfolio, a development that calls for more capacity building training workshops. 
                                                 
42 Interview discussion with Gabriel Chipare during the SADC parliamentary forum annual meeting help in 
Lilongwe, Malawi, 24 November 2012. 
43 Zimbabwe’s constitutional life-span of Parliament (both Lower and Upper Houses) 
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 However, a well-known lack of financial resources from the fiscus and donor agents counter 
the above claim. This means that the Zimbabwe’s legislature could not roll out the requisite 
capacity building exercises in order to empower the MPs with knowledge, a development that 
would have facilitated their interactions with other state institutions, NSAs working on trade 
and development and fellow MPs in the ESA group and beyond. Lack of resources also 
denied the MPs opportunities to participate in the RNF and joint ESA-EU EPA meetings held 
in the regional capitals and in Brussels.  
 
Over this period, the Harare administration presided over polarised media practices, private 
and public, with the former perceived as being in league with a hostile foreign media and 
western governments and pursuing an anti-government agenda based on exposing every 
unfolding weakness. Katurura (2012) further attests that the government could not have 
interacted with the private media (foreign and domestic), which massively and offensively 
criticizes government approaches not only on political and governance issues, but also on the 
management of the economy, including bilateral trade relations with other countries and the 
EU bloc. However, the exclusion of private media omits a significant proportion of the media 
whose strategic value would have linked the process with broader constituencies, in particular 
unorganised but potentially determined and committed agricultural producers, exporters and 
investors. It is known that since 2000, national umbrella bodies representing agricultural 
producers, the key economic drivers, have been rendered dysfunctional largely due to the 
unfolding economic and political developments in the country. For example, the new 
farmers
44
 (both Model A1 and Model A2) have since 2000 been largely unorganised, that is, 
functioning without a dedicated umbrella institution representing their economic and political 
interests in various short-lived macro-economic policies (see Table 6.4, section 6.4.1) and in 
the EPA process. As a result, to date both Model A1 and Model A2 farmers belong neither to 
the Zimbabwe Farmer Union
45
 nor to the Commercial Farmers Union
46
 whose national 
prominence and significance over this period have drastically dwindled, hence their total 
absence from the EPA process. Indeed, these farmer organisations have not been influential 
in lobbying and realigning farmers’ commercial interests with national strategic policies and 
                                                 
44 Model A1 is for smallholder farming areas (famers) with an average size of six (6) hectares whilst Model 2 is 
for commercial farmers areas (farmers) with an average size ranging from 30 to 5,000 hectares. By 2005, 
Zimbabwe had settled 140,866 families under Model 1, drawn mainly from the communal areas and junior 
workers in government, and 14,500 under Model 2, mainly ruling elites (Kamidza and Mazingi, 2011: 328) or as 
largely seen by donors and other critics, a sanctuary for the political elites (Matondi, 2011: 96).. 
45 Represents smallholder (peasant) farmers, now Model 1. 
46 Represents commercial farmers, now Model 2 farmers 
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 external interests, as informed by scenario analysis and projections of both lucrative and 
depressed markets throughout the world. This attests to the fact that both Model A1 and 
Model A2 farmers had not been represented in all the related EPA processes despite the 
potential of the new trade regime to have a short to medium term onslaught on the sector, the 
backbone of the economy. The new farmers are already struggling to satisfy national demand 
and agro-processing value chains to offensively penetrate the EU market and/or to 
defensively seal off European products from flooding the local market. Farmers are currently 
struggling to stimulate their respective production levels to quantities that can sufficiently 
trigger sustainable forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy. While the 
new commercial farmers interests went begging during the EPA process, the EU’s 
agricultural sector is driven to a large extent by MCs and TNCs, some of which have 
competing operations in the country and the sub-region, which is known for receiving 
substantial subsidies from the EU member states. The EPA process entails a rough 
negotiating mandate, as the EC often regards the MCs and TNCs as strategic allies in major 
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. In this process, as reflected in Figure 4.1, the EU 
is not only working with its traditional allies (MCs, TNCs and business lobbies), but also 
with GFIs (the World Bank and IMF).  
 
Secondly, the exclusion of the media means the process remained out of touch with the 
marginalised groups in society and the general population, especially a significant proportion 
of civil society groups including social movements. This means that potential unorganised 
entrepreneurs in key politically sensitive sectors, including agriculture and mining, have not 
been part to the process, and that agreed positions and offers are not within their respective 
interests. While limited resources and state-media relations are appreciated, government 
negotiators should have institutionalised frequent media releases and debriefing sessions prior 
to and/or after every important EPA-related meeting, platform, or event throughout the 
process. This would be a strategic way of facilitating interaction with the above category of 
stakeholders’ whose interests as either entrepreneurs or consumers will be affected either way 
when the new trade regime is implemented. For instance, the authorities could have 
instructed the ZBC daily TV programme entitled ‘Murimi waNhasi’ (Farmers Today) - which 
is anchored by academics from the University of Zimbabwe for the purpose of interacting 
with the new farmers in particular and the nation in general - to include the unfolding 
developments in the EPA process with a view to soliciting input from new farmers in the 
formulation of national positions and offers (see section 1.5). Sadly, this opportunity was not 
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 used, keeping the farmers in the dark despite the fact that they will be facing the EU’s 
onslaught in the short to medium term. 
 
Research institutions provide critical views of economic policy processes, especially 
indigenisation and economic empowerment programmes as an integral part of their 
contribution to the country’s socio-economic and political developments. In the past, their 
(the research institutions) relationships with the state were cordial in spite of their critical 
reflections on economic policy frameworks, especially paradigms such as ESAP. For 
instance, organisations such as the Sapes Trust and Ledriz produced volumes of critical 
reflections on government shortcomings in the public policy arena. Despite this, relationships 
with the state remained cordial as such reflections act as input in public policy related 
processes. However, since 2000, there has been limited interaction between government 
structures and institutions and the country’s research institutions, despite the fact that 
research institutions are instrumental in the articulation of national issues and interests during 
policy formulation and implementation. Unfortunately, the prevailing policy environment 
that characterises the EPA process undermines this relationship. Equally significant is the fact 





Zimbabwean research institutions have not been producing critical reflections on the EPA 
process. This has greatly undermined rational articulation of national issues and interests, and 
subsequent development of national positions, offers, collective strategies, and tactics. It has 
also undermined the formulation of well-focused advocacy activism, the outcome of which 
would have benefited the country’s positions and offers.  
 
The EPA process suffers from non-availability of two equally important policy blueprints, 
namely the national trade policy and the industrial development policy, both of which were 
launched in 2012. Firstly, these should have provided strategic guidance in the articulation of 
national issues and interests, and the development of national positions and offers. Secondly, 
they should have facilitated stakeholders’ engagements and subsequent input into the process 
regardless of the level of critique and the polarised environment. Unlike most EPA states - 
where wisdom and resources of the private sector and CSOs have been harnessed in support 
of this process - Zimbabwe, in spite of its past record, especially during the ESAP era of 
working constructively with CSOs and the private sector on economic policy formulations 
                                                 
47 Lack of donor support  
48 Due to brain drain 
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 and implementation including bilateral and multilateral trade talks, the government has 
ignored this tradition, largely due to the above noted political and policy environment 
related distinct features.  
 
While this study does not focus on civil society-private sector relationships in the EPA 
process, it has been observed that there has not been much collaborative interaction and 
networking within the NSAs. No visible platforms to share notes or consultation on the 
process were noted. The study submits that, in an environment of political tension, such 
platforms should have been established to build coalitions and synergies. Multi-stakeholder 
dialogue platforms are necessary to constantly review the implementation of both industrial 
and trade policies as well as the implementation of iEPA regime. It is also necessary to 
monitor iEPA related issues, especially with respect to protecting tariffs of sensitive products, 
which are both a necessary and sufficient condition to support infant industries, distressed 
industries, new industries, and intrinsic economic sectors, as defined by both trade and 
industrial policies. The study, however, regrets that important EPA-related documents such as 
studies and meeting records were not available during the EPA process. 
 
Both government officials and CSO representatives agree that national level consultative 
processes have been hampered by budgetary constraints. This has made it extremely difficult 
for the country to raise fiscal resources to support economic policy directives, including EPA 
negotiations, when the priority has since 2000 been to domestically support grand economic 
programmes such as the fast-track land reform and indigenisation economic empowerment 
programmes. Unfortunately, there was no wisdom to link the beneficiaries of the programmes 
with future markets, especially the main trading partner (the EU) with strong economic and 
political links that date back to colonial era. Meagre government’s resources have supported 
the participation of additional officials who joined the EU funded officials (two or three) in 
all the EPA-related dialogue sessions. While appreciating EU support, the arrangement was 
politically decisive and distasteful as the negotiating partner facilitated contact and 
interaction at lower levels while denying the same at higher levels through sanctions and 
travel prohibition. In addition overall government participation support was far less compared 
to other more ambitious economies in the group including Kenya, Mauritius, and Uganda.  
 
Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s suspension from the 10
th
 EDF’s financial assistance earmarked for 
economic and regional integration negatively impacted on the state’s ability to deepen and 
151 
 widen the consultation process. This means that the country has not been able to benefit 
from the EPA financial window, through which other EPA negotiating countries have been 
able to access resources to build negotiating consultative skills, capacities and synergies. The 
country also could not access external resources from other western governments and donors 
to facilitate economic related discourse, including the EPA process.  
 
This financial limitation also limits the frequency of consultative meetings between 
government officials and other key national and regional stakeholders interested in the 
process. It limits the inclusiveness of all the relevant stakeholders’ input, positions and offers 
before being shared within the group and/or with the EU on many platforms. Fiscal 
constraints, in particular, limit the number of government officials who can attend the RNF 
meetings which over the review period have been scheduled to take place almost every 
month
49
 as determined by the deadlines
50
. This also involves inclusive participation by most 
trade-related government ministries and departments. In addition to financial limitations, the 
process has to contend with a shortage of human resources, given that in many instances 
some of the government trade officials are also responsible for other trade and economic 
integration desks or portfolios. For instance, the same government officials who deal with 
EPA process are also responsible for trade-related areas such as the COMESA, SADC, and 
WTO. 
 
The above discussion reflects how stakeholders’ omissions undermined the country’s 
development of positions and offers that were shared with the EC, resulting in the signing and 
ratifying of the iEPA as a new trade dispensation. It also reveals the challenges which 
confronted the state-stakeholder relationship in terms of constructive and collective crafting 
of a new trade regime with the country’s historical leading trading partner, now a bilateral 
antagonist. These omissions justify the study hypothesis that the EPA is a short to medium 





                                                 
49 The launch of the roadmap in 2004 envisages RNF meetings almost every month in light with the 31 
December 2007 deadline to conclude the EPA regime.  
50 December 31, 2007, July 2008, and December 2008. 
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 5.5 Interim EPA outcome, ratification and implementation process 
 
While the rest of the ACP EPA groups maintain their respective compositional memberships, 
the original ESA configuration split into two towards the end of 2007, namely the EAC and 
the reconfigured but diverse ESA group. In this respect, the EAC states
51
 initialed an iEPA on 
23 November 2007 with the EU as a custom union, and negotiations on the full EPA are in 
progress. Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe, member states of the newly 
configured but diverse ESA group - comprising the IOC
52
, the Horn of Africa
53
 and some 
southern African
54
 countries - individually tabled separate market access offers based on their 
respective specificities to the EU, resulting in the signing of the iEPA on 29 August 2009 in 
Mauritius.  
 
Following the individual ESA countries signing ceremony, the EC Trade directorate heralded 
the first iEPA outcome in Africa as a major stepping stone towards a wider and more 
comprehensive EPA deal currently under negotiation between the EU and the whole of the 
ESA region. These negotiations have been under way since 2008, covering rules and 
commitments on trade in services, investments, agriculture and rules of origin; trade-related 
areas such as sustainable development, competition and trade facilitation; and cooperation on 
sanitary and phytosanitary provisions and technical barriers to trade. In 14 May 2012, an 
excited EU Trade Commissioner, Krel De Gucht, remarked on behalf of four ESA countries 
iEPA signatures:  
 
Today, our first iEPA with an African region is applied. This is excellent news and I salute 
the hard work of negotiators and colleagues on all sides. With this trade deal, we hope to 
accompany the development of our partners in eastern and southern Africa and open up better 
and lasting business opportunities. www.trade.ec.europa.eu 
 
In contrast to the EU Commissioner, some representatives of CSOs - including Afrodad, 
ANSA, Ledriz, Mwengo, and Zimcodd - expressed their astonishment that Zimbabwe, given 
its economic circumstances within the context of a dysfunctional GNU (Chifamba, 2012) and 
a hostile economic policy environment, was among the first group of ESA countries to sign 
                                                 
51 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
52 Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles 
53 Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan 
54 Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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 and ratify the iEPA with the EU without exhausting consultations, especially from civil 
society sector and the private sector
55
. In this respect, Zimbabwe’s ratification process in 
both the Lower and Upper House was concluded in February 2012. An excited EU 
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Aldo Dell’Ariccia (while addressing a seminary workshop on 
iEPA in August 2012), assuming full retain to normal bilateral relations and conducive 
business environment, predicted an improved EU exports and near doubling of imports under 
the now ratified WTO compatible trade regime between the negotiating parties. While this 
might not necessarily be linked to the iEPA outcome, it can be inferred that the outcome is a 
rejuvenated confidence in producers and exporters, especially from Europe. It can also be 
inferred that Zimbabwean producers in the short term will be unable to compete with 
European products. Indeed, competitiveness is inter alia a function of industrial productive 
capacity utilisation that currently hovers at over 20%. The ratification has inspired the EU 
bloc to benevolently promise funding to support the establishment of a trade and private 
sector development start-up programme, which inter alia, seeks to improve the business 
environment, encourage public-private sector dialogue, facilitate SME value addition, market 
competitiveness, export diversification, access market information
56
 and upgrade the Zim-
Trade trade database and the Standards Association of Zimbabwe’s laboratories
57
. For 
instance, public-private sector dialogue sessions will facilitate interactions on the state of the 
economy including economic policy and trade arrangements reviews and strategies for 
reviving and sustaining sectoral forward and backward productive and export linkages. The 
platform will also facilitate engagements on iEPA implementation challenges and 
opportunities, the implementation of industrial development policy options including 
productive value chains, downstream and upstream industrial linkages, mineral beneficiation 
options and competitiveness and diversification challenges and opportunities.  
 
Table 5.2 below summarises the status of ESA EPA countries that have initialed, signed and 
ratified the iEPA. The table also reflects existing trade regimes with the EU, the status of 
notification to the WTO and the ratification process. As illustrated, most countries of the 
newly configured ESA group countries are not under pressure from the withdrawal of MAR 
                                                 
55 Khumalo, a former Harare EU Delegation official now with the SADC secretariat, argues that the COMESA 
EPA CTA, Moses Tekere was instrumental in persuading and advising Zimbabwe to sign the deal in which most 
officials and private producers knows its contents. 
56 EU tools such as the market access database and the export help-desk. 
57 Equipment and software, and staff skills training.  
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 1528/2007 because they can continue trading with the EU under WTO compatible EBA 
provisions. 


















    
Djibouti  EBA    
Eritrea  EBA    
Ethiopia  EBA    
Sudan  EBA    
Madagascar  iEPA 29/08/2009 09/02/2012 Yes 
Mauritius iEPA 29/08/2009 09/02/2012 Yes 
Seychelles  iEPA 29/08/2009 09/02/2012 Yes 
Malawi  EBA    
Zambia  EBA    
Zimbabwe  iEPA 29/08/2009 09/02/2012 Yes 
ESA / EAC 
Burundi  iEPA    
Kenya  iEPA    
Rwanda  iEPA    
Tanzania  iEPA    
Uganda  iEPA    
Source:  Own compilation from various sources 
 
With respect to Zimbabwe, the signed agreement with the EU includes WTO-compatible 
market access schedules, and provisions on development cooperation, fisheries and other 
related issues. The agreement allows the EU to liberalise its market by 100%
59
 by value as of 
1 January 2008
60
 while Zimbabwe is expected to liberalise by 80% by value by 2022 as 
shown in Figure 5.3. The figure also shows a comparative analysis of four ESA countries’ 
                                                 
58 Comoros withdrew at the last minute to sign iEPA. 
59 With transition periods for rice and sugar 
60 It is possible that this date may be interpreted to mean “the date the agreement enters into force, that is, when 
both agree to implement the agreement.” 
155 
 agreed tariff liberalisation schedules and commitments, that is, the extent to which they are 
prepared to open up their respective economies to the European products across all sectors. 
The figure also reflects different levels of ambitions for the four countries in terms of ability 
and capacity to compete with EU products in the domestic market. Of the four, Zimbabwe 
reflects a slight degree of resistance though not enough to defensively protect local products 
from massive and competitive European product onslaught, while at the same time allowing 
industrial and sectoral productive capacity utilisation to rebound to its past regional and 
global competitive glory. 
 
Figure 5.4: ESA countries liberalisation of EU imports, percentages 
 
Source:  www.acp-eu-trade.org/epa/ESA.php 
 
Of the above liberalisation schedules, 45% would be achieved by 2012 with the remaining 
35% to be progressively liberalised until 2022. Statistically, Zimbabwe has already opened 
close to half of the market to EU producers and exporters. It can thus be inferred that an 
opening up by 45% at a time the economy is still struggling to rebound, favour the 
commercial interests of European producers, exporters and investors. Unfortunately, this 
liberalisation time-frame of 2012 negated the fundamental dynamics that are still entrenched 
in the economy at various levels ranging from national body politic to economic utilisation of 
national resources. In particular, it negated the dysfunctional GNU (Chifamba’s sentiments) 











 empowerment programme policy, unlocking international financial resources and fiscal 
prioritisation towards industrial sector revival. The agreed liberalisation time-frame also 
negated the politicisation (CSO sentiments) of the implementation of GPA provisions by 
quarrelsome parties in government, which has direct implications to the forthcoming 
presidential and national elections. All of this confirms the existence of a poor economic 
(business) environment, thereby sending the wrong signals to potential domestic and foreign 
investors that are badly needed in the economy. This is particularly true for the agricultural 
sector where new economic agents are competing with European producers, exporters and 
investors - both domestically and on their own market. This further illustrates not only the EU 
potential onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy, but also the potential readiness of the EU 
investors, producers and exporters to increase their market share in the country with ease. 
 
As Zimbabwe and other iEPA signatories gradually open 80% to 98% of their respective 
markets to European exports over the course of 15 years, some products that are considered 
sensitive to national industrial development and other political considerations (as reflected in 
Table 5.3 below), have been excluded from tariff liberalisation phase-down commitments. 
This means that the EU on the basis of differences in economic development between the 
negotiating parties, has agreed to allow the respective countries to maintain existing tariff 




 Table 5.3: List of sensitive products by iEPA signatory 
Country  Main exclusions from liberalisation  
Comoros  Products of animal origin, fish, beverages, chemicals and vehicles. 
Madagascar  
 
Meat, milk and cheese, fisheries, vegetables, cereals, oils and fats, edible 
preparations, sugar, cocoa, beverages, tobacco, chemicals, plastic and 
paper articles, textiles, metal articles, furniture  
Mauritius  Live animals and meat, edible products of animal origin, fats, edible 
preparations and beverages, chemicals, plastics and rubber articles of 
leather and fur skins, iron and steel, and consumer electronic goods  
Seychelles  Meat, fish, beverages, tobacco, leather articles, glass and ceramic products, 
and vehicles  
Zimbabwe  Products of animal origin, cereals, beverages, paper, plastics and rubber, 
textiles and clothing, footwear, glass and ceramics, consumer electronic 
and vehicles. 
Source:  www.acp-eu-trade.org/epa/ESA.php 
 
From the table, Zimbabwe, by only identifying 20% tariff lines for exclusion (Zim-Trade, 
2012), appears to be less ambitious than the other smaller ESA economies in many respects. 
Interestingly, the general level of ambition to protect sensitive sectors and industries was far 
below that of Madagascar, a regional country facing similar political tensions and isolation 
from the western governments, including the EU. Interestingly, while other economic 
sensitivities can be linked to Zimbabwe’s economic and industrial development imperatives, 
the study raises questions on the moral, economic and political value of wanting to continue 
to protect, for instance, the Willow-Vale motor industry, given that since 2000 Zimbabwe has 
experienced an exponential increase in imported second-hand (pre-owned) vehicles from 
Europe and Asian countries such as Japan and Korea. The study has also observed that even 
under the SADC FTA, vehicles are presented as sensitive. However, as can be seen in Table 
5.4 below, the sensitive list excludes some sectors and products currently prioritised in the 
national industrial development policy of 2012. These sectors and products have high 
employment creation potential, and are a significant contributor towards national economic 




 Table 5.4: Zimbabwe prioritised agri-business subsectors and products 
 
Sector and products Importance to the economy 
Food and beverages  
 Cane, oil seed, grain, 
vegetables, meat production 
and processing  
 Operations attracts small, medium and large-scale producers; 
 High potential for growth 
 A back bone of the agricultural sector in terms of raw material 
requirements or provision. 
 Significant stimulus of agro-based raw material supply 
industries (seed, chemicals and fertilisers), printing and 
packaging, milling and energy.  
Clothing and textiles 
 Cotton, polyester, acrylic, 
yarn, sanitary pads, clothing, 
under-garments, cotton wool, 
blankets and carpets 
 Vehicle for manufacturing development due to its quick 
turnaround from investment to production 
 High adaptability in operations of SMEs to bigger corporate 
entities 
 Huge scope for value addition and for backward and forward 
integration 
Leather and footwear 
 Quality leather and footwear 
products 
 High potential to enhance value addition thereby benefiting 
hides producers, collectors and merchants 
 High potential to encourage associated manufacturers  
Wood and timber 
 Quality timber products 
 High potential to simulate furniture related industries, exploiting 
both exotic and indigenous hardwoods and softwoods 
 High potential to establish a niche in the EU and global markets 
Source: Industrial Development Policy, 2012: 17-24 
 
It can therefore be inferred that conflictual and uncooperative state-NSAs relationships and a 
politically charged national body politic may have contributed to narrow compilations of 
national exclusion lists before they were shared by the EU. Munyuki (2012)
61
 claims that: 
 
Although government invited business to pre-negotiations talks on many occasions, the 
business community’s response was very slow. In many instances, the business community 
and business umbrella organisations and/or lobbies such as industrialists and commercial 
farmers failed to appear at crucial preparatory meetings.  
 
Kamidza (2009) supports this inference by noting the plea by the former chief negotiator, 
Angelica Katuruza, to the private sector to submit their sensitivities to government even 
though the textual iEPA was already submitted to the EU during a regional workshop held in 




                                                 
61 Interview discussion with Elijah Munyuki, Gaborone, Botswana, 26 August 2013. 
62 Interview discussion with Angelica Katuruza, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2013. 
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 Firstly, over the period, the main partner, the business community was preoccupied with day 
to day business management and/or survival issues and cared less on the EPA process. 
Secondly, they cared less about any government’s economic policy directives, including 
contributing to or commenting on the process and potential impacts. Lastly, they developed a 
negative attitude towards economic policies and trade agreements in general and EPA in 
particular, despite the fact that they are the prime beneficiaries of the outcome and other trade 
agreements (regional and global). 
 
From the exclusion list of sensitive products it can be inferred that Zimbabwean negotiators 
either failed to present compelling arguments regarding the merits of the country’s infant 
industries, industries under distress and sensitive sectors such as the agriculture. This means 
that the negotiators failed to clearly articulate potential iEPA implementation impacts on 
human and social development while negotiating the new trade regime with Europe. On the 
other hand, a relatively small or weak exclusion list and lack of concessions can be attributed 
to weak state-private sector consultations (see Katuruza above) and the deliberate exclusion 
of civil society voices. It could also be a product of the former ruling ZANU (PF) party’s 
macro-economic mismanagement and partisan indigenous economic empowerment 
programmes, whose processes and outcomes hardened the attitudes of the EU negotiators, 
member countries and various constituencies. Finally, this could be a product of limited 
bilateral contact or interaction between the negotiating parties. As confirmed by Katuruza, the 
EU only contacted or interacted with Zimbabwe within the context of ESA EPA processes, 
and at the level of the EPA processes. Indeed, the absence of higher levels of interaction 
reduces options for lobbying and articulating national interests within the Cotonou Trade, 
Development, and Political Agreement Framework that considers agriculture as the main area 
of focus (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010:19). Thus, in any rational, social, economic, and 
political arguments, most sectors and industries would have qualified for distress protection 
in the form of an exclusion list. Maybe, as Chifamba argues, the level of ambitions reflects 
the mandate given to the negotiators to merely aim at securing future markets for the 
economy, a development that was exploited by the EU.  
 
The above Zimbabwe’s failure to protect sensitive and infant industries argument has to be 
assessed in the light of EU-Zimbabwe trade relations which, since the Lomé Conventions, 
have been characterised by the application of import and export duties and taxes, sharing of 
lists of sensitive products, and other safeguard mechanisms that have been considered 
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 important instruments for sustainable agricultural growth and development and food 
security. In the context of the ongoing EPA processes, potential increments in economic 
production and export competitiveness are a source of compensation for the loss of fiscal 
revenues as a result of tariff cuts. However, it has since been noted that the economic 
meltdown for over a decade, coupled with massive withdrawals of donor funding and 
investors, have undermined the country’s ability to service and finance huge challenges 
associated with social development, economic underdevelopment, inequalities in society, and 
humanitarian assistance because tariffs constitute a significant portion of government 
revenue.  
 
Now that the trade agreement has been ratified, the implementation is underway. Regardless 
of generally accepted weak consultations during the negotiations and ratification
63
, the state 
needs the cooperation of all the stakeholders in the implementation of iEPA because building 
strong trade consultative platforms and alliances is essential. The current focus of the iEPA 
implementation commitments are reflected in Box 5.2 below. Broadly, it entails establishing 
an EPA implementation unit under the ministry of Industry and Commerce to spearhead all 
work related to the domestication of the iEPA - including research analysis, awareness raising 
and buy-in by all stakeholders and the general population. 
 
Box 5.3:        Zimbabwe iEPA implementation support requirements 
o Undertaking needs assessments on the legal framework and administrative and human resource 
requirements. 
o Domesticating iEPA in terms of Zimbabwean laws, including the customs book. 
o Establishing a Zimbabwean EPA implementation unit, preferably under the ministry of Industry 
and Commerce. 
o Pursuing accompanying measures to finance EPA-related adjustment costs including capacity 
building, modernisation and re-structuring of industries affected by trade liberalisation. 
o Launching an awareness programme to inform all stakeholders (civil society, MPs, and the 
business community) of the rights, obligations and opportunities contained in the iEPA. 
Source:  Compiled from various sources 
 
In addition, the parties agreed to facilitate the implementation of the iEPA and to support 
regional integration and development strategies. The level of such cooperation is based on the 
                                                 
63 CSOs were generally unaware. The process was also rushed through according to the Deputy Clark of 
Parliament. 
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 ESA development cooperation strategy and a jointly agreed-on development matrix. This 
entails cooperating in terms of mobilising resources from EU member states and other 
donors through the Aid for Trade commitments in support of iEPA implementation 
requirements and related adjustment costs. The country can also access funding from the 10
th 
EDF financial framework. While this sounds enticing, caution has to be exercised because of 
the prevailing hostilities between the bilateral partners and confrontational state-civil society 
relations. Already, the EU has instructed that the allocated 10
th
 EDF resources, be channeled 
towards humanitarian assistance governance and human rights projects. Indeed, the electoral 
related disputes between the negotiating parties that characterises the bi-lateral trade and 
development relationship is certainly to continue (see section 7.4).  
 
In addition, there are capacity related issues with respect to accessing EDF and the 
entrenched complex bureaucratic machinery within the EU member states. ACP countries 




 EDF financial windows (see Table 
4.3). This means that the degree to which the country accesses the promised ‘developmental 
assistance envelope’ through cooperation determines the appropriate iEPA implementation 
scenario described in Table 5.4 below. These scenarios are a function of the country’s ability 
to rejuvenate industrial production and productivities, export capabilities and competiveness, 
leading to improved capacity to generate fiscal revenue. The status quo therefore requires a 
cautious approach in implementation. In addition, implementing the iEPA will be determined 
by the character of the relationships between the negotiating parties, and between the national 
stakeholders and the prevailing political environment. 
 
Table 5.5: Zimbabwean approaches in implementing an iEPA 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
A cautious approach as determined by 
the desire to minimise threats from: 
o revenue losses  
o infant and strategic sectors or 
industries  
o investor confidences  
o social cohesion (inequalities and 
un-even development). 
A quick approach as determined by the desire to: 
o generate more revenues  
o facilitate: 
o technology transfers 
o value addition 
o economies of scale and specialisation 
o foreign direct investment flows 
o job creation (poverty alleviation)  
o human resources development. 
Source:  Compiled from various sources 
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 As before, on-going comprehensive negotiations would be concluded at a regional level to 
foster regional integration within the group. Critics have, however, warned the ESA 
negotiators to prepare to individually square up with the EU at the negotiating table, as was 
the case in the conclusion of the iEPA. Already a precedent has been set in which individual 
ESA countries signed an iEPA based on individual market access offers leading to the 
ratification of a new trade in goods agreement in the member states parliaments, despite 
having been negotiating together as a bloc. This suggests a possibility that individual ESA 
group countries may sign the comprehensive EPA with the EU. This requires introspection on 
the part of the Zimbabwean negotiating team in order to avoid errors that will harm the 
country’s commercial and political interests in the short to medium term. Such an eventuality 
(which is highly probable) would mean that the EU has been fronting the ESA group to 
intensify interactions with lower echelons of the Zimbabwean government as a proxy to 
quickly seal a medium to long term future trade regime with a current sworn bilateral 
antagonist. While this confirms EU guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics, it equally 
opens the Zimbabwean economy to the former’s operators, investors and exporters, including 
MCs and TNCs. Given that the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in the short to medium term 
would be able to compete with products originating from Europe, the study predicts the 
future exodus of some of local entrepreneurs out of their respective businesses, thereby 
creating opportunities for yesteryear commercial farmers and mining owners to invest in the 





A review of the trade regime with Europe has been undertaken by institutions and structures 
that were established during the launch of the ESA-EU EPA negotiations roadmap in 
February 2004. These institutions and structures have been guiding the process at different 
levels (national, RNF, and joint EU-ESA) depending on the objectives, nature and context of 
the meetings. In this respect, at the national level, the negotiating structure that was/is 
supposedly involved in all the preparatory EPA work and reviews, has been the NDPTF, 
comprising of government officials from all trade related ministries and other state 
institutions and representatives of NSAs. However, as discussed above, the structure had its 
share of challenges that seemed to confirm to the hypothetical statement of this study. These 
challenges allowed it to be subsumed in the normal trade coordination process within the 
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 ministry of Industry and Commerce. Thus, the NDTPF has throughout the process remained 
on paper as it could not be publicly identified with the process up to the iEPA signing, yet it 
could have been a structure to be transformed into the proposed ‘EPA Implementing Unit’. 
 
At the configuration level, the ESA-EU EPA roadmap established a structure to interact with 
the EC for the purposes of advancing the negotiations. This structure, as articulated in this 
chapter, is the RNF, comprising of ESA delegations as informed by the NDTPF and national 
imperatives and dynamics, ESA RECs representatives, the Brussels based ESA group, the 
committee of ambassadors’ representatives and a Seatini official as representative of the 
CSOs in the configuration
64
. In this structure, as discussed elsewhere in the study, the 
COMESA secretariat has been coordinating the process with moral support from other ESA 
RECs secretariats, namely EAC, IGAD, and IOC. In order to streamline the coordination 
process, the ESA group with the financial support of the EU, agreed to establish the EPA unit 
under the COMESA directorate of trade headed by CTA with support from a secretary to 
facilitate the coordination of the process in terms of managing meetings, communication 
flows, arrangements and logistics. In all these layers of engagement, the CTA has been 
providing technical and intellectual leadership, in addition to attending to specific 
requirements of the ESA countries. The unit has also been liaising with the EU in the process, 
especially with respect to joint ESA-EU meetings. On paper the unit should have been 
accessible to all relevant stakeholders, but in practice this has not been as fluid as the study 
would have preferred.  
 
Other structures were discussed in this chapter. Firstly, the RTPF, an informal body of 
experts that facilitate interaction, better technical understanding and/or interpretation of 
certain issues and unfolding developments in the process on both sides (ESA and EU), was 
discussed. This body comprises Brussels-based ambassadors and their respective officials, the 
committee of ESA group Brussels–based ambassadors, COMESA officials and ACP 
secretariat representative(s). Secondly, the committee of ambassadors composed of lead 
cluster spokespersons who have been responsible for liaising with both EU officials and the 
ESA ambassadors on all EPA related matters, was discussed. Lastly, the council of ministers 
responsible for the EPA negotiations, who have been meeting only when necessary to provide 
political guidance and leadership towards resolving stalemates of political nature, and with 
                                                 
64  Seatini’s official was booted out of this structure in 2005 
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 political implications thereof in the process, was discussed. These structures were meant to 
complement and build synergies in the process of the RNF, the negotiating engine room of 
the ESA group. The structures were also meant to harness available ESA group human 
resources based in Brussels in ways that utilises their proximity to the EU negotiating 
machinery for betterment of the ESA group.  
 
The chapters discussed at length guerrilla negotiation approaches employed by the 
negotiating parties in league with their respective political and economic allies to extract 
significant concessions in this trade negotiation round. In this respect, the chapter observes 
that the EU has not only consistently been consulting all the relevant constituencies, inter 
alia, producers, exporters, investors, and consumers but also economically and politically 
powerful business lobbies, MCs, TNCs and GFIs (the World Bank and the IMF). The EU, 
using guerrilla strategies and tactics was able to meet the mandate given by the EU member 
states. On the other hand, the Zimbabwean negotiators, despite being aware of the politically-
linked isolation in terms of direct bilateral contact with the EU, seems to have failed to rally 
all the relevant stakeholders in articulating national issues, interests, positions and offers. The 
level of discord among Zimbabwean stakeholders dominated the public domain from time to 
time, a development that bolsters the EU to press for an early iEPA signature. The fact that 
the EU is considered a very strong, powerful, united and more integrated region, with well-
known defensive and offensive interests in the country based on historical ties, should have 
convinced the Zimbabwean negotiators to pursue unity and a constructive stakeholder 
approach in the EPA process. This unity of purpose should have largely been a product of 
proper, inclusive and apolitical coordination between the state and other relevant 
stakeholders. This should have amplified the ESA-EU roadmap motto that the process should 
widely and deeply consult and involve all NSAs. 
 
The CSOs’ coordination, strategic networking, and synergy building with government 
negotiators, MPs and the private sector in the EU-Zimbabwe EPA process has not been as 
robust and intense as the EU-ACP and the WTO trade talks (see section 2.4). The CSOs’ 
coordination seems to have been undermined by domestic stakeholder relationship (see 
Chapter 6) coupled with the government’s decision to exclude those perceived to have critical 
views against the state on economic management, including its policies and programme. All 
this indicates that the process suffers significantly from a lack of inside and outside strategy, 
a development in which the dynamics and contradictions in both internal configuration and 
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 joint ESA-EU engagement should have been reported with a view to strategically fuelling a 
series of engagements with the Zimbabwean authorities at various levels. Such a 
development would have helped coordinate the CSOs’ advocacy and strategic engagements 
with government negotiators and the private sector in the process. All the above weaknesses 
support the study hypothesis that the process is an ‘onslaught on the national economy’ in the 













This chapter inaugurates a discussion on state shortcomings and civil society advocacy in the 
EPA process and is premised on the notion that international trade negotiations are 
increasingly becoming an important arena in which Zimbabwe in particular and African 
countries in general have opportunities (consultative policy spaces and platforms) that can 
only be exploited if governments partner with all the relevant stakeholders. This essentially 
requires government-NSA cooperation, collective consultations and participation if the 
challenges that are likely to undermine efforts to secure viable and predictable markets for 
exportable products and sources of necessary imports are to be overcome. This also 
essentially requires Zimbabwean authorities and NSAs to create sustainable consultative EPA 
networks and partnerships with their counterparts in other African countries regardless of the 
configuration. 
 
The chapter acknowledges both ZANU (PF) and GNU administrations’ wide fault lines (see 
section 1.1) and CSOs’ limited financial and human resources to engage the Zimbabwean 
authorities, RECs’ EPA units and EU institutions in the EPA process. The wide fault lines 
and limited resources have been accused of entrenching state shortcomings and CSO 
advocacy challenges and inadequacies in the EPA process, thereby undermining collective 
identification of both offensive and defensive political and commercial issues, interests, 
positions and offers; collective analysis of unfolding issues, interests and positions; and 
strategic stakeholders’ networking and synergy building. The wide fault lines and limited 
resources have further been accused for fuelling levels of state-CSO mistrust and 
uncooperativeness, leading to the deliberate exclusion of critical CSO voices on economic 
policies, including the EPA process. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes the practical functions 
of the RECs (COMESA and SADC) secretariats to locate opportunities and challenges for 
CSOs activism and to understand the weaknesses and strengths of CSOs advocacy in the 
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 process in Zimbabwe, Africa and beyond. The second section focuses on the extent and 
implications of the fault lines in the state-civil society relationship, elaborating on the 
process and the practical challenges for both parties to gravitate and finally converge as they 
face an economically powerful partner who employs tried and tested guerrilla negotiating 
strategies and tactics. The section further interrogates the nexus between donor funding and 
CSOs’ advocacy activities, highlighting emerging inadequacies, challenges and opportunities 
as the process unfolds. The third section highlights emerging real and potential fears, 
implications, and policy options as the process unfolds, zeroing in on trade and industrial 
policies, industrial production, export competitiveness, supply-side constraints and 
disruptions in national and regional markets. The section concludes by highlighting the 
persistence of state shortcomings and the conflictual state-CSO relationships that even 
characterised the GNU administration in this process.  
 
 
6.2 COMESA and SADC secretariats
1
 and civil society activism 
 
Despite the directive of the ESA roadmap for countries to deposit their respective impact 
assessment studies (IAS), and NDTPF consultative reports with the regional secretariat 
(COMESA), (Kamidza, 2004) reports that only five countries had done so at the beginning of 
2005; it is unclear which countries submitted and if the remaining countries eventually 
complied with the directive. Most CSOs representatives interviewed concurred that the IAS 
and NDTPF reports in some ESA countries, including Zimbabwe, were not a collective 
engagement exercise which involved all the relevant stakeholders. Had they been inclusive it 
could have enhanced the EPA-related advocacy work of CSOs at various levels (country, 
configuration, region and EU). In particular, it could have also facilitated robust and rigorous 
engagements on the findings with a view to translating difficult proposals or positions into 
stakeholder expectations or inclusive developments and pro-poor outcomes.  
 
The participation of civic bodies has throughout the process been constrained by limited 
democratic space, poor state-civic relationships and outright exclusion by coordinating 
institutions and structures in Lusaka and Gaborone, the capital cities of COMESA and the 
SADC respectively and the respective members’ state capitals. For instance Seatini, the 
                                                 
1 ESA and SADC Secretariats have established EPA Units to provide technical and intellectual leadership to 
this process. In this section, I opt to use ‘intellectual leadership’ instead of ‘Secretariat’ in some cases. 
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 roadmap’s identified official voice of civil society, was booted out of the internal processes 
in December 2004 largely due to expressed strong views on the unfolding process 
(Kamidza, 2004). That also led to the death of the inside-outside strategy, meaning that 
Seatini, by participating internally, was able to flag out controversial issues or positions to 
other CSOs outside the official negotiating regional and Brussels meetings. As a result, the 
voice of the pro-poor and pro-development continues to express itself, pleading with the 
technocrats that ESA is not for sale. Surely poor constituencies could not dream for a positive 
EPA outcome when the process succeeded in totally excluding pro-poor social development 
partners and/or social development representatives. Failure to share process information 
between government negotiators, ambassadors and officials on the one hand and civil society 
activists working on trade and development issues on the other hand not only undermines 
robust engagement, but also generates perceptions of mistrust on the process at national, 
configuration and regional levels.  
 
While it was evident that the inclusion of CSOs in formal discussions outside their respective 
government delegation was not applicable, the sector failed to articulate constructive and 
systematic form of engagement in the process. Throughout the process, the CSOs have not 
explained why their respective representatives failed to develop or commission analytical 
work on the process with a view to share with government negotiators thereby adding value 
to the process and outcome. 
 
The above process and procedural shortcomings, which were/are replicated in all other 
continental EPA configurations, compelled the CSOs in Africa - who were in league with 
their counterparts (NGOs) in the north - to develop and implement a lobbying and advocacy 
strategy targeting EPA negotiating institutions, structures and personalities within the 
configurations, both in Brussels and  the EU member states. In this respect, the objective of 
lobbying and advocacy activities was/is to specifically focus on the on-going processes and 
procedures that were/are likely produce pro-development and pro-poor EPA outcomes. 
However, the lobbying efforts undertaken in the EU institutions though highlighted the likely 
negative impact of the proposed EPA in southern Africa, they suffered from ‘lack of recent 
data that would have convinced the EU’s DG Trade Directorate that confirmed to have 
undertaken 50 years trade and development scenario on each ACP country’ (Masiiwa, 2012). 
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 Firstly, CSO advocacy and campaign missions were undertaken at various levels and 
intervals aimed at directly lobbying and engaging the EU’s political institutions such as the 
EU Council, the EU Parliament and EU presidency and the EU’s technical institutions and 
structures, including the EU Commissioner, Directorate-General Trade, Directorate-General 
Development and Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development. Further, the 
CSOs representatives’ advocacy and engagements targeted pro-Africa’s development 
oriented research institutions to lobby for pro-poor and pro-development comparative 
synthesis and analysis of the unfolding EPA process developments in the six configurations 
and Europe. This level of engagement helped to counter the EU’s strategy of exerting 
pressure to ‘configuration X’ during the introductory remarks at the joint meetings usually by 
saying that ‘configuration Y’ has already accepted the EU’s proposal or position or made 
tremendous progress on the proposal or issue. The advocacy and engagements also targeted 
stakeholders with moral authority and access to the corridors of EPA power with a view to 
ensuring a pro-poor and pro-developmental trade regime between Europe and Africa. The 
above level of advocacy and engagement missions contributed significantly to the EU’s 
decision to extend the deadline to conclude ACP-EU EPA negotiations beyond 31 December 
2007.  
 
Secondly, the CSOs advocacy crusade was mainly focused on Africa and culminated in the 
launch of the ‘Stop EPAs Campaign’ in March 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya by CSOs that are 
affiliated to the ATN based in Accra, Ghana. The activities varied by targeted audience, but 
usually took the form of direct persuasive exchanges supported by evidence of potential EPA 
outcomes and implications. The strategy identified like-minded African governments and 
also entailed producing explanations of why the 31 December 2007 deadline process was set 
to fail African producers, exporters, investors, consumers, democracy and governance. The 
CSOs complemented this by holding several meetings, including at the margins of the annual 
AU organised African Trade Ministers, mobilising other constituencies interested in Africa’s 
trade and development to resist fast-tracking the process without the participation of all key 
stakeholders. Indeed, the work resulted in several extensions of the set deadlines, thereby 
allowing negotiators to navigate slowly towards pro-poor and pro-development EPA 
outcomes. In spite of the above, a number of challenges and fault lines impacted negatively 
on the CSOs’ advocacy work in the ESA configuration in general and Zimbabwean process 
in particular. However, while the sector narrated the challenges and fault lines, especially in 
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 the Zimbabwean context there was no corresponding articulation of solutions and 
alternative ways of engagements in a manner that unify all relevant stakeholders.  
 
Thirdly, the CSOs’ advocacy targeted RECs and authorities in respective governments at 
different levels. Targeted RECs included both those that are in the driving seat of the EPA 
process such as the COMESA and SADC secretariats, and those who have been giving moral 
support including the EAC, IGAD and IOC (for ESA) and SACU (for SADC EPA). The 
advocacy and engagements were largely premised on the fact that the ESA configuration 
through COMESA had not organised a single dedicated meeting with NSAs, particularly civil 
society, to share the implications of the unfolding negotiations’ issues, interests and positions 
to the citizen’s livelihoods. Indeed, failure by COMESA and the SADC EPA units to 
organise dedicated EPA meetings with NSAs prompted CSOs to successfully mobilise 
resources for the purpose of organising meetings with the COMESA and SADC EPA units’ 
CTAs. Subsequently, the regional CSOs organised a number of EPA dialogue sessions aimed 
at facilitating interactions and sharing of information, strategies and tactics under the 
intellectual leadership of two EPA configurations
2
. In this respect, the CSO organised EPA 
dialogue sessions included: 
o a regional conference, whose theme was “ESA and SADC experiences in negotiating 
EPAs with the EU” organised by the Trades Centre based in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 
February 2009  
o a regional workshop, whose theme was “EPAs and Economic Development in ESA 
Countries” organised by the Consumer Unity and Trust Society – Africa Resource 
Centre (CUTS-ARC) based in Lusaka, Zambia in October 2006 
o a regional roundtable discussion, whose theme was “EPAs negotiations: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Poverty Eradication in Southern Africa” organised by the 
Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (SAPRN) based in Pretoria, South Africa 
in October 2006. 
 
While the CSOs could be saluted for organising the above events, the sector had not indicated 
if the main dialogue session negotiating points or arguments were shared with the relevant 
national and configuration authorities with a view to add value to the process.  
 
                                                 
2 ESA and SADC configurations 
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 Unfortunately, the CSOs’ representatives argued that COMESA and SADC secretariats’ 
respective EPA units CTAs failed to avail themselves to the funded policy dialogue 
workshops aimed at exchanging views with the regional civil society formations. This 
snubbing of the CSO organised EPA meetings has since been described as a violation of the 
consultations with all national and regional stakeholders. It has also been equated with a lack 
of an open door policy and political will to interact with both moderate and radical CSOs in 
the process. Indeed, as discussed in many instances in this study, the Zimbabwean authorities 
have since the launch of EPA process, ardently excluded CSOs that were/are perceived as 
radical and politically incorrectly aligned. Thus SADC officials snubbed all the funded 
dialogue sessions while ESA officials only attended the Trades Centre organised conference 
in Harare. Further, both ESA and COMESA officials snubbed the 21
st
 plenary assembly of 
the SADC parliamentary forum meeting held in Johannesburg, South Africa on 10-17 
November 2006 under the theme “Enhancing the role of Parliaments in Governance and 
Development at Regional Level: Trade and Development Issues relating to the ACP-EU 
Trade negotiations”. 
 
The above shows that the CSO advocacy and lobbying challenges over this episode were 
fueled by perceptions of power and mistrust between the RECs’ EPA unit officials and 
member state authorities, on the one hand, and representatives of civil society on the other. 
This also reveals the challenges of linking regional parliamentary work in the EPA process 
through sub-regional EPA units. Ironically, while sub-regional member states had unlimited 
access to sub-regional EPA units, other organs (parliamentarians) had difficulties interacting 
with the sub-regional EPA units CTAs and the respective governments’ negotiators and 
officials. These platforms could have facilitated direct interaction and engagement between 
MPs and regional member state officials, especially since most MPs did not participate in the 
RNF meetings.  
 
In the Trades Centre organised conference
3
 (see above), COMESA technical officials 
circulated the ESA-EPA draft negotiating document that was officially submitted to the EU 
with a response timeframe of 30 September 2006. An excited Moses Tekere, ESA-EPA CTA, 
when asked about the rationale of sharing negotiations positions and offers with the EC 
                                                 
3 The only dialogue session in which regional civil society groups made an effort to bring together COMESA 
and SADC technical and intellectual leadership to share their respective experiences in negotiating EPA with 
them.  
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 before exhausting internal (ESA) consultations, said: ‘It is a wise strategy meant to outwit 
our counterparts in the EU. The ball is now in the EU’s court, and a timed response is likely 
to work in favour of the happy ESA family.’ This was the first time that the regional CSOs 
saw the above draft. However, they could have opted to undertake further work with a view 
to scientifically critique Tekere’s assertion of ESA’s job well done as well as to support those 
countries eager to conclude the deal as individuals.  
 
While ESA-EPA CTA expresses triumph and optimism over the draft textual proposals, 
failure to consult widely and deeply with other interested stakeholders at various stages of the 
process reflects COMESA’s, and by extension Zimbabwean, shortcomings in the process. It 
also reflects the extent of the CSOs’ challenges to directly lobby and engage political and 
technical personalities at the sub-regional RECs compared to the EU (see above). However, 
this fuels fears of negative implications and outcomes likely to tie ESA economies to 
European producers, exporters and investors in an unbalanced framework likely to perpetuate 
an unjust trade regime with the potential to undermine economic growth and development 
and regional integration efforts. Deve (2009), while reporting on the outcome of the Harare 
Conference to the regional CSOs and social movements on a follow-up social forum 
platform, remarked: 
 
….. this mirrors the competitive race of African configurations all wanting to be the first to 
reach out to the EU’s negotiating machinery in spite of limited capacity, tight timeframe and 
space to assess outcomes in light of emerging national and regional economic units and 
consumers’ aspirations. Being the first to knock at the EU negotiating machinery’s doors not 
only fuels pessimism on the process, but also points to a bleak future for ESA economies 




 opted for text-based negotiations, that is, a compiled 
comprehensive wish list document which highlights: 
o the scope of the agreement coverage: trade cooperation, trade related issues, trade in 
services, fisheries, economic and development cooperation, development finance 
cooperation, institutional framework and dispute settlements;  
                                                 
4 Its role is to guide the EPA process, provides technical direction and is responsible and/or accountable for the 
outcomes. 
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 o a schedule for eliminating customs duties a day after the agreement’s entry into force, 
that is, 10 years for capital goods and raw materials, 20 years for intermediate goods 
and 25 years for finished goods; and  
o the exclusion lists of sensitive products from liberalisation commitment.  
 
The above forms the basis for actual negotiations with the EU, and ESA-EPA CTA expected 
these provisions to improve the respective economies’ industrial productive capabilities, 
export competitiveness, trading capacities, as well as their abilities to attract FDIs and an 
assortment of technologies. However, the ESA-EPA draft text fuels the CSOs’ fear that the 
EPA outcomes may fail to assist the developmental objectives of the respective economies, 
saying: 
 
.... every five years the ESA-EU EPA Council shall undertake a formal and comprehensive 
review to ascertain if the development benchmarks have been attained by individual ESA 
countries as well as to determine whether EU’s trade and development policies and assistance 
have contributed to individual ESA countries achieving the development benchmarks. (ESA-
EU Draft Text, 2006: 8)  
 
Further, CSOs advocacy work focuses on associated EPA adjustment costs that were 
estimated by the European Research Office in 2006 (see Table 6.1 below). As can be seen, 
revenue losses include falling fiscal revenues necessary to support government expenditures, 
including agricultural research and development, infrastructural development, social 
development and poverty alleviation programmes; dwindling resources to support trade 
facilitation and export diversification initiatives; production and employment initiatives; and 
skills and production improvement. Madagascar and Zimbabwe’s adjustment cost levels are 
equally high, signifying equally great future challenges in satisfying fiscal expenditures and 
any initiatives meant to support respective industrial production capacities, export 
competitiveness and production and export diversification. This is instructive since the two 
countries have political challenges that impact negatively on any form of economic recovery.  
 
In many respects, regional CSOs have throughout the EPA process been concerned with 
poverty (currently estimated at 60% of the population in many ESA member states) as well as 
high levels of unemployment, socio-economic under-development and growing inequalities. 
They have also been concerned about the potential negative impact of the EPA outcomes, 
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 especially on economic units, especially small and medium sized entrepreneurs and new 
farmers (in the case of Zimbabwe) who are now exposed to an EPA driven bilateral and 
global market environment and conditions. In spite of the above, both the COMESA and 
SADC intellectual leadership (EPA units’ CTAs) seem unwilling to consult other 
stakeholders such as civil society groups’ ideas and views. There is also no evidence that the 
EPA unit CTAs engage the business community in dedicated sessions other than meetings 
where they form part of government delegations, in which they express their feelings on the 
process through government negotiators. 
 
Table 6.1: Estimated EPA-related adjustment costs by country, (€ million)  















Angola  40 45 40 45 170 
Botswana  30 12 25 15 82 
Lesotho  40 25 25 35 125 
Mozambique  60 90 50 65 265 
Namibia  40 12 12 15 79 
Swaziland  60 12 25 15 112 
Tanzania  70 65 40 65 240 
Madagascar  90 65 40 65 260 
Malawi  40 45 20 30 135 
Mauritius  40 12 12 15 79 
Seychelles  30 30 6 15 81 
Zambia  50 45 25 45 165 
Zimbabwe  40 20 25 30 115 
Source:  European Research Office, December 2006 
 
The regional CSOs’ representatives noted and agreed that the EPA process contains a number 
of contentious and complex issues that demand thorough and strategic preparation, 
coordination and synergy building between the various stakeholders. This requires an 
inclusive, constructive, and sound state-NSAs working relationship. They further observed 
limited political will to widely consult and deeply involve other stakeholders at national, 
configuration and EU levels. Of the three levels, they absolved the EU, at least for 
entertaining African CSOs representatives’ missions, something that proved totally difficult 
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 at both the configuration and national levels. With respect to Zimbabwe, the country of 
focus, there was absolutely no interaction between the state’s political and technical 
personalities and regional and/or national activists. Unfortunately such developments have 
future short to medium term implications, especially on vulnerable infant and sensitive 
sectors of the economy such as agriculture and manufacturing and societal welfare.  
 
Anecdotal evidence acknowledges that agriculture supports about 70% of the population for 
household consumption, and plays a minor role in both commercial agricultural markets and 
agro-processing activities. This fuels the fear among CSOs that EPAs are likely to flood ESA 
markets with subsidised agricultural products, a development that has future negative 
implications on the sector and the entire economy, especially in Zimbabwe where new 
farmers are still establishing themselves. Regional CSOs lament that the EPA process has 
failed to provide platforms for farmer organisations to contribute to the process, given the 
fact that most ESA countries are largely dominated by agriculture, agriculture-related 
activities and agriculturally linked sectoral industrial processes. They also expressed concern 
because the unfolding dynamics and importance of the sector would have qualified them for a 
dedicated session. Furthermore, the CSOs observe that COMESA’s insensitivity in this 
regard has future implications, especially for smallholder farmers, other producers of 
agriculture-related products, industrial development and competitiveness - given the sector’s 
strong forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy - as well as consumers, 
with respect to balancing food security and food sovereignty objectives. The CSOs have thus 
been arguing that ‘consultation is not about making assumptions about other social and 
economic units’, (Makanza, 2011
5
) but rather about direct or indirect soliciting of their views. 
They therefore called upon regional political and technical leadership to also harness the 
radical views of broader constituencies including the ‘Stop to EPAs’ campaigners. 
 
In Harare, the ESA-EPA CTA appealed to CSOs and other participants to popularise the 
ESA-EPA document in various constituencies. However, the appeal to popularise the draft 
raises the following questions: Should CSOs focus on the weakness of the document with a 
view to improving the final output, or on lobbying for its acceptance in the EU negotiating 
machinery? Should CSOs focus on inherent COMESA intellectual leadership weaknesses and 
failure to widely consult broader constituencies before serving the ‘menu’ on the EU table? 
                                                 
5 Interview discussion with Tendayi Makanza, Durban, South Africa, 10 August 2011. 
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 Should CSOs focus on COMESA’s intellectual leadership’s lack of organic team spirit to 
call for a review of the process to date with the view to improve negotiating tactics, 
strategies and mandate? This prompts Deve (2009) to argue that requesting constructive 
engagement on a document that has already been shared with the counterpart for 
consideration highlights a high degree of contempt to other stakeholders’ intellects, energies 
and activism; a display of mistrust between COMESA and CSOs, and a lack of team spirit, 
strategic networking, and synergy building - all of which are a necessary condition for 
positive socio-economic developmental EPA outcomes.  
 
The regional CSOs agree that the ESA region can improve its negotiating capacities by 
harnessing all the available actors and critical voices. They also agree that a wide array of 
critical voices require efficient coordination as well as analysis, dissemination and sharing of 
critical information on the process. But coordination of all the voices, especially of critical 
constituencies, demands an ’open door policy’, coupled with the expressed intent to 
accommodate different views. The CSOs further agree that coordination is about 
accountability of outcomes, reaching out to broader constituencies, and building strategic 
alliances, synergies and networks aimed at ensuring policy driven strategies and positive 
outcomes necessary to promote pro-poor development and improve livelihoods. Given the 
success of the “Stop EPAs Campaign” (See Section 1.1, page 7), the CSOs coordination 
would have forewarn the implications and dangers of the EU political structures’ decision to 
withdraw MAR, especially to those countries eager to be the first to sign.   
 
The concerns of the CSOs were echoed by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, 
in his opening remarks to the 21
st
 Plenary Assembly of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, held 
in Johannesburg, South Africa on 10-17 November 2006, questioning the regional EPA 
intellectual leadership
6
: “How do we ensure that EPAs currently being negotiated with the 
EU by all SADC member-states do not serve as an obstacle to the envisaged SADC customs 
union?” Subsequent to the meeting, regional MPs claimed that “the EPAs issues, positions 
and offers have not been shared adequately with other organs of states in respective member-
states”. Negotiators have not interacted with MPs on the EPA processes in the context of their 
three roles: oversight to the executive, representing the people, and legislating national laws 
and regulations. Since then, annual regional parliamentary forum meetings have included a 
                                                 
6 COMESA and SADC Secretariats 
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 dedicated session on EPA processes in southern Africa in order to clarify issues and 
concerns in the MPs’ three constitutional mandates: oversight, legislation and 
representation. This also means that the consultation and coordination between government 
negotiators and other state organs have remained very poor. By now, the ESA-EPA 
intellectual leadership should have developed a database of both national and regional 
activists and MPs to facilitate easier coordination of their input or voices into the process. 
This is instructive in that regional political leadership should have systematically engaged 
CSOs and other constituencies on how EPA outcomes would promote and support regional 
integration initiatives, processes and agendas. 
 
 
6.3 Zimbabwe EPA process and civil society advocacy 
 
6.3.1 State-stakeholder relationship and civil society advocacy 
 
Stakeholder participation and consultation on the EPA process in Zimbabwe have been the 
operational responsibility and capacity of the ministry of Trade and Industry (now Industry 
and Commerce). This entails identifying stakeholders to participate in the process at all levels 
from other trade-related ministries, para-statals, private sector bodies, CSOs and labour (see 
section Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.2). However, failure by the ministry of Industry and 
Commerce to implement the above reflects state shortcomings and the road for civil society 
advocacy on the EPA process. It also qualifies state shortcomings and civil society advocacy 
in Zimbabwe as a function of state-stakeholder relationship which, in turn, is a function of 
well-known fault lines. The above suggests a general lack of political will to involve and 
consult with all the relevant civic bodies in the EPA process. This has undermined the 
potential of harnessing all the available financial and human resources for a national common 
course. While the anti-EU mantra was directed by ZANU (PF) and their allies against the 
Zimbabwean economy, technical studies and assessment contextualised the bilateral fight as 
between the EU and ZANU (PF) leadership. This contradiction was not adequately exposed 
by the CSO advocacy and lobbying, a development that could have facilitated the 
convergence of extreme positions in national economic policy making in Zimbabwe. Firstly, 
the narrow and partisan approach to engaging the EU in EPA process has marginalised the 
voice of vulnerable groups in society, including that of unorganised entrepreneurs. Secondly, 
there was no political will to encouraging all stakeholders to mobilise resources in support of 
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 the EPA process, especially knowing that there were no donor funding possibilities and 
fiscal limitations. Thirdly, there was no political will to encourage the mobilisation of all the 
relevant stakeholders and consumer welfare groups to support the EPA process. This would 
have facilitated the process and policy reviews now dominated by an economic 
empowerment agenda, as well as raising inequalities and uneven development in the country. 
As discussed elsewhere in this study, this would also have allowed collective identification of 
priorities, issues of national concern and interests and strategic approaches and tactics during 
the negotiation.  
 
Thus, of all the CSOs approached, Seatini, Mwengo and the Trades Centre admit that the 
former Trade and Industry ministry (now Industry and Commerce) has throughout the 
process consistently invited them to every national preparatory engagement prior to the RNF 
and joint ESA-EU EPA related meetings. They have also participated in these meetings as 
part of the government delegation. For instance, Seatini, a Harare-based leading regional 
trade organisation specialising in trade negotiations, officially represented ESA civil society 
groups in all the EPA related RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in 
Brussels between January and December 2004 as per the EPA roadmap. The organisation 
developed trust with the Trade and Industry ministry, resulting in the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of 
International Relations, aimed at facilitating dialogues sessions on topical thematic areas
7
 on 
trade and development. As an insider in both the Trade and Industry ministry and RNF trade 
sessions, Seatini succeeded in passing crucial lobbying information to other national and sub-
regional CSOs. All the CSOs sampled for this study attest to this. However, following the 
organisation’s removal from the RNF framework
8





, the influence of Seatini in shaping advocacy and activism in the EPA 
process in Zimbabwe in particular and ESA in general, dwindled. Secondly, the Trades 
                                                 
7 Topics presented included ‘Assessing political risk in the SADC with specific reference to Zimbabwe and the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). 
8 Participating support was withdrawn in July 2004 and February 2005 for the two CSO representatives on 
account of insisting on free editorial in its monthly “Electronic Bulletin” in line with the insider-outsider 
strategy.  
9 Two key officials (economist and policy expert, and a trade lawyer) resigned to join diaspora jobs in South 
Africa and Botswana, respectively in the same month (July 2005), mainly on account of the country’s 
deteriorating economic situation while another media expert went for further education (Masters) in the same 
year.  
10 On account of the staff exodus and donor funding models in Zimbabwe that prioritise governance, 
democracy and human rights activities while excluding economic programme activities including trade 
negotiations. 
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 Centre, considered pro-government by the civil society sector, produced the country’s EPA-
IAS and facilitated the stakeholders’ engagement in the findings and recommendations that 
eventually shaped the country’s positions, interests and offers in the process. The Trades 
Centre also facilitated a subsequent EPA related conference dialogue in both Harare and 
Bulawayo to review and engage with the EPA-IAS findings and recommendations, national 
imperatives and the economic transformation agenda. Some CSOs who were interviewed 
participated in the proceedings. However, the EPA-IAS suffered from limited engagement 
between government and critical key stakeholders, namely civil society fraternity and the 
business community, a development that equally undermined the potential to build national 
synergies, coalitions and partnerships in support of Zimbabwe’s goal of a better deal. This 
also undermined a pro-development and pro-poor EPA outcome based on collective 
articulation of the country’s developmental aspirations. Lastly, Mwengo, though considered 
pro-government and someone who enjoyed cordial working relationship with the former 
Trade and Industry ministry, could not be identified with specific EPA related output or 
outcome mainly due to limited funding, which translates to limited activities and exodus of 
personnel from the organisation. 
 
While Seatini, Trades Centre and Mwengo had good working relationship with government, 
they (three organization) would have invested more effort and time in ensuring that the 
contributions of other civil society groups add value to formal processes. They could have  
also lobbied government officials to acknowledge their respective strengths in the EPA 
process with a view to strategically build on sound state-CSOs relationship.  
 
Other Harare based CSOs claim exclusion from directly engaging with the ministry on 
account of well-known fault lines, especially the perception that they are allies of the MDC 
formations and the EU. What is undisputed is the fact that most of the excluded CSOs at 
some stage publicly sympathised with MDC formations, in addition to publicly expressing 
strong views against the ZANU (PF) government’s economic mismanagement and partisan 
approach to economic transformation and economic empowerment. That alone precipitated 
their exclusion while fueling state-CSO mistrust and uncooperative tendencies on economic 
policies including trade talks. The above also fuelled state shortcomings and paranoia over 
CSOs in the region and beyond thereby denying them access to the country’s EPA-IAS (a 
national strategic document). This equally demonstrates that CSOs, regardless of location in 
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 the sub-region and beyond, experienced difficulties in interacting with the state on the EPA 
process. 
 
The organisations also argued, and rightly so, that direct engagement would be purely based 
on national economic interests rather than realignment along the national body politic. Firstly, 
the CSOs cited their undisputed but impressive record of engaging the IMF and the World 
Bank’s sponsored ESAP, that was more often than not, characterised by a critique of the 
state’s approaches to policy implementation as well as resistance to consider policy options 
and/or alternatives. Secondly, they pointed out their undisputed record of mobilising various 
constituencies in support of government policy space, then under threat from GFIs such as 
the World Bank and the IMF. Thirdly, they cited the leadership abilities of Ledriz, the 
research arm of the ZCTU, which successfully mobilised resources and other regional 
activists, academic and research institutions and labour, culminating in an ANSA policy 
dialogue platform and a publication with a set of lobbying policy alternatives to replace neo-
liberal policies in the region. The above exclusions in the EPA process equally points to 
excluding critical sources of strategic analysis and views that could have contributed 
positively to the articulation of national issues, interests, positions and offers. Indeed, the 
hardline stance of politically labeling organisations as anti-ZANU (PF) not only made it 
extremely difficult for the Trade and Industry ministry to even consider their views in the 
process, but also completely closed any window or opportunity for lobbying and advocacy 
work in the process.  
 
Some of these organisations are highly respected in the region, a development that allowed 
them to contribute to other regional EPA processes. Unfortunately the EPA process, because 
of embedded sensitivities about future commercial interests with respect to the EU, makes it 
equally difficult for other sub-regional member states to act as conduits of civil society 
advocacy work in Zimbabwe. Sub-regional member states leaders regard the Zimbabwe’s 
civil society-EU nexus, which Harare often describes as an instrument of regime change, as 
sensitive to publicly interacting and/or engaging with on matters of the country’s national 
importance. So, the only way for CSO advocacy and lobbying was/is with the Zimbabwean 
state. While a sound state-civil relationship on trade related issues is a necessary condition for 
constructive and effective engagements and participation, it is not a sufficient condition for 
the country to secure a better deal in this round of negotiations. Indeed, in the absence of both 
a necessary and sufficient state-stakeholders relationship, it remains a short to medium term 
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 dream for the EPA to explicitly and implicitly redress the multi-dimensional nature of the 
country’s current social and economic developmental challenges - including growing 
poverty, societal inequalities, and underdevelopment; under-equipped, under-funded and 
static industrial production; and value addition processes and export diversification. It is 
difficult at this stage to qualitatively ascertain the impact of excluding critical CSOs from the 
process in terms of securing a pro-poor and pro-development outcome
11
. Success in the above 
will level the competitive trading environments between the negotiating parties.  
 
The Commonwealth Secretariat Hub and Spokes Project (2012) observes that most ACP 
countries including Zimbabwe have‘ multi-stakeholders trade consultative networks’ to 
inform trade policy making and input into bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. 
However, more often any resemblance of a ‘trade consultative network’ that may exist, is 
largely over-represented by government officials at the expense of the private sector and 
CSOs. This means that countries may struggle to build sustainable and lasting pro-trade 
development outcomes including input into trade policies and trade negotiations. Thus, the 
prevailing conflictual state-civil society and state-private sector relationship both point either 
to a non-existent or dysfunctional trade consultative network in the country during the period 
under review. In concurring with the above, Willie Shumba
12
, the SADC’s secretariat senior 
customs officer in his presentation to the regional trade and integration stakeholders, 
observed that while other regional countries with frictional political environments such as the 
DRC, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland have succeeded in establishing active customs-
business forums in support of their respective trade and economic development goals, 
Zimbabwe is yet to do so. This is contrary to the past constructive, consultative and rigorous 
state-NSAs economic development policy debates within the context of the Bretton Woods 
Institution’s
13
 sponsored free market policies and trade liberalisation. 
 
Stakeholder relationships are necessary to sustain investments made in the trade and 
development dialogue in the context of the country’s industrialisation strategy. It is 
imperative for government, business, and civil society formations to work together to share 
unbiased and rigorous analyses of achievements, best practices and challenges in the current 
EPA process. Such a level of collective honesty and trust sustains collective responsibilities 
                                                 
11 The EPA objectives (see Box 2.1) have all the nuances that the EPA Framework seeks inter alia to score pro-
poor and pro-development outcomes.  
12 Presentation made during the SADC Trade Negotiating Forum, Gaborone, Botswana, 15 March 2013.  
13 The IMF and the World Bank. 
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 on matters of trade and industrial policy formulations, trade negotiations and the 
implementation of regional and international trade agreements. Zimbabwe needs to come up 
with a sustainable mechanism that rallies all the relevant stakeholders behind the government 
in future bilateral, regional and multilateral trade and development cooperation negotiations. 
This suggests rejuvenating the public-NSAs consultative trade and industrial policy dialogue 
platforms. It also suggests supporting and encouraging national institutions and structures to 
be active, not only in national trade and development discussions and practices, but also in 
regional and global networking. Success in this direction has huge potential to galvanise 
current and future collective political will in support of the country’s commercial interests 
and concerns.  
 
Government officials argue that the main drive to negotiate was largely informed by the 
country’s future needs in the global economy. Though this assertion is linked to short to 
medium term national commercial interests, it suffers from weak strategic stakeholders’ 
consultations and objective, rational and collective analysis of the short to medium term 
strategic goals in the proposed reciprocal trade regime with the EU. The process also suffers 
from a lack of collective and inclusive articulation of national commercial interests in the 
context of the country’s ambitions and comfort measures. The process further suffers from 
growing negative perceptions about the government-NSAs working relationships. In the light 
of these unfortunate developments, CSO advocacy has firstly failed to convincingly discredit 
the government’s assertion of securing future markets by practically linking the present 
country’s characteristics of unimpressive socio-economic indicators with the potential EPA 
outcome. Secondly, the CSOs have failed to discredit the assertion by demonstrating the 
dangers of a reciprocally open economy to European operators, producers, exporters and 
investors, some of which have strong lobbies including MCs and TNCs. Thirdly, the CSOs 
failed to advocate for the participation of new economic entrepreneurs across all the sectors 
of the economy, most of whom are yet to be organised under effective umbrella bodies with 
the objective of protecting their interests in regional, bilateral, and multilateral trade 
negotiations. Finally, the CSOs’ advocacy failed to quantify and qualify their messages in 
ways that contrast the government assertion with potential negative EPA outcome. Unlike in 
the ESAP era, most CSO advocacy messages - although predicting general and specific future 
social, economic and political ramifications of the new trade regime - were not based on 
rigorous and scientific scholarly analyses. Further, the CSOs’ lobbying message remains 
largely without an empirical base. Most of the published materials on EPA advocacy were 
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 produced by activists, and as such, are emotional, one-sided and without balance, and do not 
offer alternative suggestions for an ideal process and outcome. While the advocacy 
messages targeted the Trade ministry’s officials in various configurations, they forgot that the 
negotiators were implicitly or explicitly given a mandate by political principals, who were not 
targeted for lobbying purposes, especially in Zimbabwe. Lastly, the CSOs’ advocacy revealed 
that the CSOs were not working closely with national, regional, continental and global 
research institutions, a condition that would have allowed rational, scientific, conceptual and 
contextual analyses to filter into some of the lobbying messages. This confirms that national 
and regional research institutions have not played an active role in the process, which 
explains the weak dialogue platforms between the research institutions and the CSOs. 
 
The passion displayed by both parties to fast-track the EPA process that culminated in the 
Industry and Commerce Minister, Welshman Ncube’s signature in 2009 in Mauritius was at 
variance with the prevailing and projected social, economic and political indicators. The 
economy that had contracted for eight consecutive years to about 50% of GDP was struggling 
to recover under the GNU administration. Expectations of in-flows of FDIs, regional and 
national investment - as well as unlocking financial resources from the international 
community - failed on account of disrespecting the provisions of GPA. The social and 
humanitarian crisis continued to absorb significant fiscal resources. Politically, the parties in 
the inclusive government continued to publicly contradict each other, especially with regard 
to economic policies and programmes. The above generated debate without success on 
whether or not the economy could be downgraded from developing to an LDC - an outcome 
that could have allowed trade to the EU to continue under EBA and DFQF initiatives. 
Meanwhile, the CSOs, having failed to dissuade the government negotiators from 
succumbing to EU pressure in Mauritius in 2009 following the de-escalation of the trade 
talks, were left in limbo. The prevailing social, economic and political indicators should have 
compelled the CSOs in their advocacy activities to point out the ramifications of splitting the 
ESA configuration, and the dangers of individual small, weak, and vulnerable economies 
signing the iEPA. They should have highlighted the violations of the joint ESA-EU roadmap 
in 2004 and the EU’s potential to extract huge concessions for the European TNCs, MCs and 
other operators and investors at the expense of Zimbabwe’s sustainable socio-economic 
development and political stability. The above would have motivated the Industry and 
Commerce Minister, Welshman Ncube, to resist pressure from the EU on the grounds that the 
country was still experiencing poor social and economic conditions, while suspended from 
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 accessing external financial support from the EU, GFIs, foreign governments and other 
development donor agents. Indeed, the Zimbabwean CSOs, under the leadership of the 
Zimcodd advocacy programme, made a spirited effort to downgrade the economy to LDC 
status on the basis of huge and growing external debts and external obligations, coupled with 
negative social and economic indicators. This position and status would have allowed trade 
with the EU to continue under the EBA initiative, like the rest of the LDCs that were not 
under pressure to initial and sign the iEPA. Furthermore, the CSOs under the leadership of 
Afrodad also argued that the economy should be classified as a highly indebted poor country 
(HIPC) on account of its huge and growing external debt overhang that was not only 
retarding social and economic growth and development, but had also become economically 
exhausting and unsustainable, politically destabilising and socially immoral and 
unacceptable. Firstly, the CSOs in this regard observed that the country’s debt overhang and 
associated obligations was denying the government the necessary resources to improve social 
development and conditions of the people. Secondly, and most importantly, this denied the 
country the resources to rejuvenate and revitalise industrial productive capacity utilisation, 
which at the birth of the GNU in February 2009, was estimated at less than 15%. Thirdly, it 
denied the country the necessary resources to revitalise downstream economic activities, 
value addition in export production, export competitiveness and supply-side development. 
Lastly, this could have facilitated rigorous research and development activities to improve 
market access to the EU and other global markets. 
 
The signing and ratification of the iEPA was merely to ensure that trade in goods between 
Europe and Zimbabwe was legal before the WTO members, lest the EU face legal battles 
from other non-ACP WTO countries. According to João Aguiar Machado, the EU 
Commission Deputy Director General of Trade and the chief negotiator: 
 
… big member countries of the WTO such as the USA and Canada, which have commercial 
interests in ACP economies, are already questioning the legality status of the trade regime 
between the EU and non-ratified iEPA countries, despite the fact that negotiations for the full 
EPAs are underway (Machado, March 2013). 
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 Machado further cited the WTO’s legality and conformity as the main reasons why the three 
political structures
14
 of the EU have unanimously voted in favour of the withdrawal of MAR 
1528 of 2007 by 1 October 2014. This withdrawal of the regulation market access will result 
in non-LDCs EPA countries that are without an alternative preferential trade regime but are 
trading under the most favoured nation (MFN) status, enjoying the same treatment as that 
accorded to all the WTO members. On this basis, the study argues that the Zimbabwean 
negotiators might have opted for early signature in order to avoid the sudden withdrawal of 
MAR, thereby swiftly cut trade flows between the negotiating parties, which as Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 show, has remained constantly impressive throughout the period under review. The 
study further argues that by remaining silent on the potential negative impact of MRA 
withdrawal, the CSOs’ advocacy lost an opportunity to converge with the government 
negotiators and officials on this process in particular and economic policy in general. The 
CSOs should have opted to discredit MAR decisions as well as alerting various 
constituencies on the implications and/or dangers of such a move. Either way, the CSOs 
would have proved that they are also fierce critics of the three political EU institutions that 
are being accused of being not only anti-ZANU (PF), but also pro-MDC
15
 and its allies. 
 
Proposed advocacy and lobbying for CSOs in Zimbabwe should therefore have entailed 
forming strategic networks with other key stakeholders - including the business community 
and broad sections of the sector ( social movements) - working on trade and development 
with a view to exerting pressure on the negotiators to summarise national interests, positions 
and offers in the iEPA framework. Further, concerted pressure should have been brought to 
bear on government through the ministries of Industry and Commerce, Regional Integration 
and other trade-related portfolios with a view to popularising the above-mentioned 
summaries in the main vernacular languages, Ndebele and Shona, in order for the various 
constituencies and citizens to understand and engage in the new trade regime with Europe. 
Furthermore, CSOs working with other NSA components should have exerted pressure on 
government negotiators to debrief the nation before and after each major EPA meeting or 
process.  
 
                                                 
14 The EU Council, the European Parliament and the EU Commission. 
15 The three EU institutions have since 2002 directed that 10th EDF resources be allocated towards 
humanitarian assistance and governance and human rights activities, areas that favour the MDC. Following the 
formation of the GNU, the EU three structures ensured that more 10th EDF resources are diverted towards soft 
sectors, namely health and education portfolios under MDC formations. 
186 
 It is known that the negotiators have not been sharing any EPA information with respect to 
potential opportunities and/or challenges with strategic key stakeholders, including 
industrial bodies such as the CZI and ZNCC as well as with research institutions and labour. 
While it is understandable with respect to labour
16
 and some critical research organisations to 
the extent of not warranting any advocacy and lobbying since the exercise will be futile, it is 
however, different with CZI and ZNCC, whose members would either benefit or suffer as a 
result of the new trade regime. In this respect, the CSOs should proactively have lobbied the 
government to at least have an open door policy for them in search of future trade 
relationship between the negotiating parties. The CSOs would have also developed 
friendships and formed partnerships with the business umbrella bodies, while creating 
opportunities for using these bodies as conduits for interfacing with government negotiators 
at all levels. Success in the above would have facilitated the CSOs to focus on forming 
strategic stakeholder alliances with government negotiators. It would also have supported 
collective harmonisation of iEPA trade liberalisation schedules commitments, with the 
current and future regional trade and integration commitments already agreed upon - or likely 
to be agreed upon - under COMESA FTA, SADC FTA and the Tripartite FTA (regional FTA 
comprising of COMESA, EAC and SADC). 
 
Having noted the challenges facing national and regional institutions in terms of undertaking 
their respective EPA related research and advocacy work, CSOs should have stepped up 
lobbying and campaigns for the allocation of resources (donor funding and fiscal) with a view 
to ensuring balanced opinions of the unfolding process. In particular, CSOs’ advocacy should 
have aimed to support the development and/or the establishment of technical institutions, the 
introduction of trade negotiations courses at different levels (diploma or degree), or 
specialised short-term trade negotiating skills at tertiary level. This would help to develop and 
build a broad base of qualified officers and activists with sound knowledge, skills, and 
capacities to simultaneously deal with bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations as well as 
regional integration agendas. While this level of critical mass does not help in the current 
negotiations round, it would be an asset in subsequent engagements and future trade 
negotiations (bilateral, regional or multilateral) in order to ensure fair publicity and scrutiny 
of the process and outcomes for the benefit of the nation. This level of trade consultative 
environment is essential for mainstreaming trade and industrial policy objectives within the 
                                                 
16 Due to existing embryonic code with the MDC, that is, labour being the foundation of the MDC party. 
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 broad trade and regional integration agenda, socio-economic development, pluralistic 
governance and body politic.  
 
Negotiations in all configurations are done in thematic TWGs, structures comprised of junior 
government officials who not only prepare background negotiations materials for senior 
government officials, but also constitute a higher proportion of every respective government 
delegations to all EPA related meetings. The TWGs officers, who are experts in certain areas, 
are easily approachable and flexible when interacting with stakeholders. The structures not 
only report to senior officials (chief negotiators), but also produce thematic negotiations texts 
or records that are used by senior officials during their internal group negotiations or joint 
negotiations with the EU. Furthermore officials of TWGs not only advise their respective 
chief negotiators during the negotiations, but also develop textual proposals of group 
positions and offers on all the areas that were or have been negotiated with the EU. 
Unfortunately, the CSOs have neglected this easy to approach structure. It also appears that 
the CSOs have been targeting higher level senior officials and ministers while the real 
negotiations take place at a lower level. This is indeed an area where the CSOs dismally 
failed to step up clear advocacy messages. 
 
The above discussion depicts the challenges that continue to constrain the trade policy 
making environment and position the trade debate to very weak state-civil society 
relationship. As a result, the above challenges have undermined CSO offensive lobbying on 
government and other key stakeholders working on trade and development issues in the 
country. This has also frustrated advocacy engagements between CSOs and other relevant 
stakeholders and constituencies such as producers, consumers and vulnerable groups in 
society. This scenario characterises state-civil society relations as merely symbolic or 
virtually non-existent since in most cases CSO efforts in the country’s economic affairs 
follow donor funding patterns and intervention objectives, sometimes regardless of relevance 
and rationality. Since 2002 the 10
th
 EDF has concentrated on democratisation, electoral 
reforms, human rights and governance activities while no funding was available for the EPA 
process. The EU cites fall-out in bilateral relations with Zimbabwe leadership as the main 
reason why the 10
th 
EDF resources (channeled through the national authorising officer 
located in the ministry of Finance) (see section 1.1) could not be accessed by NSAs, 
especially by CSOs.  
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 Thus, the CSOs’ discourse on economic matters (including trade negotiations) often became 
a political mine-field, and as such, increasingly irrational, uncooperative and irresponsible. 
Overall poor state-NSAs point to potentially poor stakeholder wisdom, effort, and resources 
at the negotiating table vis-à-vis politically and economically focused EU institutions with 
full support from MCs and TNCs lobbies. Indeed, any weakness by the Zimbabwean 
negotiators increasingly becomes fertile ground for possibilities of short-gains and early 
harvest trade regime for the EU. It is sad to observe that most national stakeholders working 
on trade and development largely remain at the periphery of the process amid limited 
government outreach programmes on account of non-availability of resources, from both the 
EU and other donors on the one hand and from government’s fiscal sources on the other. It is 
common knowledge that all donors have not been funding the Zimbabwean government’s 
policy space, including trade negotiations related activities. It is also common knowledge that 




6.3.2 Donor funding and civil society advocacy 
 
The EU’s institutions and structures are well endowed with financial, human and technical
17
 
resources to advance the EPA negotiations with all six configurations. On the contrary, the 
ESA countries have had limited financial, technical and human resources, and have had to 
rely on the financial benevolence of the negotiating counterpart (the EU) to support the 
process nationally and configurationally. As a result, various interest groups have become 
frustrated or opted out of the process. Of all the ESA countries, Zimbabwe was in the worst 
situation: there was a massive exodus of foreign funding and high fiscal prioritisation of 
economic empowerment at the expense of trade negotiations. In addition, the country has 
since exhibited declining industrial capacity utilisation and productivity and export 
competitiveness. Lack of donor funding denied CSOs the opportunity to develop advocacy 
activities which would have influenced more fiscal allocation in support of the EPA process.  
 
Through EU funding, ESA member states have throughout the process been guaranteed 
financial support (air tickets, accommodation and daily subsistence allowances) for three 
                                                 
17 Includes technical experts, specialised skills, short to long term consultancy and equipment.  
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 participants at both RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the region and in Brussels. In 
this respect, the EU was categorical in stating that the funding support would cover two 
government negotiators and one private sector representative. This decision was announced 
during the launch of the EPA roadmap, hence is not a product of the CSOs’ advocacy work. 
In particular, Zimbabwe, even though under a restrictive regime within the confines of frosty 
bilateral relations with the EU, has benefited from this benign funding mechanism meant to 
facilitate the EPA countries’ participation in this process. However, as the foreign currency 
in-flows dwindled, especially from mid-2005, the government ended up utilising the financial 
support earmarked for the private sector’s representative. Again, this decision to fund 
Zimbabwe, regardless of the fall-out in bilateral relations, was not a product of CSOs’ 
advocacy and lobbying efforts. 
 
Interestingly, the EU decided to bankroll EPA processes and activities in the ESA group, 
publicly considered a 'high breed configuration’ with no legally acceptable status to receive 
any donor money. It is instructive to note in this discussion that ESA was not formed by a 
legal binding instrument such as a treaty or MoU, hence was not a legal structure or entity to 
enter into financial transaction with the EU. As discussed in section 5.2.2, the ESA group’s 
activities have been coordinated by COMESA with moral support from three RECs (EAC, 
IGAD and IOC). As a coordinator, COMESA was then identified by the EU as an appropriate 
secretariat to coordinate financial transactions from the EU in this process. It is also 
instructive to note that not all the countries of the original ESA group (before the split into 
EAC and reconfigured ESA) are members of the COMESA region. In particular, Tanzania, 
which the CSOs successfully lobbied to join a configuration with other EAC countries, is not 
a member of COMESA. This supports the study’s argument that COMESA has throughout 
the process been used as a conduit to fund all EPA-related activities of ESA. This means that 
the EU, as a donor, opted to ignore basic rules and principles of funding institution activities 
by transferring all EPA financial resources earmarked for the ESA group through the 
COMESA secretariat. Kamidza (2008), in assessing donor funding to the CSOs working on 
EPA issues remarked: 
 
…. because the donor is an interested party, who expects to gain from the conclusion of EPA 
round of negotiations, they simply overlook the ESA’s legal and structural deficiencies. ….. 
because the EU is a domineering party, which expects secure markets through rushed EPA 
process, simply overlooks basic donor principles of funding organisations, institutions and 
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 structures. …Basic funding principles dictate that under normal circumstances, no donor 
could have bankrolled the activities of a recipient through another entity’s structure the way 
the EU is supporting ESA-EPA activities through COMESA secretariat.  
 
Throughout the EPA process, no EU funding was extended to national and sub-regional 
CSOs in support of their participation; that is, no civil society representative was financially 
supported through COMESA to participate in RNF and joint ESA-EU meetings held in the 
region and in Brussels. It is also regrettable that the ESA group officially withdrew Seatini’s 
representatives from all EPA related meetings, a development that weakened state-civil 
society consultative processes at national, regional, and Brussels levels. A few donor agents 
and philanthropists with a focus on economic justice network programmes supported the 
CSOs’ participation in the process, though not in a sustained and structured way. The 
donors/donor agents and philanthropists who have supported the process are reflected in 
Table 6.2 below. Most of their funding models have been unsustainable and unpredictable to 
warrant systematic and structured advocacy on many of the fault lines of this process. As 
such, inadequate donor funding to a larger extent restricted CSOs advocacy to unstructured 
and inconsistent activities, more often without clear outcomes. Firstly, the state shortcomings 
and fault lines increasingly worsened to the extent of paralysis of the GNU’s economic 
policy-making process. Secondly, the EU’s benign support to three trade officials’ 
participation, while employing divide and conquer tactics to the ESA group (see section 
4.4.2) and guerrilla negotiating strategy and tactic (see section 5.3) survived crude public 
scrutiny not only outside the realm of ZANU (PF) anti-colonial agenda, but also within the 




 Table 6.2: Donor agents and philanthropists who funded government and CSOs in 
the EPA process  
Donor What was supported? 
EU Government officials/negotiators participation in EPA meetings, 
and impact assessment study. 
African Capacity 
Building Foundation 
CSO representatives participation in AU organised meeting. 
Action Aid CSO representatives participation in RNF meetings, consultation 
sessions with government and other civic bodies, and advocacy at 
national level, and CSO organising an EPA conference. 
Afrika Groups of 
Sweden 
CSO hosting national EPA workshop. 
Christian Aid CSO representatives lobbying mission to the EU, and CSOs 
hosting national EPA workshop. 
Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung  
CSO representatives participation in Brussels meetings, 
consultation sessions with government and other civic bodies, 
advocacy at national levels and CSO organising an EPA workshop. 
Foreign Trade Union 
Organisations (FNV 
and FOS Belgium) 
CSO representatives participation at the NDTPF and RNF, and 
advocacy at national level, CSO consultation sessions with 
government and other civic bodies, and organising an EPA 
conference. 
Hivos  CSO representatives participation at RNF. 
Oxfam America CSO representatives participation at RNF, consultation sessions 
with government and advocacy at national level, organising EPA 
workshops. 
Oxfam Novib CSO representatives participation at RNF, consultation sessions 
with government and other civic bodies, and advocacy at national 
level, and CSO organising an EPA workshop. 
Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation 
CSO representatives participation at the NDTPF and in Brussels 
meetings, organising an EPA conference, workshops. 
Source:  Compiled from the questionnaire responses 
 
As a result, only a few civil society representatives have been able to participate in RNF 
meetings. In particular, only two CSOs
18
 among all those working on EPA issues have 
participated, and to a lesser extent, in joint ESA-EU proceedings as part of the Zimbabwean 
delegation. This denied the country an opportunity to build synergies and coalitions between 
                                                 
18 Trades Centre and Seatini 
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 government negotiators and the broader section of CSO representatives, who over the 
decade have been able to build strategic trade-related networks across the continent as well 
as in Europe. This further denied the Trade and Industry (now Industry and Commerce) 
ministry the opportunity to receive moral and technical support from the civil society sector, 
to collectively and inclusively project national EPA issues, interests, positions and offers, and 
to build trust with civil society activists, given the politically charged environment in which 
the ruling party viewed civil society as ‘swimming in EU money’ in pursuit of a broader 
social and economic agenda in the country devoid of nationalistic perceptions and views of 
the ZANU (PF) party. 
 
Indeed, limited funding to the EPA greatly compromised CSO activities which would have 
contributed significantly to the articulation of issues and interests and the development of 
positions and offers. Civic bodies, whose work typically involves interacting with both 
policy-makers and grassroots communities, would assumedly have been the natural advocates 
of pro-poor developmental policies during the process of developing Zimbabwe’s issues, 
positions and offers. They would also have amplified the voices of unorganised 
constituencies in the process, in their interactions with government negotiators and officials 
at the national and regional levels, and representatives of various EU institutions and 
constituencies. 
 
While most ESA countries have the opportunity to access promised developmental assistance 
through the 10
th
 EDF, Zimbabwe does not qualify. This means that the county cannot 
prioritise improving existing supply-side constraints to facilitate trade in goods. This also 
means that the country has to wait for the normalisation of bilateral relations with the EU, an 
outcome that largely dependent upon the outcome of the forthcoming harmonised elections. 
Furthermore, the country can continue to trade with the EU, regardless of the supply-side 
bottlenecks, a development that will not only throttle the flow of trade, but also give the EU 
products an advantage in the market. However, a combination of limited resources and the 
hardline position of the government vis-à-vis critical CSOs, frustrated civil society advocacy 
prowess in engaging with emerging EPA national challenges in particular, and those relating 





 Table 6.3: Emerging EPA challenges by level 
National level 
 Limited financial resources to undertake wide and deep consultations, and own 
supervised industrial or sectoral studies. 
Politically charged environment undermine effective national consultations. 
Lack of skills and capacity to adequately prepare the negotiations. 
Deploying chief negotiators to Regional Missions
19
 grossly undermine continuity in the 
pursuant of national interests, positions and offers. 
Vast negotiated areas requiring a very large team of experts and specialists - including 
economists, trade policy analysts, political and social analysts, lawyers and statisticians 
- who were not easy to mobilise given the brain drain across all sectors of the economy. 
The business community – the main stakeholder – has throughout the negotiation 
process been preoccupied with day to day business management issues, hence cared 
less about the EPA process. 
Configuration level  
 Co-ordination at the regional level, resulting in negotiating parties keeping their cards 
close to their chests. 
Maintaining the group’s cohesion given the continuous dangling of the ‘development 
aid envelope’ by the EU. 
Different tariff liberalisation commitments among ESA countries (see Table 6.6), which 
also vary with existing regional integration commitments. 
Divergent interests among ESA member states. 
EU level 
 Getting the EU to the negotiating table has not been easy given that the same (EU) 
negotiators have also been negotiating with other ACP configurations. 
Outwitting the EU with thorough knowledge of ESA countries vis-à-vis its commercial 
interests. 
Dealing with the EC’s specific mandate backed by a large pool of experts and 
specialists in all the areas under negotiations. 
Engaging EU with huge resources, all the necessary data and access to impact 
assessment studies’ findings and recommendations of all ESA countries and extensive 
experiences in trade negotiations. 
Source:  Compiled from questionnaire responses 
 
 
                                                 
19 The chief negotiator between 2004 and 2006 was posted to the Embassy in Zambia, and the chief negotiator 
between 2007 and 2008 posted to the Embassy in Pretoria. 
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 6.4 Emerging fears, implications and policy options 
 
6.4.1 Trade and industrial policies 
 
There is increasing consensus in African policy circles that trade is a powerful engine for 
economic growth and development (Kalenga, et al. 2011) and that promoting the 
participation of ACP countries in international trade requires effective, trusted and 
accountable trade consultative networks that are mainstreamed as part of the national trade 
policy framework (Commonwealth Secretariat Hub and Spokes Project, 2012). This ensures 
that a trade policy framework balances a country’s capacity to generate foreign currency and 
to produce competitive products destined for external markets. It entails balancing the flow of 
imports and exports with government’s prevailing social and economic objective(s). For 
instance, in pursuit of a consumer welfare maximisation goal, the government may opt for 
growth in imports which invariably introduces competition in the domestic market leading to 
a reduction in the price of goods.  
 
Ugarteche (2000:73) observes that foreign competition forces an accelerated rate of domestic 
economic change and produces new opportunities to learn new technologies and new 
management practices that can be used to improve domestic productivity. Ugarteche (Ibid:1) 
further notes that in economies with small domestic markets, primary production spearheads 
economic modernisation while raw materials become a growing source of generating foreign 
currency to meet national import demands. In such economies, employment is not a concern 
as small to medium sized industries and emerging informal sector entrepreneurs increasingly 
become a vital source of job creation, income, poverty alleviation and livelihoods.  
 
The above is instructive of the Zimbabwean economy over this period which, as a result of 
the economic meltdown and informal cross border trading activities in particular, increasingly 
became the main source of jobs, livelihoods and untraditionally a reliable source of fiscal 
revenue - a trend that continued under the GNU administration. This reflects deficiencies in 
macro-economic policy frameworks and/or weak implementation thereof. It is therefore 
instructive to note that the country launched a series of macro-economic policy blueprints 
between 2000 and 2008. However, these remained on government shelves on account of the 
non-practicability of implementation in a context of chaotic grand standing designed to 
appease ZANU (PF) functionaries, while pretending to find solutions for the country’s 
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 mounting social and economic challenges. The country’s homegrown macro-economic 
blueprints that failed to rescue the economy from its alarming downward spiral trend are 
summarised in Table 6.4 below. It shows the short life-span of outlined policies, the 
country’s deficiency in implementing macro-economic policies, perennial macro-economic 
policy failures, and a lack of collective approach in macro-economic policy making process 
and implementation. The table also reflects the growing frustrations among stakeholders 
fuelling state-NSA tensions. Lastly, the table provides sufficient evidence why it has been 
difficult to harness stakeholder resources in support of collective, inclusive and effective 
participation in the EPA trade negotiations. 
 
Table 6.4: Zimbabwe’s macro-economic policy frameworks visions, objectives, and 
targets, 2000 - 2007 
Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) (2000 – 2001) 
 The vision was to mobilise all stakeholders (government, business, labour and civil society) to 
implement a set of measures that would restore macro-economic stability in the country.  
National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) (2003) 
 The objective was to achieve macro-economic stability including a reduction in inflation and 
stimulating national output, productivity and foreign currency earning capacity. 
Macro-Economic Policy Framework (MEPF) (2005-2006) 
 Outlined policy interventions and programmes targeted every economic sector, covering 
agricultural development, industrialisation, infrastructural development, investment promotion, 
social service delivery, poverty reduction, economic empowerment, youth development and 
gender equality, macro-economic stabilisation and strengthening institutional capacity.  
National Economic Development Priority Programme (NERDPP) (2006) 
 The aim was to mobilise foreign currency in three to six months and to restore industrial 
production, which was on the verge of collapsing. 
Zimbabwe’s Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) (2007) 
 The aim was to consolidate the country’s economic development strategies aimed at achieving 
sustainable, balanced, and robust economic growth and development. However, issues contain 
therein are summarily repackaged from previous policies and/or policy pronouncements. 
Sources: Kamidza and Mazingi, 2011, page 320 - 323 
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 It can thus be argued that the life-span of these macro-economic policy frameworks reflect a 
high degree of uncertainty, government-NSAs mistrust, and low confidence in the country’s 
economic affairs. Indeed, all macro-economic policy directives and interventions have failed 
to restore macro-economic stability in the country, an outcome which suggests that other 
stakeholders opted not only to totally reject the macro-economic policies, but also to question 
the sincerity of such policy frameworks while the economy has rapidly and systematically 
been sliding into a hyperinflationary environment. Thus, a combination of economic 
meltdown, a hyper-inflationary environment and less than 20% industrial capacity utilisation, 
has significantly compromised state-NSAs collective development of national issues and 
interests,  offensive and defensive positions and offers that were shared with the EU. This 
epitomises the ZANU (PF) administration’s dismal failure to embrace macro-economic 
policy frameworks as ‘national policy tools’ capable of stimulating economic activities and 
production across sectors, regardless of the country’s political and bilateral fault lines. 
However, the GNU cultivated national expectations (across political divides) to create 
necessary and sufficient confidence-building measures to involve not only domestic and 
foreign economic entrepreneurs and investors, but also national constituencies and the 
general population in the design of macro-economic policies and their subsequent 
implementation in support of economic recovery, and to subsequently improve national 
product competitiveness vis-à-vis European products in both EU and local markets. For 
instance, the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) launched on 18 March 
2009, inter alia: adopting the use of multiple currencies as legal tender and the Rand as a 
reference currency; dismantling of foreign controls; the revival of productive sectors; and the 
creation of a conducive investment climate. 
 
In line with the GNU’s objective to inspire industrialists to prioritise their allocation of 
resources to favour industrial production, industrial productivity, export competitiveness and 
industrial research and development, a trade policy was developed and launched in 
September 2012. The policy has the potential to support the national economy by providing 
strategic guidance in linking industrial production processes with external markets and 
investors. It also has the potential to significantly turn the economy around as it contains both 
sectoral and national industrial policy options, linking national productive capacities and 
consumers with external consumers and exporters of goods and services. For example, 
industrial policy dictates the objective of trade policy expressed through import tariffs as 
instruments capable of enhancing the country’s economic growth and competitiveness. 
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 Unfortunately the policy - as a strategic economic tool with the potential not only to guide 
the EPA negotiations, but also to significantly support socio-economic transformation and 
the integration of the Zimbabwean economy into the regional, EU and global economy - was 
introduced well after the iEPA’s signature and ratification. This means that Zimbabwean 
stakeholders have to navigate a tricky and complex process without the guidance of this 
important document. It also means the country has formulated levels of trade liberalisation 
schedules and commitments (see Table 6.6), and identified sensitive sectoral products (Table 
5.3) to be exempted from liberalisation commitments without the strategic input and guidance 
of the trade policy. Furthermore, it means that the Zimbabwean negotiators, by failing to 
demand the development of the trade policy prior to the trade talks, implicitly succumbed to 
the domination of Europe’s MCs, TNCs and other producers, investors, and operators; this 
outcome  supports the study hypothesis that the EPA process is an onslaught on the 
Zimbabwean economy in the short to medium term. 
 
Similarly, the Zimbabwean GNU only launched its industrial policy well after the iEPA was 
signed and ratified. This means that the EPA negotiations continue without an industrial 
policy to inform, guide and advise stakeholders, and the business community in particular, on 
future industrial and sectoral development potential in support of Angelica Katuruza and 
Tadeus Chifamba’s claims that the EPA process was meant to secure the country’s future 
predictable trade regime with Europe (section 1.2.2). The industrial policy should have 
assisted in the identification of sensitive and strategic sectors and associated products, and in 
the development and articulation of sectoral sensitive issues, interests and positions prior to 
exchanging textual proposals and offers with the EU. In this respect, the study argues that 
both the proposals and offers that culminated with the ratified iEPA were not developed and 
articulated from an informed point of view. This may not only contradict the revolutionised 
economic empowerment and transformation crusade, but also suggests that the new 
indigenous economic entrepreneurs, while celebrating economic freedom, will soon falter on 
both local and the EU markets largely due to the fact that they had no input into the process 
that arrived at the agreed trade regime. The study further argues that the development and 
articulation of the country’s national and sectoral positions and offers were informed by the 
findings of the impact assessment study that was done in 2005, which was unfortunately not 
thoroughly interrogated by most stakeholders - owing to the prevailing political environment, 
limited fiscal resources and no donor funding support. Collective articulation of issues and 
interests across all sectors could have assisted negotiators to push for viable and sustainable 
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 trade regime with Europe capable of supporting sectoral development in the form of present 
and future forward and backward sectoral linkages in the economy.  
 
Both the trade and industrial policy frameworks should have provided sound and strategic 
analyses based on the stakeholders’ collective contributions. The policy blue prints also 
should have formed the basis for linking Zimbabwean economic sectors and consumers with 
EU consumers and investors.  The policy documents should have informed or shed light on 
the country’s present and future industrial development capacities and potential capabilities 
in the region - the EU and global markets as well as the potential and viability of export 
diversification - and product competitiveness. The two policies should have supported and/or 
created public-NSA
20
 platforms to continuously engage and interact on economic policies, 
trade policy, trade negotiations (including EPA process), and the implementation of regional 
and international trade agreements. The two policies  should have also assisted in building 
synergies and coalitions between government and NSAs, and within the NSA fraternity 
(business, labour, and civil society) leading to collective wisdom in the development and 
articulation of strategies and tactics in pursuit of national issues, interests, positions and 
offers. Lastly, both trade and industrial policies could have assisted in the development of 
appropriate new export and import taxes or increases thereof, leading to more government 
revenue to support social and economic development, including industrial sector 
improvement, and production capacities and productivity, especially in agriculture and 
manufacturing. The above characterisation of the policy environment inevitably undermines 
collective national efforts to craft a long-term trade regime with its historically long term 
trading partner, the EU.  
 
 
6.4.2 Industrial production and export competitiveness 
 
Zimbabwean industrial productive structures have over the period under-review been very 
weak. This is evident from the economic meltdown and hyper-inflationary environment, and 
an industrial operating capacity estimated in 2008 at between 4% and 10% (Nyakazeya, 
2009). This level of industrial capacity could not match the dictates of regional, EU, and 
global competitiveness. The study argues that the low industrial capacity level is a function of 
                                                 
20 Representatives of the private sector (Confederations of Industries and Chambers of Commerce) and civil 
society formations working on trade and development and regional economic integration initiatives. 
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 a decade-long MDC – ZANU (PF) political contestation, a development that compels the 
latter party (ZANU PF) to adopt a political survival strategy of grand-standing economic 
empowerment and transformation programmes, with particular reference to the fast-track 
land reform and indigenisation agendas. The level of political contestation is even blamed for 
massive withdrawals of both foreign and domestic investors from the economy. Even when 
the politically belligerent parties agreed to jointly govern the country, they (the GNU) 
struggled to mobilise the necessary external and domestic financial resources in support of 
industrialisation, downstream industrial activities and export capabilities, which remain still 
extremely weak for a country that has huge potential in natural (agriculture and mining) 
resources and high human capital formation
21
, and a population that is known for being 
educated, skilled, disciplined and hard-working. Low uncompetitive industrialisation and low 
capacity industrial utilisation translates into equally weak and low export diversification and 
competitiveness levels. Regrettably, the level of the industrial and export bases have 
remained very weak, narrow and highly oriented in favour of primary and unprocessed 
commodities, particularly mineral products (diamonds, articles of base metals and precious or 
semi-precious stones) and agricultural products (prepared foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco) 
(see Table 4.2). Most of these commodities, particularly mineral commodities, are generally 
fetching low values in the international market. 
 
Meanwhile, the country’s demand for foreign currency remains huge amid smart sanctions 
placed against the ZANU (PF) leadership and associated companies. Since 2000, the country 
has been unqualified to access the 10
th 
EDF development aid window that is designed to 
assist ACP countries in redressing industrial production challenges and supply-side 
bottlenecks that may undermine trade flows with Europe. The economy is also not qualified 
to borrow money from the GFIs such as the World Band and the IMF, not only due to 
western governments upholding smart and travel sanctions, but also due to a huge and 
increasing external debt overhang. All this means an inability, especially prior to the 
                                                 
21 The South African government regards Zimbabwe as a strategic human resource centre on the basis of its 
highly educated, skilled, disciplined and hard-working citizens. This is evident from the decision to relax the 
visa requirements for Zimbabweans entering the Republic of South Africa in October 2008 following the 
signing of a GPA from ‘less than a month one-entry’ to ‘three months multiple entry’ with the provision to be 
extended by another month at any Home Affairs Office while inside the country. Following the formation of the 
GNU on 9 February 2009, South Africa further relaxed the visa requirements of Zimbabweans already in the 
country by regularising their stay. This entailed appealing (through extensive multi-media campaign 
advertisements on radio and television channels and newspapers) to every Zimbabwean to apply to the nearest 
Department of Home Affairs for a period of four years regardless of specific skills and work experiences, type 
of work, and with or without relevant documents such as certificates, passports and national identification cards. 
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 introduction of the multi-currency regime, to satisfy national requirements, particularly 
external debt service obligations, and the importation of industrial and consumer goods. 
Further, on-going debt service continues to divert scarce resources from supporting 
industrialisation, export diversification, research and skills development, and technological 
advancement. This also means that the country’s industrial and export capabilities are likely 
to take longer than expected to revive and transform, and before the country’s products 
become more competitive in local and EU markets in particular and regional and other global 
markets in general. Although progress in the macro-economic policy environment in general 
and industrial and trade policies in particular are potential ingredients necessary for industrial 
development, export capacity development, and/or diversification probabilities, the reality of 
the Zimbabwean economy points to a huge opening for EU commercial interests. Such a 
highly likely scenario supports the study’s hypothesis that the EU’s guerrilla negotiating 
strategies and tactics is an ‘onslaught on the Zimbabwean economy in the short to medium 
term’. This is based on the alluded country’s inability (unqualified) to access 10
th
 EDF 
resources in support of industrial production and redress of supply-side constraints, and 
failure to unlock the international financial resources amid growing external debt. 
 
This confirms the fear of an unbalanced EPA outcome and its inability to support the 
country’s industrial and export development. The stage is set for more EU products to flood 
the local market, thereby entrenching a European capitalist (investors and operators) foothold 
in Zimbabwe. Such an outcome embarrassingly defeats the anti-colonial agenda as well as 
disgraces the much celebrated revolutionary and unconventional reclaims of the land rights 
programme. The study further confirms the fear that the EPA outcome is set to tie the 
Zimbabwean economy to Europe in an unbalanced framework and fashion that undermines 
national producers of goods in the short to medium term. The study also confirms the fear 
that the EPA is likely to intensify a further opening up of the national economy to EU 
competition in particular and other international economies in general thereby firmly 
entrenching the neo-liberal policy project of the 1980s and 1990s, characterised by trade 
liberalisation. Zimbabwe has had bad experiences and/or memories of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
economic reform blueprint; this is especially true in terms of industrial downsizing and 
closure, and job and income losses, all of which contributed indirectly to the current political 
tension, and social development challenges such as widespread poverty, and economic 
challenges (including industrial stagnation due to aging equipment in the country). The study 
triggers the fear that the EPA outcome is likely to provide limited options for the country’s 
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 industrial strategies and developmental objectives. In this respect, the EPA outcomes may 
result in loss of industrial competitiveness and employment opportunities, and cuts in tariff 
levels leading to revenue losses. Such a development compromises government efforts to 
improve the economic empowerment programmes, policies and initiatives that currently 
underpin the country’s industrialisation and agriculturalisation processes. The study gives rise 
to the fear that the economy may continue to fail to attract international capital in the form of 
foreign investors and funding from GFIs and foreign governments due largely to political 
fault lines and contradictions in economic policies.  
 
Furthermore, by negotiating trade-related issues such as infant industry protection, 
government procurement, intellectual property rights and competition policy, Zimbabwe is 
likely to lose its options to protect sensitive and infant industries which are avenues of 
promoting economic and investment policies that encourage local and regional investors to 
take part in upstream and downstream industrial growth and development opportunities. 
According to the ESA-EU Report (2011), Zimbabwe requires urgent technical assistance and 
capacity-building support in the area of competition policy and sanitary and phytosanitary 
issues with respect to live animals, beef products, cut flowers and vegetables (mange tocit 
peas, peas and beans), tobacco, sugar and cotton. This not only inhibits efforts towards 
building sectoral and industrial capacities, but also limits market competitiveness of local 
products and export diversification efforts to enter fast-growing markets such as those of 
emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil. Had the bilateral relationship between the 
negotiating parties been good, specific components of trade-related assistance, especially 
strengthening tax collection and tax administration systems, particularly where revenue 
shortfalls due to reduction in tariffs are expected to be high, might have come well before the 
implementation of iEPA’s trade liberalisation. These developments support the study’s 
hypothesis that the EPA process is a short to medium term onslaught on the Zimbabwean 
economy. 
 
The EPA outcomes are unlikely to create viable economic activities given limited market 
related information coupled with challenges related to industrial diversification and 
competitive initiatives which Zimbabwe does not have the technological capacity to control. 
The risk is therefore high that the country will rely too heavily on the EU market even though 
opportunities avail themselves in other thriving regions such as in the emerging economies of 
Brazil, India, China and Russia. The Eurozone crisis has dampened the spirit of entrepreneurs 
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 who fear that a new trade regime is set to undermine short to medium term economic 
recovery. Further, the Eurozone crisis has dampened the spirit of negotiators who fear that 
the proposed trade regime with Europe has the potential to lock the Zimbabwean economy 
into an unhealthy trade imbalance for decades and/or may not necessarily create economic 
and social development benefits for the country. Rightly so, critics and government officials 
view the EPA process and expected outcome as an ‘economic onslaught’ on the local 
economy for current and future generations. Similarly, some civil society activists view EPA 
as an ‘ideological economic onslaught’ on the Zimbabwean economy whose external debt is 
growing fast while the country’s ability to generate foreign currency is equally dwindling fast 
and is highly unpredictable, and likely to remain so at critical levels in the short to medium 
term. Sadly, however, the EPA negotiations process coincided with limited access to both 
domestic and foreign financial resources as well as donor support to economic programmes, 
policies and initiatives that would have added value to the process.  
 
The economic meltdown translated into a narrow, undiversified and low value industrial and 
export base. This further translates into vulnerability with respect to regional, Eurozone and 
global market competitiveness. It also translates into serious capacity constraints to generate 
foreign currency, as predicted by the UNECA (2005) study which concluded that the impacts 
of an EPA on Zimbabwe is an estimated revenue shortfall of US$18.4 million. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, since 2000, Zimbabwe has failed to diversify from traditionally 
dominated exports to non-traditional exports, and also from the traditional, now shrinking 
dominant Eurozone market to fast-growing new markets (emerging economies). This is 
confirmed by Tadeus Chifamba, who remarks, “the Eurozone crisis has vindicated the voice 
that argued against joining the EPA process, preferring to vigorously promote the ‘look east’ 
policy.”
22
 Following a massive fall in the country’s industrial capacity utilisation to less than 
10% in 2008 (Nyakazeya, 2009), the distinct politically-motivated division in the inclusive 
government, often referred to as dysfunctional, failed to unlock the necessary external 
resources from western foreign governments and GFIs as well as to mobilise domestic and 
foreign investors to revitalise and recapitalise industrial production processes. This means 
that the economy is highly unlikely to build or improve industrial capacity to diversify 
production and exports in the short to medium term, or to promote labour-intensive industries 
in the manufacturing sector and in other related downstream industrial activities. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
22 Interview discussion with Tadeus Chifamba, Harare, Zimbabwe, 14 September 2012. 
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 trade barriers and other cross-border transaction costs (on account of the failure to access 
the blocked 10
th
 EDF resources promised during the start of the negotiations specifically for 
this purpose) continue to rise thereby undermining any feasible potential to manufacture 
exportable goods. The above does not augur well for an economy that still has extremely high 
levels of unemployment (which by 2009 were estimated at over 90% of the total labour 
force).  
 
Indeed, slow economic recovery in particular, in traditionally labour-intensive sectors, 
supports the study’s proposition that the EPA road has offensively trapped the Zimbabwean 
economy in the short to medium term. Since the launch of the joint ESA-EU EPA roadmap in 
February 2004, both parties to the EPA negotiations have been aware of Zimbabwe’s 
economic and political challenges. Since then, the country has been experiencing shrinking 
industrial production and productivity as well as export competitiveness. Following massive 
withdrawals of investors (both domestic and foreign), an unorthodox nationalistic and 
populist economic reorganisation policy agenda epitomised by ‘radicalised land reform’ 
(Moyo and Yeros, 2007), domestic political contestation and polarisation and isolation from 
the international community, including the EU, the economy has recorded massive de-
industrialisation and de-agriculturalisation that has culminated, inter alia, in less than 10% 
industrial capacity utilisation and the worst hyper-inflationary environment in the world by 
2008. All the sectors of the economy are struggling to improve levels of production and/or 
capacity utilisation after the ratification of the iEPA in 2012. 
 
 
6.4.3 Supply-side constraints 
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (2004) argues that countries derive greater 
benefit from increases in market access if they build competitive enterprises that are able to 
produce products and services at reasonable cost structures. This entails combining measures 
that enhance productive capacity with measures that facilitate cross-border trade, thereby 
further reducing the cost of conducting trade. It also entails reducing supply-side constraints 
that prevent an economy from exploiting its comparative advantage under any trade 
liberalisation arrangement. In this respect, prevailing supply-side bottlenecks mean the 
production processes in an economy are unable to keep pace with rising domestic or external 
demands, and more often makes both products and services uncompetitive. Subbarao (2012) 
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 attributes the supply-side constraints to a variety of factors including inadequate air, rail and 
road infrastructure, lack of credit and low-cost access to reliable market information, and 
non-availability of skilled labour force and technology. 
 
Many African countries continue to experience poor trade performance on account of high 
supply-side constraints (Hodge, 2002), which impose serious limitations for locally produced 
commodities to compete favourably in domestic, EU, and other global markets. They 
continue to suffer from a high presence of supply-side bottlenecks, which some scholars and 
civil society activists blame for constraining the capacities of most ACP countries to 
maximise trade flows under the EBA dispensation of (DFQF) non-reciprocal market access in 
the EU. Furthermore, these supply-side constraints were largely neglected by the 
development instruments of the Lomé Conventions, and so the countries failed to exploit the 
potential and promised benefits from the EU trade preferences. This is further supported by 
the Cotonou Monitoring Group of European Development NGOs’ networks (2002) seminary 
discussions, which observed that ‘the experience under the Lomé Convention has 
demonstrated that ACP countries face major problems in producing and supplying goods 
competitively within an increasingly liberalised trading environment’. In sympathy with the 
ACP economies Kohnert (2008) blames the EU for failing to deliver the promised 
developmental programmes and packages meant to redress supply-side constraints in order to 
even the trading playing fields. Kamidza (2007 and 2008) identifies the following as key 
supply-bottlenecks, which are present in most ACP countries, including Zimbabwe: 
 
.. unreliable public utilities (electricity and water); poor public infrastructure (run down roads, 
bridges and railways); weak institutional policy frameworks (fluctuating exchange rates, high 
inflation rates and poor fiscal measures); low labour productivity (arising from poor 
education, health and housing provisions); and an unfavourable investment climate, coupled 
with inadequate resources to foster socio-economic transformation. 
 
Meyn (2005) observes that redressing the above supply-side bottlenecks is a crucial 
development towards improving the country’s export capacities. This is supported by the 
constituencies, including some radical CSOs who have persistently been calling for pro-
developmental EPA outcomes within the broader anti-EPAs campaign under the leadership 
of ATN based in Accra, Ghana. Indeed, various meetings of the ESA processes and CSO 
lobbying missions to the EU institutions and structures have continuously raised the need for 
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 the EU to honour its promise of delivering the ‘developmental aid envelope’ through which 
supply-side improvements could be financed. However, there is currently no tangible 
evidence that most countries have been able to access the EU resources meant to redress 
supply-side constraints. Most ACP economies are under stress due to these widespread 
supply-side bottlenecks.  
 
Zimbabwe has struggled to maximise trade related benefits under the Lomé Conventions 
trade arrangement dispensation. This was also due to country specific factors that undermined 
efficient and competitive industrial production. This is supported by the Cotonou Monitoring 
Group of European Development NGOs’ networks (Ibid), which argues that Zimbabwe’s 
shortage of skilled labour compelled the clothing and textile industry to apply technologies 
that were about four generations behind those used in developed economies, including the EU 
or east Asian tiger economies. 
 
Over this period, the central thrust of EU’s Trade Development and Political Cooperation 
policy has worsened the fragility and vulnerability (poverty, under-development, net-importer 
and intra-conflict) of Zimbabwe. In this regard, the conclusion by all three political structures 
of the EU in 2002 to deny the government access to the 10
th
 EDF developmental aid 
resources and the imposition of smart sanctions on ZANU (PF) ruling elites and associated 
companies that was supported by other western governments and GFIs negatively impacted 
the economy in general and the ability to improve supply-side constraints in particular. This, 
for instance, makes the call to improve the supply-side bottlenecks that featured in several 
joint ESA-EU trade negotiations, under the ‘standing agenda of developmental aid envelope’ 
a hollow discussion with no evidence of EU remorse for ‘political misjudgment’ on the EPA 
win-win outcome objective. For Zimbabwe, the EPA process embodies the ‘EU’s predatory 
onslaught on the economy in the short to medium term’. Linked to the above, there was a 
large-scale withdrawal of investors and donors from the economy. All this has denied the 
country the opportunity to overcome the well-known supply-side constraints summarised in 
Table 6.5 below. 
 
These supply-side constraints could not and are unlikely to be prioritised, largely due to 
limited fiscal resources and continued public display of GNU contradictions in policy 
directives, especially with regards to farm invasions and indigenisation policy programmes. 
This is aggravated by non-commitment to GPA provisions, thereby fuelling political tensions 
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 between belligerent political parties and mistrust between the government and NSAs. 
Meanwhile, since 2000, the country has experienced high frequency power shortages that 
not only hold back manufacturing productivity and exports, but also discourage start-up 
industries, especially SMEs with the potential to compete with EU products. CZI (2012) 
lamented the continued underperformance of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority 
(ZESA) evident from frequent power outages due to many years of under-investment, 
underpricing of electricity, poor management and an absence of workable legal and 
regulatory frameworks for private sector investment.  
 
Table 6.5: Zimbabwe’s main supply-side constraints 
Antiquated equipment, machinery and technology which: 
o hampers efficiency in production. 
o Demands frequent maintenance. 
High input cost, resulting in: 
o overall, high cost production for most goods relative to the EU and regional countries. 
o cost production structures with variables that ordinarily would be excluded in a normal sound economy. 
Low agricultural and mining outputs, vital feed to industry, resulting in: 
o high importation of raw materials no longer available locally. 
o chocking supply to agro-mining based supply chain. 
Low industrial capacity utilisation. 
Physical infrastructure (roads and railways) in need of urgent revamp and upgrade, especially: 
o the unreliable national railway of Zimbabwe (NRZ), a bulk carrier of industrial production related goods. 
o increasingly expensive road transport.  
Skills flight due to massive brain-drain, especially from 2000 to 2008, which contributed to: 
o shortages of skilled labour, and/or poor workmanship.  
Tight liquidity conditions, characterised by: 
o lack of long term funding, hence a huge bearing on competitiveness. 
o lack of supplier credit. 
Uncompetitive, expensive and often limited options procurement system. 
Unfavourable investment climate fuelled by political tension and policy contradictions. 
Unreliable and costly utilities (water and electricity), in need of urgent revamp and upgrade. 
Wage pressures unrelated to productivity. 
Weak institutional policy frameworks (fluctuating exchange rates, high inflation rates and poor fiscal measures). 
Source:  Adapted from Mushowe (2012) and other sources 
 
Furthermore, Zimbabwe continues to suffer from a weak regulatory environment, particularly 
for utilities, resulting in high production costs for firms, thereby eroding the competitiveness 
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 of export products. The country continues to display poor physical infrastructures that 
grossly undermine efficiency and reliable transport networks and facilities thereby limiting 
the flow of trade with the EU, regional economies and other regions or countries. This 
confirms that supply-side constraints, especially the high cost of transport and logistical 
infrastructures (roads, ports, border facilities and railways) which currently constitute the 
greatest portion of marketing costs not only in the SADC region but also in European 
markets, if not addressed soon, will undermine the competitiveness of Zimbabwean products 
in the local market, as well as other markets, particularly the EU. The country also continues 
to suffer from trade-related transport costs associated with border controls and procedures, 
storage and market facilities, telecommunication systems and facilities and utilities (power 
and water). In particular, the country’s fixed-line telephone services are limited and 
unreliable with notoriously high call charges while the establishment and/or operation of 
modern communication systems is constrained by lack of skills and capital investments. This 
has further been compromised by a failure to meet international quality standards, lack of 
information on available market openings, limited competitiveness of local industries and the 
lack of an entrepreneurial culture. All these factors are critical in the Zimbabwean economy, 
particularly with regard to agricultural growth and development, agro-processing, and 
manufacturing. As a result of these supply-side bottlenecks, Zimbabwe has lost its 
competitive standing both regionally and internationally (Mushowe, 2012). Therefore, 
effective improvement of supply-side bottlenecks is a fundamental challenge to promoting 
the structural transformation of the Zimbabwean economy in order to promote and/or attract 
investment, thereby adding more value locally and creating jobs and income-earning 
opportunities. 
 
While ZANU (PF) received significant sympathy and protection from international platforms, 
including the United Nations, from emerging countries such as Russia and China, a 
development that fashioned the ‘look east policy’, that outcome is unfortunately yet to 
translate into significant improvements of some supply-side constraints. Indeed, Zimbabwe’s 
more than decade long-relationship with China whose commodity-exchange financing model 
with respect to physical infrastructural development, could have resulted in much improved 
existing supply-side constraints. Such a development could have prepared the country to 
competitively supply products on both local and the EU markets. Unfortunately, it remains a 
wild guess how soon the country will improve these supply-constraints to facilitate easy 
trading with Europe under the 2012 ratified iEPA trade regime. As most investors (domestic 
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 and foreign) and donors, including the EU, are sitting on the fence pending the process and 
outcome of the forthcoming harmonised plebiscite, accessing the 10
th
 EDF and 
developmental assistance from other western governments and GIFs to improve supply-side 
bottlenecks, remain largely a dream.  
 
The former government lacked the capacity to mobilise investment resources due to a poor 
investment climate consisting of political polarisation and total disrespect of property rights 
and state-NSA relationship. As argued elsewhere in the study, this was worsened by the 
imposition of smart sanctions against the ZANU (PF) leadership and associated firms, a 
development that fuelled the political divide in the country. The GNU failed to unlock 
external resources from the international community, including western governments and 
GFIs, as well as to lure MCs, TNCs and other foreign investors to support the country’s 
economic transformation, especially industrial recapitalisation processes across all sectors of 
the economy. Indeed, success in unlocking external resources would not only have 
rejuvenated the economy, but also provided options for financing supply-side constraints, 




6.4.4 Disruptions of national and regional markets 
 
Unlike the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement in which the EU as a bloc 
preserved the unity of the ACP countries as a region, the EPA negotiations split the latter 
(ACP countries) into six configurations
23
. The disintegration of the ACP regional bloc was 
engineered by Europe’s dangling of a 'developmental aid purse‘, hypothetically available to 
those countries that were ready to enter into non-reciprocal EPA negotiations. While the 
Pacific and Caribbean each has one configuration, the African countries were bundled into 
four small, weak, vulnerable and fragmented configurations to negotiating the EPA trade 
regime with the EC. Thus, while the four African groups sometimes had no historical 
cultural, social, economic and political bonds between economic units and citizens, as is the 
case with ESA, the EU substantially enlarged from 15 to a powerful united 27 member region 
both economically and politically. The strategic dangling of a ‘developmental aid envelope’ 
                                                 
23 The six configurations are (Pacific) PACP, (Caribbean) CARIFORUM, (west Africa) ECOWAS, (eastern 
and southern Africa) ESA, (central Africa) CEMAC and (southern Africa) SADC EPA. 
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 ensures EC control not only of the negotiating counterparts, but also the agenda and process, 
leading to an outcome that is likely to promote and entrench Europe’s commercial interests 
in the sub-region. Tandon (2004) verifies the EU’s ‘divide-and-rule tactics’ aimed at 
controlling the agenda, process and outcome: 
 
We are aware of well-documented threats the EU has made in the past, including withdrawing 
development aid, existing trade, aid and investments, contracts and budgetary support; 
interfering with national and regional security policies; re-imposing trade barriers; and 
removing ambassadorial representations from WTO and ACP-EU headquarters where key 
events take place. Tandon (2004). 
 
The sub-regions of eastern and southern Africa highlight the divisive character of the EPA 
processes, as reflected in Figure 6.1 below which shows the multiple memberships of the 
region. It also confirms that the EPA process has logically created another layer of regional 
integration initiative with its own programme of action (structured and systematic negotiation 
rounds), and time lines for tariff liberalisation scheduling and commitments. Only Angola 
and Mozambique belong to one regional integration scheme (SADC) in addition to belonging 



































Source: Compiled from various sources 
 
                                                 
24 The EU and EU member states have been the main funders of RECs in east and southern Africa since their 
respective formations. The EU is the sole funder of the EPA negotiation process in ACP countries.  
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 The diagram above demonstrates that EU negotiators, by supporting various EPA 
configurations roadmaps in full knowledge of overlapping memberships in the sub-region, 
have been controlling the process in order to indirectly force countries to comply with 
Europe’s commercial interests
25
. It also demonstrates that the process supports the capitalist 
agendas of carving markets for European investors, producers and exporters, especially in 
vulnerable countries like Zimbabwe. It further shows how the EU’s money influences the 
ESA member states to compromise not only collective ownership of the process as articulated 
in the joint ESA-EU roadmap of February 2004, but also the impetus, direction and time-
frames for deeper regional and/or configuration integration, the basis through which these 
countries increasingly become integrated into the EU market and the global economy in line 
with EPA objectives. Furthermore, the EPA process and outcomes compromised sub-regional 
political leadership support to existing regional integration initiatives established by treaties 
and supported by various protocols, MoUs and the Heads of State and Governments’ Summit 
Communiqué. This compromising of the regional integration process is well illustrated by the 
EU and SADC secretariat’s commissioned study of 2012 that developed a ‘Trade Facility’ 







). While the goal is to fast track the 
implementation of the EPA agreement provisions, such a development is set to directly or 
indirectly disrupt both regional and national markets. Indeed, emerging developments point 
to the fact that the process and outcomes also author disruptions in national and regional 
markets, mainly on account of agreed different tariff liberalisation scheduling and 
commitments to those currently obtained in sub-regional RECs (see Table 6.6 below). For 
Zimbabwe, this poses challenges with respect to prioritising iEPA implementation and/or on-
going regional integrative goals, and the ability to generate fiscal revenues without any 
derogation, as was the case under the SADC FTA.  
 
Ironically, the EPA processes, as reflected by the iEPA outcomes, totally disregarded the 
provisions of existing regional economic integration initiatives in the sub-region in terms of 
tariff liberalisation (tariff phase-down), agreed integrative milestones and resource 
mobilisation strategies. Bilal and Rampa (2006) argue that the EPA process may derail 
                                                 
25 The disintegration of the ACP regional bloc, of Africa into four configurations, and of ESA configurations 
into two groups (EAC and reconfigured ESA) was engineered by Europe’s dangling of a 'developmental aid 
purse’ – the EDF resources as argued elsewhere in the thesis. 
26 Tanzania. 
27 Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
28 DRC. 
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 regional integration by imposing too fast a pace for political, economic and social realities 
of some regions, overstretching their capacities and creating tensions with overlapping 
memberships or with members whose interests in an EPA differ. In this respect, the process 
produces two outcomes that have a direct bearing on existing regional integration goals in the 
sub-region. Firstly, the process compounds the multiplicity of overlapping regional 
membership, that is, it created another bloc that has not only been meeting more often but is 
also committed to different tariff scheduling than the prevailing regional integration schemes 
as reflected in Table 6.6 below. Indeed, an EPA bloc already has a financing window aimed 
at ensuring quick implementation of agreed EPA provisions. Secondly, the process has 
shaken the allegiance of member states to existing regional schemes, since the choice to 
participate in a configuration has largely been a sovereign decision based on future trade 
ambitions with the EU. In this case, some member states of the SADC region - such as 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - preferred 
the ESA group while the DRC opted for CEMAC. Some of these countries including Malawi, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are original members of the SADC. Table 6.6 below 
reveals individual ESA countries’ tariff liberalisation scheduling and commitments, alongside 
those of the EAC and SACU region  
 
Table 6.6: iEPA tariff liberalisation schedule and commitment
29
, percentages 
Country  2008 2010 2012 2013 2017 2018 2022 2023 2033 Total 
EAC
30
  64.0      80.0 82.0 82.0 
Madagascar    37.0   80.7   80.7 
Mauritius  24.5    53.6  95.6   95.6 
Seychelles    62.0 77.0  97.5   97.5 
Zimbabwe   45.0    80.0   80.0 
BLS
31  86.0        86.0 
Mozambique 78.5         80.5 
Source:  Own compilation from various sources 
 
While some SADC member states opt for mid- or back-loading tariff liberalisation under the 
SADC FTA, the negotiators under the iEPA appeared to have succumbed to the EU guerrilla 
                                                 
29 Cumulative value of imports from the EU to be liberalised by specified year. 
30 EAC countries sign as a bloc, so this is a proxy of Tanzania. 
31 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Note that Namibia is omitted because she did not sign iEPA. 
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 negotiating strategies, tactics, and divisive agendas by front-loading their respective 
commitments. For instance, both Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which back-loaded their 
respective tariff phases under the SADC FTA, agreed under the iEPA to open their respective 
economies to the EU products by 78.5% and 45% respectively (see section 5.5). Plainly, the 
outcomes, as reflected in the iEPA tariff liberalisation, are an affront to the objective of 
deepening the economic integration of existing regional integration schemes in the sub-
region. In particular, sub-regional RECs have, through the financial support of the EU and 
other development partners, developed regional integration milestones with a strict roadmap 
to follow. However, the funded implementation of the EPA outcomes is set to disrupt these 
milestones, resulting in disruptions of regional and national markets due to potential flooding 
of EU products in the sub-region. It is also instructive to acknowledge the existence of porous 
borders in the region, which makes the imported flow of EU products end up in non-EPA 
implementing countries. This development negates the ambition of wanting to facilitate 
economic integration among ACP economies, and between ACP countries and the global 
economy. 
 
The EU’s ‘divide-and-conquer strategies and tactics’ cited by Tandon (Ibid) and aimed at 
controlling the EPA agenda, processes and outcomes, are vividly reflected in the unfortunate 
disintegration of the ESA group into two parts (see sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2) by the end of 
December 2007. Indeed, bundling the ESA countries into two configurations means that these 
countries have to comply with tariff reduction schedule commitments, rules of origin, and 
other liberalisation requirements that are different from each other when, prior to the iEPA 
initialling, the countries were working together to secure a win-win trade regime with 
Europe. As shown in the table above, different levels and time-bound commitments 
increasingly support the thesis that, ideologically, the EPA process is seeking ‘long-term 
markets’ for European products, especially in countries such as Zimbabwe with huge 
industrial production constraints, export competitive challenges, and entrenched polarised 
political cultures. This confirms the potential of an EU ‘short to medium term onslaught on 
the country’s economy’. 
 
The reconfigured ESA group shown in Map 6.1 below clearly illustrates that the countries’ 
economic units and citizens lack historical cultural, social, economic and political ties, giving 
the impression of three distinct groups within the configuration agreeing to continue the 
negotiations as a unity vis-à-vis the united and enlarged EU bloc. The three distinct groups 
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 are IGAD, IOC and the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
32
 countries. As a 
result, the EU guerrilla onslaught just focused on securing individual deals with island 
economies
33
 and Zimbabwe, while the rest continue treading under the EBA regime since 
they are LDCs (see Table 5.2 in section 5.5). The map further flags potential challenges with 
respect to the notion that the EPA’s goal is to support regional integration within the 
configuration. The map confirms that the EPA process has the potential to disrupt regional 
and national markets and dispels the notion of ‘regional integration within the configuration’ 
on the basis that the trade and development trajectories of the ‘newly configured economies’ , 
as argued above, suffer from a lack of well-developed social, economic, and political ties or 
relationships. There are currently insignificant trade flows between southern African 
countries and those in the Horn of Africa. There are also no common borders between the 
southern African group of countries and those in the Horn of Africa and the IOC. This 
development rejects the assertion propagated by the EU that the EPA process, seeks to 



















                                                 
32 Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
33 Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. 
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 Map 6.1:  Configuration mapping of eastern and southern African counties 
 
 
Meanwhile, unlike the iEPA, Zimbabwe under the SADC FTA has successfully negotiated 
trade concessions that are explicit with regard to industrial development, export capacity 
building and fiscal revenue flows for the limping economy. They entail the following: 
o Securing a derogation, allowing the country to push compliance on agreed FTA tariff 
phase-downs towards the end of the cycle by substantially mid- and back-loading 
tariff reductions; that is, postponing tariff reductions towards the final years of FTA 
implementation. This contradicts the iEPA tariff liberalisation phase-down as 
reflected in Table 6.6 in which the country significantly front-loaded tariff reductions 
by 45%.  
o Securing the space to generate about 70% of the country’s revenue from custom taxes 
as well as having space to resist any significant scaling down of tariff walls under the 
FTA on account of wanting to sustain fiscal revenue flows to support growing 
national needs without censoring from other regional countries. 
o Having the space to resist pressure under the SADC TNF to remove the new surtax 
imposed by the GNU on some regional products that should be at zero tariffs without 
censoring from other regional member states. 
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 All of the above, points to the disruptive nature of the EPA process to regional economies in 
general and the Zimbabwean economy in particular. The country risks losing most of the 
gains secured under the SADC FTA, while the iEPA risks becoming an affront to leadership 
objectives of the regional countries’ to assist the economic transition process through 
derogation on tariff phase-down in line with the regional mandate of mediating in the intra-
political conflict in Zimbabwe. 
 
The fact that the EU - the main donor of regional integration projects in the eastern and 
southern African sub-regions - agreed to different trade liberalisation scheduling and 
commitments (see Table 6.6 above), illustrates the superiority of guerrilla negotiating tactics 
and dominance in controlling the process. By concluding and signing an iEPA with 
individual reconfigured ESA countries, the EU projects its well calculated guerrilla 
negotiating strategies and tactics that have been perfected through negotiating on many fronts 
with both weak and strong regions and/or countries. Most importantly, by concluding and 
signing an iEPA with Zimbabwe - a staunch critic at every international public platform 
including the UN Assembly and the ACP-EU meetings - vindicates the predatory instinct of 
the capitalist bloc in scoring victories in this process as shown in Figure 5.3 in section 5.3.  
o Firstly, the EU’s guerrilla survival instinct succeeded in isolating Zimbabwe’s EPA 
negotiating machinery (team of negotiators, officials and other stakeholders) from the 
solidarity cover of the ESA countries’ representatives, who were/are more concerned 
about the group’s cohesion in the process than entertaining any EU-Zimbabwe 
bilateral fights in this process. 
o Secondly, the swift predatory instinct of the EU succeeded in securing a trade regime 
with a sworn bilateral nemesis whose economic productive and export capacity is too 
weak to withstand any offensive entry of European products into the local market. 
Also, Zimbabwe’s economic export capacity is too weak to penetrate the European 
market. It is a fact that the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector is very small, narrow, 
and weak, and certainly not positioned to compete with EU products in the short to 
medium term, a situation that rewards the EU’s MCs, TNCs and other operators, 
producers and exporters.  
o Thirdly, the developments that resulted in the ratification of the iEPA heralded the 
defeat of ZANU (PF)’s anti-colonial agenda since the new economic entrepreneurs, 
especially in the agriculture sector, will be competing with the EU in the market under 
the forces of demand and supply (see Figure 5.3 in section 5.3).  
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 o Fourthly, the forces of demand and supply are set to provide the EU with an 
opportunity to take revenge in both markets (the EU and Zimbabwe) on ZANU (PF)’s 
unorthodox methods of reclaiming land rights
34
 from white commercial farmers and 
51% shareholding in companies and other equities. In particular, Zimbabwe’s chief 
negotiators and officials seem to have underestimated the EU’s cohesive and explicit 
exhibition of strong offensive and defensive economic interests in its relations with 
Zimbabwe. They also underestimated the influence of former coloniser, the United 
Kingdom’s strong commercial presence in the country across all sectors of the 
economy, particularly in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and finance to the EU 
bloc. They further underestimated the grievances of some EU member states such as 
the Netherlands whose bilateral investment treaties were violated by the ZANU (PF) 
government in its crusade against foreign control and ownership of the means of 
production, particularly in the agricultural sector.  
o Fifthly, the developments and outcomes clearly show that the revolutionary 
credentials of ZANU (PF), while succeeding in defeating imperialist control and 
ownership of the means of production, were found wanting in the negotiating rooms 
where strategies and tactics became increasingly subtle with short to medium term 
impacts. In particular, the EPA negotiation outcome exposes state shortcomings in 
mobilising all the relevant stakeholders regardless of their known views about 
partisan economic programmes, and being fully aware of the resourcefulness of the 
negotiating partner. 
 
The above developments attest to the study hypothesis that the EPA process is an onslaught 
on the Zimbabwean economy. As reflected in Figure 5.3 below, the economy in the short to 
medium term will be swamped with EU products resulting in uncompetitive entrepreneurs 
fleeing the domestic market. There is no significant immediate scenario of trade creation 
impact with respect to the Zimbabwean economy. This development sustains current levels of 
de-industrialisation as was the case in the mid-1990s when South African competitive 
products wiped out lots of Zimbabwe industry. The study further argues that over this period 
local products will not be offensive in the EU market (see section 5.3). Such a scenario will 
be unprofitable for the new entrepreneurs, a development that may in future force some of 
                                                 
34 ZANU (PF) leadership from the onset of the fast-track land reform advanced the thesis that the land occupied 
by white commercial farmers was taken by force during the colonial era, and therefore, they were simply 
reclaiming it back, hence only improvements made on it should be compensated. 
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 them to sell a part of or their entire establishments. Assuming full return to political 
normalcy characterised by governance and democratic values and respect of property rights, 
former commercial farm owners and EU nationals and investors including MCs and TNCs 
will be among the buyers. 
 
While a Trades Centre (2002) study based on the assumption that all tariffs on imports from 
the EU will be eliminated by 2020, reveals that most countries in the SADC region are set to 
incur substantial revenue losses as shown in Table 6.7 below, the implications for regional 
and national economies cannot be ignored. Significant cumulative revenue losses of about 
40%, 38%, 33%, 28% and 24% are expected from Mauritius, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Namibia respectively which will have ripple effects on their national 
markets. For Zimbabwe, a loss of 33% translates into significant limitations in terms of 
redressing short to long term industrial and export capacities and market competitiveness. It 
also translates into limited social services delivery (health care, education, housing, and 
water), limited infrastructural development, agricultural research and development, human 
resource development, poverty alleviation and the living conditions of citizens. 
Unfortunately, such a development not only guarantees European products and services easy 
access to the Zimbabwean market for a longer period, but also disrupts market forces of 
demand and supply.  
 
Table 6.7: Tariff revenue losses as percentages of total import revenues 
Country  T<50 per cent in 
2012 
T<50 per cent in 
2016 
T<50 per cent in 
2020 
Total Loss 
Botswana  1.9 2.7 3.1 7.7 
Malawi  4.2 5.9 6.8 16.9 
Mauritius  9.9 13.8 15.8 39.5 
Mozambique  7.0 9.8 11.2 28.0 
Namibia  6.0 8.4 9.6 24.1 
South Africa  2.6 3.6 4.1 10.3 
Swaziland  2.5 3.5 4.0 10.0 
Tanzania  9.4 13.2 15.1 37.7 
Zimbabwe  8.3 11.6 13.3 33.2 





 6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter explored the relation between COMESA and the SADC EPA units, the drivers 
of the EPA process and regional CSOs, noting opportunities exploited and insurmountable 
challenges that persisted throughout the process to the extent of compromising the sector’s 
(civil society) input. It further noted the CSOs’ visible lobbying of the three EU political 
structures and related institutions but decried lack of the same with respect to COMESA and 
SADC secretariats, as evidenced by the snubbing of civil society organised dedicated 
dialogue sessions by respective EPA units’ CTAs. The CSOs’ failure to systematically lobby 
and engage with Zimbabwean authorities in terms of mobilising all the available opinions 
while raising awareness of the counterpart’s capacity and manipulative abilities in the 
process, was also discussed. 
 
The chapter further explored the state-CSOs relationship in this process in the context of the 
historical fault lines that continue to fuel mistrust and uncooperativeness between the two 
parties, leading to government’s total exclusion of civil society organisations or 
representatives considered too radical and opposed to its views on the economy and/or 
economic policy, including the EPA process. The chapter further explored the political 
dynamics and landscape over this period which made it impossible for the state to consult and 
involve civil society groups considered critical of the former ZANU (PF) government or the 
ZANU (PF) party’s economic empowerment programmes and policies, including the EPA 
negotiations. The exclusion of some CSOs reflects a lack of transparency and inclusive 
involvement in the EPA process. This also raises questions about the partisan selection or 
identification criteria of the trade and development focused CSOs who participated in the 
process, a development that undermines the possibilities of formulating and developing 
negotiating issues, interests, positions and offers in the cultural context of co-existence and 
diversity in opinions. As a result, the EU exploited Zimbabwean state shortcomings in 
dealing with the prevailing economic environment and the political discourse in the country. 
 
The discussion concludes by noting that donors have not been systematically and consistently 
funding the CSOs activities including advocacy in the process, a development that hampered 
their expected impact. Conversely, the same donors including the EU through its 10
th
 EDF 
resource window, have been supporting, inter alia, democracy, governance and human rights 
programmes thereby constantly fuelling friction between the former ZANU (PF) government 
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 and some sections of civil society. In this respect, CSOs such as Ledriz and Zimcodd, 
although working on EPAs, are known for being ideologically close to the MDC party, 
perceived by ZANU (PF) as a strong ally of the EU that imposed ‘smart sanctions and travel 
bans’ on the leadership as well as denied interaction outside the ESA meetings – the point of 
direct contact between the EU and Zimbabwean authorities. This demonstrates that the 
omission of some of the CSOs representatives was due to their association with the sworn 
nemesis of the ZANU (PF) party. The exclusion also prevented interested citizens, especially 
research analysts and students, from occasionally interacting with government officials on the 
process. 
 
The discussion explored emerging real and potential fears, implications and policy options 
from the unfolding process, demonstrating the competitive challenges likely to undermine 
Zimbabwean products on both markets – local and the EU. These fears and implications of 
iEPA or full EPA are likely to impact negatively on the implementation of trade and 
industrial policies, the ability of the country to improve industrial production and export 
competitiveness, the capacity of the economy to redress supply-side constraints and the 
capacity of the economy to minimise the impact of disruptions in national markets. These real 
and potential fears in the realm of serious political and bilateral fault lines, state shortcomings 
and weak CSO advocacy, all confirm the ‘EU’s onslaught on the Zimbabwe economy in the 









7.1 Theoretical reflections on the findings 
 
The conventional trade theory argument is that the differences in productivity and costs of 
production between countries are the underlying reasons why it is advantageous for countries 
to engage in trade. This argument, however, has to be considered against the realpolitik of 
trade, especially negotiated agreements between sovereign states set tariff levels, sequence 
liberalisation and concessions such as protection of sensitive sectors or products. This is 
especially true when it comes to provision of development aid assistance in support of the 
integration of negotiating parties’ economies. These complications have since 1980 
characterised the EU-Zimbabwe trade and development bilateral relationship, although in the 
most recent round, the latter could not access development aid assistance from the former 
including member states. The findings of this dissertation confirm the hypothesis of the vastly 
superior EU’s productive and export competitiveness in the short to medium term. Both the 
findings and the hypothesis agree with the FTA proponents’ argument that under competitive 
free market conditions, trade maximises potential economic welfare by moving both parties 
to a situation where no country can be made better off without another being made worse off. 
Indeed, as the findings confirms, trade relations have reached the point that the EU would 
maximise economic welfare in the short to medium term while Zimbabwe struggles to 
improve the capacity utilisation and competitiveness of productive and export sectors. In 
other words, these trade relations don’t work in Zimbabwe’s favour. 
 
The study findings agree with standard trade theory that defines FTA as a process in which 
countries agree to eliminate tariffs and quotas on most goods between them. This is supported 
by the FAO Report (2003) argument which postulates trade as an important development 
tool, though not an end itself, meaning that an increase in trade volumes and/or in the value 
of trade is not necessarily an indicator of industrial productivity and development. Likewise, 
Zimbabwe’s experiences with trade liberalisation in the early 1990s left the country to record 
an improvement in trade flows but simultaneously a decline in industrial production value 
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 chains, in part because of ageing machinery, equipment and tools. Even with modernization 
of the underlying capacity, the structural trade deficit remained. Similarly, the study argues 
that the most recent round of EPA-driven trade liberalisation and Zimbabwe’s commitment to 
subject 80% of trade value to the EPA in 2022 when the agreement enters into force, may fail 
to modernise the country’s industrial production, even though trade flows may improve 
because of outflows of mineral commodities and unprocessed agricultural products. 
Zimbabwe will stuffer weak industrial output and innovation, which will open more 
opportunities for manufactured European products to flood the local market. Even 
agricultural outputs from the EU will be provided to the world market, and to Zimbabwe, in a 
more productive manner, and the latter’s unprocessed agricultural products may not be 
competitive given the power of transitional agribusinesses in EU and other global agricultural 
markets. 
 
Explaining why Zimbabwe entered into the latest trade round in a context of political hostility 
is an important contribution of this dissertation, especially because a relatively sophisticated 
civil society advocacy network – one of Africa’s strongest in terms of both research and 
social mobilization – was shunned by state negotiators while longer-term business interests 
were not properly considered by negotiators. The study addresses these shortcomings through 
the lens of negotiation theories and practices which emphasise the intrinsic value of 
information, and financial, human and technical resources in trade negotiations, and through 
bargaining game theory which values information as a strategic weapon during the 
negotiation process. As such, the study concluded that the EU, with its superior access to 
information and resources, succeeded in influencing the process, and that political paralysis 
inside Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity is largely to blame for not generating the 
full set of informational resources that local negotiators could have otherwise relied upon. 
Moreover, by dangling a developmental assistance envelope, the study argues that the EU 
sealed the EPA victory before the process even started. In this regard, it successfully 
marshaled ACP countries into adverse negotiating configurations, despite empirical evidence 
indicating an absorption rate of less than 48% of the promised assistance (Table 4.3) since 
1975. This outcome enabled the EU to effectively employ its policy of divide and conquer 
from above, and from below the potential for solidarity relationships between EU and ACP 
(especially Zimbabwe) civil society were also unrealised. As a result, the study laments the 
breaking up of the ACP region into six configurations and subsequent disintegration of the 
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 ESA group into two, resulting in four member states of the reconfigured ESA group, 
including Zimbabwe, signing iEPA with the enlarged EU community. 
 
The EU member states have been able to defend a common position with a single voice 
throughout the negotiation process and also maintain political pressure on Zimbabwe’s rulers 
– as is evident from sustained smart sanctions and travel bans on ZANU (PF) leadership – 
while refusing contact with the Zimbabwean government except in the context of the ESA 
configuration. By allowing ZANU (PF)’s former Trade and Industry minister, Samuel 
Mumbengegwi, to attend EU-ESA or ACP-EU trade including EPA meetings in Brussels, the 
EU succeeded in ensuring that its bilateral political discord with Zimbabwe regarding human 
rights and property rights would not derail the EPA process. Further, the bloc continued 
bankrolling democratic CSOs while denying funding to critical CSOs which participated in 
the EPA process. The study sums up the EU dominance and influence in the process as 
‘guerrilla negotiations strategies and tactics’ that successfully outwitted a different set of 
Zimbabwean guerrilla strategies and tactics: the reclaiming of land and mining rights from 
non-indigenous Zimbabweans (white owners). The study therefore concludes that the EU’s 
‘invisible hand’ on the market (demand and supply forces) at the same time it exercised a 
very visible hand on bilateral politics will result in its dominance over Zimbabwe’s economy. 
Zimbabwe’s political elite was somewhat effective at political grandstanding, but much less 
so in operating within the confines of market forces of demand and supply, which are now 
positioned to further degrade Zimbabwe’s economy. Normally such forces would have 
reacted by lowering the price of Zimbabwe’s exports and raising import prices through 
currency devaluation, but without control of the currency – a hard currency basket let by the 
US dollar since early 2009 – this option is not available. 
 
By considering how CSO actions influenced the process, there are further lessons about 
successes and failures of the EPA negotiations. Indeed, the sector influenced a change in 
attitude and public will of the EU with respect to the 31 December 2007 deadline and 
subsequent missed deadlines. Elsewhere, CSOs succeeded to some degree in forcing African 
negotiators in general and ESA negotiators in particular to confront and mitigate the dangers 
associated with a rushed process. However, in Zimbabwe, the CSO failed to influence a 
change in attitude of local authorities, in part because of complications associated with the 
intrusion of party politics into economic policy and the EPA negotiating process. At a time 
when civil society was often understood as mainly allied with the Movement for Democratic 
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 Change, many of the CSOs that would ordinarily have had a strong advocacy role failed to 
convince the ZANU (PF) authorities that the EU’s refusal to provide financial support to 
their (critical) EPA activities was enough proof that they were not agents of European 
political and commercial interests. These are the core civil society advocacy inadequacies 
amid glaring state shortcomings and suspicious stakeholder relationships. The dissertation 
concludes that a combination of CSO advocacy inadequacies and state shortcomings 
delivered the Zimbabwean domestic market to the EU while severely constraining the 
country’s future trade within the latter’s markets. 
 
 
7.2 Methodological lessons of the study 
 
The study offers valuable methodological lessons to anyone wanting to undertake an enquiry 
into public-oriented policy (economic and social) in an environment dominated by tense and 
politically suspicious state-society relationships. These are structural problems, often 
disguised by shallow public commentary regarding the government’s weaknesses or 
leadership styles, especially when belligerence characterises the rival parties. In the course of 
the investigation, these sensitivities were obvious, and the need to gain trust and make 
government officials feel secure was a prerequisite to having them eventually open up in 
face-to-face interviews.  
 
Informants have referred to the “IMF way” of extracting information   a view to compile 
sensitive social, economic and political country reports (section 3.4). In this respect, the 
posing of critical questions is done haphazardly without any physical recording of responses 
while absorbing as much as possible the entire essential points in the conversations. 
However, in addition to institutional power (which this researcher lacked), this requires 
patience and time to build trust, and sufficient resources to make frequent visits. It also 
requires discipline with respect to protecting the sources of information, and concealing one’s 
mission. This level of self-discipline is informed by the fact that the prevailing Zimbabwean 
academic sector has been polarised just as much as any in society. The risk, therefore, is that 
any association during field work with critics of state-shortcomings on social and economic 
policy ends up being construed as supporting the regime-change agenda. In a country 
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 suffering what Elijah Munyuki
1
 terms ‘high levels of political surveillance’ there is always 
the possibility of unintended consequences such as the abrupt end of field visit, inviting 
state control of one’s movement and/or access to data sources, and confiscation of any 
information at one’s disposal. Conversely, associating with pro-regime academics invites 
derogatory labels from other intellectuals and CSOs such as anti-democratic. Then, in such a 
politicised environment, it is difficult to get requisite information or cooperation, especially if 
the sample is dominated by CSO representatives, and if one is bent on interrogating the 
sector’s advocacy activities. The above calls for due diligence ranging from seeking 
permission
2
 from the relevant authorities before undertaking research to devising ways of 
sharing research-related information with relevant stakeholders, the government and the 
general public.  
 
There is no substitute for direct participation in national or regional policy dialogue sessions 
(mainly conferences, roundtables discussions, seminars and workshops) thereby offering a 
chance to refine further research questions, objectives and ideas. This also occurs by 
participating in regional policy dialogue sessions which facilitate engagement with 
government officials, and in the case of this dissertation research, junior officials then shared 
their respective ideas on unfolding socio-economic and political developments, especially of 
a policy nature. However, this requires having sufficient resources – including the 
institutional location enjoyed by the researcher – and remaining connected with the 
convenors of such regional platforms. That these factors were available during this 
dissertation research, facilitated access to both government officials and CSOs, in a way that 
is probably unprecedented, and allowed unique findings to emerge about their respective 
strategies and narratives. 
 
 
7.3 Key contributions of the study 
 
As the study shows, prospects for a positive outcome from EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations, 
in terms of the latter’s industrial development, export diversification and competitiveness, are 
remote, at least in the short to medium term. This suggests a potential learning curve for the 
                                                 
1 Interview discussion with Elijah Munyuki, Gaborone Botswana, 24 August 2012. 
2 In Zimbabwe, it is mandatory to get permission in writing before undertaking any public policy oriented 
research anywhere in the country including rural areas.  
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 Ministry of Industry and Commerce and all other relevant stakeholders
3
 to realise the 
importance of collective and constructive consultations in trade negotiations, regardless of 
economic and political differences. There was also a learning curve for CSOs in terms of 
assessing the relevance, attitudes and capacity of their advocacy activities on economic 
policy in general and trade negotiations in particular. Indeed, failure to heed important 
lessons from this round of EPA negotiations will result in a replication of both the current 
‘state shortcomings’ and ‘civil society advocacy inadequacies’ in future bilateral and 
multilateral trade talks. Such a development potentially undermines future trade contributions 
to the country’s socio-economic development.  
 
The study provides insights into why Zimbabwe was among the first countries to agree to the 
iEPA and to fast-track its ratification process, even when its industrial capacity utilisation 
was less than 20%, and when the GNU’s political dysfunction and economic policy 
contradictions alienated both foreign and domestic investors and donors. These insights 
include the obvious need to depoliticise and contextualise the economic policy and trade and 
development debate in Zimbabwe. For instance, the EU targeted sanctions and travel 
prohibition on ZANU (PF) leadership and associated companies may not have had much 
impact upon the state of the economy over the period, characterised, inter alia, by negative 
growth from the late 1990s and the most hyperinflationary environment in Africa’s history.  
But given the high level of politicisation, it is always necessary to demystify the economic 
sanctions debate. The study also brings to the fore the need to depoliticize and contextualise 
the debate about indigenous economic empowerment and transformation, especially during 
2013 when national empowerment objectives were directed towards a partisan electioneering 
outcome. 
 
The study also demonstrated that, in the wake of default on foreign debt starting in 2008, 
Zimbabwe’s inability to access global financial credits – including on occasion vitally needed 
trade finance – severely limited the country’s potential to put in place appropriate remedial 
measures to revamp and/or sustain industrial production and raise export capabilities. 
Sanctions against Zimbabwe’s access to finance also prevented a conducive environment 
which in other circumstances would have allowed state officials to consult deeply and widely 
with all relevant stakeholders and constituencies. The problems with adverse power relations 
                                                 
3 Trade-related Ministries, ZIMRA, Tariff Commission, MPs, CSOs, business community and the labour 
movement. 
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 are not uniquely Zimbabwean, of course, because as Diamond Chikhasu, the principal trade 
officer of the Malawian Industry and Trade ministry, put it, the ‘EPA process through its 
best endeavour language is likely to mirror the negative implications and outcomes of the 
structural adjustment programme (SAP), including closure of several companies in most 
regional economies including Malawi’
4
. Zimbabwe’s iEPA trade liberalisation will now 
intensify, but under conditions of extremely low industrial capacity utilisation, use of ageing 
machinery, hesitant domestic and foreign investors, and an unpredictable political landscape. 
Together, these threaten the goal of economic recovery. The country’s 1990s SAP experience 
should have compelled negotiators and the relevant authorities to carefully sequence iEPA 
tariff liberalisation and commitments with current plans (if any) to revamp and build 
industrial production and export capabilities, and market competitiveness for local products.  
 
The thesis has shown that the ongoing EPA process in the ESA configuration has, since 
December 2007, achieved its purpose of creating individual, small, weak and vulnerable 
economies whose rulers were so divided that they eventually signed and ratified iEPAs in 
2009. Even the Zimbabwean government, which since 2000 had only minor bilateral contact 
with the EU, finally signed and ratified the iEPA. This was a major climb-down by ZANU 
(PF) officials from earlier revolutionary pronouncements, a reflection of the success of the 
EU’s guerrilla negotiating strategies and tactics. It also signals a short to medium term 
victory for the EU and its allies (business lobbies, multinational corporations and global 
financial institutions) since market competitiveness favours EU entrepreneurs in both markets 
(the EU and Zimbabwe). Kamidza (2010) exposed the hypocricy of the EU’s strategy of 
‘divide and conquer’ in EPA negotiations. The EU is currently the main sponsor of all sub-
regional economic integration schemes, and yet promoted iEPA tariff liberalisation schedules 
and commitments that are at variance with those obtained regionally. The EU strategy to win 
markets in the sub-region required disruptions of regional and national markets. 
 
The reluctance by the relevant organs of the Zimbabwe government – as well as others in the 
ESA region –to regularly interface with civil society groups, particularly those critical of the 
process, was an unfortunate development that should not have been allowed to continue. One 
outcome of this failure has been a process of intense lobbying and resource mobilisation in 
support of programmes of the SADC Council of NGOs, based in Gaborone, Botswana, which 
                                                 
4 Interview discussion with Diamond Chikhasu, Lilongwe, Malawi, 9 March 2013. 
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 signed a MoU with the SADC secretariat to engage regional heads of states and government 
at their annual summit. To date, the organisation has developed a fully-fledged regional 
integration programme that is linking other CSOs with the SADC secretariat’s Trade, 
Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate, which is the engine of the regional trade and 
integration agenda.  
 
Many other countries engaging in EPA negotiations have platforms that allow all the relevant 
stakeholders to give input into the process, including those with critical opinions, a 
significant deficiency in the EU-Zimbabwe trade talks. The study has highlighted civil 
society’s inability to engage in the EPA process, which directly undermines lobbying not 
only between Zimbabwean negotiators, officials and other state organs that are central to the 
process and the implementation of this agreement, but also regional EPA units (COMESA 
and SADC) in terms of resisting or at minimum harmonising iEPA liberalisation and 
commitments. Regional CSOs should also have lobbied other SADC countries’ officials 
involved in EPA negotiations to reconcile iEPA provisions with regional integration and 
development plans, if such was possible. 
 
 
7.4 Policy recommendations 
 
Stakeholders should strategically engage in the processes of the EPA and sub-regional 
integration, and constantly share information with respect to emerging challenges and 
opportunities. The study therefore recommends a new round of intensive, inclusive debates 
on the EPA process in particular and economic policies in general. Such discourses can also 
focus on how the country should sustainably develop and mobilise human, financial and 
technical resources in support of existing public, quasi-government, and independent research 
institutions, and establish them where necessary. Success in this regard has huge potential to 
solve potential problems associated with state shortcomings, stakeholders’ adverse 
relationships and civil society’s inadequacies in trade advocacy. A more robust analysis of 
the process will also require increased human, financial and technical support for generation 
of reliable statistics and information. The study further recommends that all key stakeholders 
should support relevant policy and data storage institutions with a view to ensuring that all 
constituencies and the general population are well informed about the process that has 
culminated in the new trade regime with Europe, the implementation of the new trade regime 
and the implications thereof, especially to the social and economic transition agenda.  
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 The study has revealed that the state was not engaging all the necessary stakeholders in the 
EPA process. This is likely to remain a problem if the political divide continues unchecked. 
For instance, the state-private sector relationship has been characterised by mistrust and lack 
of cooperation on major economic policy or economic programme decisions. This is 
underscored by the appeal from Katuruza, the former chief negotiator, that the private sector 
submits a list of sensitive products for onward sharing with the EU at future negotiations.  
 
The state-CSO relationship has predominantly been tense. As a result, the state has mainly 
been consulting CSOs which are not critical of government’s approach to economic 
empowerment issues. The study recommends institutionalising state-society platform 
dialogue sessions (conferences, workshops, seminars and roundtable discussions) to 
encourage stakeholders to appreciate diverse opinions in social, economic, and political 
developments. Indeed, frank and honest state-society platforms have huge potential to 
address many shortcomings and advocacy challenges that arise in economic and trade 
debates. Ideally, such state-society debates should galvanise all available resources (human, 
financial and technical) and commitments, to collectively and constructively engage on 
economic policies, institutional set-ups, systems and structures with a view to promote 
smooth implementation – or a revisiting – of iEPA outcomes. State-society relations should 
therefore intrinsically link the implementation or mitigation of the iEPA with development 
assistance in order for them to become tools for development. Already, the EU, during the 
signing ceremony with iEPA ESA-countries, promised to support the establishment of EPA 
Implementing Units in trade ministries. This also encourages state-society alliances to apply 
collective efforts and wisdom for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the iEPA 
agreement.  
 
Scholars should, meanwhile, interrogate the ideological underpinnings and concrete 
processes associated with bilateral trade negotiations and help map the stakeholder tensions 
arising from the EPA processes, with a view to rationally assessing how the process would 
benefit from greater collective preparedness, unity and consistency during the negotiations. 
This dissertation is an attempt to do just this. Such a review has the potential to help the 
country in future trade negotiations at various levels: regional, bilateral, and multilateral. 
Such interrogation should entail specifying institutional processes for negotiating 
constructively, thereby avoiding the recent experiences, and instead promoting solid policy 
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 analyses and evidence-based advocacy in support of the process, including strengthening 
negotiation-related technical skills. 
 
The study has emphasised the fact that the Zimbabwean economy has, since 1980, become 
more agriculture-based, and that future EU trade will adversely affect Zimbabwe’s ability to 
compete with EU agricultural products in both local and European markets. The study has 
also observed the levels of de-agriculturalisation triggered by the Bretton Wood Institutions’ 
neoliberal policies, particularly on trade liberalisation, during the 1990s. Further, the study 
observed the objective of the ZANU (PF) government’s unorthodox guerrilla approaches, 
strategies and tactics used to reclaim farm and mining rights since 2000, but decried the lack 
of appropriate analyses, strategies and tactics in the EPA negotiating room with the EU. Both 
the Bretton Woods Institutions’ and subsequent World Trade Organisation interventions 
based upon trade liberalisation and the ZANU (PF) government’s interventions based upon 
unconventional fast-track land redistribution and indigenous economic empowerment were 
premised on the potential economic and social transformative power of the agricultural 
sector. In line with both interventions which recognise the sector as the backbone of the 
economy, the study recommends a combination of trade policy and specific trade promotion 
processes premised on the significance of agricultural trade under EU-Zimbabwe trade 
relations, particularly under the iEPA. Sector-specific policies and interventions are needed, 
especially from Zimbabwean authorities in line with the draft Regional Agricultural Policy 
(SADC, 2013) in order to inspire confidence in new farmers who might feel out-maneuvered 
by the outcome of the EPA process. High-level participation of farmer associations and other 
stakeholders is needed with a view to providing strategic inputs into the process. This could 
one day produce a competitive surplus for local and other markets – including the EU – to 
meet food security and food sovereignty objectives, contribute to economic development, 
improve farmers’ returns on investment and enhance the adoption of modern technologies to 
sustain good agricultural practices.  
 
If these recommendations are pursued in the state and society, an improved EU-Zimbabwe 
bilateral institutional relationship within the 10
th
 EDF funding framework has the potential to 
stimulate the Zimbabwean economy to its past glory. Success in this regard would confirm 
the practical developmental aspect of EPAs in Zimbabwe, especially if accompanied by 
liberal democratic values and acceptable governance practices. The study therefore 
recommends continued efforts by the EU to soften smart sanctions and travel bans on ZANU 
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 (PF) leadership and associated companies, since such sanctions have not generated liberal 
politics. Instead, the dissertation recommends increasing regional political will to decisively 
tackle governance and electoral disputes in order to avoid another 2008 disputed electoral 
outcome, or the questions raised about the 2013 poll in many quarters in regional civil and 
political society. Success would generate new space for rational, constructive and inclusive 
state-society engagements on economic policy frameworks and future trade negotiations at 
various levels and will also assist in mobilising foreign and domestic resources. This will 
significantly unlock Zimbabwe’s entrepreneurial potential, especially in agro-processing 
value chains and SMEs in order to exploit economic opportunities associated with the iEPA. 
Success in political and economic transition also opens up development opportunities based 
on mutual interests, not only in trade and development including trade-related areas, but also 
in technology transfers, technical expertise with respect to capacity, and skills development 
across all stakeholders’ constituencies, and innovative financial instruments, that is, 
combining EU grant resources with private or national government capital. Successful 
political and economic transition also encourages other donors, friendly foreign governments 
and citizens to formulate and implement trade-related initiatives and platforms that are linked 
to the EPA outcomes. Ultimately, cooperation with development partners further satisfies the 
nation’s yearning for a deeper and more wide-ranging partnership on sustainable pro-poor 
developmental strategies.  
 
Given that the negotiating parties have signed the iEPA and that both the EU and ZANU (PF) 
leadership are working towards the normalisation of the bilateral relationship (easing 
sanctions and improving political co-existence with respective MDC formations), the study 
recommends that the EU-Zimbabwe institutional collaboration create a predictable financing 
mechanism, through which the latter can unconditionally access the 10
th
 EDF to facilitate 
industrial rehabilitation and modernisation, and improve physical supply-side related 
bottlenecks (rail and road networks, reliable electricity and communications, and water 
provision) (see section 6.4.3). The financial window can also assist in attracting the necessary 
technology and essential knowledge to meet product standards, including sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and technical barriers prevailing in high value markets such as the 
EU. Success in this regard will enable the country’s entrepreneurs to exploit iEPA associated 
opportunities. It is thus imperative that improvements are made in the EU-Zimbabwe bilateral 
relations to unconditionally unlock global financial resources (from the IMF and World 
Bank) to support export competitiveness. Coupled with stakeholder collaboration, the 
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 improved EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations has the potential to promote Zimbabwe’s 
commercial interests in Europe as well as in regional and other global markets through 
which the country can sustain equitable economic growth and socio-economic development. 
 
The study highly recommends stakeholder interaction either at institutional or representative 
levels to improve constructive and collective national economic and trade debates through 
various policy dialogue sessions. Such interactions have a huge potential to improve future 
economic policy frameworks, trade policy formulations, trade negotiations and subsequent 
implementation and evaluations. The interactions could also lead to the development of 
requisite capacities and skills to support future trade negotiations and/or trade agreement 
reviews at regional, bilateral and multilateral levels.  
 
The study also recommends that Zimbabwean authorities should work towards accessing 
‘Aid for Trade’ resources. This will be made possible with improved bilateral relations with 
the EU and other international organisations, including the World, Bank, IMF, OECD, UN 
organisations, WTO and other donor agents. Access to funding will enable Zimbabwe’s 
products to penetrate not only the European market, but also other regional and global 
markets as well as to facilitate the economy’s integration into a multilateral trading system. 
Such developments will sustain sectoral and industrial development, create opportunities for 
economic growth and development, and generate welfare gains for citizens leading to 
improved livelihoods.  
 
It is essential that Zimbabwe receives huge public investments in infrastructure and 
institutions if the country is to benefit from the trade liberalisation under the iEPA regime. It 
is also imperative that the country receives huge private sector investment in industrial and 
sectoral productive and export capacities. Given the above, the study recommends sustaining 
current efforts to improve EU-Zimbabwe bilateral trade, development and political 
cooperation and improving state relations with civil society, particularly with organisations 
working on trade and economic issues. Success in these areas has the potential to normalise 
the national body politic and the political environment, thereby contributing towards an 
uncontested forthcoming presidential and parliamentary electoral outcome. Such an outcome 
would significantly contribute to confidence building in the economy, thereby attracting 
much-needed domestic and foreign investors that remained at bay throughout the GPA 
dispensation. 
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 The study recommends extensive use of public-private sector and state-civil society 
dialogue platforms in order to ensure not only that the laws and regulations are in harmony 
with the implementation schedules of the new trade regime with Europe, but also to relieve 
the tensions that have dominated the policy making environment over the period under 
review. Thus, as the interaction between state and other stakeholders working on trade and 
development gathers momentum, it is possible to attract funding in support of projects and 
programmes meant to improve state shortcomings in terms of modernising and restructuring 
industrial export diversification and upgrading competitiveness, particularly in agriculture 
which is likely to face challenges with the implementation of the iEPA. 
 
The study also recommends the establishment of an informal national trade facilitation team, 
composed of representatives from the ministry of Industry and Commerce, the private sector 
and CSOs working on trade and development, with a proviso to meet regularly to identify 
bottlenecks likely to undermine full implementation of the EPA provisions taking into 
account the needs of stakeholders in the trade. 
 
The above recommendations support ZANU (PF) leadership in normalising the political and 
economic bilateral relationship with the EU and in accessing financial, technical and “Aid for 
Trade” resources currently benefiting other ACP countries, especially iEPA signatories. The 
recommendations also advocate improvement in state-society relationships through intensive 
and inclusive engagement on macro-economic policy and/or development environment, 
especially the regional, bilateral and multilateral trade agenda. Furthermore, the 
recommendations support the post-electoral confidence that has so far created conditions for 
improving state-civil society and state-private sector lobbies (industrialists and commercial 
farmers) relationships in macro-economic management including future bilateral, regional 
and multilateral trade negotiations as well as the implementation of related trade agreements.   
 
 
7.5 Topics for future studies 
 
In line with Prasad (2005), Zimbabwe, with its abundant natural resources, requires an in-
depth study assessing the contribution of existing supply-side constraints to the current export 
sector development and growth. Such a study, which should employ linear programming 
models of export receipts and build scenarios of causal relationships between the level of 
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 export receipts and reductions of supply-side constraints, would help the country to identify 
and subsequently analyse the impact of supply-side constraints on its export receipts.  
 
The study suggests the establishment of a working collaboration between CZI and ZNCC in 
order to identify signs of sectoral or industrial distress resulting from the implementation of 
the iEPA. This can be institutionalised as periodic monitoring of the performance of sectors 
and/or industry whose products are competing with those from Europe either locally or in the 
EU market. Such periodic studies should be comprehensive and cover production-marketing 
value chain processes with a view to making the necessary recommendations to improve 
productivity levels and market competitiveness. Further, the study suggests that both the CZI 
and ZNCC should work closely with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to periodically 
undertake trade competitive diagnostic sectoral and/or industrial studies in line with Reis’s 
(2011) argument to assist companies to understand their positions, performance and 
capabilities in the EU and other global export markets and factors that underpin prevailing 
levels of competitiveness and/or constraints. Such an analysis will also enable firms to 
explore existing and potential market opportunities vis-à-vis the factors that underpin the 
adjustment processes. 
 
The study suggests a critical review of the role and function as well as the challenges and 
successes of the NDTPF as an EPA institutionalised consultative platform for the state and 
stakeholders to formulate national issues, interests, positions and offers. These could also be 
used for subsequent sharing with other ESA-EPA states during the RNF and joint ESA-EU 
meetings. These recommendations would help the country in building synergies and 
coalitions, not only in the trade debate but also in future trade negotiations. 
 
The study suggests a critical assessment of the collaboration and synergies between CSOs 
working on trade and development on the one hand and private sector bodies and the 
parliament’s Trade and Development Committee on the other hand as well as a critical 
review of the state-stakeholder working relationship in economic policy frameworks and 
trade negotiations with a view to identifying challenges and opportunities that may require 
immediate attention. The exercise can also review the trade regime’s socio-economic impact 
vis-à-vis trade provisions, thereby paving the scope for the search for alternatives versus what 
would constitute a development-oriented EPA agreement.  
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 The study has identified the difficulties in terms of CSOs interacting with sub-regional 
secretariats’ EPA units and their respective CTAs in the process including the snubbing of 
CSO organised meetings and the related difficulties in terms of disseminating and obtaining 
information on the process. The study further argues that the above has kept CSOs at the 
periphery of the unfolding process, a development that contributed to inadequacies in their 
advocacy about glaring state shortcomings. An assessment of the roles and functions of sub-
regional EPA units in the EPA process with a view to recommending future working 
relationships in the implementation of iEPA is suggested, as is an assessment of trade 
negotiations and regional economic integration processes. Such recommendations, it is 
believed, would provide best practices and lessons to other ACP configurations in general, 
and to EPA countries in particular. 
 
 
7.6 Way forward and study hypothesis 
 
The Zimbabwe economic and trade debate is bleak, especially within the context of hostile 
EU-ZANU (PF) relations following the ZANU (PF) 31 July 2013 electoral victory, given that 
major EU countries expressed doubts about the election’s integrity. The GNU’s failure to 
fully normalise relations with the EU and other western countries meant the continuation of 
smart sanctions
5
 and the inability to restructure Zimbabwe’s international financial relations. 
An estimated US$10.7 billion worth of Zimbabwean sovereign debt is outstanding, of which 
70% is accumulated arrears. The GNU administration could not access direct overseas 
development assistance, cheap credit, grants and concessional capital from GFIs (mainly the 
World Bank, IMF and the AfDB) and other international financial institutions. The 
anticipated debt cancellation did not occur. 
 
Darracq (2010: 1) argues that the EU-ZANU (PF) sanctions debate has divided the European 
Council into two camps: hardliners led by the United Kingdom, Germany and the 
Netherlands on the one hand, and more moderate forces led by Portugal, France and Denmark 
on the other. Hove (2012: 74) describes the division as Euro-centric versus Afro-centric. 
Mawere (2009) argues that many African heads of state and government, and the general 
public, view the EU-Zimbabwe bilateral crisis within the context of neo-colonialism, the 
                                                 
5 The EU partially removed sanctions imposed on ZANU (PF) leadership a few months towards the harmonised 
elections. 
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 north-south divide and imperialist power. The ZANU (PF) electoral victory was endorsed 
by AU and SADC observers and by most regional and African governments, on the one 
hand, and the failed MDC-T electoral challenge in the national courts
6
 was endorsed by 
traditional backers, mainly Australia, the EU and USA on the other. This ongoing dispute 
potentially entrenches pre-existing divisions; whether it will lead to renewed sanctions 
remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Mugabe revived some of his most vitriolic anti-Western 
rhetoric. A week after sworn in office, Mugabe further threatened ‘tit-for-tat’ retaliation 
against companies from Britain and the USA if sanctions persist.  
 
The contested election may cause divisions within the EU over renewal of smart sanctions. 
Indeed, there is little doubt that EU-Zimbabwe bilateral conflict, tension between western 
governments and ZANU (PF), donor-state mistrust, state-civil society divergence, state-
private sector suspicions (possibly leading to further property nationalisations) and 
polarisation of the national body politic will continue. Though there is now policy ‘certainty’ 
insofar as the GNU’s incoherence has passed, the course and pace of the country’s economic 
transition is not obvious, given the ruling party’s promise to redistribute wealth in the form of 
majority indigenisation stakes in the top 1200 listed Zimbabwe Stock Exchange corporations, 
leading to a US$1 billion (nearly 20%) crash in the stock market’s valuation in the week after 
the election. The prospect of on-going sanctions is also likely to harden ZANU (PF)’s anti-
colonial attitude in relation to economic indigenisation. As Mugabe proclaimed on 13 August 
2013, “Over the next five years the country is going to witness a unique wealth-transfer 
model that will see ordinary people taking control of the economy, targeting over 1,000 
foreign companies including banks” (Zim247.com, 13 August 2013). The model did not 
immediately materialize, but given that this would imply a private sector investment drought, 
such a development is likely to undermine any immediate prospects for economic recovery in 
the short to medium term. In turn, such a policy would adversely affect prospects for 
competing with EU products in both markets (Europe and local), prospects for attracting 
potential investors and donors, especially from western economies; and prospects for 
borrowing international financial resources. Conversely, the continued EU-Zimbabwe 
debacle may equally open space for emerging economies, especially Asian commercial 
interests through ‘look east politics’ and perhaps also better conditions for South African 
                                                 
6 The growing perception of Mugabe’s party controlling both legal and political institutions in the country not 
only reduces the MDC-T legal challenge to an academic exercise unlikely worry ZANU (PF) and allies (SADC 
and AU head of states and government), but also influences the party’s decision to withdraw before case. 
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 corporate investors as a reward for the quick endorsement of the electoral process by SADC 
facilitator, Jacob Zuma. South Africans have recently expressed interests in retail expansion 
through conglomerates such as ShopRite and Checkers, Pick ‘n Pay and Wal-Mart (which has 
inherited Makro warehouses in Harare and Bulawayo). Russian investors are also gaining 
access to Zimbabwe’s platinum and gold through preferred arrangements associated with 
military relations. Therefore, besides affecting EU-Zimbabwe trade, residual sanctions create 
conditions for Asian, South African and Russian producers and exporters to become potential 
drivers of the ‘new trade tsunami’, resulting in rock-bottom prices that may equally drive 
domestic producers, including new entrepreneurs (new farmers and small-scale industrialists) 
from the local market. Furthermore, with foreign debt arrears of about US$11 billion, any re-
engagement with Bretton Woods Institutions would introduce trade liberalisation-related 
conditionalities. Coupled with the current the state of power outages and water shortages, 
physical infrastructure decay and outdated technology and machinery across most currently 
operating firms, we can expect not only slower economic growth and development prospects, 
but also a more difficult environment for trade with Europe. It will therefore be difficult to 
test the study’s hypothesis, that “an EPA outcome is an onslaught to the Zimbabwean 
economy in the short to medium term”, but such an onslaught may now instead be the result 
of a variety of other factors, of which low-quality EU-Zimbabwe relations are an important 
symptom. ‘A typical underdeveloped economy, Zimbabwe, would not be allowed to 
concentrate on those sectors of the economy, which in turn, would generate growth and raise 
production to a new level altogether’ (Bond and Kamidza, 2009) to compete with three 
market-led tsunamis: made-in-Europe products (see Figure 5.3 in section 5.3), made-in-China 
and -India products (especially clothes and electronics) in line with ‘look east politics’, and 
made-in-South Africa products consistent with Pretoria’s sub-imperial commercial agenda. In 
particular, the nexus between western governments’ upholding punitive measures against 
ZANU (PF) leadership and Zimbabwe government’s implementation of indigenisation and 
empowerment programmes would be another important symptom. Indeed, it remains to be 
seen how Mugabe’s final government will unlock both foreign direct investment flows and 
multi-donor resources to stimulate current weak agricultural and industrial production 
processes, and to support economic transitional trade and development policies and debates – 








A. Primary documents and submissions 
 
African Union (2012). Press Release: The 8
th
 African Development Forum. Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, 23 October. http://uneca.org/GeneralArticleList, accessed on 20 June 2013. 
 
African Union (2010). Kigali Declaration on the Economic Partnership Agreement 
Negotiations. AU Conference of ministers of Trade, 6
th
 Ordinary Session, 29 October 
– 2 November, Kigali, Rwanda. http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/.../AU_EN_15112010_AU_Kigali%20declaration, accessed on 20 June 
2013. 
 






trade.org/library/library_detail.php?library_detail_id. , accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
Eastern and Southern Africa and European Union (2011), Economic Partnership Agreement 
Technical negotiations, 28-30 November, Port St Louis, Mauritius. http:// 
www.mcci.org, accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
European Commission (2013). Trade negotiations step by step. Director General Trade, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/agreements/, 
accessed on 28 June 2013. 
 
Republic of Zimbabwe Ministry of Trade and International Trade (2007), Progress Report on 
Southern Africa Development Community – Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations, MTI/NCTPN/12
th
/2007/9. 12 September 2007, Harare, 
http://www.miit.gov.zw, accessed on 25 June 2013.  
 
Republic of Zimbabwe Ministry of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (2011). 
Understanding Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment. National Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment Board, http://www.nieeb.co.zw, accessed on 13 March 
2014 
 
Republic of Zimbabwe (2012). Industrial Development Policy (2012-2016). Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, Harare, Printed by Printflow Pvt Ltd, 29 March 2012, 
http://www.miit.gov.zw, accessed on 10 July 2013. 
 
Southern Africa Development Community Draft Report (2013). Regional Agricultural 
Policy. SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. http://www.sadc.int, accessed on 25 




 Southern Africa Development Community Secretariat Report (July 2011). European Union 
Sponsored Consultancy on the establishment of the Southern Africa Development 
Community Development Fund, prepared by Technical Assistance coordinated by 
ADE in association with Coffey International Development and TDI, Gaborone, 
Botswana, http://www.sadc.int, accessed on 15 June 2013. 
 
 
B. Secondary sources: books and book chapters 
 
Benoliel, M. and Hua, W. (2009). Essential Managers Negotiating. London: Dorling 
Kindersley Limited.  
 
Bond, P. (1998). Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development, and 
Underdevelopment. Trenton: Africa World Press.  
 
Bond, P. (2006a). Looting Africa: the Economics of Exploitation. London, Zed Books and 
Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Bond, P. (2006b). Talk Left and Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms 
(second edition). Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Bond, P. and Manyanya, M. (2002). Zimbabwe’s Plunge, Exhausted Nationalism, 
Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal 
Press, and London: the Merlin Press. 
 
Chang, H-J. (2007). Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the Threat to the 
Developing World. Random House, London. 
 
Chizema, R. and Masiiwa, M. (2011). Trade and trade policy. In Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T., 
Chitambara, P. and Martens, J. (eds), Beyond the Enclave: Towards a pro-poor and 
inclusive development strategy for Zimbabwe. Weaver Press in association with 
Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa, Labour and Economic 
Development Research Institute Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, 
Harare, Zimbabwe. (pp. 444–472) 
 
Collins, P. (2009). Negotiate to win! Talking your way to what you want. Sterling Publishing 
Company, New York/London. 
 
Das, B. L. (2004). Coping with WTO Needs New Institutions in South Countries. In Tandon 
Yash and Megan Allardice (eds). Paved with Good Intentions: Background to the 





 Doroh (2011: 143). Manufacturing. in Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T., Chitambara, P. and 
Martens, J. (eds), Beyond the Enclave: Towards a pro-poor and inclusive 
development strategy for Zimbabwe., Weaver Press in association with Alternatives to 
Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa, Labour and Economic Development Research 
Institute Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
(pp. 129–159). 
 
Hartmann, T. (2008). Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism. Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2008. 
 
Hodge, J. (2002). Liberalisation of Trade in Services in Developing Countries. In Hoekman, 
B., Mattoo, A. and English, P. (eds), Development and the WTO. World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
 
Irwin, D. A. (1996). Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Kachingwe, N., (2004). Partners or Predators? How Europe’s Expansionist Trade Agenda has 
Hijacked Development Cooperation. In Gobalisation and Africa. edited by Peter 
Custers, http:// www.petercusters.nl/file/44 , accessed on 15 June 2013. 
 
Kahler, M. and Odell, J. (2004). Developing Countries and the Global Trading System. In 
Tandon Yash and Megan Allardice (eds), Paved with Good Intentions: Background to 
the GATT, Uruguay Round and WTO. Seatini, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Kalenga, P. (2011). Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area work. In the Cape to Cairo – An 
Assessment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. RSAM Printers, Trade Law Centre for 
Southern Africa, Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2008). Can SADC-EU Trade Negotiations Unblock Development and 
Regional Integration? In Brito, L., Castel-Branco, C., Chichava S. and Francisco, A. 
(eds), Southern Africa and Challenges for Mozambique. Maputo, Mozambique. 
 
Kamidza, R. and Mazingi, L. (2011). Inequality in Zimbabwe. In Deprose Muchena and 
Herbert Jauch (eds), Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa. Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 
Kanyenze et al. (ed), (2011). Beyond the Enclave: Towards a pro-poor and inclusive 
development strategy for Zimbabwe. Weaver Press in association with Alternatives to 
Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa, Labour and Economic Development Research 
Institute Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Kramarenko, V. L. et al. (2010). Zimbabwe: Challenges and Policy Options after 
Hyperinflation. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
241 
 Kramer, R.M., and Messick, D.M. (1995). Negotiation as Social Process. in R.M. Kramer 
and D.M. Messick (eds). London: Sage. 
 
Matondi, P. (2011). Land, Agriculture and Rural Development. In Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T., 
Chitambara, P. and Martens, J. (eds), Beyond the Enclave: Towards a pro-poor and 
inclusive development strategy for Zimbabwe. Weaver Press in association with 
Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa, Labour and Economic 
Development Research Institute Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, 
Harare, Zimbabwe. (pp. 75–128). 
 
McCandless, E. (2011). Polarisation and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, 
Strategies and Dilemmas. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
 
Meunier, S. (2000). What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade 
Negotiations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Myerson, R. M. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Raghavan, C. (2004). From Free Trade to Managed Trade. In Tandon Yash and Megan 
Allardice (eds), ‘aved with Good Intentions: Background to the GATT, Uruguay 
Round and WTO. Seatini, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Rege, V. (2004). Developing Countries and Negotiations in the WTO. In Tandon Yash and 
Megan Allardice (eds), Paved with Good Intentions: Background to the GATT, 
Uruguay Round and WTO. Seatini, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Riddell, R. (1990). Zimbabwe. In R. Riddell (ed), Manufacturing Africa. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
 
Rothstein, R. L. (1979). Global Bargaining: UNCAD and the Quest for a New International 
Economic Order. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Sandrey, R. and Vink, N. (2011). Agricultural production in the tripartite region. In the Cape 
to Cairo – An Assessment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. RSAM Printers, Trade 
Law Centre for Southern Africa, Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 
Sebenius, J.K. (1996). Sequencing to build coalitions: With whom should I talk first? In 
Zeckhauser, R. Keeney, R. and Sebenius, J.K. (eds), Wise Choices: Decisions, Games 
and Negotiations. (pp. 324-348).  
 
Todaro, M. (1990). Trade Development and the Theory of Comparative Advantage. London, 
Longman Press. 
242 
 Ugarteche, O., (2000). The false dilemma: Globalisation opportunity or threat? Inter Pares, 
Ottawa, Zed Books Ltd. 
 
World Bank (2006). World Bank - Civil Society Engagement: Review of Fiscal Years 2005 
and 2006. The World Bank, New York, USA. 
 
Yash, T., (2004). African Political Economy as if Reality Mattered. In Globalisation and 
Africa. edited by Peter Custers, http://www.petercusters.nl/file/44 , accessed on 15 
June 2013. 
 
Zartman, I.W. (1991). The structure of negotiation. In Kremenyuk V.A. (ed), International 
Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. (pp. 65-77). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
ZCTU (2006). Beyond ESAP: Framework for a Long-Term Development Strategy for 
Zimbabwe. Harare: Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. 
 
 
C. Academic journals, thesis, reports and working papers 
 
African Development Bank (2011). Zimbabwe: Country Brief 2011 – 2013.  
 
Balchin, N. and Kamidza R. (2008). Angola Economic Partnership Agreement Hand Book. 
Mthente Research and Consulting Services, http://www.mthente.co.za, accessed on 15 
June 2013. 
 
Bilal, S. and Rampa, F. (2006). Alternative to EPAs: Possible scenarios for the future ACP 
trade relations with the EU. Policy Management Report No. 11. European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, February 2006, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni, 
accessed on 15 June 2013. 
 
Bilal, S. and Szepesi, S. (September 2003). EPA Impact Studies: SADC and the Regional 
Coherence. InBrief 2B, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
http://www.ecdpm.org, accessed on 15 June 2013. 
 
Bio-Tchane, A. and Christensen, B.V. (2006). Right Time for Africa: Finance and 
Development. A quarterly magazine of the International Monetary Fund, Washington 
DC, Vol. 43. No. 4. 
 
Bond, P. (2007). Competing explanations of Zimbabwe’s long economic crisis. Safundi, 
Journal of South African and American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2007. (pp. 149-
181). 
 
Bond, P. (2009). Lessons of Zimbabwe: An exchange between Patrick Bond and Mahmood 
Mamdani. International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 
http://www.links.org.au/node/815, accessed on 15 June 2013.. 
243 
 Bond, P. and Kamidza, R. (2009). How Europe underdevelops Africa and how some fight 
back. Pambazuka News, Issue 381, http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 15 June 
2013. 
 
Brander, J.A and Spencer, B.J. (1992). Export subsidies and international market share 
rivalry. Journal of International Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2. 
 
Burnett, P. and Manji, F. (July 2005). Economic Partnership Agreements: Territorial 
conquest by economic means? Pambazuka News, Issue 216, 
http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 15 June 2013. 
 
Chigora, P. (2006). On Crossroads: Reflections on Zimbabwe’s Relations with Britain at the 
New Millennium, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, 
No.3, Fall 2006. 
 
Christian Aid (2003). What works? Trade, Policy and Development, London, 
http://www.christainaid.org.uk, accessed on 15 June 2013.  
 
Christian Aid (2005). For Richer or Poorer: Transforming Economic Partnership Agreements 
between Europe and Africa, London, http://www.christianaid.org.uk, accessed on 20 
June 2012. 
 
Christian Aid briefing (2004). Why EPAs Need a Rethink?, London,  
http://www.epawatch.net, accessed on 20 June 2013. 
 
Confederation of the Zimbabwean Industries (2008). Manufacturing Sector Survey. 31 
October 2008, Harare: Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, http.://www.czi.co.zw, 
accessed on 20 July 2013.. 
 
Confederation of the Zimbabwean Industries (2009). Manufacturing Sector Survey. 26 May 
2009, Harare: Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, , http.://www.czi.co.zw, 
accessed on 20 July 2013. 
 
Coorey, Sharmini, Clausen, J. R. et al, (2007). Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for 
Stabilising the Economy in Zimbabwe. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
Washington DC, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0799.pdf . accessed 
on 20 June 2013. 
 
Cotonou Monitoring Group of European Development NGOs and networks (May 2002). 
Discussion Note: Addressing Supply Side Constraints, Brussels, http.://www.eu-





 Crump, L. (2005). Concurrently Linked Negotiations and Negotiation Theory: An 
Examination of Bilateral Trade Negotiations in Australia, Singapore and the United 
States. Griffith University, School of International Business and Asian Studies, 
Brisbane Australia. 
 
Crump, L. (June 2006). Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, Griffith 
University, School of International Business and Asian Studies, Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 9, No. 2., (pp. 487 -510), Brisbane Australia. 
 
Dorman, S. R. (2001). Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe. 
Department of Politics and International Relations in the Division of Social Studies, 
the University of Oxford, D. Phil Thesis. 
 
Draper, P. (June 2007). EU-Africa trade relations: The Political Economy of Economic 
Partnership Agreements, Jan Tumlir Policy Essay No. 2, European Centre for 
International Political Economy, http://www.ecipe.org, accessed on 20 January 2013. 
 
Dunn, B. (2009). Neither free trade nor protection but international socialism: contesting the 
conservative antinomies of trade theory. Marxist interventions, 
http:/www.anu.edu.au/polsci/mi/1/mi1dunn.pdf . (pp. 23-45), accessed on 20 August 
2012. 
 
European Commission (May 2012). EU’s first EPA with Africa region goes live. Brussels, 
http://www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=800, accessed on 10 August 
2013. 
 
European Commission Staff Working Paper (September 2011), 10
th
 EDF Performance 
Review. SEC (2011) 1055 Final, Brussels, 
http://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vj6ipnw6my0, accessed on 5 
May 2013. 
 
European Research Office (December 2006). Understanding the Possible Gains to African 
Countries from EPAs. Brussels, http://ero@be/content/documents/trade_negotiations-
01/pdf/1.1.epa-general/costs-epa-related -adjustments.pdf, accessed on 8 May 2013. 
 
European Union (1999). European Parliament resolution on the communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU approach to the 
WTO Millennium Round. Official Journal of the European Communities. Brussels, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed on 5 February 2013. 
 
Food Agricultural Organisation (2003b). WTO Agreement on Agriculture: The 
Implementation experience – Developing Country Case Studies, Economic and Social 
Development Department, Rome, http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4632e/htm, 
accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
245 
 Food Agricultural Organisation (2003a). Trade Reform and Food Security: Conceptualising 
the Linkages. Commodity Policy and Projections Service, Economic and Social 
Development Department, Commodities and Trade Division, Rome, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e00.htm, accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
Garfield, S. and Knudsen, U.V. (1997). An Electric Negotiation Theory of Trade Policy 
Behaviour. University of Copenhagen, Discussion Paper No. 97. 
 
Gideon, R. (1998). Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge University Press, Vol. 51, No. 1, (pp. 144-172), Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068, accessed on 15 May 2012. 
 
Goodison, P. (2007). The Future of Africa’s Trade Relationship with Europe: New EU Trade 
Policy. Review of African Political Economy, Vo. 34, No. 111. 
 
Goodison, P. and Stoneman, C. (2005). Trade, Development and Cooperation: Is the EU 
Helping Africa? Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 102. 
 
Grynberg, R. and Clarke, A. (2006). The European Development Fund and Economic 
Partnership Agreements, Commonwealth Secretariat Economic Affairs Division, 
http://www.secretariat.thecommonwealth.org, accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
Hammouda, H. B. and Osakwe, P.N. (2008). Global Trade Models and Economic Policy 
Analysis: Relevance, Risks and Repercussions for Africa. Overseas Development 
Institute: Development Policy Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, (pp 151-170). 
 
Harrison, G. W. and Rutström, E. E. (May 1991). Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and 
Applied Game Theory. The Economic Journal, Vol. 101, No. 406, (pp. 420-435), 
Published by Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Economic Society. 
 
Hove, M. (2012). The debate and impact of Sanctions: The Zimbabwean Experience. 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 5, March 2012, (pp. 
72-84).  
 
ICCO Report, (September 2008). Dialogue of the deaf, An assessment of Europe’s 
development approach to trade negotiations. Postbus 8190, 3503 RD Utrecht, 
http://www.icco.nl, accessed on 15 March 2013. 
 
International Monetary Fund Report (May 2011). Zimbabwe Article IV Consultation Country 
Report, No. 11/135. IMF, Washington DC, Publication Services, http://www.imf.org, 
accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Kahuika, et al (2003). Trade Assessment: Namibia and Angola. Namibian Economic Policy 
Research Unit Occasional Paper, XIV, 82 Series. 
 
246 
 Kalima-Phiri, B. (2007). Financial Flows to Civil Society in Southern Africa: Key Lessons 
and Policy Implications, Pretoria, http://www.osisa.org/file/openspace, accessed on 27 
May 2013. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2002). Budget 2002: A mismatch of policy objectives and allocations. Southern 
African Political Economy Monthly, Vol. 14, No. 8. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2004). EPAs Negotiations: Sub-regional Development Challenges in the EU – 
ESA Relations. Seatini Bulletin, http://www.seatini.org, accessed on 5 May 2011. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2004). EPAs: Unequal Partners, Unequal Outcome against ESA countries. 
http://www.aidc.org, accessed on 5 June 2011. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2004). ESA-EPA negotiations still lack substance and direction. Seatini 
Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 15, 2004. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2007). Southern African Trade Talks with EU. Institute of Global Dialogue, 
Tradewinds, Vol. 1, No. 1, http://www.igd.org.za accessed on 5 September 2009. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2008). Southern Africa – EU Fisheries Agreements: The case of Angola and 
Mozambique. Open Society Institute for Southern Africa Resource Watch publication, 
Unpublished 
 
Kamidza, R. (2009b). Zimbabwe’s Post-conflict economic transition: State shortcomings and 
civil society advocacy, Unpublished. 
 
Kamidza, R. (2010). The SADC Free Trade Area’s Impact on the Socio-economic and 
Environmental well-being on the People of Southern Africa. Economic Justice 
Network, Unpublished, http://www.ejn.org, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Kamidza, R. (July 2005). Predictions for EPAs Negotiations: EU=1, ACP=0. Pambazuka 
News, Issue 216, http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 
Kamidza, R. (February 2006). EPAs: How the poor are excluded from trade negotiations. 
Pambazuka News, Issue 243, http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 
Kamidza, R. (January 2007). EPAs road show rolls on. Pambuzuka News, Issue 284, 
http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 




 Kamidza, R. (March 2009c). Government and civil society in Zimbabwe’s economic 
recovery. Pambazuka News, Issue 425, http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 5 
January 2010. 
 
Kamidza, R. (May 2009a). Donors won’t cough up without change: Zimbabwe future in 
jeopardy amidst Unity government impasse. Pambazuka News, Issue 432, 
http://www.pambazuka.org, accessed on 5 January 2010. 
 
Kaminski, B. and Ng, F. (2011). Zimbabwe’s Foreign Trade Performance During the Decade 
of Economic Turmoil: Will Exports Recover? 
http://www.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Keet, D. (1999). Globalisation and Regionalisation: Contradictory Tendencies, or Strategic 
Possibilities? Foundation for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper, No. 18, 
http://www.tni.org/es/archives/act/1832 , accessed on 5 October 2012. 
 
Keet, D. (2007). Economic Partnership Agreements: Europe’s latest Economic Policy 
offensive against Africa, http://www.info@aidc.org.za, accessed on 5 October 2012. 
 
Kohnert, D. (2008). EU-African Economic Relations: Continuing Dominance Traded for 
Aid? German Institute of Global Areas Studies Working Paper, Transformation in the 
Process of Globalisation, No. 82, July 2008. 
 
Ladner, R. E. (2006). Broader Impacts: what, why and how. University of Washington, 
SIGACT Chair, http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/broaderimpacts.pdf, accessed on 5 May 
2013. 
 
Lamy, P. (January 2010). Quoted in Cheickna, S. D., Banana Producers Turn to Regional 
Markets, Inter Press Service, http://www.ipsnews.net, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Linder, S.B. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Stockholm: Almqvist and 
Wicksell. 
 
Macrory, P. and Stephensson, S. (2011). Making Trade in Services Supportive of 
Development in Commonwealth Small and Low-income Countries, in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Economic Paper Series, Economic Paper, 93. 
 
Magure, B. (2009). Civil Society’s Quest for Democracy in Zimbabwe: Origins, Barriers and 
Prospects, 1900-2008, PhD thesis, Department of Political and International Studies, 
Rhodes University. 
 
Mamdani, M. (2008). Lessons of Zimbabwe. London Review of Books, December 2008. 
 
Menkel-Meadow, C. (2001). Negotiating with lawyers, men and things: The contextual 
approach still matters. Negotiation Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3: (pp. 257-293). 
248 
 Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. (2007). The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe Interrupted Revolution. 
Review of African Political Economy, ROAPE Publications Ltd. 
 
Moyo, S. et al. (2010). The Land Occupation Movement in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of 
Neo-liberalism. Journal of International Studies, Millennium 
 
Nalunga, J. (2003). ACP – EU Partnership Agreement and Negotiations, Seatini Bulletin, 
http://www.seatini.org/publications/factsheets/agreements.htm, accessed on 5 May 
2013. 
 
Nalunga, J. (October 2004). ESA EPA third meeting of the Regional Negotiating Forum, 
Antananarivo, Madagascar, Seatini Bulletin. 
http://www.seatini.org/publications/factsheets/agreements.htm, accessed on 5 May 
2012. 
 
New Agriculturist (June 2011). Country profile – Zimbabwe, WREN media production, 
http://www.new-ag.info/en/country/profile.php?a=2073, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (October 1999). Open Markets 
Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation. OECD Observer, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/1948792.pdf, accessed on 5 October 2013. 
 
Osakwe, P.N. (2007). Foreign Aid, Resources and Export Diversification in Africa: A New 
Test of Existing Theories. MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
Oxfam (2002). Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, globalisation and the fight against 
poverty, Brussels. http://www.oxfam.org, , accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Prasad, C., B. (2005). Explaining the Supply-side Constraints to Export-led Growth in 
Selected Pacific Island Countries. ARTNet website, http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet, 
, accessed on 5 May 2013.. 
 
Putnam, R., D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. 
International Organisation, Vol. 42, No. 3, 42(3): (pp. 427-90). 
 
Ralph, O. (2008). A New Trade Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations. Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, No. 877. London, 
UK. 
 
Rattso, J. and R. Torvik, (1998). Zimbabwe trade liberalization: Ex post evaluation. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, (pp. 325-46). 
 
Reimer, J. K. et al (2006). Evidence on Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Theory. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agriculture and Applied 
Economics, Staff Paper Series, No. 498. 
 
249 
 Rodrik, D. (1990). How should structural adjustment programmes be designed? World 
Development, Vol. 18, No. 7. 
 
Roux, W. (February 2008). EPAs demystified, Insight, www.insight.com.na/login.html. 
 Seatini Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 7, July 2007. 
 
Shell, R. G. (March 1995). Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis 
of the WTO. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 44, No 5. 
 
Shivji, I. (2004). Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What We Are, What We Are Not and 
What We Ought To Be? Development in Practice, Vol. 14, No. 5. 
 
Southern Africa Trade Hub (June 2011). Technical Report on the Impact of Derogations from 
Implementation of the SADC FTA Obligations on intra-SADC trade, 
http://www.satradehub.org, , accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Southern African Development Community secretariat (2000). Industry and Trade Annual 
Report. July 1999 – June 2000, http:// www.sadc.int, accessed on 27 July 2013. 
 
Southern African Development Community secretariat study (2012). SADC Framework for 
the establishment of a Trade Related Facility, Southern African Development 
Community House, Gaborone, Botswana, http://www.sadc.int, accessed on 27 July 
2013. 
 
Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute Bulletin, (2004). 
Cotonou Agreement, Vol. 7. No. 6. 
 
Stephen S. G. and Chang-Tai, H. (2002). Classical Ricardian Theory of Comparative 
Advantage Revisited. Review of International Economics, Volume 8, Issue 2, 
published online, 17 DEC 2002. 
 
Stolper, W.F. and P.A. Samuelson (1941). Protection and Real Wages. Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 9: 58-73. 
 
Structural Adjustment Programme Review Initiative Network (2004). Structural Adjustment: 
The Structural Adjustment Programme Review Initiative Network Report: The Policy 
Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality. London: Zed. 
 
Subbarao, D. (November 2012). What are Supply-side constraints? 
http://www.livemint.com/Money/TMgrNtZDTSag6iLrNdlHgL/Dejargoned--Supply-
side-constraint.html, , accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 
Tandon, Y. (2004). The ESA-EU EPA Negotiations and the Role of COMESA. Seatini 
Bulletin, Harare, Vol. 7, No. 9. 
250 
 Tandon, Y. (2010). Salvaging EPA negotiations with Europe: A turning point for Africa. 
Pambazuka Online, Issue 474, www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/63120, , 
accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Tekere, M. (February 2013). State of play of Eastern and Southern Africa and European 
Union Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations. COMESA, Unpublished. 
 
Tekere, M. (2001). Trade Liberalisation under Structural Economic Adjustment – Impact on 
Social Welfare in Zimbabwe, Harare: University of Zimbabwe, paper for the Poverty 
Reduction Forum, SAPRNI Initiative. 
 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (2004). Addressing Supply-side Constraints 
and Capacity-Building. Subcommittee on International Trade and Investment, 27-29 
October 2004. Bangkok. 
 
Valodia, I. and Velia, M. (2006). Macro-Micro Linkages in Trade: Trade, Efficiency and 
Competitiveness of Manufacturing Firms in Durban, South Africa. Journal of African 
Economies, Vol. 15, NO., 4, (pp. 688-721). 
 
Vickers, B. (2007). From Middle Power to Development State: The Political Economy of 
South African Trade Diplomacy in the DOHA Development Round, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies. PhD thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of 
London. 
 
Watkins, M., and Passow, S. (1996). Analysing linked systems of negotiations. Negotiation 
Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4: (pp. 325-339). 
 
World Trade Organisation (2011). Zimbabwe Trade Policy Review. 
WT/TPR/S/252/Revision.1, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g252_e.doc, , 
accessed on 5 JUne 2013. 
 
World Trade Organisation (August 2012). Press Release: WTO membership rises to 157 with 
the entry of Russia and Vanuatu, Press/671, http://www.wto.org, accessed on 5 May 
2013. 
 
World Trade Organisation Report (January 2005). The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
institutional challenges in the new millennium. Report by the Consultative Board to 









 D. Newspaper opinion pieces, presentations, papers and speeches 
 
Basevi, G. (2008). Regionalism vs Multilateralism: Trade Negotiations. Notes for the course 
on “Theory and policy of international trade”. University of Bologna: University 
Press. 
 
Bhebhe, T. (July 2012). Zimbabwe: Bulawayo factories shut up shop. The Africa Report, 
http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/sectors/zimbabwe-bulawayo, accessed on 
20 June 2013.  
 
CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis, (2000). Make a Difference for Poverty Reduction. A paper 
presented at the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, a CIDSE-Caritas 
Internationalis, Position Paper, 
http://www.wto org english forums e ngo e  os    cidse e  df , accessed on 5 May 
2013. 
 
Confederation of the Zimbabwean Industries Report (2012). The Annual CZI Manufacturing 
sector survey, Unpublished. 
 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2010). Hub and Spokes Project Phase I Performance 2004 – 
2010, http://www.secretariat.thecommonwealth.org, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Commonwealth Secretariat Hub and Spokes Project Phase II (April 2012). Building trade 
capacities in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific regions, Discussion and Consultation 
paper, http://www.secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Darracq, V. (2010). The EU in Zimbabwe: What to do now? ISS opinion, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media, accessed on 21 
February 2011. 
 
Deve, T. (October 2006). Wither ACP trade relations with the EU in the context of EPAs 
negotiations: Challenges and opportunities for poverty eradication in sub-Sahara 
Africa, Regional Roundtable Discussion Paper, South Africa. Unpublished. 
 
Deve, T. (September 2009). EPA Negotiations and Non-State-Actors in SADC and ESA 
configurations. Speech given to regional CSOs and social movements during the 
southern Africa social forum, Mbabane, Swaziland. Unpublished. 
 
European Commission Press Release (May 2012). EU’s first EPA with an African region 
goes live. European Commission, Brussels, http://www.trade.ec.europa.eu, accessed 
on 5 February 2013. 
 
Kachingwe, N. (September 2005). Regional forum on trade and regional integration in 
southern Africa, workshop paper presentation, 27-30 September 2005. Unpublished. 
 
252 
 Kadzere, M. (September 2012). Zimbabwe Trade Deficit Widens. Senior Business Reporter, 
The Herald, Harare, Zimbabwe, http://www.herald.co.zw, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Kadzere, M. (March 2010). Zimbabwe: Exports to EU up. The Herald, Harare, Zimbabwe, 
http://www.herald.co.zw, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Kapoor, K. (ed) (1995). Africa’s Experience with Structural Adjustment: Proceedings of the 
Harare Seminar, 23-24 May 1994, Washington DC: World Bank, World Bank 
Discussion Paper. (pp. 288).  
 
Madambi, P. (March 2013). Zimbabwe must take advantage of EU beef market. Sunday Mail, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, http://www.sundaymail.co.zw, accessed on 5 May 2013 . 
 
Mawere, M, D. (2009). The EU-Africa relationship post-colonialism, 
http://newsdesk@newzimbabwe.com, accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
Meyn, M. (June 2005). The progress of Economic Regionalisation in Southern Africa. 
Challenges for SADC and COMESA, Conference paper for Namibian Economic 
Policy Research Unit, Windhoek, Namibia.  
 
Mushohwe B., (2012). Addressing Supply Side Constraints Presentation on ZIMTRADE 
Annual Exporters Conference, 
http://www.zimtrade.co.zw/pdf/presentations/mushowe.pdf, accessed on 5 June 2013. 
 
Nalunga, J. (May 2004). Implication of EPAs on Regional Integration in COMESA and 
SADC. Discussion paper presented at the ESA civil society policy dialogue 
workshop, Nairobi, Kenya. Unpublished. 
 
Nyakazeya, P. (August 2009). Manufacturing sector needs major rebuilding. Zimbabwe 
Independent, Harare, Zimbabwe, http://www.theindependent.co.zw/, accessed on 5 
May 2010 
 
Raftopoulos, B. (June 2005). The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Challenges of the Left. Institute 
of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Public lecture delivered at the 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. 
 
Raftopoulos, B. (July 2013). Is Zimbabwe heading towards another disputed election? Royal 
African Society, Africa at LSE, African Arguments, 
http://www.africanarguments.org/2013/07/30, accessed on 5 May 2011. 
 
Reis, G., J. (March 2011). Identifying supply-side constraints to exports. OECD Workshop 
presentation on ‘Aid for Trade Implementation’, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/47441603.pdf, accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 
Robinson, R. (1998). The Poverty of International Trade Theory. Lecture Notes, 1998, 
http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/capital5.htm, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
253 
 Sibanda, G. (November 2012). Trade with South Africa declines. The Herald, Harare, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa Foreign Policy Initiative of the Open Society Foundation 
for South Africa, http://www.safpi.org, accessed on 5 May 2012.  
 
Stop unfair trade campaign (2007). Stop unfair trade deals between Europe and ACP 
countries, http://www.epa2007.org/stories_quotes.html, accessed on 5 May 2012. 
 
Tandon, Y. (March 2010). The EPA negotiations with Europe: A turning point for Africa. 
Speech at Wolpe Trust, Cape Town, 
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88636, accessed on 5 May 2013. 
 
Tekere (2009). Response to a participant’s question during the conference discussion. 
 
Zapiro (2006). An adopted Catoon. 
 
Zim247.com (August 2013). Zanu-PF Government faces Tough Economy Fight, 
http://www.zim247.com, accessed on 5 September 2013. 
 
 
E. Personal interviews 
 
Angelica Katuruza, Zimbabwe government former chief negotiator, now with the  
 Zimbabwean Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, Johannesburg South Africa, 28 May 
2012. 
 
Diamond Chikhasu, Malawian Industry and Trade ministry’s principal trade officer, 
Lilongwe, Malawi, 9 March 2013. 
 
Dolphine Mazambani, CZI chief economist, Harare, Zimbabwe, 16 September 2012. 
 
Elijah Munyuki, trade law consultant, Gaborone Botswana, 24 August 2012. 
 
Gabriel Chipare, deputy clerk of the Zimbabwean parliament, Lilongwe, Malawi, 24 
November 2012. 
 
Godfrey Kanyenze, director of Ledriz, the research wing of the ZCTU, Harare, Zimbabwe, 28 
June 2011. 
 
Medicine Masiiwa, lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, Gaborone Botswana, 25 August 
2012. 
 
Rangarirai Machemedze, Seatini deputy director, Harare, Zimbabwe, 25 June 2011. 
 
Richard Mandebvu, Zimcodd social and economic programme officer, Harare, Zimbabwe, 24 
June 2011. 
 
Tedious Chifamba, Zimbabwean Regional Integration and International Cooperation 
permanent secretary and current government chief negotiator, Harare, Zimbabwe, 14 
September 2012. 
254 
 Tendayi Makanza, senior researcher: ZCTU Alternative to neo-liberalism in southern Africa 
project, Durban, South Africa, 10 August 2011. 
 
Willie Shumba, former Zimbabwean revenue commissioner and regular government delegate 
to EPA-related meetings, now SADC secretariat’s customs senior programme officer, 
Gaborone, Botswana, 14 March 2012. 
 
Junior government officers and other informants were not directly quoted as per their request. 
 
 
F. Observations  
 
During the joint EU-SADC EPA meetings (Johannesburg, South Africa and Brussels, 
Belgium): 
EU commission’s deputy director general of trade, and the chief negotiator, João 
Aguiar Machado. 
 
During internal SADC EPA ministerial meeting (Gaborone, Botswana): 
Rob Davies, South African minister of Trade and Industry, Gaborone, Botswana, 19 
May 2013. 
 
During joint EU-SADC EPA group negotiations (Johannesburg, South Africa and Brussels, 
Belgium): 
Machado always focus on Xavier Carim and Malan Lindeque, chief negotiators of 







A. Questionnaire to government officials and/or negotiators 
 
1. List key civil society organisations (CSOs) and private sector chambers that have been or are 
still involved in the EPA negotiations 





2. Explain why government? 
Participated in the EPA process  
Participated under the ESA configuration   
 
3. With respect to EPA process, what are your views on? 
The old Zanu (PF) government’s
7
 strategy at Seattle, Doha and Cancun WTO negotiations; 
Explain   
 




4. With respect to EPA process, what are your views on?  
COMESA Secretariat 
Explain  
SADC EPA Unit 
Explain  
South Africa’s Trade and Industry’s Minister, Rob Davies 
Explain  
 




6. With respect to the EPA preparedness in the EPA process, describe how the EU – Zimbabwe 
bilateral relations affected? 
Government’s preparations  
Government-civil society relationship  
Government stakeholder mobilisation  
 
7. How do you describe government - civil society consultative relationship on the process with 
respect to? 
Challenges   
Opportunities   
 
                                                 
7 In particular, the role that the former minister of Trade and Industry, Nathan Shamuyarira played in putting 
Zimbabwe at the cutting edge of critical diplomacy during the WTO processes since Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. 
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 8. With respect to the EPA preparedness, what are your views on the effectiveness of? 
National Development Trade Policy Forum
8
  
Stakeholders’ consultations  
 
9. With respect to the EPA preparedness, how would you describe civil society’s inputs on? 
Skills and capacity development  
Negotiating strategies and tactics  
Identifying issues  
Identifying interests  
Developing positions  
Developing offers  
 
10. With respect to stakeholders’ consultations on the EPA process, describe government’s: 
Strengths   
Weaknesses   
 
11. Describe how government shared issues, interest, positions and offers with civil society? 
 
 
12. With respect to negotiating guiding principles on the EPA process, how would you describe 
government’s negotiating approaches, strategies and tactics? 
At ESA configuration level  
At the EU level  
 





14. With respect to supporting the EPA process, which donor(s) funded the following? 
 Funding donor(s) 
Government officials/negotiators participation in EPA meetings  
Impact assessment study  
Stakeholders consultations  
Other, specify  
 




                                                 
8 The National Development Trade Policy Forum is a stakeholder forum comprises of government officials and 
representatives of the private sector and civil society organizations working on trade and development issues in 
the country. 
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 B. Questionnaire to the representative of civil society organisations 
 
1. List key civil society organisations (CSOs) and private sector chambers that have been working 
with you in the EPA negotiations process. 






2. Describe the working relationship in the EPA process with other CSOs, government and 
donors. 




3. With respect to the EPA process, describe government’s: 
Strengths   
Weaknesses   
 
4. With respect to EPA process, what are your views on? 
The old Zanu (PF) government’s
9
 strategy at Seattle, Doha and Cancun WTO negotiations; 
Explain   
The impact of the International Trade Minister, Welshman Ncube’s new political portfolio; 
Explain  
 
5. With respect to EPA process, what are your views on?  
COMESA Secretariat 
Explain  
SADC EPA Unit 
Explain  
South Africa’s Trade and Industry’s Minister, Rob Davies 
Explain  
 
6. How do you describe negotiators’- civil society consultative relationship on the process with 
respect to? 
 Zanu (PF) Government Government of National Unit 
Challenges    
Opportunities    
 
7. With respect to the EPA process, how would you describe negotiators’ appreciation on? 
Implications  
Challenges   
Opportunities   
                                                 
9 In particular, the role that the former minister of Trade and Industry, Nathan Shamuyarira played in putting 
Zimbabwe at the cutting edge of critical diplomacy during the WTO processes since Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. 
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 8. With respect to participation on trade and industrial policy debate, how would you describe 
the EPA process and why? 
Category  Reason(s) 
Zanu (PF) Government Government of National Unity 
Transparency   
Inclusive    
Democratic    




9. With respect to the EPA preparedness, what are your views on? 
National Development Trade Policy Forum
10
  
Stakeholders’ consultations  
 




11. With respect to the EPA preparedness, how would you describe civil society’s inputs on? 
Skills and capacity development  
Negotiating tactics  
Negotiating strategies   
Identifying issues  
Identifying interests  
Developing positions  
Developing offers  
 




                                                 
10 The National Development Trade Policy Forum is a stakeholder forum comprises of government officials 
and representatives of the private sector and civil society organizations working on trade and development 
issues in the country. 
259 
 13. With respect to the EPA process, which donor(s) funded your organisation’s activities in 
terms of? 
Participation in the EPA process  at the: 






African Union meetings;   
Brussels meetings  
Dialogue sessions: 
 Conferences;  
Workshops;  
Seminars; and   
Roundtables  
Advocacy at: 
 National level;  
ESA level;  
EU level  
Consultations with: 
 Government negotiators;  
Other civic bodies;   
Other constituencies;  
Other activities, specify 
 
14. How would you describe civil society’s advocacy strategy in the EPA process at the: 
National level  
Regional level  
AU level  
EU level   
 
15. Given the politically-charged environment, how would you describe CSOs’ advocacy with 
respect to? 
Implications  
Challenges   
Opportunities   
 
16. With respect to the EPA preparedness, describe how the EU – Zimbabwe bilateral relations 




                                                 
11 The Regional Negotiating Forum is a platform in which member states belonging to the same configuration 
meet to prepare their negotiation positions and offers with the European Union. 
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 17. Given the tense EU-Zimbabwe bilateral relations, how would you describe CSOs’ advocacy 
strategies with respect to? 
Implications  
Challenges  
Opportunities    
 
18. Any other information, specify. 
 
 
